Examination of Witnesses (Questions 380-399)
Major Andrew Mallia
28 NOVEMBER 2007
Q380 Baroness Henig: If there was
a particular emergency in which there was an operation co-ordinated
by Frontex, what would be the relationship then with the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees? In other words, what is their relationship
with Frontex and with the operations?
Major Mallia: The UNHCR have a permanent representative
in Warsaw with Frontex, so they already have a very close liaison
with the UNHCR.
Q381 Baroness Henig: Is that repeated
at your—
Major Mallia: It would not be repeated at the
ICC (International Co-ordination Centre) level which is conducting
the operation. The reason for that is because the ICC has a more
operational character and is supposed to concentrate on the conduct
of operations. I have personally never experienced anything similar;
however, I would assume that the co-ordination can happen very
rapidly then at Frontex head office or headquarters level because
Frontex is in constant contact with the ICC and if they receive
information which they think is of interest for the UNHCR, they
have a UNHCR person with them now. That has definitely improved
the liaison. As I have said, my personal opinion would be that
the ICC is not the place to conduct this liaison because of the
operational nature of what is happening. It is possibly too close
to events. It is possibly more appropriate that this is happening
at Frontex head office level.
Q382 Baroness Henig: The Commission
say that between January and August 2006 14,567 irregular migrants
landed on Lampedusa and 1,502 irregular migrants landed in Malta.
I wonder whether you would be happy to comment on these figures.
Major Mallia: I can comment on the figure for
Malta. I am not able to confirm or deny the figure for Italy;
I can, however, confirm that the figure for Malta for January
to August 2006 is correct. For January to August of this year,
to offer some comparison, the number was down slightly to about
1,379; however, that was more a seasonal fluctuation rather than
any substantial reduction. This year the figures are less than
100 less than last year in total, and the year has not yet finished
and there are still boats out there. Obviously you can see the
substantial difference for Lampedusa and Malta. The reasons behind
that are numerous. First of all, the types of craft used on the
two migrations are different. The craft used on the route passing
by Lampedusa will be large fishing boats carrying between 200
and 400 people and therefore a single craft means that you have
200 to 400 people on your doorstep. In our case, they are much
smaller craft, carrying between 25 and 35 people. It does not
reflect any less work. The number of cases which we are having
to handle may be the same: their cases are larger and our cases
are smaller. The other point is that Lampedusa is obviously recognised
as part of Italy and the migrants know they will be spending very
little time on Lampedusa, they will be very quickly transferred
to the Italian mainland. Despite it being an even smaller island
than Malta, and even more remote in some senses, politically it
is part of the Italian mainland, so reaching Lampedusa means that
you have reached Italy. It is a more convenient way of doing it
because the distances are shorter. Obviously Malta is less targeted,
in the sense that arriving in Malta, because of the Dublin II
Convention you are staying in Malta. There is nowhere much else
to go. The acceptance rates are reasonably high when it comes
to applications for refugee status and for protected status but
obviously Lampedusa continues to be more attractive. That probably
accounts for the difference in numbers.
Q383 Chairman: You confirmed that
figure of 1,502 for Malta. I know you cannot be precise and you
may think it is an unfair question, but what sort of volume is
there that you do not know about?
Major Mallia: That is an extremely difficult
question to answer. I can say that we do see a number of other
craft passing by who refuse assistance, who refuse to allow us
to aid them in any manner, and, basically, just want to be left
alone. Our actions in this case would be to remain in their vicinity—and
in a number of cases this has proved very fortuitous because they
have capsized later on in their voyage—and, as soon as they
start approaching Italy, to inform our Italian colleagues. But
I would say that this year we have had 1,700 almost entering Malta
and at least that much again passing by—at least. But it
is extremely difficult to put a handle on it, for a number of
reasons. We are not aware of all the craft. We are having multiple
reportings of the same craft and it is very hard sometimes to
separate these into different craft or collate them into a single
craft, so it is difficult to put an exact handle on that, my Lord
Chairman.
Q384 Lord Harrison: A warm welcome,
Major Mallia—especially to someone born in Oxford! UNHCR
says that three out of ten of those who landed in Malta in 2006
were recognised as refugees or accorded humanitarian status. How
does Malta deal with the other seven out of ten? If this is a
problem—and I am sure it is—what help is given by
other Member States and what further help might we or others,
the Italians, give to assist Malta in dealing with that problem
of the seven out of ten?
