Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 60-79)

Mr Andrew Mathewson, Professor Phil Sutton and Captain Richard Stokes

29 NOVEMBER 2007

  Q60  Lord Swinfen: Where are we going to get them?

  Mr Mathewson: We will have to look at the situation at the time; we will have to see whether the situation requires airlift or sealift.

  Q61  Lord Swinfen: I am assuming at the moment it is airlift. In most places we would have to go it would be quicker to move them by air.

  Mr Mathewson: If the situation requires truly rapid response. I think it is the same answer as I gave earlier, that we have in-house capability; we will have to assess the availability at the time alongside whatever else is going on.

  Q62  Lord Swinfen: All the RAF transport aircraft are servicing in Iraq and Afghanistan at the moment.

  Mr Mathewson: So we will have to look at options like the strategic airlift interim solution, which we are contracted into, or use of the market. As I said earlier, use of the market is not novel; this is not a controversial part of our logistics plan. The in-house capability provides the base level of capability and we routinely—virtually daily—go to the market to provide for peak loads. I think we would see this as one of those peak loads.

  Chairman: Lord Crickhowell.

  Q63  Lord Crickhowell: Can we move on to R & T? How will the Strategy on Defence R & T, adopted at the Steering Board Meeting, help the EU—and I quote Dr Solana—"spend more, spend better and spend more together"?

  Professor Sutton: First of all, my Lord, it was not the strategy that was supported by the Board but a framework document which actually set down the criteria for how such a strategy would be put together. The Board also charged the Agency with getting its research and technology directors from the Member nations together and to develop that strategy on some form of an agreed approach. So that is really the next step in this action. I am very pleased to say, however, that the UK is already leading a group looking at where there might be opportunities for a common interest and so forth, so we are trying to be in a good state for when that strategy is put together. But there is no time table yet for when the R & T Directors will meet, although in fact I have had a discussion with the current Chief Executive, Alexander Weis, who is planning to get that group together in the spring. He has not given a date yet but that is his intention.

  Q64  Lord Crickhowell: This is an area which the Secretary of State has endorsed—he has endorsed the framework for the purpose of his letter. Reading the document it is a fairly lengthy statement of what is envisaged and what might be the advantages to various groups—national governments, industry and so on. As we are endorsing it I would like you to comment a little further on what we see the advantages are for this country. Clearly one's instincts are right that it must be a good thing to identify what are common priorities and who is working on them and who is ready with what and when, and the other points dealt with in the framework document. Could you elaborate a little more because it may enable us to judge better the value of the whole exercise?

  Professor Sutton: Gladly. I should again restate that we are always driven in our thinking, including for research and technology, on meeting our military capability needs—that is always what is behind our thinking. As such we prepared and released a Defence Technology Strategy very recently which very much embodied the UK's view and the Ministry of Defence's view about how various areas of technology would enable it to move towards meeting our future capability needs. So we would hope in working with our colleagues across Europe that we would be able to get them to think in terms also of how their research efforts would similarly look towards meeting capability needs. The key part, of course, is seeing where those capability needs align and one must be careful in that one might be able to agree a fairly high level topic but depending upon how one is going to deliver that in capability terms it may be that there is a subtle or perhaps quite important variation between various Member States. So looking for Members who have common areas of interest and certainly from our perspective based on a capability driven need.

  Q65  Lord Crickhowell: I do not see any reference, from a very quick read, to the academic world, to the university world. I am not quite clear into which the main efforts are to be directed. Clearly there are international manufacturing concerns doing their own research and development as part of the development of products and so on, but this is an area presumably which extends far beyond the efforts of individual companies or the individual national government research efforts. Is it part of the framework to bring the university and the academic world into this exercise?

  Professor Sutton: I believe it is expected that the Member nations will make sure that the connections exist between their respective industries and academia and so forth, and indeed from the UK's perspective looking to our own indigenous defence research programme that is very much at the heart of what we are trying to achieve. And following on from the Defence Industrial Strategy we are looking for good and effective ways to work with our industry; we are looking to work with the research councils that of course fund universities and so forth—a rich seam of possibilities, something like £2.8 billion a year, I believe. So that would be the conduit I would suggest for how this would happen.

  Q66  Chairman: But is there a problem in this given the considerable range between the sort of R & T expenditure in which the UK engages and the R & T expenditure which presumably the majority of Members of the EDA engage in, which is obviously a relatively small fraction of what we do. How many problems arise because of this spectrum?

  Professor Sutton: Certainly, as you correctly say, Lord Chairman, the difference in spending between various Member States is quite significant, with the UK and France being the largest contributors by far.

