Memorandum by Mr Luis Simón Navarro,
University of London and Mr James Rogers, University of Cambridge
1. To what extent has the European Security
Strategy provided a useful tool for addressing the security challenges
faced by the EU? To what extent does it inform policy-making in
the European Institutions and in the EU Member States?
It is often overlooked that the European Security
Strategy (ESS) of December 2003 cannot be seen in isolation, but
has rather built on previous European treaties and declarations.
Chief among those is the Laeken Declaration of 2001. This
represented a distinct paradigm shift, in the sense that the Member
States declared for the first time that they wanted the European
Union (the Union) to become itself a power in the wider world.
As the declaration put it:
What is Europe's role in this changed world?
Does Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a leading role
to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to play
a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many
countries and peoples? Europe as the continent of humane values,
the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution and
the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, solidarity
and above all diversity, meaning respect for others' languages,
cultures and traditions. The European Union's one boundary is
democracy and human rights. The Union is open only to countries
which uphold basic values such as free elections, respect for
minorities and respect for the rule of law.
Now that the Cold War is over and we are living
in a globalised, yet also highly fragmented world, Europe needs
to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation.
The role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle
against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which
also does not turn a blind eye to the world's heartrending injustices.
In short, a power wanting to change the course of world affairs
in such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries but also
the poorest. A power seeking to set globalisation within a moral
framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable
development.1
And although the Laeken Declaration was
also the product of a lineage of previous treaties, statements
and documents, as well as events (not least 11 September), the
declaration nonetheless dug out the foundations for the direction
of the contemporary Union. Through branding the Union a "power",
European integration finally transcended its traditional role
and purpose of cementing peace between the component Member States,
and moved into the traditional realm of "High Politics".
That is to say, since 2001 it has become increasingly involved
with providing a decisively European approach to the outside
world, in order to protect Europeans from external challenges
and threats.
It is in this setting that we should understand
not only the creation of, but also the need for, a European
Security Strategy, in 2003. Since its publication, the ESS
has come to be a point of reference across most European institutions,
national ministries, and importantly, academia, think tanks and
security and defence institutions. The latter three, dimensions
of civil society, are often overlooked in the way in which they
shape the parameters of deliberation and debate, particularly
when political leaders and civil servants responsible for the
production of national or European security strategy attend their
numerous events, and read their many publications. There is now
a whole coalition of these institutions, and it grows annually.
Further, some of the most successful and dynamic think tanks dealing
in part or whole with European security strategy, are based in
the United Kingdom. Here, the Centre of European Reform and the
newly established European Council on Foreign Relations, both
based in London, are the best known throughout the European Union.
It is in this sense that the road towards European strategic
thinking works like a water fountain. It involves a bottom
up component: this occurs when struggles between various groups
with particular strategic assumptions about the direction of European
security strategy compete to crystallise their visions into a
European strategic and security culture (much like the water being
thrust up the fountain). And it includes a top down component:
this occurs when one vision comes to dominate, and is diffused
down through the layers of European civil society, the Union's
institutions, and the governments of the Member States (in which
case the water, having been thrust up into the air, comes back
down again). The ESS should be understood as an outcome of this
dynamic interplay, a snapshot of how far it had come by 2003.
Determining the concrete impact of the "water
fountain" component, particularly on the existing strategies
of the Member States, is a more difficult task. It is seemingly
impossible to confirm how national security strategies are becoming
similar. The "water fountain" model is not alone, for
the Member States' security strategies could also be a result
of spontaneous convergence. Yet we should be careful here:
while the degree of spontaneous convergence is in itself
quite an illustrative thermometer of the state of the Union's
success in its quest for strategic actorness, we should
be reluctant to draw any conclusions. Just because a number of
Union Member States start to see the world in a similar light,
it does not necessarily transfer into a European approach.
Moreover, spontaneous convergence does not automatically
mean that the Member States would begin to favour the empowerment
of the Union as a vehicle for the realisation of common strategic
action. After all, West Europeans shared similar strategic worldviews
throughout the Cold War, but that did not mean that their preferences
would be transferred from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,
and towards the European Community. Having said that, spontaneous
convergence between the Member States' strategic worldviews
can hardly damage the evolution of either a European security
culture or European strategic culture. On the contrary, the growing
similarities should only confirm the reasons as to why deeper
European co-operation in the realm of foreign, security and defence
policy makes sense.
