Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 400-401)

Major Andrew Mallia

28 NOVEMBER 2007

  Q400  Lord Teverson: Indeed. Thank you, my Lord Chairman. What is the experience of Malta in receiving the resources it needs to mount operations through pledges from Frontex? I know we have dealt with this to a degree and you sounded a little bit more satisfied with the way things are going. Forgive me for having left the room briefly but I was trying to postpone my next meeting so that I could hear your full evidence, which I am very keen to do. It is clear that you believe this is a young organisation that is developing—and you have gone through some of the areas that you think it should develop to—but do you believe that, despite those issues, it has added value generally to what you are trying to do so far, given its youth? Particularly, this is coming back this area of the resources it needs to mount operations through pledges.

  Major Mallia: When it comes to resources, obviously Frontex has to balance the demands of various Member States. The joint operation which is happening around Malta is not the sole joint operation that is happening at sea. We are well aware that operations are happening around the Canaries; the West Mediterranean; the East Mediterranean, where we have participated. Last week I was in Lisbon and it was stated very clearly by the Director of Frontex, Ilkka Laitinen, that they are trying to rationalise the number of joint operations which are happening. They are seeing that there are many proposals for joint operations but now they are going to have to accept the fact that the resources will always be limited and that they are going to have to prioritise operations in regard to the limited funding available. They are going to do that by risk analysis. That is one step forward. It is clear to us that we cannot expect to be the sole joint operation, or the most important possibly; however, we feel comfortable that with an assessment done on risk analysis we will be receiving adequate funding. Obviously some operations will lose funding, some will possibly lose funding completely and will not occur, and others will gain funding. The manner in which that funding is given, as I have said, is reasonably simple when you compare it to other EU financial instruments. It is a very simple system of funding: it is directly to the operators rather than going through some chain of administrators and it is reasonably prompt. As far as can be expected when you are talking about the sums involved and the bureaucracy which goes with it, we are happy about the promptness. When it comes to the value added by Frontex, if we were to assume for a moment that Frontex did not exist we would still be conducting operations. That is clear. This is not something which is happening because Frontex is in existence. However, where Frontex has helped, at least in the Maltese experience—and I cannot speak for any other Member State—is that, because of our limited size, because of our limited financial resources, Frontex is doing things for us to which previously we could not have dedicated all the resources we would have liked. An example would be risk assessment. We are a military organisation. We do have an intelligence organisation within the military organisation, but they are not solely involved in migration. We cannot dedicate that amount of resources, both human and financial, and time to assessing that particular problem. Frontex is doing that for us as a third party—as a subcontractor, if you would like to put it that way. If I might turn to joint operations: joint operations happened before Frontex, mostly on a bilateral basis, but happening on a multinational basis did not exist before Frontex. I think Frontex has been the vehicle for that. We have yet to see the real rewards of conducting business in this manner. I cannot tell you now whether we have found joint operations to be a very, very good thing or a very, very bad thing. They have definitely had some positive effect but to give you a real assessment would have to be a couple of years down the road—they are still too new—but they would not have happened without Frontex, I firmly believe. The final area is that Frontex has got more people talking to each other and, strangely enough, both within Member States and between Member States. To give you the example of Italy, the organisations in Italy did not have particularly good co-operation before Frontex. Their co-operation has improved. I have heard it said by Italians themselves, because they are sitting at the same meetings and having to co-operate. This has happened in Malta: our co-operation with the police has improved because of Frontex, because now we are involved in joint conferences, we are involved in joint projects, we are involved in working groups together. This has improved both inter-force liaison within the Member States and, most definitely, the liaison between the Member States. We are talking on a much more regular basis. Sometimes it is just talking shop, just talking general trends, but sometimes it is talking very, very important issues which normally would not have been handled. As a clearing house, in a way, Frontex is adding value. It now remains to be seen in which direction Frontex decides to go. I personally—and this is something which we have also submitted in our written evidence—do not think Frontex should go down the operational path. Frontex should not be an operational organisation, it should be an organisation which co-ordinates, which brings people together, which looks after relations with third countries. That, I think, is where its strengths should lie.

  Q401  Lord Teverson: That is very interesting. Thank you very much. Finally, could we turn to "RABITs"—the terrible term for the Rapid Border Intervention Teams. Have Maltese border guards participated in RABIT operations? What is the future for that? Do you see RABITs as a positive, added value? Perhaps I can ask you at the same time the other question which you will have seen which is about the carrying of weapons. In which scenarios would you envisage weapons would be needed to be used in the exercise of border operations? You have said you carry weapons but how they are used or the context is very different between civilian and military. Do you think the safeguards are adequate?

