European Union -Developments in EU Trade Policy


CHAPTER 6: UNILATERAL, BILATERAL & REGIONAL LIBERALISATION

117.  Alongside the WTO multilateral negotiations, liberalisation occurs through unilateral action and bilateral and regional agreements. This chapter considers these alternatives and their interaction with the multilateral process.

Unilateral liberalisation

118.  Mr Erixon told us that 65-70% of all liberalisation since 1980 has been unilateral (with the remainder split between bilateral and multilateral deals) and he predicted that this would continue (QQ 287-288). Professor Evenett noted that unilateral liberalisation was a real prospect in developing countries, as governments were under pressure to demonstrate to their electorates the gains from bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations, but could take unilateral liberalising actions for their own sake (QQ 55, 62). Mr Laurent suggested that many of the unilateral concessions were in fact tied to support from the World Bank and IMF—although countries who had been made to liberalise did now recognise the benefits of liberalisation (Q 86). India and the South East Asian countries were cited as examples of countries which had chosen to liberalise unilaterally in order to attract overseas investment (QQ 140, 236). Mr Erixon noted that the EU had unilaterally liberalised on agriculture through its reforms on the CAP (Q 287).

119.  Whatever the source of this liberalisation, the challenge for the WTO in the present economic environment is to find a way to ensure that countries, under pressure from the economic downturn, do not return from these positions to their bound tariff levels, and ideally to expand their application. Mr Laurent suggested that countries would not want to bind existing tariffs as they would want to maintain "policy flexibility" (Q 86). The Government should work with developing countries to promote policies in the WTO which allow credit to be given for unilateral liberalisation in multilateral negotiations and thus encourage countries to bind their unilateral actions.

Bilateral trade agreements

120.  The number of bilateral trade agreements notified to the WTO has grown in recent years, although ICC UK noted that the rate of growth was below that of the increase in the number of WTO members over the same period (p 2). Currently there are some 200 preferential trade agreements notified to the WTO with perhaps another 100 under negotiation. The share of world trade covered by preferences is estimated at up to a third, although it is also estimated that less than half of that level actually benefits from the preferences given by the agreements.[31]

121.  The ITC gave five reasons for the growth in bilateral trade agreements:

·  Some agreements are a reaction to implementation of WTO agreements, and aim to maintain some preferential access to beneficiary countries.

·  An attempt to align historical relationships (such as that between the EU and former colonies) with the multilateral trading system.

·  Regional political integration has driven agreements in East and South East Asia.

·  Some agreements are attempts to cover issues which are not yet in the purview of multilateral trade talks.

·  Some agreements reflect the "slow progress" in multilateral liberalisation (p 119).

122.  There are disadvantages to bilateral agreements. The CBI and Professor Higgott explained that bilateral agreements distort trade flows, leading to market segmentation and higher prices for those not party to the deal (Q 74, p 4). Agreements are often asymmetrical, giving more economic benefit to the more developed partner (Q 74) although poorer countries appreciate the certainty of a secure export market (Q 89). The CBI added that some agreements include their own dispute settlement mechanism which can conflict with the WTO panels (p 4).

123.  Bilateral agreements also created a complex system of overlapping rules and tariffs (commonly known as a "spaghetti bowl") which exporters need to learn (QQ 219, 355, 442, pp 216, 226). Mr Biswas explained that in some cases exporters chose to pay a tariff as if they were in a third country rather than deal with the bureaucracy created as part of the bilateral deal (Q 43). Mr Kamall MEP recalled that the EU negotiations with South Korea had stumbled on an issue where the South Koreans were unable to give ground on account of their bilateral with the USA (Q 219). Ms Francis gave an astonishing example of trade diversion from an agreement between the USA and Central America which required the pockets of garments to be produced in the USA regardless of where the rest of the production took place (Q 356). However, IFSL agued that bilateral deals are less damaging in services than in manufactured goods (p 2).

124.  The CBI also said that trade was sometimes a secondary factor to political drivers for a deal (p 4): Ms Page agreed and characterised some examples as "trade free" agreements (Q 14). Professor Lehmann argued that further reasons for bilateral agreements were to "keep people busy" in government trade departments and because politicians wanted the political kudos of reaching agreement with certain countries (Q 476). However, CIDSE[32] argued that non-trade issues, including human rights and environmental protection, should be taken into account in bilateral agreements (p 223).

125.  Dr Gasiorek explained that his colleagues at the University of Sussex had developed the Sussex Framework as a way of measuring the impact of free trade agreements. It examined existing trade flows, data on economic growth, inflation and unemployment and the contents of proposed agreements to examine the potential welfare costs or gains arising from the agreements. In the cases to which the Framework had been applied to date, the "very common conclusion" was that the agreements examined had slender welfare gains because of trade diversion issues (QQ 35-36).

