Memorandum by Mr Helmut Kuhne, MEP
1. To what extent has the European Security
Strategy provided a useful tool for addressing the security challenges
faced by the EU? To what extent does it inform policy-making in
the European Institutions and in the EU Member States? Have the
EU Strategy for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
and other similar EU strategies served as tools for the implementation
of the European Security Strategy?
Kuhne 1-31) ... the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction is potentially the greatest threat
to our security and urges, (...) that the EU use the full panoply
of instruments at its disposal in defeating the WMD threat, noting
in this regard that the possible combination of terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction requires prompt and appropriate action;
Von Wogau 2) ... is concerned about the
prospect of renewed arms races at global and regional levels and
the ongoing proliferation of conventional arms;
Kuhne I-30) acknowledges (...) the overall
coherence of the European Strategy against the proliferation of
WMDs, as formally adopted by the European Council in December
2003, with the strategic objectives of the European Security Strategy;
notes with satisfaction the work undertaken by the Personal Representative
of the High Representative in pursuing the implementation of Chapter
III of this Strategy, particularly as expressed in the priority
list endorsed by the European Council in December 2004;
Kuhne I-32) ... notes further the congruence
of efforts to integrate aspects of non-proliferation within the
EU Neighbourhood Policy with the overall strategic objective of
building security within the Union's neighbourhood;
Kuhne I-36) takes note of the current
practical difficulties in implementing the strategy against the
proliferation of WMDs, due in particular to the various sources
and procedures through which budgetary means are to be mobilised;
Kuhne I-33) welcomes the intended inclusion
of WMD non-proliferation clauses in all future partnership and
cooperation agreements between the EU and third countries, as
exemplified by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with
Tajikistan of 11 October 2004 as well as the draft Association
Agreement with Syria now awaiting approval;
Kuhne I-34) welcomes the fact that the
EU's negotiations with Iran as a regional power, aimed at preventing
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, were carried out in connection
with legitimate economic and regional security interests; notes
that this policy is an expression of foreign and security policy
based on the principles of international law and multilateralism
in the best interests of the international community; welcomes
the fact that the EU and US positions on Iran have come significantly
closer;
Kuhne II-27) stresses the leading diplomatic
role played by the EU with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme,
which not only involves the High Representative speaking on behalf
of the EU and the EU3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom),
but also the United States, Russia and China bringing together
different interests and approaches in pursuit of a common goal;
reaffirms that the proliferation risks attaching to the Iranian
nuclear programme remain a source of serious concern to the EU
and the international community; highlights in this regard its
resolution of 31 January 2008 on Iran and supports the UN Security
Council's Resolution 1803 (2008) of 3 March 2008 as well as the
offer made to Iran by the EU3 and by the United States, Russia
and China concerning the peaceful use of nuclear energy, political
and economic cooperation, energy partnership, agriculture, environment
and infrastructure, civil aviation, and development cooperation
in the fields of economic, social and humanitarian aid;
Kuhne I-45) expresses its wish for a
stronger cooperation with the United States in the fields of non
proliferation and the fight against terrorism; urges the EU and
the US none the less to continue with their positive dialogue
in these areas and to fully pursue an action plan for further
cooperation as reflected in the EU-US Declarations on combating
terrorism and on the non-proliferation of WMDs adopted at the
EU-US Summit on 26 June 2004; considers that these points should
be addressed in the context of all EU-US meetings relevant to
security policy;
Kuhne I-38) calls on the countries defined
in the Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear weapon states, in particular
the USA, China and Russia, (...) to review their own nuclear policies
in the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; regrets, therefore,
the efforts made by the US administration over the last four years
to promote research into, and the development of, new nuclear
weapons and its refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
expresses concern at Russia's inadequate efforts to protect its
nuclear stocks; is alarmed at China's massive increase in military
spending (12,6%), its comprehensive modernisation of its nuclear
armed forces and the increase in its imports of modern weapons
technologies;
Kuhne II-26) is of the opinion that the
40th anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
on 1 July 2008 must be seen as an opportunity for the EU to promote
the need for nuclear disarmament in its Strategy Against the Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, with a view to the Preparatory
Committees for the forthcoming NPT review conference; reiterates
its view that this includes the need for the "recognised"
nuclear weapons powers to put forward disarmament initiatives,
to make Europe a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and to conclude a global
convention banning nuclear weapons.