Major Mallia: Before answering this question,
I must point out that this is something which I had to go to my
colleagues in the police and literally research in detail with
them, because, once the case of an individual has been decided
then, again, it becomes a police competency as to what then happens
to that person. Basically, after the three out of ten have been
accepted, either as refugees or have been accorded humanitarian
status, in the case of the seven out of ten they will be subject
to repatriation. That is obviously a much more complex situation
than one would think because the first thing you have to do is
to establish their identity and their nationality. In some cases,
that is reasonably easy. In those countries where we have diplomatic
representations in Malta, for instance Egypt, the Egyptian Ambassador
has become an expert in this regard and he can immediately tell
you from which suburb of Cairo that individual has come because
of his accent. It is very easy to establish the fact that they
are Egyptians and the Egyptians are very forthcoming in issuing
travel documents for those individuals. In the case of other countries,
it is much more difficult for a number of reasons. First of all,
we do not have the diplomatic representations permanently in Malta,
so an ambassador or a member of the Embassy would have to come
to Malta from either Tripoli or Rome in most cases. Secondly,
especially in Central Africa, you will find ethnic groups distributed
over a number of countries, so being able to find that the individual
is from a particular ethnic group does not give you the country
he is from, it narrows it down to maybe three, so then we have
to still work further to identify exactly which country. Once
you have got to that stage, the issuing of travel documents can
take a substantial period of time and sometimes the travel documents
have to be returned and updated for new requirements of, for instance,
the EU. They must contain other security features, et cetera,
et cetera, or they would be inadequate for that person to travel
on. The final problem is then making the travel arrangements for
that individual, which in some cases can prove difficult. In all
cases, it is extremely expensive. This is one area where we are
co-operating within Europe, and that is on joint repatriation
flights, so you have an aircraft departing from Germany with,
say, ten individuals who are being returned to Nigeria, it will
be stopping in Italy for another five or six individuals, landing
in Malta for another two individuals and then continuing the flight.
That does decrease the costs overall. If we cannot identify where
a particular person is from, then, at the end of that day, that
person becomes an illegal migrant in Malta, with very few rights
to work, et cetera, but no possibility of sending him home. That
is the major problem here. It is not the genuine refugees who
are causing the problem; it is these persons who have no right
to any status but cannot be returned because it is impossible
to establish where they are from. There was a project at one point,
which was funded, if I am correct, by the Commission, to provide
expert interviewers to try to establish where these persons had
come from but it fell into the same pitfall as the diplomatic
representatives: "Yes, I can tell you he is from Mali, Chad
or Niger" but that is not much of a starting point. It has
narrowed it down but it has not given us the exact information
to allow us to be able to repatriate this person. What more can
be done at the European level? On an individual basis, there are
a number of countries which are assisting us, in that they are
taking genuine refugees and already reducing that part of the
burden. The Netherlands have been notable in this regard. The
Baltic Republics have taken one or two—as a gesture more
than anything else, but a much appreciated gesture, I should note.
The US is accepting a substantial number as well under a resettlement
programme. The danger of that is obviously that it starts to generate
a pull factor. It starts to become a target for why you should
try to get to Malta, because all of a sudden the United States
is offering so many places to get to the US this year. You have
to be very careful with that. On the other hand, there is always
the question of Dublin II—which remains a problem because
Dublin II for us means that whoever applies for asylum in Malta
cannot apply anywhere else within Europe, they cannot move anywhere
else within Europe. Relaxation of the Dublin II would be another
particular area where at least some relief would be felt. Another
proposal which happened recently, although a very specific proposal,
regarded those persons rescued outside the Maltese Search and
Rescue Region—of which we have had a number of cases. While
being brought sometimes to Malta, the Maltese proposal, which
was made by our Minister of Justice and Home Affairs, was basically
that there should be sharing mechanism for these persons: that,
because they are not the direct responsibility of any EU state,
there should be a pre-established mechanism by where they are
shared, so to speak, across the EU Member States, and, therefore,
obviously sharing the burden. That is an ongoing process. I would
not be competent to speak at what stage that has arrived. Perhaps
the High Commissioner can clarify further on that. It is one of
the other ways in which we are seeing that we can reduce the pressure
which is directly on them.
