Memorandum by the Spanish Embassy
1. Reference year, 2005. The Commission's
proposal takes 2005 as a reference year to distribute the effort
and establish the reduction national objectives in the diffuse
sectors. The new Member States are in favour of maintaining 1990
as basic reference, given that it is a year before their economic
collapses and with much higher emissions. But 2005 suits Spain
better, as it represents its current reality. The choice of 2005
is key to maintain equal efforts among the Member States.
2. Use of flexibility mechanisms by
Governments and companies. The Commission proposes a restricted
use of the flexible mechanisms. Spain understands that, in this
sense, the package should be flexible, as in this way the global
costs of implementation will be reduced, promoting at the same
time the transfer of clean technologies to the developing countries
and the progressive involvement of the Governments in the fight
against climate change. It is also essential that the companies
can have a fair access to the flexible mechanisms.
3. LULUCF. The package does not
take into account the emissions/absorptions from the forestry
sector. The Commission claims that there are still important methodological
uncertainties on that matter. Spain believes that in this sense,
the Commission's proposal is not well grounded. The carbon sinks
must be part of the national objectives of reduction of emissions.
Also, regarding the emissions trade, credits from forestry projects
must be allowed.
4. Effects on income from auctioning.
It is established that 20% of the income from auction of emissions
rights should be applied to the fight against climate change.
This provision is not compulsory. However, as some other countries,
Spain maintains in principle an opinion opposed to the pre-allocation
of the income.
5. Distribution of income from auctioning.
A 10% of the rights of emissions that are auctioned, are distributed
among the Member States applying principles of "solidarity
and growth". The distribution is done according to estimated
GDP per capita and direct costs of the implementation of the package.
This is a very controversial issue. The new Member States demand
that the achievements derived from the implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol are taken into account in the allocation. Others regard
the Commission proposal as a cohesion policy that does not fit
into the environmental legislation. Spain supports the text that
the Commission has proposed.
6. Flexibilities between ETS and non
ETS sectors. Some Member States wish to make the package flexible
by allowing the transfer of "efforts" between the sphere
of the trade in emissions rights and that of diffuse sectors.
They are flexibility options on which, in principle, Spain has
negative reservations of study. In accordance with the impact
report elaborated by the Commission, the share of responsibility
proposed between both spheres relates then to a cost-efficiency
criterion. Consequently, the transfer of emissions between these
spheres trough flexibilities between ETS and non ETS sectors would
lead to greater global compliance costs.
7. Increase of the effort: from -20%
to -30%: when and by which procedure. The package includes
an automatic adjustment mechanism in case that an international
agreement to tackle climate change is reached. The adjustments
would affect mainly to the national objectives of reduction, the
volume of emissions rights within the framework of emissions trading,
and the access to flexibility mechanisms. It is being debated
under which conditions and through which procedure these adjustments
must been carried out (codecision and comitology). Spain maintains
that, in principle, the procedure must be that of codecision.
Nevertheless, it could also assess the possibility of comitology.
8. Sectors exposed to competitiveness:
special rules and identification date. The Commission's proposal
presents exceptional measures ("protective") for sectors
that compete in a global market and that are unable to transfer
costs. Within this framework, some sectors are exposed to carbon
leakage. In line with the majority of delegations in the Council,
Spain believes that the best option to tackle the issue of carbon
leakage is to reach an international agreement. Likewise, Spain
is in favour of establishing special rules for the exposed sectors
in view of the possibility of failure to reach the above-mentioned
agreement promptly. Nevertheless, greater certainty for the industry
is requested. This would be achieved by bringing forward the dates
on which the exposed sectors are determined and on which the Commission
must submit a report on this subject to the Council and the European
Parliament. Lastly, Spain maintains reservations of examination
with regard to the need to reimburse non direct costs (derived
from the increase in energy prices) to the sectors exposed to
carbon leakage.
9. Biofuels: default values. The
Commission has created a Group Ad Hoc on the biofuels' sustainability
criteria. Spain (with the European lands of the lowest productivity)
is discriminated against in relation to Northern Europe after
being expressly excluded from the option to use default values
in article 17. 3 of the proposal. According to this article, default
values can only be used for biofuels produced outside the Community
or within the Community in lands of high productivity (crops of
Southern Europe are excluded). This entails a grave imbalance
in the market, Spain being left in a weak position with respect
to the Northern Europe countries in the market of biofuels production
(consequently, the estimates of future agro-energy crops in Spain
are being jeopardized).
27 June 2008
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