2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of
the Strategy? Does it provide a coherent and well-balanced assessment
of the threats and risks facing the EU? Is there a need for the
Strategy to pay greater attention to evaluating and analysing
the EU's sources of vulnerability and dependence, such as on energy
supplies?
Kuhne I-1) emphasises that only a comprehensive
understanding of the concept of "security" can properly
take into account both the influence of issues of political democratic
concern (eg violation of human rights, wilful discrimination against
particular groups of citizens, the existence of repressive regimes)
and the wide range of social, economic and environmental factors
(eg poverty, famine, disease, illiteracy, scarcity of natural
resources, environmental degradation, inequitable trade relations,
etc) in contributing to existing regional conflicts, the failure
of states and the emergence of criminal and terrorist networks,
though the actions of the latter may not be seen as being justified
in any way, shape or form by the above-mentioned factors;
Kuhne I-2) welcomes, therefore, the comprehensive
understanding of the concept of "security" as expressed
in the European Security Strategy (ESS); shares the view expressed
within the ESS that key threats to our global security presently
include terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs), unresolved regional conflicts, failed and failing states
and organised crime; emphasises that these threats can neither
be primarily addressed nor exclusively resolved by military means;
Von Wogau 2) emphasises that the increasing
worldwide competition for sources of water and energy, as well
as natural disasters and the security of the Union's external
borders, must be included as a strategic objective in the further
development of the ESS;
Kuhne II-4) invites the High Representative
to assess in a White Paper the progress made, and any shortcomings,
in the implementation of the ESS since 2003, including lessons
learned from ESDP operations; the link between external and internal
aspects of security (fight against terrorism); the protection
of borders and critical infrastructure including protection against
cyber-attacks; the security of energy supply as a challenge for
civilian, economic, technical and diplomatic efforts; unresolved
regional disputes in the EU's neighbourhood, ie Transnistria,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh; humanitarian and
security challenges on the African continent; and the consequences
of climate change and natural disasters for civil protection and
human security, as well as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
invites him further to evaluate whether those threats, risks and
challenges are directly relevant to a broad understanding of European
security or whether they merely possess a security dimension;
Kuhne II-5) invites the High Representative
to include in that White Paper proposals for improving and complementing
the ESS, such as the definition of common European security interests
and criteria for the launching of ESDP missions; invites him further
to define new targets for civilian and military capabilities (including
structures for command and control, and transportation for all
European actors in crisis management for both ESDP and disaster
relief purposes) and to reflect on the implications of the Lisbon
Treaty with regard to ESDP and proposals for a new EU-NATO partnership;
Kuhne I-27) takes note of the following
three categories of material deficiencies, which could seriously
affect the Union's ability to conduct both civilian crisis management
operations and humanitarian intervention operations of high-intensity
dimensions using mainly military means, such as halting humanitarian
catastrophes of similar dimensions to that in Rwanda:
(a) lack of deployable forces required for maintaining
the rotation needed (one third on deployment, one third on training,
one third resting) in such long-term/high-intensity operations;
(b) lack of permanent large-scale airlift capabilities
for transporting forces abroad;
(c) lack of sufficient deployable command, control
and communications capabilities as well as intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance resources within the collective framework of
ESDP.
3. Should the Strategy place a greater emphasis
on drivers of insecurity, such as challenges to the rules-based
international system, climate change, competition for energy,
poverty, inequality and poor governance? Does the Strategy sufficiently
take into account the interrelationship between security and development?
Concerning the first part: see the White Paper
tasks above.
Concerning the second part:
Kuhne I-3) draws, therefore, the same
conclusion as that expressed within the ESS that a combination
of the various assistance programmes and instruments, including
those of development policy, at both EU and Member State level,
in conjunction with diplomatic, civilian and military capabilities
and expertise can best serve to contribute to a more secure world;
Kuhne II-25) welcomes the first ever
EU joint meeting of Defence and Development Ministers on 19 November
2007, which was an important step in reviewing the problems faced
by the developing world, thus enhancing coherence and consistency
in the EU's short-term actions on security and long-term actions
on development vis-a"-vis the countries concerned; also welcomes
the Council Conclusions on Security and Development dated 19 November
2007, particularly the emphasis placed therein on conflict analysis
and conflict sensitivity, and strongly encourages the Council
and the Commission to implement those conclusions.