Lord Harrison: Thank you for the clarity in
your answer.
Q385 Baroness Tonge: Welcome and
thank you for coming. In May of this year it was reported that
57 Eritreans were lost from a vessel off the coast of Malta and
have not been seen since. Could you explain what steps were taken
at that time by the Maltese authorities and could more be done
in the future to deal with emergencies like that?
Major Mallia: I am very familiar with this particular
case. I was the co-ordinator for this particular case, so I can
answer that with some authority, so to speak. First of all, the
reporting was extremely poor. "Off the coast of Malta"
was initially 200 kilometres from Malta, closer both to Libya
and to Lampedusa, so you have to put that into perspective. We
initially received the call from a third party, likely a migrant
who was already in Malta, who called to say that a friend or relative
of his was aboard this boat, and, as usual, provided a satellite
telephone number which was on board the boat. All the boats are
equipped with a satellite telephone, given to them by the traffickers,
which allows them to call for help and to call relatives, and,
because it has an embedded GPS, it also provides the navigation
details. That is standard procedure. On initially receiving the
call, which was about six o'clock in the morning, because the
position we were given was still within the Libyan Search and
Rescue Region, our first step was to inform the Libyan authorities.
At the same time the Italian authorities had also received a second
call on the same case and at that time we started exchanging faxes
and telephone calls of what we knew and what we were doing at
that time. We did not receive a response from the Libyan authorities
in this particular case, so, as first Rescue Co-ordination Centre—thus
that centre still responsible for the case—we continued
to monitor the progress of this boat by regular contacts with
these people. At one point, they had stated that they were in
a position within the Maltese Search and Rescue Region, their
craft was adrift and that they required assistance. We immediately
deployed a vessel from Malta and, as we normally do, also an aircraft.
The reason we deploy the aircraft is because sometimes the positions
are not exact and that gives us a very quick handle on the situation.
I think two hours after the initial alert we had an aircraft on
scene—which also took those pictures which were then shown
in the media. The craft did seem adrift. It did not seem to be
making way at that time. It took approximately seven hours for
our boat to transit from Malta to the position—which also
gives you a feel of how far away it was. Obviously during that
time the aircraft was withdrawn for refuelling and sent again
to the position. On arriving in the position, it did not find
a boat, neither in the position where it had been initially sighted
nor within a substantial radius around it. We had also alerted
merchant shipping in the area to be alert for this craft but we
received no reports from merchant shipping of the sighting of
this craft and therefore our vessel which arrived in the area
began a search. During this search it found a second craft with
25 people on board which had just capsized. It conducted the rescue
of those persons and proceeded directly to Malta because a number
of them required medical assistance. The next day we flew a further
sortie with an aircraft and also liaised with the Italian Rescue
Co-ordination Centre in Rome to fly at least one sortie in the
area and ask any other aircraft in the area to keep a sharp look
out, and they found nothing. Given that a number of the people
on board this craft were wearing life-jackets and there were a
number of empty fuel receptacles which could be seen visibly in
the photo, it is highly unlikely that a boat like that would sink
without leaving at least minimal trace. Some three days later
we noted on a couple of Eritrean websites which are of the Eritrean
nationalists that this craft had been reported to have arrived
again in Libya. Basically they had lost their way and they had
landed again in Libya. Obviously we are not able to confirm the
veracity of those reports but that is the only information further
that we have on the case. Could we have done more? When we look
at our search and rescue plan and the way it is set out, I think
we reacted fully in accordance with it. The only unknown was that
when we got there we found another craft, so, instead of searching
for longer, we had to return to base. But that is the nature of
the game and there was very little we could do about that. We
did search the area extremely well, both ourselves and the Italians.
The only thing we cannot allow for is if a boat is continuing
on its course. We can find a drifting object quite easily but
a boat being driven in a particular direction, God knows which
direction, is very difficult to find because we do not know what
the person driving that boat is thinking. We could not really
have done much more and I have my doubts whether this craft disappeared
so completely as was said by the press.
Q386 Baroness Tonge: The obvious
question is: Did you have any contact with Libya after that? Do
we have any idea whether they did in fact arrive? Does Malta have
any formal contact with Libya?