  Major Mallia: Let me start by speaking about RABITs in general. Regarding RABIT deployments: as far as I am aware, none have as yet happened—and I received an update on RABITs again last week in Portugal. What has occurred is a test deployment to Portugal of a RABIT team, which, as far as I am aware, was approximately 20 people and was an air borders team. That was just a test exercise, a test deployment. RABITs would probably have their major applications on land and air borders, but I say that because, when you look at the pledges of Member States to RABITs, how many experts they will be giving, you do not see the ships which come with them. They are not equipped to operate in the maritime environment. Operating on the maritime/land interface, yes—possibly interviewing people who have been brought in, et cetera—but I see their main role on land and air borders. They will be useful as a rapid reaction force in cases of real emergencies. The example which was given at the conference last weekend is an actual example: when you have a sudden influx, for instance, of South American citizens towards Spain, trying to pass through the airports, but that is a very particular scenario and the RABITs are a very particular tool. They can only be deployed for very short periods—28 to 30 days, if I am correct—and, again, they are literally the warm bodies. They are not the equipment, really. They are the people. It cannot be an equipment-intensive task which they are going to do, unless they are operating the equipment of the host nation. It remains to be seen how often Member States will ask for a RABIT deployment—because I am sure you are aware it is something which has to be asked for by a particular Member State. Also, on effectiveness when they deploy: there were a number of minor issues in this test deployment, one of which was associated with weapons—and I will speak about that in the answer to the second part of your question. I do think, however, that they are a useful concept, in that you may need to get a number of experts to a place in a hurry to advise on a particular issue or a particular situation. As an operational force patrolling the borders I see less of a value for it, but it remains to be seen. They are a very, very new institution and I think the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. Regarding weapons: one of the contentious issues in the RABIT regulation was this issue of carrying of weapons in a third country by border guards from another Member State. There were a number of restrictions placed upon this. The first of those was that only if the Member State border guards are carrying weapons should the RABIT team carry weapons and they should be of a similar level as those for the host nation. So it is not to be expected that the host nation will be carrying side arms while RABITs roll up in a tank, obviously. The other issue which, unfortunately, was not so clear in the RABIT regulation, if I am correct, was the issue of what we would term a status of forces agreement. There has to be a very clear legal chain and a clear jurisdiction to which these deployed forces are subject, because, if something happens, as it inevitably one day will, we will have to see the liability of that deployed border guard. Is he liable to the host state? Is he liable in his Member State? He definitely cannot be liable in both. That would lead to a number of problems. There does need to be a certain clarity in the status of the individuals deployed. Weapons do have a role in border control, unfortunately. It is an unfortunate fact but it is a fact. Speaking from personal experience, we regularly conduct rescues of in excess of 100 migrants, by a boat which has a crew of 20 people. So you immediately have a law and order issue: you have 100 people on one side and 20 on the other and you have to keep a very strict control of matters. It is a fact that we have often found these people carry weapons: knives, shanks (a sharp object with a wooden handle) and various other bits and pieces. So far, there have been no firearms, I am glad to say. The weapons have two roles in such a scenario. The first is, literally, the visual impact of the fact that the people are carrying weapons. It immediately acts as a deterrent: if somebody is going to do something silly, he will certainly think about it twice. The second reason we carry weapons—and it comes from our rules of engagement—is for self-protection, protection of third parties (that is, when there is an act happening), or, if it is the last resort, to prevent that act even happening, so as a deterrent. These are issues which are rarely talked about but unfortunately do exist. There is a security threat on board a small boat when you have rescued 100 people. You have to keep the situation well under control. There are enough hazards on board as it is. There are the medical hazards involved in picking up these people, who carry a number of diseases which are no longer present here in Europe—and this has also been another issue which we have had to address. So weapons are unfortunately a necessity when conducting such operations. There is one area where I think this could be improved upon. I am sure you are all aware of the common core curriculum, which is another Frontex project to try to give a basic level of training for border guards. I think it would be very reassuring for all Member States if the common core curriculum contained weapon safety training and rules of engagement, because then I am assured that the RABIT being sent to my country has a basic knowledge of which I know exactly what the points are: I know how he is using his weapon; how he will be handling his weapon; what his safety procedures are. That would be much more reassuring. It is a simple tool of training but it would be a common training for all EU border guards.

  Chairman: Are there any other questions.

  Baroness Henig: I would just like to say that was excellent clarification of all the issues.

  Chairman: Major Mallia, I would like to thank you for what I think has been an outstanding presentation. You have been clear, you have been helpful and you have been most interesting. I would like to say that I think many ministers I have known over many years in this House, at both ends of it, could well have taken advantage of sitting and listening to the way you have answered our questions. I can only think you will not be a Major for much longer and I congratulate you very warmly on the way you have answered our questions. Thank you very much.



 
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