Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-59)
Mr Andrew Mathewson, Professor Phil Sutton and Captain
Richard Stokes
29 NOVEMBER 2007
Q40 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Can
you give us some comparative data on other countries and the extent
to which they have not engaged in such initiatives, particularly
France, for example?
Captain Stokes: I am sorry; I do not have that
information.
Q41 Lord Anderson of Swansea: No,
if you could give us a note on this. You say that we are participating
in perhaps one-third and I wonder whether that is part of the
reason why relations are said to be soured between ourselves and
the EDA because we are semi-detached.
Captain Stokes: We can let you have a note.
Q42 Chairman: Just on this particular
point, if we could just pursue this. You talk about these projects
being in different stages of development. Is it a question you
either join at the start or you do not join, or is it possible
that perhaps a project which we might have been sceptical about
at the start, after a period of time does appear to be more promising,
and can we have a chance to join later?
Captain Stokes: My Lord, the nature of the project
teams is very different between each of the teams. We can join
at any stage and we can leave at any stage. But they are not the
same as a traditional UK project team that is there to manage
the concept assessment, demonstration of bringing introduction
to service. The general principle we have in a project team is
to bring interested groups of nations to see if they can identify
shared requirements, common requirements in a common time scale.
So usually you can see fairly early on whether it is something
in which you might have an interest in that capability area in
the same time scale as an international requirement.
Q43 Lord Anderson of Swansea: When
we talked about heavy lift, I think it was Lord Crickhowell who
raised the point, you gave a very full reply in respect of not
only the revamped Hercules but the Ukrainian Antonovs and so on.
When we did have Lord Malloch-Brown before us he mentioned particular
shortfalls in respect of helicopters, saying we were scrambling
around to find groups of helicopters available for Darfur and
other key areas. What is the position of the EDA in respect of
pooling research on helicopter development?
Mr Mathewson: While Captain Stokes is gathering
his thoughts, we through NATO identified a process of trying to
examine why there are so few helicopters available for operation
in grounds like Afghanistan, against the background that when
forces are declared to NATO there seem to be far more helicopters
in theory available. So what are the reasons why the helicopters
which are in theory in the catalogue are not being provided? There
are a variety of reasons which nations have identified—some
to do with training, some to do with a particular mark of a helicopter,
some to do with its ability to operate at high altitude and in
hot climates, and some to do with defensive aid suites. What we
have been encouraging both through NATO and the European Union
is for countries to try to come together where they have a similar
issue, and we have asked to be inserted into the EDA's work programme
for next year some work in this area. Are there groups of countries
which have a similar helicopter, which faces a similar challenge
in adapting it to the modern environment? For example, we understand
that there are a number of countries which have substantial numbers
of former Soviet helicopters—can we encourage them through
the Agency, therefore, to come together to work out how they might
equip these for the current operational environment? This is not
the high tech, the leading end of science, it will often be fairly
basic adaptations, and it does, I have to say, require those countries
to want to spend the money to do it.
Q44 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Could
there be a leasing capability possibility? I believe when the
Germans certainly initially went to Afghanistan they were leasing
Antonovs from the Ukraine—that is on the heavy lift, particularly
on the helicopters now.
Mr Mathewson: There are options and, as I think
I mentioned earlier, in Afghanistan NATO has decided to let a
contract for some of the basic helicopter roles, some of them
just carrying freight around, so that the helicopters that have
more specialist requirements are available for the more specialist
roles. So there are certainly levels of capability required and
in some cases you can lease the capability and that is what NATO
is trying to do south of Afghanistan, hire in a capability just
to do the logistical supply role in a fairly unthreatening environment,
which allows the helicopters, which are available with more specialist
capability to be used on the more demanding roles.
Q45 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Is
the EDA also involved in this in seeking to identify areas where
leasing can solve the immediate problem?
Mr Mathewson: This issue is on their work plan.
It will depend to a very large extent on how countries want to
respond. This often comes back to whether there are countries
that want to solve the problem and want to use the EDA to solve
the problem.
Q46 Chairman: But if it is on NATO's
work plan that it is doing it we presumably have to be careful
not to duplicate it and do the same thing twice with largely the
same people, and there clearly should be some sensible division
of labour on some of these things, presumably? Should be?
Mr Mathewson: My concern is not that there are
too many people getting into the business of upgrading helicopters
but that there are too few people getting into the business of
upgrading helicopters.
Chairman: My Lord Swinfen has been trying
to get in on this for some time.
Q47 Lord Swinfen: You were saying
that other people are looking at force protection and that we
are not working with them at the moment, but they will also be
learning the lessons, albeit second hand, from Afghanistan and
Iraq. What is being done to make certain that there is no duplication?