4. How successful has the Strategy been in
promoting security in the EU's neighbourhood?
Kuhne I-11) notes the valuable experience
gained in civilian and police missions over the course of the
last two years, including: the assumption of control by the International
Police Task Force (now EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 2003;
PROXIMA in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and
EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia;
Kuhne II-5) White Paper task: "unresolved
regional disputes in the EU's neighbourhood, ie Transnistria,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh";
Kuhne I-12) Recognises the significant
progress made in expanding the military capabilities of the Union;
at the same time notes the importance of the Berlin Plus Framework
agreed with NATO, which made the first EU military mission CONCORDIA
in FYROM and the ALTHEA mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina possible;
acknowledges the advantageous flexibility of the Union's ESDP
framework (...)
Kuhne I-14) Emphasises that the defining
characteristic and the additional value of the ESDP lie in the
combination of civilian and military components and notes, in
observance of the aforementioned accomplishments, that the EU
will in future be increasingly faced with the challenge of striking
a good and proper balance between military and civilian components
in order to fulfil the objectives and the spirit of the ESS; takes
the view that the ALTHEA mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina will provide
valuable experience in this regard, in so far as the Union will
be able to coordinate its military efforts with the civilian operations
and programmes currently under way.
5. Does the Strategy make appropriate recommendations
on the action the EU should take to address the security challenges
it faces? Is there a good balance between short-term and long-term
priorities for action?
See answers to questions 2 and 3.
6. In what ways could the Strategy be better
implemented? Has the promotion of stability taken precedence over
the promotion of democracy and good governance in the EU's neighbourhood?
Kuhne I-4) Consequently stresses the
urgent need for the practical transposition of this concept of
the security environment within the existing structures of the
Union, so as to enable the Union to detect crises sufficiently
far in advance to act in a pro-active manner; in that connection,
recommends greater efforts to establish an early-warning system
for threats using innovative technologies from the civilian IT
sector to carry out news analysis and assessment; expresses its
view in this regard that the establishment of "tension detection
centres" in regions particularly susceptible to crises, centres
which may be set up under the auspices both of the future European
External Action Service and of services outside the European Union,
such as those of the African Union, would be one of many sensible
ways of identifying, reporting on and helping to eradicate the
roots of conflicts and thus preventing any violent escalations;
stresses further in this regard the importance which it attaches
to the integration of conflict prevention and the fight against
terrorism as components within all EU policy areas;
Kuhne I-13) Emphasises the positive contributions
already made by the EU Situation Centre (SITCEN) in combining
all available civil, military and diplomatic intelligence to produce
cogent background analyses of any given situation; urges the Member
States to further intensify their information-sharing with the
SITCEN, so as not to unduly hinder the fulfilment of ambitions
expressed in the ESS;
Kuhne II-general considerations) A. whereas
in 2007 and early 2008 the Council has taken important operational
decisions in the field of ESDP and on the implementation of the
ESS, including:
(a) the launching of an EU police mission in
Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan);
(b) the decision to launch an EU military operation
in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA);
(c) the reconfiguration and reduction of EUFOR
Althea troops in Bosnia;
(d) the preparation for a civilian EU mission
in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo);
(e) the preparation for an EU security sector
reform mission in Guinea-Bissau (EUSEC Guinea-Bissau).
B. whereas in 2007 and early 2008 further
developments in the field of ESDP capabilities and the implementation
of the ESS have been achieved, including:
(a) the adoption of a new Civilian Headline Goal
2010;
(b) the establishment of a Civilian Planning
and Conduct Capability (CPCC) within the Council secretariat;
(c) the reaching of operational capability by
the EU Operations Centre;
(d) the reaching of full operational capability
to undertake rapidly and simultaneously two ESDP military operations
using the Battle Groups.
