Memorandum by Mr David Clark, Chairman
of the Russia Foundation
EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS
INTRODUCTION[1]
Relations between the European Union and Russia
have deteriorated markedly over the last four years. At the time
of the EU-Russia Summit in St Petersburg in May 2003 the relationship
was largely constructive and friendly. The EU recognised Russia
as a market economy, thereby advancing the goal of WTO membership,
cooperation was deepened in areas comprising the "four common
spaces" (defined broadly as economic relations, justice/internal
security, education/culture and international security) and the
institutional basis of the relationship was strengthened with
the establishment of the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council.
By early 2004 strains were already becoming
apparent. In an official communication issued in February of that
year the European Commission noted with concern a tendency towards
"divergence" on key policy issues and a more "assertive"
Russian stance towards its neighbours, including a number of countries
that were in the process of joining the EU. While praising aspects
of Russia's political development, it was sharply critical of
the country's overall direction:
"President Putin's four years in charge
have seen a drive to consolidate federal control and strengthen
the state apparatus. This has produced more stability, in itself
welcome after the uncertainty of the Yeltsin era. This period
has, however, also witnessed a weakening of the values to which
the EU and Russia (as a member of the Council of Europe and OSCE)
are committed. Indeed, reports by international organisations,
including the OSCE and Council of Europe, the conduct of Duma
elections in December 2003, events in Chechnya and indications
of the selective application of the law raise questions about
Russia's commitment and ability to uphold core universal and European
values and pursue democratic reforms."[2]
The worsening climate of relations was confirmed
when Russia chose to respond to these criticisms by refusing initially
to extend its Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU
to the ten new accession states. Although this problem was ultimately
resolved, it was the start of a trend towards a more assertive
and confrontational approach in Russia's dealings with the EU
and its member states. This has led to a number of serious bilateral
disputes affecting several EU countries.
In a move condemned as unwarranted by the European
Commission, Russia imposed a ban on Polish meat and plant products
in November 2005 when diplomatic relations between the two countries
declined sharply. The ban remains in force. Oil supplies to Lithuania
have been cut off for more than a year in a step many observers
interpret as punishment for the refusal of the Lithuanian authorities
to sell its Majeika Nafta oil refinery to a Russian company. An
acrimonious dispute over the decision of the Estonian government
to relocate a Soviet war memorial led to accusations that Russia
had resorted to cyber-warfare to disrupt Estonia's internet communications.
The refusal of the Russian authorities to extradite the main suspect
wanted in connection with the murder of Alexander Litvinenko in
London led to the UK expelling four Russian diplomats, drawing
a retaliatory response from Moscow.
Relations at a European level have also been
badly affected. Drawing criticism on energy policy and human rights
from a number of EU leaders at the Lahti Summit in October 2006,
President Putin adopted an openly contemptuous attitude. Two months
later the Polish government, with support from Lithuania, vetoed
the start of negotiations on a replacement for the Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement, due to lapse in November 2007. The
EU-Russia Summit in Samara in May 2007 failed to move forward
on substance and led to angry exchanges on human rights. In July
2007, despite warnings from Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister,
the European Union adopted a common position in support of the
UK over the Litvinenko affair.
The Russian government has also sought to undermine
parts of Europe's political architecture to which it belongs.
The election monitoring and human rights roles of the OSCE and
the Council of Europe have been actively obstructed and both organisations
have drawn fierce allegations of anti-Russian bias from Moscow.
Russia's legally binding obligations as a signatory of the Energy
Charter Treaty have been openly flouted.
It is against this background that the European
Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, was forced to concede in
April of this year that: "Relations between the EU and Russia
. . . contain a level of misunderstanding and even mistrust we
have not seen since the end of the Cold War".[3]
DIVERGING POLITICAL
VALUES
To reduce these problems to the level of a misunderstanding
would seem to be an optimistic assessment of the situation. Instead
they reflect a process of political estrangement that has its
origins in Russia's evolution away from democracy and towards
a more authoritarian and nationalist style of politics. By definition
this is not something that can be addressed through better communication
and intensified dialogue. Russia's ruling elite understands the
nature of EU concerns about its political and diplomatic behaviour
very well but perceives its interests to be divergent and chooses
to pursue them competitively rather than collaboratively. It sees
no reason to desist from its current course of action and the
EU has so far failed to give it one.
At the heart of this tension is the Russian
elite's rejection of the idea that the western model of liberal
multi-party democracy is applicable in Russian conditions. In
contrast to the chaotic pluralism of the Yeltsin period, which
at least created the potential for democratic progress, the Putin
era has been defined by efforts to construct a powerful and controlling
state structure as the basis for Russia's national revival. Although
Russia's leaders claim to be creating their own model of democratic
development, it is one that dispenses with many of the principles
considered integral to the western idea of democracy, such as
the separation of powers, the rule of law, competitive elections,
an independent civil society and a free media. In that sense Russia's
recent development reflects a fundamental departure from European
political values.