Major Mallia: At the time, contacts were not
particularly good. We had made a written request, asking whether
they could confirm the report that this boat had arrived—and
I cannot confirm but I think the Italians did the same as well.
We did not receive a response to that. Currently things are improving.
We have already been to Libya on a bilateral visit; we hope to
host them in Malta in January; and we are working on drawing up
a search and rescue agreement between the two sides. We hope that
that will improve the relations in general. The problem is more
identifying which is the agency responsible rather than any lack
of effort on their part. It is just a complicated system.
Q387 Chairman: Lady Tonge, before
you go on, I wonder whether I could put another question. I visited
earlier this year an extraordinary establishment in Stavanger
in Norway. Whilst I was there, a report came in of a boat occupied
by potential refugees which was drifting without fuel or food
or water 200 miles in the Indian Ocean east of Djibouti. The organisation
in Stavanger organised the rescue operation, I think through the
Seychelles in the end. Do you use that organisation in Stavanger
at all?
Major Mallia: The RCC in Stavanger is one of
the RCCs within the global SAR system. They are a particularly
co-operative one, it must be said. They are known for the high
level of work they do. However, this necessity of co-ordinating
out of area operations is something which we are all faced with.
RCC Malta will co-ordinate or at least observe any rescue case
in the world which has a Maltese registered ship—and that
is 27 million tonnes of shipping. We would regularly be monitoring
a search and rescue case off Japan or possibly in the Americas,
so it is a general feature of the global SAR system that the geographical
location of a SAR case does not necessarily dictate who is looking
after it. There is also the principle of first RCC. If you are
the first Rescue Co-ordination Centre to be advised, then you
hold legal responsibility for that case until the competent centre
has taken over. Until they send you a written message confirming
that they are assuming responsibility, you are responsible.
Q388 Lord Mawson: If they had a satellite
phone on this boat, was there communication between the aeroplane
and the boat? How do you deal with the question of language and
understanding the communication? Is there some facility to help
you on that?
Major Mallia: To the first question: no, our
current aircraft are not fitted with a satellite telephone—it
is something we are trying to remedy at this time—so we
did not have direct contact with the craft from the aeroplane.
The language issue is a problem sometimes. We are fortunate in
that, being such a small island, our citizens tend to have reasonably
good language skills, so if it sticks to French, English and Arabic
we can generally get along, and that covers most of the nationalities
with whom we are dealing, either from Francophone Africa or Anglophone
Africa or from Northern Africa, which is generally Arabic and
we have at least two or three fluent Arabic speakers on each boat,
so that is not really that much of an issue.
Q389 Baroness Tonge: What is the
policy of Malta towards merchant vessels who attempt to disembark
unregistered migrants whom they have rescued at sea?
Major Mallia: The last part is a very important
clarification, because when it comes to stowaways who have been
picked up in another port there are clear international rules
for that. Regarding the disembarkation of persons rescued, we
basically act in full accordance with international law as we
have ratified it. I am sure you are all aware that we have not
ratified the 2004 amendments to the SAR and SOLAS conventions,
so we act in a manner as provided by the conventions up until
that point. If persons are rescued within our Search and Rescue
Region we will do everything we can to make sure they are disembarked
to the nearest safe haven. For us, the nearest safe haven is that
port where they can be reasonably easily disembarked—it
does not require a helicopter disembarkation or something of the
sort—where they are assured of medical treatment and all
their basic needs will be seen to, and where, if need be, they
can continue their voyage be it a legitimate one—there is
obviously that issue. If persons are recognised outside the Maltese
Search and Rescue Region then we will generally not accept their
disembarkation in Malta. That has been the case in a number of
cases which have also received much media attention but, again,
the media failed to note the fact that these persons were not
rescued within our Search and Rescue Region. Generally, we would
not. However, that being said, if there are overriding humanitarian
reasons, yes, we would disembark those persons.
Q390 Baroness Tonge: Could the owner
of the merchant vessel not just say, "We have rescued these
people at sea"? How can you prove that they have not? Do
you see what I mean?
Major Mallia: I do. You have no ability to say,
"I can prove that you rescued these persons in this position
and not this position." That is completely true. However,
generally the information given to you by a captain we find is
genuine information. There are a number of reasons for that. Partly
it is because the captain knows that there will be an investigation
into the case and the migrants themselves can produce some information,
being equipped, as I have told you, with GPS embedded phones.
