Memorandum by Mr Michael Emerson, Centre
for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
This is a short submission, in line with the
limited importance of the European Security Strategy document,
either in its first version of December 2003, or most likely its
successor version to be presented by the EU institutions at the
end of 2008.
These kinds of exercise have to be put into
a realistic perspective. It is certainly desirable that such documents
be drawn up from time to time, as an exercise to provide a coherent
reference for the EU institutions themselves, for the foreign
ministries and diplomatic services of the member states, as also
for the EU's partner states and organisations in international
affairs.
However the document is neither legally binding
nor an operational text. The 2003 document had the merit of brevity,
although this also meant many banal and vague expressions of desirable
intent. This is not a criticism of the method, since there is
a place for overarching and comprehensive definitional documents.
However this is not the format for thrashing out major moves of
foreign and security policy in operational terms, since this cannot
be done across the board simultaneously at a single point of time
on all matters of foreign policy.
Some of your Committee's questions seem to imply,
to the contrary, that the document should be seen as an operational
instrument of action. Was it successful? Could it be better implemented?
Should its effectiveness be reviewed? Has it contributed to shaping
EU policy in various places? Our reply would be "not really",
since the document is more in the nature of a still photo at a
certain point of time. And to expect its successor document to
be more than that would be illusory.
I have a substantive comment on the question
whether the promotion of stability has taken precedence over the
promotion of democracy and good governance in the EU's neighbourhood.
The answer is clearly yes. The EU is acting in practice more as
a status quo power rather than a normative one, with the singular
exception of its enlargement policy, which is itself now on slow
or stop.[1]
In the Southern neighbourhood the EU and member states have backed
off promoting democracy or criticising human rights abuses except
in the mildest of terms; this in deference to maintaining positive
relations with the region's authoritarian leaderships in the interests
of cooperation with security services over terrorism, as well
concern for energy supplies. In the Eastern neighbourhood the
EU has notably refused the membership perspective incentive for
Ukraine's reform processes, partly out of deference to Russia,
partly out of concern for the EU's absorptive capacity (ie its
own internal stability).
The EU's actual instruments of foreign, security
and defence policy have in fact developed quite rapidly over the
period since the 2003 document was published. And there are of
course many vital issues of EU foreign and security policy to
be further developed (relations with Russia, China, the next US
administration, world trade negotiations, climate change, EU enlargement
and neighbourhood policy etc). But the next European Security
Strategy document will no doubt be no more than a well drafted
update of the status quo at a rather high and imprecise level
of generality. There is no basis today for proposing a drastic
change of strategy, only incremental moves as time goes on.
20 June 2008
1 For a detailed analysis see "Who is a
Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The EU and its Global Partners",
edited by N Tocci, CEPS, 2008. http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1661 Back
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