It is important not to exaggerate what this
involves. Russia is not retreating into its Soviet past, but it
is borrowing selectively from the authoritarian toolbox of that
era to create a political order in which all important decisions
are taken from the top down. The "political technologists"
and Kremlin advisers that perfected the techniques associated
with this system dubbed it "managed democracy". The
aim is not to control every aspect of national life in the manner
of a totalitarian state, but to manipulate only those aspects
of it necessary to monopolise political power and prevent change
from below. Many of the rules and institutions of a democratic
polity remain in place, at least in a formal sense, but they are
prevented from functioning in the manner intended.
— Freedom of speech has been maintained
insofar as there is no formal censorship and it remains possible
to find strong criticism of the authorities in minority media
outlets. But all of the national television networks are controlled
by the state and slant their coverage accordingly. The intimidation
and murder of independent journalists creates a climate of self-censorship
that affects the media as a whole.
— Standards of justice may have
improved for ordinary Russians, with acquittal rates rising to
more credible levels, but there is no real judicial independence
and the executive can rely on the courts to do its bidding in
the most politically sensitive cases. As the Foreign Secretary
noted in his Parliamentary statement on the Litvinenko affair:
"both the UN and the EU have reported that the law in Russia
is applied selectively".[4]
Courts in the UK and elsewhere in Europe have refused to extradite
a number of Russian citizens explicitly for that reason.
— Civil society remains theoretically
independent, but increasingly operates within a legal framework
that makes it difficult for NGOs that challenge the Kremlin to
raise funds and organise. Complex registration procedures, arbitrary
tax inspections and national security provisions allow the authorities
wide discretion to intimidate or close down organisations they
disapprove of. A respected human rights group, the Russian-Chechen
Friendship Society, was closed down for "extremist"
activities in 2006.[5]
President Putin and others also routinely condemn NGO's as instruments
of foreign influence.
— Opposition political parties
are entitled to organise and stand in elections, but only on terms
that put them at a significant disadvantage. As the reports of
international election monitors have noted, the administrative
resources of the Russian state and state controlled media are
used to favour parties that support the ruling elite. Opposition
parties find it impossible to get fair and equal coverage on national
television. New electoral laws setting a 7% threshold and abolishing
single-member constituencies for elections to the Duma, along
with arduous registration requirements for political parties,
are designed to shut out independents and those opposed to the
current government. It is likely that the forthcoming parliamentary
elections will produce a Duma composed exclusively of parties
of an authoritarian and nationalist character.
DIVERGING STRATEGIC
CULTURES
The speeches and comments of President Putin
and his allies make it clear that they associate the reform period
of the 1990s with national humiliation and blame Russia's decline
on the imposition of inappropriate western principles. Moreover,
they interpret any attempt to pressure Russia into resuming democratic
reform as a ploy to weaken her. The "Orange" and "Rose"
revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia were seen as hostile, western-inspired
events designed to encircle Russia, prompting further Kremlin
efforts to restrict political pluralism and subordinate civil
society to the state. Authoritarian and nationalist ideas have
therefore become fused in the minds of the Russian ruling elite.
In his annual State of the Nation address following
the Orange revolution, President Putin asserted his right to define
Russia's political future without reference to western democratic
standards:
"Russia is a country that has chosen democracy
through the will of its own people. It chose this road of its
own accord and it will decide itself how best to ensure that the
principles of freedom and democracy are realised here, taking
into account our historic, geopolitical and other particularities
and respecting all fundamental democratic norms. As a sovereign
nation, Russia can and will decide for itself the timeframe and
conditions for its progress along this road."[6]
His chief ideologue and Deputy Head of Presidential
Administration, Vladislav Surkov, has termed this approach "sovereign
democracy". In a speech in early 2006 he expanded on this
theme and identified the "reduction in national immunity
to external actions" as one of four major threats to Russian
sovereignty (along with terrorism, military conflict and the loss
of economic competitiveness). In this view Russia's ability to
resist westernisation under the guise of political and economic
reform (what he called "soft absorption" using "Orange
technologies") is the key to its national revival and its
ability to compete with other countries at a global level. So
too is its ability to assert national control over its mineral
resources and realise its potential as an "energy superpower".[7]
In many respects the concept of sovereign democracy
signifies a reversion to a traditional style of Russian foreign
policy thought defined by Dr Bobo Lo, Director of the Russia and
Eurasia programme at Chatham House, as "a Hobbesian understanding
of the world as an essentially hostile and "anarchic"
place; the fear of encirclement by outside forces; and a strategic
culture dominated by the geopolitical triad of zero-sum calculus,
the balance of power and spheres of influence".[8]
The idea of a relationship between Russia and the west based on
multilateralism and partnership, envisaged by Russia's first post-Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, has been rejected in favour of
a competitive model of international relations in which conflicting
sovereign interests are asserted through a process of power bargaining.