126.  Lord Mandelson, in his role as European Commissioner for Trade, provided an insight into why bilateral deals are popular despite these disadvantages. He told us that Ministers from developing countries preferred bilateral deals because they could choose the countries to whom they opened up: in particular they could avoid liberalising trade with China which they saw as a threat to their own domestic manufacturing base (Q 247).

127.  Occasionally, bilateral agreements can have wider benefit. Professor Evenett told us that a number of agreements extended rules on foreign investment beyond their signatories (Q 74). Mr Kamall MEP suggested that, for smaller countries, a bilateral negotiation offered an opportunity to develop negotiating experience and skills, which could be transferred to the multilateral arena (Q 218). The ITC agreed, and also argued that bilateral deals allowed governments selectively to liberalise without incurring the wrath of domestic lobby groups which feared globalisation (p 3).

128.  Ambassador Gosper, Chair of the WTO General Council, expressed regret that the Doha Round had not considered the rules that relate to bilateral and regional trade agreements to ensure that they are not used to entrench existing protected interests (Q 373).

The EU's approach

129.  The EU introduced a moratorium on bilateral deal negotiations in 1999 (Q 285) in order to focus on multilateral talks, but this ended in 2006. Mr Jonathan Peel, a member of the European Economic and Social Committee, noted that the 2006 decision had seemed to indicate a lack of faith in the multilateral process at the time, but that in retrospect it appeared to be more pragmatic (p 3). In its 2006 policy document Global Europe, the Commission set out with which countries it would choose to negotiate bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), and the content of the FTAs:

    "Based on these criteria, ASEAN, Korea and Mercosur (with whom negotiations are ongoing) emerge as priorities. They combine high levels of protection with large market potential and they are active in concluding FTAs with EU competitors. India, Russia and the Gulf Co-operation Council (negotiations also currently active) also have combinations of market potential and levels of protection which make them of direct interest to the EU. China also meets many of these criteria, but requires special attention because of the opportunities and risks it presents.

    "FTAs would need to be comprehensive and ambitious in coverage, aiming at the highest possible degree of trade liberalisation including far-reaching liberalisation of services and investment ... Where our partners have signed FTAs with other countries that are competitors to the EU, we should seek full parity at least. Quantitative import restrictions and all forms of duties, taxes, charges and restrictions on exports should be eliminated.

    "FTAs should also tackle non tariff barriers through regulatory convergence wherever possible and contain strong trade facilitation provisions. They should include stronger provisions for IPR and competition, including for example provisions on enforcement of IP rights along the lines of the EC Enforcement Directive. We will seek to include provisions on good governance in financial, tax and judicial areas where appropriate. We should also ensure Rules of Origin in FTAs are simpler and more modern and reflect the realities of globalisation. We will put in place internal mechanisms to monitor the implementation and the results of new FTAs.

130.  Dr Balas told us that he expected the majority of Member States to support a move towards bilateral deals to fill the vacuum created by the inability to conclude a multilateral deal this year; European business was reporting that bilateral agreements already signed between Asian nations were having a negative impact on European exports (Q 114). Lord Mandelson, in his role as European Commissioner for Trade, was blunter and explained why he had begun bilateral talks in 2006: "I wanted to be ready for what I anticipated would be the completion of the Doha Round in 2007 ... and, also, because in the event of the multilateral talks failing, I felt Europe should be in a position where it could make up, in trade terms through bilateral agreements, some of what it had, I hope, temporarily lost through the temporary failure of the multilateral. I cannot stand still. I cannot see the United States or Japan and others concluding bilateral agreements of their own and have Europe left so far behind the curve" (Q 257).

131.  Mrs Kinnock MEP criticised the Commission's approach, arguing that bilateral negotiations undermined the multilateral approach and saying that FTAs would harm non-signatories in nearly every case (p 238). None of the industry groups which submitted evidence objected to the Commission's approach and choice of partners, particularly given the slow progress of the multilateral talks (pp 214, 218, 226, 234, 246). The Sporting Goods Industry Association and EEF/UK Steel added that the Commission should focus on removing raw material export restrictions during its negotiations (pp 228, 246).

132.  Prior to the July Ministerial, we asked Lord Mandelson, in his role as European Commissioner for Trade, whether, given that the multilateral talks had not concluded, the aims set out in Global Europe remained compatible with continued negotiations at the WTO. He said that the multilateral deals sat alongside the plurilateral and bilateral deals, with the latter extending benefits to trading partners that it was not possible to secure through the multilateral process. The bilateral deals that the EU hoped to sign would not be narrow and trade diverting but WTO compliant, trade creating and capable of multilateral expansion (QQ 247, 256). In addition, he made it clear that he would not focus on agreements with other developed countries as to do so would damage international trade (Q 260)

133.  Dr Balas was not optimistic about the possibilities of plurilateral agreements (Q 125). His colleague Mr Garzotti provided us with an update on negotiating priorities: in India and Korea, the EU is working to address competitiveness issues for EU firms; talks with the Gulf Co-operation Council have market access as the priority (Q 145).

