Memorandum by the Coalition for the Reform
Treaty (CRT)
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Coalition for the Reform Treaty
(CRT) is a network of organisations and individuals advancing
a positive view on the proposed EU Reform Treaty.
1.2 The principles of the CRT are as follows:
— The UK and its citizens derive significant
benefit from membership of the EU.
— The EU's successful enlargements,
which have increased membership from 15 in 2004 to 27 members
today, necessitate reform of its institutions.
— The Reform Treaty is in Britain's
interests as well as the European Union's because it will lead
to more efficient, effective and democratic decision-making.
— Agreement and ratification of the
Treaty by all 27 EU Member States will help the Union to focus
on the issues that really matter: competitiveness, social and
consumer policy, and the EU's role in tackling global challenges
such as trade liberalisation and climate change.
1.3 The CRT has both individual supporters
and member organisations. The member organisations of the CRT
are as follows:
— All-party Group on Europe.
— Business for New Europe.
— European League of Economic Cooperation.
— Global Policy Institute.
— Jean Monnet Association.
— Labour Movement for Europe.
— Liberal Democrat European Group.
— Weidenfeld Institute for Strategic
Dialogue.
2. GENERAL ARGUMENTS
FOR THE
REFORM TREATY
2.1 The CRT supports the Reform Treaty because
we believe that its provisions will result in the EU's institutions
becoming more efficient, effective and democratic.
2.2 Though we do not view the Reform Treaty
as a panacea for the EU, we do see it as a positive step in the
right direction. The origins of the changes encapsulated in the
Reform Treaty lie in the policy of enlargement. The enlargements
of 2004 and 2007, allowing the EU to take in a total of 12 new
member countries, have dramatically changed not only the size
but also the challenges it faces. The majority of new members
are former communist countries from central and eastern Europe
who are often reform-minded, often share the British government's
economic reform instincts. All three major UK political parties
were rightly supportive of EU enlargement and we should bear in
mind that this Treaty is addressing the consequences of such enlargement.
The debates about the similarities and differences between the
Constitutional Treaty and the Reform Treaty often overlook the
essential point that both Treaties are seeking to address the
same problem, namely providing the EU with suitable tools to function
with an enlarged membership.
2.3 The EU's institutions are much maligned
and misunderstood in the UK. Many people think of the European
Commission as a large unwieldy bureaucracy, and are surprised
to hear that it is transparent and accessible organisation, with
a total staff numbering less than a large city council in Britain.
The most important point is that the EU institutions do not exist
for their own sake, but are needed to deliver and implement the
EU's policy remit. For instance, if we want to see a fully functioning
single market, this must be underpinned by an effective European
Commission and European Court of Justice to enforce the EU's regulations.
2.4 The Treaty is designed to help the EU
work better. While it is hyberbolic to claim that enlargement
has made the EU decision-making machinery unworkable, there has
been evidence of some slow-down in decision-making in the policy
areas of JHA and foreign affairs (Centre for European Reform policy
brief "Why Treaty change matters for business and for Britain",
May 2007). Furthermore, even though there has not been a profound
short-term impact, there is a danger of the EU's creaky institutions
rusting in the long-term unless these reforms are adopted. It
is untenable for the rules of the Union which were designed for
6 or 12 member states to apply to a much larger EU of 27 members
(and possibly more in the future).
2.5 The ratification of the Treaty by the
UK and the other member states will enable the EU to shift from
its internal debate about institutions to an outwards-facing one
about policy delivery. The EU needs to focus on competitiveness,
social, environmental and consumer policy, and its role in tackling
global challenges such as trade liberalisation and climate change.
There is a cross-party consensus in the UK that the EU has an
important policy agenda, encompassing globalisation, advancing
international development and combating climate change. In order
to meet these massive policy challenges, the EU needs to draw
a line under the institutional debate as soon as possible.
2.6 We believe that the UK debate on the
Treaty in recent months has been pointing in a negative direction.
We would like to see the government advance more positive arguments
for the Treaty, using it as an opportunity to make the wider case
for Europe in the UK. Many of the changes made in the Treaty should
be welcomed, and we would support political leaders accentuating
some of the positive changes precipitated by the Treaty.
3. SPECIFIC ISSUES
IN THE
TREATY
3.1 European Council President
— The Presidency of the Council that
rotates every six months may have worked well in an EU of 12 or
15 member states. However, in a Union of 27 member states this
modus operandi is impractical. It means that smaller member states
are left with the onerous task of managing the Presidency for
which they are often ill-equipped.
— Also the current system lacks continuity,
with Presidency programmes or policy agendas becoming obsolete
in six months. The proposal to create a permanent non-executive
Presidency, therefore will give the EU better coordination and
continuity.
— The new Council President, whose
duties include chairing meetings of the European Council, will
be able to devote his/her full energies to the job. This contrasts
with the current set-up, whereby a national politician chairs
the council for six months at a time.