The result is a strategic culture that conflicts
sharply with the one that defines the modern EU where traditional
concepts of power politics, such as the balance of power, spheres
of influence and the use of force as a routine instrument of policy,
have been replaced by voluntary integration, sovereignty sharing,
systems of mutual interference and the rule of international law.
In some ways this represents the real clash between "old"
and "new" Europe in the sense that Russian leaders are
articulating ideas that were common in the chancelleries of nineteenth
century Europe, whereas the EU represents a conscious break with
that tradition. However EU leaders choose to respond, it is important
that they recognise this divergence of strategic cultures instead
of pretending that it doesn't exist.
To the extent that the EU provides a pole of
attraction for states that were formerly part of the Soviet bloc,
and which Russian leaders regard as part of their natural sphere
of influence, there is the basis for considerable geopolitical
tension whether the EU seeks it or not. As long as countries within
Russia's "near abroad" aspire to follow a European path,
the current Russian leadership will tend to see the EU as a normative
threat simply by virtue of its existence. President Putin has
described the collapse of the Soviet Union as "a major geopolitical
disaster of the [20th] century"[9]
and although he is not attempting to resurrect it in its old form,
the Kremlin makes no secret of its ambition to reintegrate as
much of the post-Soviet world as possible under Russian leadership.
The EU complicates that project and is therefore increasingly
seen as a rival to be neutralised.[10]
The EU could seek to diminish this tension,
but only by ignoring its own values and accepting a new continental
order that recognised a de facto Russian sphere of influence.
That is clearly the aim of Russia's policy towards the EU. There
has already been some slippage in that direction with Jaques Chirac
and Gerhard Schroder undercutting EU solidarity by engaging in
big power summitry with the Russian President and a reluctance
on the part of the EU as a whole to consider further enlargement
to the east. Whatever principled objections might be made against
this approach, the fact is that it has failed to produce a more
cooperative relationship with Russia. On the contrary, it appears
to have emboldened President Putin to believe he can divide European
opinion and maintain the upper hand.
THE STRATEGIC
ROLE OF
RUSSIAN ENERGY
POLICY
The climate of EU-Russia relations is has been
significantly affected by President Putin's attempts to fulfil
Russia's potential as an "energy superpower" and use
it as an instrument of geopolitical leverage. Russia is the world's
largest gas producer and exporter and is currently the second
largest producer of oil. It accounts for 45% of total gas imports
into the EU, equalling approximately 25% of total EU consumption,
along with 27% of EU oil imports.[11]
The EU's dependence on energy imports is set to rise further as
domestic sources of hydrocarbons continue to decline and demand
continues to rise.
At the same time high energy prices have transformed
perceptions of Russia's relative global position, contributing
to high growth rates and substantial export earnings that have
allowed the Russian state to pay off foreign debts and accumulate
a large financial surplus. There are significant doubts about
the sustainability of this performance over the next decade with
many analysts predicting that a combination of heavy-handed state
interference and under-investment will lead to a crisis in Russian
energy production.[12]
But for the moment policy-makers in Moscow feel that European
dependence on Russian energy supplies gives them a decisive edge
and they are determined maintain and press home their advantage.
President Putin set out his personal belief
in the strategic function of energy policy in an article he wrote
in 1999 when he was head of the state security service, the FSB.
In it he argued that "the natural resources complex"
would be the decisive factor in "the strategy for Russia's
exit from its deep crisis and restoration of its former might
on a qualitatively new basis". Energy policy should not be
designed to meet commercial and civilian objectives alone, but
should be "aimed at furthering the geopolitical interests
and maintaining the national security of Russia".[13]
This would be achieved by creating strong, vertically integrated
energy companies answerable to the state.
This can be seen as a blueprint for the policy
Putin has pursued since 2003 of renationalising Russia's energy
assets and bringing them under state control. The arrest and imprisonment
of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and business partner Platon Lebedev on
tax charges widely regarded as politically inspired allowed the
state to dismantle Yukos Oil, Russia's largest private oil company,
and seize its assets. Major foreign investors, Shell and BP, have
also been dispossessed, selling stakes in the lucrative Sakhalin
2 and Kovykta projects to Gazprom at bargain prices in the face
of threats to revoke their licences. Proposals to formalise restrictions
on foreign ownership of strategic energy projects are contained
in a draft Subsoil Law due to be considered by the Duma.[14]
This is happening at a time when Russia is demanding unrestricted
access and ownership rights for its state-owned companies in European
markets.
The trend towards greater state control has
been accompanied by an increase in the use of energy supplies
as a coercive tool of foreign policy. A number of countries heavily
dependent on Russian energy sources have experienced price rises
or supply interruptions widely seen as political in motivation.