Secondly, in the case of merchant vessels there is an insurance
question here. They are going to be compensated by their insurers
for their rescue activities, so they have to give to their insurers
the exact starting time and the exact ending time and the exact
starting time position and any position of those activities, and
that information can easily be cross-checked. Generally, I find
the merchant captains are an extremely honest bunch of people.
That is for a number of reasons but also due to the fact that
the type of person selected for that job will generally be quite
a focused, honest individual. We are not talking about people
who are operating on the fringes of society; we are talking about
international citizens, yes, because they come from a complete
variety of countries, but there is an underlying thread of honesty
in all of them, so we very rarely are deceived about where a rescue
has taken place.
Q391 Lord Dear: I would like to ask
you a question about Frontex operations, which switches the focus
from what you have been talking about so far. I do not know whether
you have been involved in Frontex operations. If you have, I would
be very interested in how the duties were allocated between the
Malta authorities and the border guards in other Member States—and
probably that is Italy, from what you have said so far. How would
you split and allocate those responsibilities?
Major Mallia: Frontex operations in general
are managed by an ICC (International Co-ordination Centre). Within
this International Co-ordination Centre there will be a Frontex
representative and there will be a representative from each of
the countries which has assets involved in that Frontex operation,
be they human resources, such as interviewers, or be they operational
resources, such as vessels, aircraft, et cetera. When a joint
operation is prepared, it is prepared by a particular host country.
Together with Frontex, this host country will draw up an operational
plan which will detail the areas where they intend to conduct
operations, the type of activity against which they are conducting
these operations, what they are trying to achieve with these operations,
et cetera, et cetera. At such time as this operational plan is
issued and the various other Member States are asked to pledge
assets towards the operation, they will also have the ability,
if they see fit, to make minor changes to the operational plan
if that is in their particular interest. It is an ongoing process
until literally the last day sometimes. Once the operation starts,
any actions which are to be undertaken by a particular vessel
have to be okayed by the national representative, so if an Italian
or a Spanish vessel or a Greek vessel is operating from Malta
and the overall co-ordinator of the operation, who will be Maltese,
as the host nation, wishes to deploy them in a particular manner,
in a particular place, for a particular role, that would have
to be okayed by the national representative.
Q392 Lord Dear: Who would be there.
Major Mallia: Who would be there in the ICC.
If he is not available physically at that time, he would have
to be contacted before the tasking is given. Generally, national
representatives have the authority to agree on the spot. In some
cases, we have seen them referring it back to national authorities
to ask whether this is go or no go, but generally they will be
on a level that they can okay it on the spot. When operations
are happening at sea, in so far as those operations are surveillance
or border control operations, the ICC will continue to manage
them in this manner. At the time at which the operations become
search and rescue, there is a distress case, operational control
moves away from the ICC and goes to the Rescue Co-ordination Centre
responsible for the geographical area and all the assets will
have to put themselves at the disposal of that Rescue Co-ordination
Centre. He may not use them all, he may decide that I require
only one vessel and one aircraft but they will have to put themselves
at the disposal of the Rescue Co-ordination Centre to allow the
conduct of the normal search and rescue operations. That is basically
how command and control is organised.
Q393 Lord Dear: Could it be improved?
From your experience are there glaring errors in that? Do you
find that you are getting by really by making it work rather than
because the system is geared up perfectly or is it alternatively
working very well and you see little chance of altering it?
Major Mallia: I would always prefer unity of
command to a Chinese parliament, I think that is clear, but that
is probably something to do with my military background rather
than anything else. However, the type of operations which are
happening and the fact that there are so many Member States involved
will necessitate that this consultative process will have to happen.
I have to admit it has worked remarkably well. As long as the
national representatives are given the power to take decisions
on the spot, that is the important decision which has to be made.
Once they are empowered, then things move extremely smoothly.
If—as has happened in rare cases, I admit—they have
to call home and say, "Listen, the Maltese would like to
put our patrol vessel there doing this, that and the other, is
that okay?" then the chain of command starts to become too
unwieldy and too long. The time periods involved are just too
long.
Q394 Lord Dear: You are looking for
as much delegation as possible.