C. (...) 2007 and early 2008 have also witnessed
continued shortfalls in the fields of ESDP and the implementation
of the ESS, including:
(a) the lack of an EU Civil Peace Corps, requested
by the European Parliament since 2000, and of civil protection
and humanitarian relief capabilities, referred to in a number
of Council and Commission documents since the 2004 tsunami catastrophe;
(b) delivery delays and rising costs concerning
the much needed long-range airlift capacity in the form of the
Airbus A400M military transport aircraft;
(c) an imbalance in the contributions from Member
States as regards the staffing of ESDP missions, thus limiting
EU crisis management capabilities;
(d) problems in recruiting sufficient police
officers for the mission in Afghanistan due to security concerns
and a lack of individual career prospects on their return;
(e) delays in the launching of EUFOR Tchad/RCA
due to unsuccessful force generation conferences, in particular
as regards the lack of helicopters;
(f) the failure as yet to sign the technical
agreements drafted between the EU and NATO with a view to ensuring
coordination in Kosovo between the International Security Force
(KFOR) and the possible future ESDP mission, and in Afghanistan
between EUPOL and the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF), due to opposition by Turkey.
Kuhne II-15) Urges the Member States
to regularly review the availability of personnel for civilian
ESDP missions and to bring their competent national authorities
together in order to set up national action plans with regard
to possible contributions, as is the case in Finland, including
the creation of procedures to secure the career prospects of participants
in such missions and appropriate consideration of UN Security
Council Resolution 1325 (2000) concerning the representation of
women in mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution
of conflict; further urges that specific training be devised with
regard to the protection of children, in line with the EU Guidelines
on Children and Armed Conflict;
Kuhne II-30) Welcomes the proposal from
the United Kingdom that information about the availability of
helicopters for EU missions be shared, with a view to better coordinating
fleets;
Kuhne II-31) Welcomes the Franco-German
heavy transport helicopter project, but is also aware of the complex
reasons for the shortage of available and operational helicopters,
mostly related to the high costs of flight hours and maintenance;
invites the Council to explore possibilities designed to bridge
the gap for the near future, either by a joint action or by supporting
Member States in the refurbishing and upgrading of Russian-built
helicopters as well as establishing a helicopter training centre;
reiterates that, generally, one of the principal obstacles to
modernising and transforming European forces so as to enable them
to cope effectively with the security challenges of the 21st century
is not the level of defence expenditure but rather the lack of
cooperation, the absence of a clear division of labour and specialisation,
and the duplication and fragmentation in arms production and procurement,
which increase the risk of non-interoperability between armies;
however, urges the Member States to envisage an increase in defence
expenditure for the concrete purpose of being able to make efficient
use of acquired helicopters;
Kuhne II-32) Calls on the Council and
the Commission to keep Parliament informed of current initiatives
to address capability gaps in key areas such as helicopters and
medical support units, and to put forward joint financial proposals
for guaranteed access to such capabilities for both humanitarian
and ESDP purposes;
Kuhne II-41) Regrets that the establishment
of the EDA came too late to prevent the emergence of three different
national programmes on the unmanned air vehicle instead of a single
European one, thus enabling some companies to engage in more than
one project and thereby to pocket taxpayers' money several times
over, leaving the EDA with no option but to work on the insertion
of unmanned air vehicles into the regulated airspace; expresses
its preference for a single European satellite project, whether
in the field of intelligence or communication.
7. To what extent have the EU's Strategic
Partnerships and political dialogue with third countries and organisations,
including the UN and NATO, contributed to achieving the aims of
the Strategy? Has the Strategy contributed to shaping EU policy
and thinking in relation to the United States and other important
partners such as Russia, China, India and Africa?