Do I gather from that that nothing is being done?
Professor Sutton: We have a close liaison with
various of the technology groups associated with these programmes
and therefore, as Captain Stokes explained, we are perpetually
in a position where we are able to observe and be part of, so
we do keep close with those programmes. At this stage we have
not seen anything significant coming through at all that suggests
that there is any real advantage that that work is offered to
date. But you are exactly right; we do need to keep in contact
with that.
Q48 Lord Swinfen: You are happy for
another country to pay for the work rather than ourselves?
Professor Sutton: It s not so much that, my
Lord, it is a question of we are a long way ahead of the field
at the present time and we do not expect at this stage to be able
to see anything, sadly, that would give us that advantage. But
we remain hopeful.
Chairman: Lord Crickhowell.
Q49 Lord Crickhowell: Earlier all
of the witnesses, understandably, were anxious to protect the
Ministry of Defence's budget but as Lord Malloch-Brown made absolutely
clear in his evidence to this Committee, when talking about aid,
said this is an issue that goes far beyond the Ministry of Defence.
He spoke of a worldwide shortage of helicopters making it impossible
for some of the aid work to be effectively carried out. He actually
pressed us, rather surprisingly, to ask some questions about the
whole issue, and he was obviously anxious for information. I wonder
how much of the work that you are doing in making enquiries about
the worldwide market and all these connected issues is being closely
coordinated jointly with the other departments that must have
an interest? Surely this is an area where we really should have
joined-up government and it is not simply a defence matter? Clearly
we do need to have a picture right across government of the worldwide
market and its availability and the way in which the various departments
of government who require helicopters can get into that market
effectively. Are you, is the Ministry of Defence working with
other departments or is there more scope than is being exercised
at present for doing so?
Mr Mathewson: I am not entirely sure that we
have seen the analysis that says there is a worldwide shortage
of helicopters. We have certainly seen the analysis that says
there are not enough helicopters equipped for the roles which
we want our Armed Forces to be able to undertake; but I think
there are additional helicopters which are not so specially equipped
which are available. So at the moment I am not sure we recognise
an analysis that there is a worldwide shortage of helicopters—there
are scarce capabilities.
Lord Crickhowell: This Committee is not
just the defence Committee for the European Union; it also covers
the other topics, such as aid. I must say I think we would be
quite interested to discover more about this general picture,
wider than the Ministry of Defence. Anyway, I leave the thought,
if I may, with you, whether this is a question that goes wider
than simply the Ministry of Defence as it seems to me a pity if
there is no wider investigation of it going on within government.
Chairman: We will be returning to this
question on the last question which we have this morning, which
really does respond to the points.
Lord Crickhowell: It would be helpful
to have a paper on this.
Chairman: I would like us to protect
the last question.
Q50 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I have
a follow-up. You said that you were not aware of the situation.
My recollection is that there was a really serious problem in
helicopter lift in the case of the Pakistan earthquake of 18 months
ago, which was not a military problem at all because nobody was
suggesting conducting military operations in Azad Kashmir—it
was a simple problem that they could not find around the world
enough people ready to deploy the helicopters in time, but perhaps
my memory is faulty.
Mr Mathewson: Again, I have not seen the analysis
that points to a worldwide shortage. There is within NATO an analysis
of why when there are on the face of it plenty of helicopters
available within national Armed Forces there are so few available
in Afghanistan.
Q51 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I would
regard that as much the same thing, to be honest with you.
Mr Mathewson: I think it has come down to largely
the specialist capabilities which we require in Afghanistan rather
than the raw numbers of helicopters themselves.
Q52 Chairman: There is presumably,
Mr Mathewson, a difference between the absolute number of helicopters
and the readiness of Member States to deploy them for particular
functions?
Mr Mathewson: I think the readiness is certainly
in issue and helicopters which are required in Afghanistan have
to fly at high altitude and in hot climates, and in many cases
to have armour and in many cases to have other defensive aid suites.
In some cases the crews will require specialist training, and
our analysis is that these issues are more crucial for the Afghanistan
problem than simply the shortage of air frames, that it is the
specialism that is required rather than the simple shortage of
air frames.
Chairman: Lord Boyce.
Q53 Lord Boyce: On 19 November the
High Representative Javier Solana talked about development in
the area of rapid reaction and the future development of an EU
rapid reaction concept. I would like you to expand on that slightly
and say what is the EU's aspiration to have an ability to take
very rapid reaction in the event of a crisis. I would be particularly
interested if you could explain something of the political process
which would allow action, (albeit the Battlegroup or whatever
being ready to go), the grindingly slow process that normally
happens in trying to get Member States to agree and the chain
of command above the military command into the PSC or whatever.
