RUSSIAN ATTITUDES TO THE PCA
90. Russian attitudes to the PCA are complex.
Several of those whom we met in Moscow told us that the Russians
did want a new agreement.[46]
Some Russians are unhappy that the process is essentially one-way:
it involves Russia adopting European technical, legal, and regulatory
standards, and there was little flow in the opposite direction.
Vladimir Mau[47] at the
Working Centre for Economic Reforms of the Russian Government
told us that Russian economists thought in the early years (2000
to 2003) that Russia should adopt the European Union's acquis
communautaire—the body of EU laws and legal principles,
including ECJ case law. He guessed that probably only a third
of those people thought the same today; even so, he said, Russian
legislation is still in practice being approximated to European
legislation. There were two important limitations on the process:
law enforcement mechanisms in Russia were not capable of ensuring
the practical application even of good laws; and the human capital
available was inadequate. On the whole, however, Vladimir Mau
thought that cooperation in the Four Spaces of the PCA was helpful
in this context.
91. More disturbing for the Russians are the
normative aspects of the PCA on democracy and human rights. Dmitri
Suslov told us that there was disagreement within the Kremlin
on whether the Russians accepted European norms or whether they
insisted on equality. The second tendency was beginning to prevail.
It was unlikely that the stalemate would be overcome unless EU
policies were changed and there was an identification of genuine
common aims in the areas of energy, democracy and the CIS.[48]
Although the Agreement is between equals based on mutual commitments,
some of the actual language points in a rather different direction.
Among the principles set out in the preamble to the Agreement
are "the political and economic freedoms which constitute
the very basis of the partnership"; and "the paramount
importance of the rule of law and respect for human rights, …
the establishment of a multiparty system with free and democratic
elections and economic liberalisation." The Agreement refers
to the obligations which Russia (and the European Community) assumed
in these fields under the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and similar
documents. And the provision for a political dialogue binds the
Parties to "co-operate on matters pertaining to the observance
of the principles of democracy and human rights, and hold consultations,
if necessary, on matters related to their due implementation".
92. The language of the PCA and the associated
mechanisms for regular consultations on human rights seem to give
the European Union something of a green light to comment on Russia's
domestic business (It also gives Russia a similar green light
to comment on the domestic business of the members of the EU).
This is something which, the Russians are increasingly disinclined
to accept (see also chapter 7).
93. The Russian Ambassador to the UK pointed
out that the principals at the EU-Russia Summit in Sochi in 2006
agreed that the PCA would remain in force until it was replaced
by a new agreement, thus ensuring that there was no legal vacuum.
There was no hurry. What was needed was a "legally binding
… politically heavyweight, forward looking framework document,
aimed at facilitating a balanced development of the system of
sector agreements … complemented by other agreements, whether
it be non-proliferation, cooperation in fighting organised crime,
counter-terrorism, immigration, asylum" (Q 419). Alexander
Grushko, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, thought that it
was quite sufficient to roll the PCA over from year to year.[49]
94. Vasily Likhachev, a former Russian Ambassador
to the EU, remarked that the existing PCA was not such a bad document:
the proposed free trade zone between Russia and the EU was the
only one of the ten targets listed in Title III of the Agreement
(Trade in Goods) which had not yet been achieved and that problem
would be on its way to solution once Russia was in the WTO[50]
(see Chapter 4). Dmitri Suslov (Russian Higher School of Economics)
told us that the best thing would be to forget about the idea
of an all embracing treaty, and concentrate on agreements on sectoral
matters, with a political declaration to cover the whole.[51]
95. It is not clear to us how much interest
the Russians will have in negotiating a new legally binding agreement
similar to the current PCA with normative aspects on human rights.
Although it will not be easy, we believe that negotiations on
a replacement Partnership and Cooperation Agreement should be
started in 2008. An attempt should be made to enshrine the principles
of the Energy Charter Treaty and the Transit Protocol in the new
agreement or as a Protocol to it (See Chapter 5). Meanwhile the
present PCA should continue to be rolled over.
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