Kuhne II-55) regards the European Union
and NATO as mutually reinforcing, and urges close cooperation
between them;
Kuhne I—46) notes the continued
recognition by many Member States of NATO as the cornerstone of
their security in the event of an armed aggression; takes the
view that cooperation and complementarity should be the key elements
upon which EU/NATO relations are based; proposes in this vein
discussions—taking into account the different character
of each organisation—concerning improved coordination of
national contributions to the NATO Response Force and those of
the EU Headline Goals in order to avoid any duplication; urges
Member States to continue to reform their armed forces with a
view to making those forces more deployable, transportable and
sustainable; notes in this regard that for the foreseeable future
most Member States will continue to commit the same units to both
NATO and the EU owing to the lack of units possessing the right
skills and capabilities; urges Member States to continue to enlarge
their pool of readily available forces so that in the future the
operational needs of both the EU and NATO can be readily satisfied;
Von Wogau 11) emphasises that, in the
event of an attack by the armed forces of a third country on the
territory of the EU, NATO remains the guarantor of collective
defence, but that the EU is expected to act in solidarity and
to provide the Member State attacked with all necessary assistance
in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter; welcomes NATO's
increasing capability of playing a role in out-of-theatre operations;
also regards NATO as the appropriate forum for transatlantic dialogue
on security issues;
Kuhne II-8) highlights that NATO is the
transatlantic forum in which security concerns are to be addressed
by most of the EU Member States, the United States and Canada;
nevertheless encourages the Council and the High Representative
to take initiatives for a direct security dialogue with the incoming
US administration and the Canadian government in fields where
the EU has competences; proposes that such a dialogue should concentrate
on concrete issues such as increasing the credibility of Western
values in the fight against terrorism and stabilisation and reconstruction;
Von Wogau 12) recognises that the capabilities
of the Member States' armed forces and their availability to the
EU are influenced by the fact that most Member States are members
of both the EU and NATO and maintain one set of armed forces at
the disposal of both organisations; demands, therefore, that the
EU should continue to work intensively with NATO, especially in
the area of capabilities development;
Von Wogau 13) stresses the "strategic
autonomy" inherent in the ESS, namely the ability to carry
out operations within its scope independently of other actors,
which requires interoperability and a more sustainable and reliable
supply chain based on mutual support and assistance, avoiding
duplication and suboptimal use of scarce resources at European
level or between Member States; warns against unnecessary duplication
of effort between NATO and the EU, and between the Member States
of the EU;
Kuhne I-49) encourages the new European
Defence Agency to examine the possibilities for cooperation with
NATO in the area of armaments and to explicitly provide for the
possibility of such co-operation within the framework of the Administrative
Agreement to be signed in due course between the two as provided
for in Article 25 of Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP on the
establishment of the European Defence Agency;
Kuhne I-50) takes note of the complementary
nature of certain policies and programmes of NATO (Partnership
for Peace and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and Mediterranean
Dialogue) and the EU (Neighbourhood Policy and the Barcelona Process);
encourages both parties to examine how these programmes and policies
can more effectively serve to mutually reinforce each other;
Kuhne II-54) is of the view that the
US plan to establish an anti-missile system in Europe at this
time may hamper international disarmament efforts; expresses its
concerns about Russia's suspension of implementation of its obligations
under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which
has caused worries about the strategic balance in Europe; stresses
that both issues affect the security of all European countries
and should not therefore be the subject of purely bilateral discussions
between the US and individual European countries; calls on the
Council and the Member States to establish, together with NATO,
a framework designed to include as many European countries as
possible in the debate; invites the Council and NATO to evaluate
estimated future nuclear threats from certain countries and the
danger of a new arms race in Europe and to propose an adequate
multilateral response to them;
Kuhne I-48) calls on Turkey, in the context
of NATO, to create the conditions to promote better cooperation—which
is urgently needed—between the EU Military Committee and
the relevant NATO bodies;
Kuhne II-53) regrets Turkey's objections
to the implementation of the EU-NATO strategic cooperation based
on and going beyond the Berlin Plus Agreement; is concerned about
their negative consequences for the protection of the EU personnel
deployed, notably EUPOL Afghanistan and EULEX Kosovo, and calls
for the lifting of those objections by Turkey at the earliest
possible date.
8. Is there a need to review the Strategy
and the effectiveness of its implementation periodically?
Von Wogau 6) considers that the geopolitical
challenges have evolved considerably since the adoption of the
ESS in 2003, making its revision necessary in 2008 at the latest;
is of the opinion that the ESS should be revised every five years
and that it should be debated in the European Parliament and the
parliaments of the Member States.
9 July 2008
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