  Q67  Lord Anderson of Swansea: Up to two-thirds, I think.

  Professor Sutton: Yes, indeed; that is clearly the major part. Where we are really working with colleagues in EDA is to look to areas where we can see this mutual benefit, again pointing to the capability need. But I would say that the contribution that other nations can make must come in two forms. Yes, we would like to see other nations frankly spending a commensurate percentage of their defence budgets on research and technology; but also our need to recognise that a good brain from Slovenia is as good as a good brain in the UK, and very often looking at some of the more fundamental areas of technology, even though it still has to align with capability needs, need not be horrendously expensive. But if we see that kind of a contribution, that kind of commitment then there are possibilities.

  Chairman: I think that you have really discussed this question as to how the MOD would implement the Strategy in the UK. Could I turn to Lord Selkirk to ask his question, and could I apologise to him that it has been trespassed upon a certain amount by his colleagues.

  Q68  Lord Selkirk of Douglas: Chairman, thank you very much. May I just preface my question by saying I think that you have in very large measure answered what I am about to ask, so if there is anything you would like to add to what you have already said that would be very welcome. Can I ask what progress has been made in mobilising the necessary capabilities, with particular reference to the transport helicopters for the EU's mission to Chad and to the Central African Republic? I think you also said in your comments that there was an insufficiency of helicopters. Could you summarise, in a few words, what you see as the solution to that problem?

  Mr Mathewson: The EU has not yet identified the forces and capabilities that it needs for the Chad Mission. A series of options for this mission were identified and the PSC decided that the option that it would support was one that required around 4000 people. There have been three-force generation conferences so far, on 9, 14 and 21 November, and the forces have not yet been identified up to the level of 4000—I think we are some way short of it yet. Within that there are some critical shortfalls—a Role 2 hospital, fixed and rotary wing, both for tactical, logistics and medical purposes, and intelligence assets. At the moment the nominated Force Commander, the Operation Commander General Nash, is reporting to the PSC that he does not yet have the forces declared to him, identified to him that allow him to recommend to the PSC that the mission should be launched. So we are in a pause period where we have to reconsider the scale of the mission and whether the forces can be generated for the scale of the mission. At the moment no country has declared, I think, any helicopters at all, which I find surprising. So I think countries might be asked to reconsider whether it is genuinely the case that they cannot provide helicopters, and the EU may wish to consider some of the solutions which NATO has considered, for example contracting helicopter support for some of the very basic freight roles which is all that NATO is looking at. But I think it is surprising that none of the countries which are offering forces have offered helicopters.

  Q69  Lord Selkirk of Douglas: I noticed in our briefing it is stated that Foreign Defence Ministers met in joint session to discuss the proposed ESDP mission to Chad. The Secretary of State for Defence underlined UK political support for the proposed mission as a key element in the comprehensive regional approach. Conclusions were agreed on current operations and missions under the European Security and Defence Policy, and he goes on to elaborate on that theme. Surely if they have agreed they should be able to put this altogether and get on with it?

  Mr Mathewson: Yes. I think this is a gap between the political support for a mission and countries' willingness to declare forces. The position of the British government has been that from the outset they were clear with the EU that we would give political support but because of the strains on the forces in Iraq and Afghanistan we would not be able to provide forces for the mission. We are providing very small numbers of personnel to the operational headquarters, to the force headquarters, but we were not in a position because of current operational demands to provide any more significant contribution. I think this illustrates a problem for the European Union, that in theory there is a force catalogue which says that we can generate a force of 60,000, yet in practice we are struggling to generate a force of 4000. We can ask why that is. Is it significant that the United Kingdom is not participating in the force? I think it is disappointing if the EU cannot generate a force of 4000 without the United Kingdom; this ought to be within the range of ambition of other Members of the European Union. But I think there is this gap between what nations say they are politically prepared to do and their willingness then to provide the assets for it.

Chairman: Lord Crickhowell.

  Q70  Lord Crickhowell: Can I move away from helicopters which we have covered pretty extensively this morning to a new element that you have just introduced, medical. Can you comment? All these operations will require medical supplies and medical facilities, and can you comment more about the European approach to this one and say more than you did in that rather throwaway remark that this was one of the problems in the Chad exercise?

  Mr Mathewson: I do not know. I could certainly look at the data which we have in the force catalogue. The EU works on the basis that it asks nations to identify the forces they are in theory willing to commit to an operation, and there is this force catalogue that shows that the EU has sufficient forces in theory declared as potentially available to mount an operation of around 60,000, and that would include a full range of capabilities that a mission would require. I am certainly very happy to check.

