Memorandum by Dr Derek Averre, University
of Birmingham
1. This is an individual submission, written
from the point of view of an academic who follows current developments
in Russia's foreign and security policy and has regular contact
with Russian academics and policy analysts, and who contributed
oral evidence to the recent House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee
inquiry "Global Security: Russia". It attempts
to provide an analysis of the position of Moscow's foreign policy
elite and respond to some of the questions posed by this inquiry.
2. The evolution of EU-Russia relations
must be viewed in the broader context of Russia's foreign and
security policy and its governing elite's response to the challenges
thrown up by the contemporary international system. Recent pronouncements
by leading Russian officials have represented a clear attempt
to challenge the existing international order, based on a claim
for equal status and attempts to establish the legitimacy of Russian
approaches to foreign policy-making, with the aim of gaining a
more influential role in international affairs. Foreign minister
Lavrov has called for collective leadership, with the major powers
working in concert within international institutions and frameworks,
in the face of global challenges and threats; in particular he
has proposed a trilateral Russia-US-EU format as a framework for
collective decision-making. Underlying this approach is the perception
that the Western alliance, which dominated the first post-Cold
War decade, has fractured, with splits between the US and Europe
on a range of political and economic issues and problems caused
by the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and the failure of policy
in the Middle East. Rightly or wrongly, the Russian governing
elite perceives a shift in global power relations, a general decline
in international governance and the reduced influence of Western
leadership; this, together with the greater resources at Russia's
disposal, leads Moscow to pursue a "multivector" policy
while sustaining pragmatic and selective engagement with the US
and Europe.
3. This approach has been transferred to
the political-military arena. Former defence minister Sergei Ivanov
has pointed to a renewed emphasis on military force in world politics,
which has produced not only cooperative responses to common threats
but also challenges to Russia's national security arising from
Russia's exclusion from security decision-making and attempted
interference in its internal affairs. In Russian eyes NATO continues
to enlarge eastwards without becoming a genuine collective security
organisation; the US has announced plans for missile defences
in central Europe outside of the NATO framework, which will inevitably
impact on relations with the Alliance and the EU. In response,
Russia is rethinking its arms control commitments and planning
to restore an effective military capability through increased
spending on its armed forces (though it should be noted that defence
spending has hardly risen as a percentage of GDP in recent years
and it is uncertain as yet whether a significant redirection of
resources to the military will take place).
4. Moscow's foreign policy strategy in the
post-Soviet space is to seek recognition for and position itself
at the centre of regional organisations, in particular the CIS,
Collective Security Treaty Organisation and Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation, as a means of addressing weaknesses in regional
security governance and developing legitimate fora capable of
interacting with external states and organisations. Underlying
this is Moscow's support for regimes where challenges to them
might spill over into wider regional instability; the volatile
situation in the region represents a fundamental challenge to
both Russia's security and its historical self-understanding as
the major political and cultural power in the wider region. The
emergence of competing blocs, and the aspirations of Ukraine,
Moldova and Georgia in particular to establish a closer relationship
with Europe—Moscow rejects "unconstitutional"
colour revolutions and resents European support for them—is
being managed by Moscow using a range of political and economic
instruments, including more active support for the separatist
regimes in the latter two countries. While Moldova and Georgia
have sought greater involvement of external players, including
the EU, in resolving the separatist conflicts, Moscow will continue
to insist on a central role as an external guarantor of security
and aim to maintain existing conflict resolution mechanisms.
5. A final aspect of Moscow's foreign policy
is its response to increasing pressure to adopt liberal values,
with the perception now widespread in Europe that under Putin
the governing elite is resisting democratic change and the development
of civil society in favour of increasing the power of conservative
state institutions in what has been termed "authoritarian
modernisation". Moscow is not only mounting a vigorous defence
of Russia's strong state model of governance, seen as key to its
re-emergence as a great power, but is challenging the legitimacy
of the values underpinning Western approaches to foreign policy-making.
It believes that the dialogue on democracy and human rights is
a cover for attempts to dictate policy, while states criticising
Russia themselves act "undemocratically" in terms of
the fundamental principles of international law, ie sovereignty
and non-intervention (divergent—or, to quote Lavrov, "diametrically
opposed"—views on the Kosovo question over the last
decade is a clear example). Western support for the democracy
movements in some of the USSR successor states has been linked
with "bloc politics" and Cold War-era attempts to constrain
Russia. In recent speeches, both Putin and Lavrov have bracketed
the EU and NATO together as organisations seeking to dictate policy
to Russia. This narrative—witness Putin's Munich speech
in February 2007—has overshadowed alternative narratives
portraying a Russia ready to consider engagement with Europe.