— The proposal of a permanent Presidency
has caused some consternation in parts of the British media (with
some stories even suggesting that the position will supplant the
Queen as Head of State), and has been wrongly interpreted as a
move towards a super-state. Yet the fact is that the President
will have no executive powers and is the mouthpiece of member
states. One could argue that this measure actually constitutes
a strengthening of the nation state, as it will improve the functioning
of the Council of Ministers, the European institution in which
national governments are represented.
— We welcome the fact that national
governments will elect the Council President for a term of 30
months (renewable once). This means that the President is accountable
to leaders of national governments. Besides there are already
Presidents in the other two EU institutions, namely the European
Commission and the European Parliament.
3.2 Team Presidencies
— The permanent Presidency will be
supported by team presidencies of 3 member for a period of 18
months, which again should provide more continuity than is the
case at the moment, with the Presidency switching every six months.
— The Permanent President, along with
team Presidencies, is something that could have salutary effects.
One of the features of the present system is that national governments
may work in a silo while carrying out their Presidency. But under
the proposed new arrangements of team Presidencies, there will
be greater collaboration and cooperation between member state
governments, which will improve not only a set of bilateral relationship
but the quality of working relationships at EU level.
3.3 Voting system in the Council of Ministers
— The Treaty introduces some much needed
reform to the Council voting system to make it proportionate with
population. The introduction of "double majority" will
mean that a measure can only be passed with 55% of member states
representing 65% of the EU's population.
— Furthermore since the Treaty of Nice,
voting weights in the Council have been lop-sided, with the largest
member states not receiving their fair share of the vote. The
UK is set to increase its overall voting weight from 8.4% to 12.2%,
an increase in its share of 45%. In addition, the change in the
voting system is set to increase the UK's share of a blocking
minority from 32% to 35%.
— Majority voting is sometimes perceived
in the UK as something to be feared, but it offers the possibility
for the UK to overcome obstruction from other countries. This
highlights the importance of the UK building up fruitful alliances
at EU level, and the recent enlargements have provided the UK
with a larger pool of potential allies.
3.4 High Representative on Foreign Affairs
— The proposal to merge the positions
of EU High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner for External
Relations into one role, the High Representative, is a logical
step and should make the EU more efficient.
— A single figure head will make consensual
EU foreign policy more efficient and effective. This increase
in efficiency has been highlighted by some of our EU partners.
— However, the decision-making method
for policies in the area of foreign affairs will remain as it
is under the current treaties, namely unanimity. This means that
the UK will act together with other EU member states only when
it decides it wants to.
— Rumours that the amalgamation of
the two posts into the High Representative would result in the
UK losing its seat on the UN Security Council are without foundation,
and an instructive example of the hyperbolic European debate in
the UK slipping into distortion and inaccuracy.
3.5 The European Parliament
— The expansion of the EU has had a
significant impact on the nature of the European Parliament. Obviously
there are sensible limits to the size of membership of any legislature
before it becomes unwieldy and unworkable. We therefore welcome
capping the size of the European Parliament at 750 members. We
note that this will affect the total number of British MEPs, but
understand that this is an important step if the European Parliament
is to remain a central, efficient actor in the EU system.
— In addition, the extension of the
co-decision procedure should strengthen the role of the European
Parliament, which is something we welcome.
3.6 Number of European Commissioners
— With the enlargement of the EU, it
is important to review the number of European Commissioners. Like
the European Parliament, the college of Commissioners has to be
a reasonable size to function. The moves to reduce the number
of European Commissioners to two thirds that of the number of
member states is welcome. Concretely it means that, as of 2014,
the EU will have 18 Commissioners (assuming no further enlargement).
— In addition, we applaud the measure
in the Treaty strengthening the role of the European elections
in the choice of the President of the Commission, which has the
potential to increase the democratic accountability of the Commission
as a whole.
3.7 Role of national parliaments
— We welcome the greater role of the
national parliaments as envisaged in the Treaty. If one-third
of national parliaments think that a Commission measure violates
subsidiarity, then the Commission must either explain why it is
needed or redraft it ("yellow card"). If a majority
of national parliaments express concern about a proposal, a majority
of national governments or MEPs can force the Commission to withdraw
it ("orange card").
3.8 Simplified revision procedure
— One of the areas in the Treaty that
has aroused great concern in Britain is the simplified revision
procedure or Passerelle Clause. This Clause states that member
states can decide by unanimity to move a policy area to majority
voting. We are reassured that the Treaty ensures every member
state has a right to veto such an initiative, and yet understand
this clause brings flexibility and may prove useful when using
EU policy to respond to crisis situations.
4. CONCLUDING
COMMENTS
4.1 The CRT supports the Reform Treaty as
we believe it will equip the EU with better tools for efficient
and effective policy-making.
4.2 Many people in Britain have been frustrated
at the lack of reform in the EU institutions over recent years.
The Reform Treaty addresses these challenges head-on. Some opponents
of the Treaty seem to want a do-nothing EU, and in extreme circumstances,
even support withdrawal from the EU.
4.3 We believe that the EU's ability to
deliver on its future agenda will be helped by the provisions
of the Reform Treaty.
Zaki Cooper
Director of Business for New Europe
December 2007
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