  Q71  Lord Crickhowell: Could we have a note perhaps on the medical point because it does seem to be a rather important one.

  Mr Mathewson: Yes. I would expect that the force catalogue includes a number of countries that have declared hospitals in theory as available and they have not been offered on this occasion.

Chairman: Lord Anderson.

  Lord Anderson of Swansea: Turning from Chad to Kosovo, clearly the EU would be playing a larger role there. Is there that same gap between aspiration and capability?

  Chairman: Not militarily.

  Lord Anderson of Swansea: No. Helicopters would be relevant, for example.

  Chairman: With respect to Lord Anderson, the military operation in Kosovo is and will continue to be a NATO operation rather than an EU operation.

  Q72  Lord Anderson of Swansea: But there will be a much grander EU operation on the civilian side and that will include, no doubt, relying on the military for the provision of helicopters and clearly across the board in that area, save for the NATO contribution from the military. What is the degree of preparedness of planning in response to a greater call for a civilian operation?

  Mr Mathewson: I am afraid I simply do not know and the EU will, if the proper legal basis can be found, mount a policing mission in Kosovo to go alongside the NATO military mission, KFOR and replacing the United Nations in the policing role. The MOD is not actually very closely involved in planning the EU police mission and I have not so far been made aware of any concern about helicopters as being an issue in the EU policing.

  Q73  Lord Anderson of Swansea: The police operation may require in an emergency rapid deployability.

  Mr Mathewson: Yes, and clearly NATO has a rapid deployable capability for KFOR, but I am not sure that it has been raised as an issue in terms of the EU's police capability.

Chairman: Lord Hannay.

  Q74  Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Following on this point about the difficulty of generating 4000 force for Chad and some specialist aspects to it, could you roughly rank in order of difficulty the problem that arises with regard to UN peacekeeping operations, the problem that arises with regard to NATO operations and the problems that arise in this case to the EU? Are they all much the same or are one of these three much better at generating forces when they take a political decision that they will become involved, because there is a really serious problem across the board, it seems to me, that one's method of approaching it would be different if it was merely identical in the case of all three organisations to which we belong or whether there were some which were better at it than others.

  Mr Mathewson: I think as between the EU and NATO the issues are very similar, which is that nations declare what are on the face of it substantial forces, but those forces have not yet properly adapted to the requirements of deployable, sustainable expeditionary forces. NATO has issued planning guidance set out in its comprehensive political guidance about what sorts of forces it needs, emphasising the need to be able to deploy, sustain and reinforce on a deployed mission. Those are essentially the same requirements as exist for an EU mission. So the challenge on the EU is essentially the same, albeit at a slightly lower scale and not across the full range of potential operations. I think what we are seeing in Kosovo and in Chad, part of it is aspects of a similar problem, that while nations have substantial Armed Forces they have not yet made the investment in the capabilities that make them deployable, whether that is deployable medical facilities, logistic support, the airlift. I think the scale of the problem is probably the same and the nature of the problem is probably the same for NATO and the EU. I think for the United Nations it is slightly different in that most of the logistics of what I think is provided essentially through UN arrangements, and they have their own logistic arrangements with which you, my Lord, will be more familiar than I am. There is less of a presumption in generating forces for UN peacekeeping that they are as fully deployable and fully as capable as they are for NATO and the EU operations.

  Q75  Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Although from what the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping is saying about the Darfur operation they are facing similar problems, although they are compounded by the unhelpfulness of the government of Sudan to allow certain units to be involved, but they do seem to be suffering from force generating capability problems too in that one. But I think there is a briefing by Lord Malloch-Brown and the Secretary of State for International Development this afternoon, so I will not waste more time at this meeting pursuing the matter here because I would like to raise it there.

Chairman: Thank you very much for having gone through the questions which we had let you have in advance. Can I thank you Mr Mathewson, Professor Sutton and Captain Stokes, we are really very grateful for you to coming to spend so much time with us and to enable us to really explore these things because it is, I think, probably only in this Committee that it is possible to go into some depth about our relations with the EU on defence matters—at least this end of the building—and we are therefore really grateful that you have found time to come to talk to us. I think you may be coming back with some of your DFID colleagues in the New Year to discuss some of the paper on fragile states and security, which was also discussed at the meeting on 19 November. Thank you very much for this morning's evidence.





 
previous page contents next page

House of Lords home page Parliament home page House of Commons home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2008