6. To summarise, Russia's political elite
claims a widely shared domestic consensus on values and identity
based on a profoundly conservative definition of sovereignty,
economic and military strength and peculiarly Russian political
models, exploiting fears of instability and of external threats
to reassert national security concerns as a prop to the state-building
project. The debate in Russia has shifted in Putin's second term,
with even pro-European liberals sceptical that a liberal democratic
international order, underpinned by a values-based conception
of human rights and freedoms, is a realistic prospect. This may
not be fully recognised or accepted in Brussels and many European
capitals but accurately reflects widespread Russian perceptions.
7. This rather long preamble is necessary
as context to the apparently unpromising development of EU-Russia
relations. Unease in Moscow over what it sees as a crisis of governance
in the EU (uncertainty of the future constitutional order in a
Union of 27+ states) and lack of a coherent external policy for
engagement with Russia, and concern in Brussels over Moscow's
insistence on a partnership between equals and the "values
gap"—doubts over Russia's commitment to political,
social and economic modernisation which would bring it closer
to Europe—have sown mutual mistrust. Added to this are lack
of a common strategic vision, particularly as regards their shared
neighbourhood; a relatively narrow agenda for security cooperation;
disputes over trade and energy issues; and an increasingly difficult
relationship over human rights, including with the European Court
(ECHR).
8. There are, nevertheless, numerous positives
in the relationship, though these are often not visible. High-level
institutional arrangements are firmly established and an increasingly
dense network of contacts between officials and experts across
wide areas of cooperation, giving Moscow a privileged and perhaps
unique position among Brussels' external partners, is developing.
While stating that Russia will pursue an independent foreign policy
course its leaders frequently emphasise the importance of the
country's "fundamental European choice". Lavrov has
repeated the formula "everything but institutions" and
has criticised sceptical Russian political analysts for "excessive
alarmism and pessimism". Moscow is acutely aware of negative
elite and public perceptions of Russia in Europe and is making
efforts to address this problem; the Russian delegation to Brussels
is trying to foster closer parliamentary cooperation and seeking
greater contributions from the business community and civil society.
The ECHR is now part of Russia's legal system and Moscow appears
to want to maintain respect for its provisions. The fact remains,
however, that Moscow's demand for a greater voice in European
affairs and acute dissatisfaction with lectures on how it should
govern itself spill over into high-level disputes.
9. Keynote speeches by leading EU officials,
notably by the then External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten
as long ago as February 2004 and by Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson
in May this year—the latter perhaps reflecting a new realism
in Brussels following Putin's Munich speech—suggest that
Brussels is aware both of the problems faced and of the institutional
shortcomings of the EU and its lack of a foreign policy vision;
indeed, Brussels is unlikely to be able to deal more effectively
with Moscow unless these shortcomings are addressed. Mandelson
emphasised the divergent perceptions arising from difficult negotiations
between the two sides and the history of Russian weakness in the
1990s, as well as the lack of coherence between the policies of
EU member states toward Russia (exacerbated by the advent of new
accession countries). Brussels should insist on respect for key
values and on clear and transparent trading rules, he argued,
and promote both as being in Moscow's self-interest as a modernising
state, but equally seek to understand the complex policy challenges
faced by Moscow and how it perceives Brussels' policies.
10. Revitalised attempts to engage Russia
might thus build on the following guidelines: belief in Russia's
"European choice" and Europe's ability still to influence
Russia's foreign policy choices, tempered with recognition that
it is a long and inevitably winding road due to internal political
challenges (as pro-European liberals have pointed out, Russia
needs time—it is less than 16 years since it emerged from
its "Soviet overcoat" and in the last decade it has
experienced two attempted putsches, two wars and two financial
defaults); respect for Russia's choice of domestic governance
models and avoidance of an inflated normative agenda, while raising
concerns (for example, within the well-established human rights
dialogue) over specific aspects and firmly defending the principles
of the EU's own governance and commitment to the rule of law;
demonstrate consistently the benefits of modernisation, with the
aim of achieving greater competitiveness for Russia, through integration
into European trading structures and adherence to transparent
international norms and rules; continue to foster wide-ranging
exchanges below the diplomatic dialogue with Russian authorities,
businesses and public bodies, both at the federal and regional
level, scientists, educationalists and representatives of civil
society; and promote a more balanced public information campaign
about Russia in Europe. A column headline in a quality UK newspaper
in the week this submission was written—"Keeping a
lid on Putin's resurgent Russia"—sums up the negative
tone prevalent in the media and begs the question: how would translating
this advice into policy meet Europe's own interests, let alone
improve relations with Russia, no longer a closed totalitarian
state but a complex and multifaceted polity and society?
11. This leads on to the issue of how to
put these guidelines into practice, and in particular what needs
to be done to secure a meaningful agreement following the expiry
of the initial 10-year term of the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA) in November 2007. A detailed examination of the
latter is beyond the scope of this submission (and indeed has
been extensively discussed by policy analysts in Europe and Russia)
but a few key points are offered. Crucial areas of focus will
be the energy relationship, securing agreement on business and
trading rules, policy in the common neighbourhood and security
cooperation.