Major Mallia: Yes, although, to be realistic,
delegation of national competencies down to ICC level is about
as far as we will get—at least in the short to medium term.
Q395 Chairman: When we were in Brussels
we met Simon Busuttil, who is, as you perhaps know, a member of
the European Parliament, and he told us that some Member States
which pledge resources towards Frontex operations do not follow
those pledges. In particular, Italy pledged 342 ships to a Frontex
operation in July but made none available in the event. Would
you comment on this. Do you think that Frontex ought to have power
to insist that members make resources available which they have
pledged already?
Major Mallia: I think the first stage of this
is that there was some misunderstanding between Frontex and the
Member States when there was the request for pledges, especially
in those Member States which were pledging military assets. A
pledge does not mean: "I am giving you this asset and it
will be there at a drop of a hat." It is saying, "I
am making these resources available. Sometimes I will be able
to participate; sometimes I will not." That has been the
case, frankly, with Malta as well. We have pledged one of our
largest vessels to the so-called "tool box" as it was
called at the time. We have deployed it on only one operation
in Spain. There were other requests, but at the time we were so
involved in national operations that it was beyond our means to
deploy this vessel. One has to look at these pledges in a very
realistic manner, in the sense that they are what could conceivably
be available rather than what is always available at the drop
of a hat. I do agree that in honouring these pledges there have
been some disappointments and possibly some Member States could/should
have done more. However, speaking from our point of view, one
does also have to appreciate that Malta is not the only Member
State which has an immigration problem. Everyone is under severe
pressure. In cases such as Spain they are under pressure from
two sides, in two oceans rather than just the one, so I understand
that at certain times they have a reluctance to release these
resources. The options to improve this picture are to provide
more resources to the Member States. The External Borders Fund
in fact is giving high priority to those projects which are producing
capabilities which can be deployed, so we will get more co-financing
for such projects and they will be given higher priority. If I
am buying, for instance, as an example, an aircraft which not
only is useful for local operations in Malta but it allows me
to deploy out of area, to Greece and Spain, that would be given
more priority. When one comes to the question of coercion, by
Frontex or any other part of the Commission forcing Member States
to provide these resources, I honestly could not comment on the
legal background to that. I am not sure whether that is legally
possible but, to give you an idea of what could be done, one could
look at NATO and NATO Standing Forces, the Standing Maritime Groups,
for instance, where vessels are pledged in rotation. But, again,
there you have a 50-year history, a 60-year history of the Alliance
working very closely together, there is where you have unified
command now because they are so comfortable working with each
other, and the pledges were entered into by individual states
with the Alliance, not as a blanket measure: "Everybody has
to give you something." I cannot really see any coercion
of the Member States to give resources happening in the near or
medium term.
Q396 Chairman: Mr Busuttil went on
to say: "The Italians in the summer when this happened simply
said that they thought that Frontex missions would never be sufficiently
effective without the participation of Libya because, as you know,
Libya has refused to participate in these missions although it
was repeatedly invited to do so." Would you like to comment
on that?
Major Mallia: I am aware of the Italian position.
It is a position which they have not expressed solely at that
time but also at later dates. It does hold some water to some
extent. On the other hand, the other option is to do nothing,
and that is not an acceptable option for anyone. There are legal
problems involved overall with joint deployments—the obligations
into which states are entering, the obligations which states may
have towards rescued persons, et cetera, et cetera—and these
are an issue at this time. So far they have been handled on a
case-by-case basis, so when an operational plan is drawn up for
a particular operation there will be a set of procedures for that
particular operation and they may be different somewhere else.
Something in which I will be engaged tomorrow—because unfortunately
I am not returning home, I am heading off to Brussels—is
that all the Member States, together with the Commission and Frontex,
are working on providing clear legal guidelines. These will be
provided to all the Member States, to all the joint operations,
and these will allow a much more clear view of what obligations
each state will be getting into when they get into joint operations.
I think they will serve to allay the concerns of a number of Member
States. I must also say that, despite that statement by Italy,
Italy has been participating in joint operations. In the second
stage of Nautilus they were there in a relatively substantial
way. They were operating generally from Lampedusa rather than
from Malta—but that was for logistical and technical reasons
and we had no problem with that—and, as far as I am aware,
they participated with at least three boats, one aircraft and
two helicopters in the second phase of Nautilus which was in September/October.