A comparative snapshot of the ESS and the latest
strategic reviews of the three biggest Member States can be quite
revealing. The following list provides the trajectory:
| — | 1998
| United Kingdom | Strategic Defence Review (MoD)
|
— | 2003 | United Kingdom
| Delivering Security in a Changing World (MoD)
|
— | 2003 | United Kingdom
| UK International Priorities (FCO)2 |
— | 2006 | Germany
| Defence White Paper (MoD) |
— | 2006 | United Kingdom
| UK International Priorities (FCO)3 |
— | 2008 | United Kingdom
| National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office)
|
— | 2008 | France
| Defence White Paper (MoD) |
| |
| |
Apart from the fact that the three Member States review and
update their strategies at varying frequencies, both the ESS and
the latest strategic reviews of the Member States make for a very
similar reading of the strategic environment: the international
system is characterised as evolving towards a multipolar system,
while the massive influence that globalisation and interdependence
exert upon security are highlighted. There is, consequently, also
considerable consensus on the characterisation of security as
a multidimensional concept and, therefore, on the identification
of the main challenges emanating from the strategic environment:
terrorism, failing states, the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD), organised crime, energy scarcity, migration flows, the
effects of climate change, the spread of global pandemics and
cyber security. From this similar analysis of the strategic environment
comes a similar group of policy prescriptions—which may
be merely coincidental—in both the European and national
strategies. These policy preferences are structured around a comprehensive
and cooperative approach to security, which integrates all forms
of power. In this sense, all three countries highlight at the
strategic level the importance of prevention and globalism, two
concepts deeply interrelated. This reflects the ongoing movement
away from "defensive defence", understood as a reactive
approach primarily concerned literally with the defence of borders,
towards "offensive defence", defined in the ESS as:
"With the new threats, the first line of defence will often
be abroad".4 These principles are eloquently condensed in
one of the flagship recipes for international security in the
ESS: "effective multilateralism".
In this sense the ESS plays a pivotal role as the reference
point to all aspects and actors that make up the European foreign,
security and defence policy system. However, the European Security
Strategy can only be effective if the right conditions for
it to take root exist. This is why the implementation and further
expansion of the ESS are crucial to its effectiveness, and why
it must provide the framework for the development of greater coherence.
2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Strategy?
Does it provide a coherent and well-balanced assessment of the
threats and risks facing the EU? Is there a need for the Strategy
to pay greater attention to evaluating and analysing the EU's
sources of vulnerability and dependence, such as on energy supplies?
The effectiveness of European security strategy and foreign,
security and defence policy will be substantially determined by
the Union's ability to impose coherence. The issue of coherence
is an inherently contending one not only in foreign policy, but
also the business of politics at large. Nation-states themselves
often show a substantial degree of incoherence in their foreign,
security and defence policy: competing interests between executive
and legislative branches of government (ie these are particularly
salient in American foreign policy), within the executive branch
of government (it is no secret to anybody that the Ministry of
Defence, Foreign Office, and the departments of the Treasury,
Trade or International Development often pursue contradictory
agendas) or even within the same department (ie divergent approaches
among the different branches of the armed forces). Incoherence
is a fact of life in pluralist societies and pluralistic systems
of government: coherence is therefore more of an ideal type than
an actual state of affairs. However, the very idiosyncrasy of
European foreign, security and defence policy makes (the lack
of) coherence a particularly salient problem in the Union's road
towards strategic actorness: a substantial improvement of coherence
in foreign, security and defence policy is a must if any enterprise
aimed at fostering (common) European strategic thinking is to
be meaningful.
The Union's two-tiered foreign, security and defence policy
system makes the lack of coherence between Member States and the
Union's central institutions—but also among Member States
themselves—the most substantial and visible obstacle to
an effective and credible security strategy. Further, the normal
intra-bureaucratic squabbles that are characteristic of any modern
polity pose a particularly pronounced problem in the Union's case:
the lack of direct accountability and public scrutiny results
in a looser sense of a public mandate that makes inter and intra
bureaucratic disputes yet more salient in the Union's case (ie
among the Council, the Commission and the Parliament, intra Commission,
etc). To be sure, the Union's coherence problem can hardly be
overestimated.