12. Both sides accept that the PCA is outdated
and have called for a more far-reaching framework for the relationship.
Moscow has responded to Brussels' desire for "ambitious objectives
on political and external security cooperation" by proposing
a juridically binding Treaty on Strategic Partnership, encompassing
all areas of interaction and determining the aims and principles
of EU-Russia cooperation, supplemented by sectoral agreements.
In terms of legal form, concluding an ambitious and comprehensive
mixed (multi-pillar) agreement presents a challenge to the EU,
since it would have to be based in EU treaties and ratified by
all EU member states as well as the European Parliament. Apart
from possible delays due to the lengthy and complicated ratification
process, achieving consensus may well be problematic; disparate
political sentiments towards Russia in Europe, particularly among
recent accession countries mistrustful of Moscow, is likely to
prevent giving Russia a privileged position among the EU's external
partners. More realistic (and which the two sides appear to be
inching towards) is a headline political agreement, setting out
broad principles and aims and restating commitment to shared values,
together with sectoral agreements based on the four common spaces
(possible with additional protocols on such as Kaliningrad), providing
legal continuity with the PCA. It is the scope of the sectoral
agreements which is crucial; the aim should be to introduce radically
reworked and augmented provisions as a basis on which to build
in future. A group of Russian specialists who are in favour of
Russia's "Europeanisation" (and who are arguing for
an advanced partnership agreement with the ultimate aim of association)
believes that Putin's administration supports an extensive agreement—in
line with its intent to strengthen Russia's international position
as a legitimate partner—rather than a minimalist legal basis
for relations with selective integration (supported by other Russian
specialists with a negative opinion of the prospects for legislative
harmonisation). It should be clearly understood, however, that
the agreements will be the subject of long and painstaking negotiation,
often subject to political interference, and a coherent strategy
on the part of the EU is needed.
13. The Common Economic Space is a key area
in which much has already been accomplished. Brussels wants the
inclusion of trade provisions, with the regulatory alignment of
Russia to EU rules and standards, as the basis for a "deep"
free trade agreement following Russia's anticipated WTO accession.
Moscow has, however, hitherto been reluctant to converge on certain
EU rules and standards and vested interests in Russia may continue
to block some of these provisions, despite the apparent willingness
of leading officials to open negotiations on a free trade area,
following Russia's accession to the WTO. The Commission is also
keen to include provisions based on Russia's acceptance of the
principles of the European Energy Charter Treaty, but again this
has been a matter of dispute and it is unclear what Moscow—given
the strategic importance of Russia's energy sector—will
agree to. Russia may give foreign investors access to its upstream
reserves in return for allowing Russian companies access to their
resources, technology, capital, distribution network and power
generation; however, there are substantial European concerns about
letting Russian state companies act as transnational majors. Though
companies like Gazprom are hardly free-market role models, integrating
them into the Western economy may nevertheless prove to be the
most efficient way of bringing them, and the Russian system, closer
to Western standards and rules and there are prospects for engaging
Russia's support in areas such as nuclear energy and energy conservation.
Specialists have argued that Europe's concerns should concentrate
less on whether political rather than commercial considerations
will henceforth drive Russian energy policy and more on the potential
impact on European economies of a drift to a more étatiste
approach to Russia's large-scale resource industry, making it
vulnerable to corruption and poor economic governance and leading
to less efficiency and slower output and export growth. The recent
Commission paper proposing a framework for external energy policy
provides few clues about Russia and it is still unclear to what
extent the principles of the Treaty can be incorporated into a
post-PCA agreement.
14. The Common Space of External Security
also faces difficulties. There has been progress on nonproliferation,
counter-terrorism and civil protection, and Moscow has a better
idea what ESDP entails; there is positive dialogue on Iran and
the Middle East (though approaches often differ and cooperation
remains more at the level of consultation than joint or parallel
decision-making). In contrast, approaches to the shared neighbourhood
differ sharply and progress has hitherto been marginal. The EU's
argument should be that Moscow's obsession with countering democracy
movements following the "colour revolutions" not only
places it on the other side of the fence to Europe but may also
mean that it is missing the chance to influence internal developments
in these countries and help create stable polities which still
retain ties to Russia—Moscow needs to free itself from this
logic and engage the efforts of the EU to create a genuine external
common security space. It is clear to the more responsible sections
of Russia's political elite that profound changes are under way
in its neighbourhood and that it can no longer be regarded solely
as Russia's "sphere of influence" and that a more selective
and pragmatic longer-term policy is required. In return a more
cohesive EU strategy, based on clearly articulated common positions
among member states, one that seeks to coordinate external policy
towards Moscow with the European Neighbourhood Policy—and
making the latter work—is vital. Reconciling the priorities
of new member states and ENP partners, and alleviating Moscow's
concerns over being isolated by current trends in the region,
will require substantial long-term political vision and greater
coherence in EU policy.
15 October 2007
|