A practical change of heart has happened for sure. Whether it
is a change of heart at the higher levels I cannot comment, but
they were definitely there for phase II of our joint operation.
Q397 Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbottts:
I wonder if we can drill down a bit and talk about "pledge"
as opposed to "conceivably available". Particularly,
you sent this very helpful paper, where, in paragraph 13, you
say that some of this "reluctance to provide surface assets
is related to the fact that no clear solution exists as to where
any rescued persons are to be disembarked". In the context
of Frontex operations, what relevant directions or guidelines
are given? Are they satisfactory to you? Could you give some specific
examples of how this works so that we can feed them back into
the question of disembarkation and the lack of assets?
Major Mallia: The question of guidance regarding
disembarkation has so far been handled on an ad hoc basis.
For a particular joint operation the participating countries and
the effective countries will sit down in a room, discuss the operational
plan, which, among other things, will address this issue of disembarkation,
and there will be some practical solution to it which is literally
working at the lowest level. It is not something which is based
on a general principle. It was made very clear by all parties
involved that it does not reflect a general position, it reflects
an ad hoc arrangement. This obviously is not satisfactory
for many of the Member States; it does not provide the stability
which they want. That is why now we are looking at it as a working
group and trying to identify the exact legal regime so that we
can provide a set of blanket rules. Even that itself is not an
easy task: there are different interpretations, there are different
levels of ratification of legal instruments, so that does also
pose a number of problems. On the other hand, we are making very
reasonable progress towards it and I think that is the only solution
to this issue, having a set of guidelines which provide stability
over time, so that any Member State when assessing whether it
wants to or does not want to participate in joint operations has
a clear legal framework from the word go. The ad hoc arrangements,
while they generally work, are not sustainable. We cannot continue
to make ad hoc arrangements for every operation.
Q398 Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts:
You say you are making progress towards the principles. When is
that?
Major Mallia: As far as I am aware, the Commission
has to report back to the Council either in January or February
of next year. I stand to be corrected, however, on that particular
date.
Q399 Chairman: We are going to move
in a short moment to a number of questions about RABITs, but,
just to complete the questioning about Frontex, I wonder if I
could ask what you think Frontex could do to give more help in
safeguarding its borders.
Major Mallia: As you probably know, there has
already been a substantial increase in the budget allocated to
Frontex for 2008 and that alone will prove of significant assistance
to Malta because it has provided for the joint operation around
Malta to be extended for a much longer period than was the case
this year. We are hoping to conduct the operation for a constant
five, possibly six months compared to a total of two and a half
months this year with a break in between. That is the first area
where we see Frontex definitely assisting us in safeguarding our
borders (that is, joint operations). Frontex also has a useful
risk-analysis role. We would like to see that strengthened. As
far as I am aware, in the business plan for 2008, in the light
of the new funding, risk analysis is one of the areas which is
going to be addressed. Knowing the trends and what we are going
to be facing over the next couple of years will be very useful
to us. There is the question of whether Frontex should be operating
its own resources. As we have said before, we feel this is a complicated
situation, both for Frontex and for the Member States. If Frontex
decides to operate ships and aircraft, they will have to carry
someone's registration and someone's flag, so someone will be
responsible for them and therefore you cannot remove their national
nature. We do not see that, therefore, as a particularly practical
solution. Training is also another area where Frontex has already
delivered and is continuing to deliver more. We are finding very
useful training opportunities with Frontex, a lot of which are
offered at no cost to us, which is obviously a major incentive.
We have a very limited training budget and it has to cover all
our competencies, not just border control, so that is another
area where Frontex is developing. The one area where we would
like to see Frontex move ahead at greater speed is in its role
as the contact point between the European Union and third states.
Frontex has been empowered to conduct these negotiations with
third states, they bring with them the leverage of the Commission,
rather than the leverage of a single state, and in addressing
the problems on the Northern African rim, most specifically with
Libya, we feel that Frontex can take a much more substantial role
and should take a much more substantial role because of their
supranational character and because of the fact that they bring
with them the weight of the complete union rather than just a
single Member State. That is one area where we would really like
to see Frontex pushing forward at some speed.
Chairman: Lord Teverson, I think you might have
another question to wind up on Frontex and then perhaps you might
turn to the questions on RABITs.
|