Beyond the institutional dimension, more coherence is needed
among the Union's general instruments (military, diplomacy, trade,
development aid, immigration policy, etc.) and with the more specific
initiatives (European Neighbourhood Policy, Barcelona Process,
Mediterranean Union, bilateral Union-third state dealings, etc);
there should also be more coherence in the Union's relationship
with other international actors, notably NATO—improving
dialogue at the strategic level, better coordination of capability
generation processes. In the realm of crisis management (the main
framework of action of ESDP), recent developments in Afghanistan
or Iraq have shown that today's crises put a premium on coherence
between prevention, intervention and post-conflict management.
Further down at the operational level, coherence implies a smooth
coordination between the Union's operational tools in the realm
of crisis management: coherence between the strategic and tactical
dimensions of an operation but also between the military and non-military
aspects of crisis management, both at the level of planning and
command (the desired Civ/Mil symbiosis) and on the ground (ie
coherence between the military, the police and other civilian
elements deployed by the EU itself or other actors).
Beyond specific initiatives adopted over the past few years
aimed at reinforcing the Union's coherence (ie the creation of
the European Defence Agency, the European Security and Defence
College, or that of an Ops Centre in the Civ/Mil Cell of the European
Union Military Staff), the process of Treaty reform that has dominated
the past five years provides the best source for assessing the
implementation and further development of the ESS. In this sense,
the Treaty of Lisbon represents a step in the right direction
for it includes elements that are likely to bring a considerable
boost not only to intra Union coherence (most notably the improvement
of elements of coordination between the Commission and the Council
in the realm of European foreign policy), but also among the Member
States—through initiatives such as making national officials
an integral part of the future European diplomatic service and,
like this, making also the European dimension of diplomacy integral
to national foreign policy. Further, the Treaty's emphasis on
flexibility provides the means for strengthening the coherence
between the Union proper and other European cooperative initiatives
in the realm of security (ie the Eurocorps, Eurofor, Euromarfor,
Letter of Intent, Occar, etc). The Treaty of Lisbon also incorporates
measures that will most likely bring further coherence between
the internal and external aspects of security, such as the transfer
of many aspects of policing, immigration and judicial cooperation
to the first pillar.
Overall, the actions of the Council of the European Union
in the past few years are a good complement of the ESS in that
many of the initiatives adopted will make it easier to achieve
the coherence that the ESS both needs and is meant to generate.
More, however, needs to be done. In this sense, many of the proposals
regarding ESDP proposed by the French government for its forthcoming
presidency of the Council of the European Union are steps in the
right direction, namely the need to increase Europe's autonomous
capabilities for effective crisis management (including the creation
of a Permanent Headquarters in Brussels for the planning and command
of European operations); the creation of a European strategic
reserve force of some 60,000 personnel with the required naval
and aerial components; a reinforcement of the mechanisms for common
funding of ESDP operations; the establishment of common schemes
for training European military and civilian personnel; the rationalisation
of Europe's defence industry; an expansion of the Union's functions
in the realm of security beyond crisis management proper (ie common
defence, the need to better acknowledge the interdependence between
the internal and external dimensions of European security); or
the call for a comprehensive European Strategic Defence Review.
The recent French Defence White Book mentioned energy security,
not only as a challenge to France, but also the rest of the European
Union. The price of energy has risen dramatically over the past
five years (since the ESS was issued), with particularly important
consequences for an increasingly dependent Europe. This development
has largely contributed to the reassertion of Russia's power:
the combination of Russia's rise and energy dependence results
in a myriad of economic and geopolitical challenges for the continent
and, arguably, represent the most far-reaching change since the
approval of the ESS in 2003. This challenge demands a bold and
coherent response on the European Union's part. First, coherence
among Member States in their behaviour vis-a"-vis
Russia is mandatory; second, progress on a common European energy
policy is needed; third, a European effort to stimulate the diversification
in the sources of energy, including far greater investment into
renewable sources, is also required. Diversification must be pursued
through coordination of domestic and international measures: keep
up taxes on oil and gas as an incentive to investment on alternative
energies, but also further investigate proposals for internationally-supervised
production of nuclear energy for civilian purposes (as was proposed
by the High Representative). So far, energy exporters like Algeria,
Libya, and particularly Russia, have done a better job in coordinating
their strategies and efforts than Europeans have. The immediate
aim for the Union must be to develop a concerted and coherent
approach to energy security. This will provide the Union with
far greater leverage over Russia, while simultaneously reducing
the forces threatening to permanently derail Russia's experiment
with constitutional government.