134.  We also asked the European Commission about the inclusion of social clauses in bilateral trade agreements. Mr Gareth Steel, Expert, Sustainable Development, DG Trade, European Commission, said that requiring potential trade partners to reform their social practices (such as labour or environmental standards) would be counter-productive. He noted that these practices had not been put in place to act as trade barriers and that bilateral agreements were a chance to discuss good practice and encourage co-operation on social issues (QQ 151-152). (Fairtrade agreed and advocated a stronger role for the International Labour Organisation to enforce labour rights (Q 206).) Mr Jean Charles van Eeckhaute, Deputy Head of Unit, Policy Coordination, DG Trade, European Commission, noted that there were strong demands within the European Parliament for a more coercive approach to these issues (Q 152). We did not collect enough evidence to be able conclude on social clauses.

135.  We also heard evidence of a lack of capacity to handle multilateral and bilateral negotiations concurrently. BusinessEurope, which supported the development of bilateral agreements, including in the long term those with other OECD countries, noted that India was prioritising its resources towards the WTO talks to the extent that it was delaying the bilateral talks with the EU (Q 274). Mr Peel expressed a concern that the Commission might face similar resource shortages (p 3). ICC UK suggested that the Commission should systematically undertake an impact assessment of any proposed bilateral deal involving the EU, to include its consistency with the WTO rules, the impact upon rules of origin (see chapter five), compatibility of regulatory structures and standards, and the proposal's impact upon the Commission's administrative capacity to negotiate multilateral agreements (p 3).

136.  Mr Thomas MP, Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Consumer Affairs, told us that the failure of the July WTO Ministerial to agree a deal would lead to these potential bilateral agreements receiving greater attention and, he hoped, accelerated progress towards their conclusion (Q 568).

Blending bilateral and multilateral agreements

137.  The ITC and Mr Biswas suggested that, over time, as the "spaghetti bowl" got increasingly complex, pressure from business would lead to renewed interest in either a multilateral approach or agreements between the major regional trade blocs (p 2, QQ 442-448). If the latter were to occur, Mr Biswas expected that LDCs not included in free trade agreements would be brought in through a WTO multilateral deal (QQ 442-448). He outlined two scenarios for the future: the first saw bilateral deals working alongside the WTO process, with the WTO working to multilateralise bilateral deals; the second saw bilateral agreements taking over from the WTO and the Organisation becoming paralysed (QQ 453-455).

138.  Professor Higgott summed up the view of many witnesses when he outlined the approach of the Warwick Commission[34]: "it was not sufficient ... simply to condemn the rise of preferential trading arrangements. Recognising that they are sub-optimal is not a sufficient reason for saying they will go away, so the question was: 'How do you live with these arrangements?'" (Q 48). His colleague Professor Evenett suggested that the WTO should do more to publicise the contents of newly signed bilateral agreements and promote those clauses in agreements which had broad trade promotion effects. This would require placing the transparency mechanism of the WTO, adopted in December 2006, on a permanent footing (Q 74). Mr Lamy accepted that the WTO rules concerning bilateral agreements could be clearer (Q 416). The Commission also supported an enhanced role for the WTO in monitoring bilateral agreements (Q 130).

139.  Ambassador Falconer, Chair of the WTO Negotiating Group on Agriculture, expected the WTO to maintain a central role, but as a consolidator of national decisions rather than a body "that changes the way people do things". Barriers to trade would fall unilaterally or bilaterally, and the Organisation would be the place where states "promised" to their "fellow states in the international community not to do certain things" (Q 513). ICC UK suggested that, with this approach, bilateral deals would be the "building blocks" of future rounds of multilateral liberalisation (p 242).

140.  We recognise that bilateral agreements are now a fixture of the trade negotiation landscape, and they can contribute to economic growth and liberalisation, both by making progress beyond the WTO remit and acting as the foundations for future multilateral deals. Some witnesses took the view that their proliferation has not been conducive to a multilateral settlement. To minimise the risk we recommend that the Government and the Commission should work with the WTO to enhance the Organisation's role in the monitoring of bilateral negotiations, and allow it to encourage good practice and the inclusion of provisions in bilateral agreements which help to minimise damage to non-signatories.

141.  The Commission's work on bilateral agreements has not undermined its commitment to multilateral trade agreements. We were particularly reassured that the previous Commissioner opposed agreements with developed nations which would freeze out poorer countries and hope that the new Commissioner will maintain this stance. We recommend that the Government and the Commission look at ways to help developing countries deal with the complexities of negotiating bilateral agreements, and welcome the Government's commitment of funds for this purpose. Aid for Trade facility is a suitable source of funds for such help and the Sussex Framework one possible instrument.


31   Denis Medvedev Preferential Trade Agreements and Their Role in World Trade, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4038, October 2006. Back

32   International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity: an international network of Catholic development agencies. Back

33   COM (2006) 567 Back

34   The 2007 Warwick Commission, coordinated by the University of Warwick, was a group of international trade practioners and analysts who considered the multilateral trading system. Back


 
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