Mr Mathewson: The starting point for this is
the Battlegroups, which we touched on earlier. There is a roster
of Battlegroups available at short notice. I think the requirements
are to have the first elements on the ground within five days
and to be fully operational within ten days of the political decision
to go. I will check those numbers but there are defined criteria
for what rapid response means in the case of the Battlegroup.
The EU Military Committee is additionally looking at the requirements
for maritime and air rapid response. We do not think that that
requires a standby force in the same way as is required for land
forces—that maritime forces and air forces are inherently
more rapidly deployable. But we think that the EU does need a
mechanism for identifying those forces which nations have, which
are at the shortest rates of readiness and being able to identify
what capability is available for them to plan on and to draw forward
forces which are at shorter periods of readiness. The work on
the air and maritime rapid response capability is going on now
and they will sit alongside the land capability, which is essentially
the Battlegroups, and there will be discussions about the mandate
for doing work on the overall rapid response capability. But I
think you are absolutely correct to identify the political problem
as much as the military problem. It is one thing to be able to
have the forces available to deploy within a period of a decision
but what we have found is that it is the period leading up to
the decision which is where the delay really comes in.
Q54 Lord Boyce: My question is whether
any effort has been made to streamline that process? For example,
allowing a reconnaissance party to depart before the order to
depart is given. But also whether anybody has made a conscious
effort to try and streamline the process, which is turgid, to
put it mildly.
Mr Mathewson: The EU military staff have fairly
well developed procedures for identifying what the options in
a military response might be, for conducting a recce. There has
been a recce into Chad which shaped the formation of the options
which were then put to the PSC. It is difficult, though, to see
how you can accelerate political considerations simply on the
basis of improved process. This does come down to political willingness
to get involved in the operation and the political appetite for
the particular operation in question at the time. That is largely
the issue over the Chad Mission—it is the different countries'
willingness to be involved in the Chad Mission rather than the
readiness at which their forces are held. This will often come
down to simple political considerations of their appetite for
that mission.
Q55 Lord Boyce: Can you remind us
whether or not the decision to deploy the Battlegroup is qualified
or is unanimous in terms of voting, and if a country has an element
in a Battlegroup and it decides that it does not want to support
the Battlegroup's deployment can it extract its elements so that
the Battlegroup can actually move ahead?
Mr Mathewson: The decision to deploy any EU
military mission will be by unanimous decision. Clearly that leaves
countries open the option to support the decision but without
being willing to participate in it, and that is the position which
we are in over Chad. We support the EU's willingness to deploy
a mission with Chad, albeit that we have made clear that we will
not have forces to contribute to the mission. In principle, if
a country has committed to a Battlegroup then its forces, which
form part of that Battlegroup, ought to deploy with the Battlegroup.
But clearly you can never rule out either that the nation considers
that its forces are unsuitable for the particular mission that
is envisaged or that it has other contingencies running at the
time, or that it simply does not want to participate in that mission
for whichever political reason. So, yes, countries could in theory
withdraw their forces from a Battlegroup. The impact of that on
the Battlegroup will, I think, vary from case to case. There are
clearly cases where nations have contributed niche capabilities
to a Battlegroup which are not critical to the Battlegroup going,
and which the framework nation might be able to replace from its
own resources at the time. Clearly in other cases the contribution
would be more.
Q56 Lord Boyce: It is reasonable
to presume that it is the case that the idea of having a very
rapid reaction force is not likely ever to materialise?
Mr Mathewson: I think it is fair to say that
the further you get from a Battlegroup which is provided by one
nation the more complications there are.
Q57 Chairman: On the other hand,
having had some discussions with the Swedes, who are the lead
country in the Nordic Battlegroup, they have obviously been working
very hard to try and make sure that they can fit together and
certainly a multination Battlegroup seems to be rather impressive.
Mr Mathewson: I think what the Swedes have done
is very impressive and we have best visibility of what the Swedes
of done and less visibility of what other Battlegroups have done.
And they have practised at the political level as well as the
military level. They have had exercises involving their ministers
and political decision-making. I think the Swedish approach to
this is exemplary; we have less visibility of what others might
have done in the same area.
Chairman: Lord Swinfen.
Q58 Lord Swinfen: Is the lift capability
also on standby or when there is a crisis do we have to look around,
find aircraft and hire them?
Mr Mathewson: Countries will have to look around
and find aircraft from whichever source. The Swedes have clearly
participated in the C17 consortium and are clearly assuming that
their purchase into the C17 consortium will be available if they
have to deploy their Battlegroup.
Q59 Lord Swinfen: We have a Battlegroup
that is going to be available in January, I believe. Do we have
designated aircraft?
Mr Mathewson: No.
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