If anything, the emphasis on the impact of globalisation
and interdependence on the strategic environment (ie the blurring
of the line between the internal and external dimensions of security
or that between traditional and non-traditional threats) are emphasised
yet more in national strategies than they are in the ESS, not
least because the former are newer documents and the manifestation
of the effects of globalisation and interdependence have grown
exponentially over the past few years. One can only expect that
the anticipated revision of the ESS in December takes further
stock of these and other variations the strategic environment
has experienced over the past five years (since the ESS was adopted).
For one thing, since the ESS was implemented, the rise of new
giant powers like China or India, and of regional powers, such
as Russia, has accelerated. There has been a tendency to ignore
geopolitical developments in East and South East Asia, which cannot
continue given that the enormous flow of trade between countries
on the Pacific Rim and the European Union passes through the region.
And the growing assertion of Russia on the periphery of our continent
adds a new dimension to geopolitics, which was not so pronounced
in 2003. Indeed, the resurgence of Russia has become the most
urgent challenge for the Union, particularly given the fact that
the Union's authority is reduced with each Russian success. This
is further compounded by new European geopolitical imperatives,
not least after the refocusing of European interests in Central
Asia, the Middle East and the Caucasus after the recent two rounds
of European enlargement.
The progressive consolidation of centrifugal forces both
globally and regionally will surely complicate effective multilateral
solutions to global and regional crises. The 2003 intervention
in Iraq has perhaps been the most visible symbol of this failure,
but it is certainly not the only case: the inability of the international
community to agree upon a common course of action towards Iran's
nuclear program; the failure to prevent violence and chaos in
Darfur; the ongoing disputes over the status of Kosovo or other
potential crises in Europe (ie Georgia); and the ongoing Zimbabe
imbroglio are only a few examples of the pace at which the international
system is evolving. The current evolution of the strategic environment
is certainly widening the gap between the concepts of effectiveness
and multilateralism. It is in this respect that the European Union's
ability to achieve the right balance between the two, and our
ability to rise to the challenge should the international strategic
environment turn ugly, depends on the cohesion and coherence of
the Union, and ultimately on political willingness to uphold its
duties and obligations to behave as a global power.
8. Is there a need to review the Strategy and the effectiveness
of its implementation periodically?
The European Security Strategy must, by implication,
be a dynamic document, ready to change with the evolving global
strategic environment, as well as reflecting the geopolitical
desires and strategic requirements of the European Union. Given
the diverging preferences for strategic renewal mentioned previously
between the United Kingdom, France and Germany, it might be appropriate
for there to be a "European standard", set by the Union
itself, and adhered to also by the Member States. That is to say,
the renewal or alteration of the Union's security strategy should
be met with a commitment on the part of the Member States to acknowledge
the changes and implement them into their own foreign, security
and defence policy white papers. So when, as anticipated, in December
2008, a renewed European Security Strategy emerges, the
British government, for example, should make public the Strategy
and its proposals to the British people. In this regard, it was
a profound failure on the British government's part to
not mention the European Security Strategy anywhere in
the National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom in
March 2008. This merely reflects the pre-existing inconsistencies
in strategic thought between the Member States and the Union as
a whole. Not only would greater publicity accelerate the movement
towards coherence, but it would also help with the forging of
a European approach when dealing with the wider world, while simultaneously
keeping the public informed of European developments.
The timing for the renewal of the existing European Security
Strategy could be dependent on a number of factors. In the
United States, the preference seems to be to renew the National
Security Strategy of the United States with each presidential
cycle.5 Should the Treaty of Lisbon be implemented, it would be
desirable for something similar, if only to keep the debate on
European foreign, security and defence policy up to date. That
is to say, the appointment of a new President of the European
Council should correspond with a review of the European Security
Strategy, in full partnership with the Union's High Representative
and his or her department. The combination of the two should provide
for new political input from the incoming president, as well as
longer-term "institutional memory" bestowed by the High
Representative. However, should the Treaty of Lisbon not be implemented,
in light of the Irish referendum, the need still exists for the
Strategy's ongoing review and development. Depending on the path
taken by the Union—which is still uncertain—the precise
nature of the changes will be dependent on that path.
Finally, it may be desirable to move away from the concept
of "security strategy" per se, and move towards
the notion of a European "grand strategy". While this
may be a rhetorical move, and fairly abstract, it also emphasises
the point that the European Security Strategy is not only
a security strategy, but also a broader strategy for staking out
and placing the Union and its interests in the wider world. Its
spatial and functional aspects should integrate foreign, security,
defence and developmental policies, including space, energy and
environment policy—three areas likely to grow in importance
in the 21st century—into a comprehensive schema, providing
a point of reference for all European institutions, the Member
States and the institutions of civil society, like university
departments, think tanks and other related institutions. Indeed,
it is only by integrating civil society with government more coherently
and comprehensively that the European Security Strategy will
grow and provide fruit; in this regard, greater consultation should
occur during future reviews. The name of the European Security
Strategy—"A Secure Europe in a Better World"—-might
also be altered in the upcoming review in December 2008. Given
that a secure Europe is only feasible if the Union is stronger,
a better title might be: "A Stronger Europe in a Better World".
1 July 2008
NOTES
1 European Council, The Laeken Declaration on the Future
of the European Union, Brussels, 15 December 2001.
2 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office's paper has been included
because it also included areas concerned with security and geopolitical
issues.
3 Ibid.
4 European Council, European Security Strategy, Brussels,
12 December 2003, p 7.
5 This is especially the case with the presidential administration
of George W Bush.
Memorandum by Mr Timothy Othieno, Overseas Development
Institute
1. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Strategy?
Does it provide a coherent and well-balanced assessment of the
threats and risks facing the EU?
— The strategy does not mention ways in which it
can deal with threats outside its borders—does it have,
for example, arrest warrant agreements with fragile and volatile
countries?
— The strategy needs to emphasis that not only is
the EU's first line of defense abroad but there is need for the
EU to work with governments in those countries where threats emanate
and in cases where there is no government, work with actors who
share the EU's values and goals as well as moderates who may not
share the EUs goals and values.
— The strategy mentions that enlargement should
not create new dividing lines in Europe, however, Kosovo might
prove to be destabilizing; so is the case of the tension between
Slovenia and Croatia over Slovenia's right to fish in the Adriatic
sea.
— The strategy is weakened by the fact that it does
not highlight contravention of EU decisions by member states over
issues such as, say, Western Sahara. In this case, EU members
are not in agreement as to how they should address the Saharawi
crisis. For example, France, Spain have taken up positions that
contradict the European parliaments position.
— In the policy implications section of the strategy,
although the strategy stresses the need to work with partners,
there is an even greater need for the EU to also engage with those
who do not share similar views with the EU rather than only focus
on those who share similar views—cooperation with like and
unlike minded states is of utmost importance.
— The strategy needs to be amended accordingly to
determine how it will engage neighboring countries that may or
may not pose a threat to the EU. The Barcelona Process is a good
example of such engagement however, how would the EU engage Russia
for example? The strategy also highlights the need for the EU
to work towards closer relations with Russia yet recent events
over gas and oil supplies, tense Anglo-Russo relations, and Russia's
mining of minerals in the North Pole paint a different picture
and casts doubt whether the EU can really engage Russia effectively.
— I think there is a general need for the strategy
to focus on building strategic partnerships and engaging with
those states that do not share the EUs values and goals. This
is the EUs major challenge which can be translated into a new
opportunity.
2. Is there a need to review the Strategy and the effectiveness
of its implementation periodically?
Periodic review of the EU strategy and its implementation
effectiveness should be undertaken to keep abreast with changing
and emerging threats and challenges. Since threats and challenges
transform over time it would be prudent on the EU to keep up with
current developments and changes in order to develop effective
responses as these "new" threats and challenges emerge.
3. Are there any other issues which should be brought to
the Sub-Committee's attention as part of this inquiry?
— Within the EU there appear to be pockets of instability,
for example, in Belgium and Spain. It would be useful if this
inquiry could take into account these two cases and determine
how the EU would address these challenges?
— I may have missed it but there is no mention in
the strategy how the EUs "internal disputes" would be
addressed. For example what is the EU policy towards Cyprus, Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo.
— I think that there is a need for the EU to support
and develop collective security systems in volatile parts of the
world. These systems would not be EU-led but would have more regional
ownership and expertise.
— The increase in horizontal inequalities (HIS)
in underdeveloped and developing countries is a threat that extend
to the EU and its neighbours.
— There is a need to mention emerging threats such
as human and arms trafficking that pose a danger not only to the
EU but the world in general.
— One important issue absent in the strategy document
is that there is a need for the EU to establish an early warning
system for both natural and man-made disasters. Such a system
could form the basis of the EUs preventive action strategy.
10 July 2008
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