Russia cut oil supplies to Belarus in January 2007 year forcing
it to accept higher prices and asset transfers that increase Russian
control of its energy distribution network. Gas was cut to Ukraine
a year earlier to impose price rises interpreted as punishment
for the Orange revolution. Lithuania has been subjected to an
effective oil embargo since 2006 after deciding to sell its Majeika
Nafta oil refinery to Poland instead of Russia. In December 2006
Georgia was forced to accept a doubling of gas prices after it
arrested four Russians on charges of spying.[15]
As well as violating international norms, many
aspects of this behaviour breach Russia's binding treaty obligations.
Along with fifty other nations Russia is a signatory of the Energy
Charter Treaty (ECT), the most important multilateral treaty covering
trade in energy products. Although it has not yet ratified the
ECT, Russia is provisionally bound by it under the terms of Article
45(1). The Treaty obliges all parties to guarantee investor protection
and respect property rights in the energy sector. It also obliges
them to facilitate the transit of third country energy supplies
across their territory. By expropriating private energy investments
and maintaining a pipeline monopoly that prevents EU countries
accessing cheaper gas from Central Asia, Russia is clearly not
honouring these obligations. Securing Russia's compliance should
be a major objective of EU foreign policy.
The EU also needs to be aware of the various
strategies the Russian government is using to increase its energy
dominance and to counteract them where necessary. The North European
Gas Pipeline planned to connect Russia to Germany through the
Baltic Sea is designed to segment the European market and marginalise
existing transit countries in Eastern Europe. Likewise, Russian
diplomacy in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Black Sea region
is aimed at preventing European countries from developing the
infrastructure and relationships needed to access alternative
sources of oil and gas. Russian state-owned energy companies are
seeking to make major acquisitions in EU energy distribution networks
as a way of extending their reach downstream, while at the other
end of the supply chain Russia and Iran are exploring the option
of turning the Gas Exporting Countries' Forum into an OPEC-style
producer's cartel.
These and other steps form a comprehensive strategy
for maintaining and strengthening Russia's position as dominant
energy supplier. The EU's response must be to develop a comprehensive
strategy of its own to depoliticise energy supplies and ensure
that the terms of trade with Russia become more balanced.
RE-ENGAGING
RUSSIA: INTERESTS
AND VALUES
The nature of the divide between Russia and
the EU is such that it cannot be resolved by an appeal to common
values. To the extent that these exist they have been heavily
diluted by the Russian government's rejection of European norms
across a wide range of areas. Even if the ultimate goal is to
encourage Russia to return to the path of political and economic
reform, as it should be, this is only likely to be achieved by
influencing the Russian elite's perception of where its national
interests lie in a more direct material sense.
There are realistic grounds for believing that
Russian policy-makers are capable of responding in a pragmatic
way to the right mix of incentives and constraints. In the first
period of his presidency Putin took a largely cooperative and
constructive approach in his dealings with the west, reacting
calmly to NATO expansion and the scrapping of the ABM treaty and
supporting the United States in its initial response to 9/11.
This corresponded with his assessment of Russia's strengths and
weaknesses at that time. Steep rises in energy prices and the
belief that Russia's natural resources offer a shortcut back to
world power status appear to have encouraged the switch to a more
assertive and confrontational style of foreign policy based on
unilateralism and power politics.
The aim of EU policy must be to counter this
and draw Russia gradually into a more balanced rules-based relationship
involving reciprocal rights and obligations that are fair and
binding. A strategy for achieving this must have two strands.
Firstly, the EU must be firm and consistent in its determination
to block and punish Russia's resort to the illegitimate and coercive
use of power. Russia only uses these tools to the extent that
it thinks they will work. Secondly, the EU needs to open up avenues
of progress that offer Russia the prospect of meeting its most
important national goals by peaceful and legitimate means. The
objective should not be to contain Russia but to channel its energies
in a more constructive and mutually beneficial direction.
The following represent some of the main areas
where the EU will need to make changes if a strategy of this kind
is to become viable:
— EU solidarity—The
first condition of developing a more effective approach is that
European governments will need to adopt a more collective and
concerted stance in their dealings with Russia. The EU has more
assets at its disposal than is often realised, but only if they
are marshalled effectively towards a common purpose. A recent
preference for bilateralism among certain member states has artificially
strengthened President Putin's hand by allowing him to play one
European government off against the other, often using energy
ties to reward or punish accordingly. The trilateral relationship
between France, Germany and Russia, in particular, has damaged
EU solidarity and undermined its ability to forge a common position.
In that respect the EU's support for the UK over the Litvinenko
affairs represents a step forward. The change in the political
leaderships of some of the larger EU countries, including France
and Germany, creates the opportunity for a more effective common
policy. This must include a presumption that member states will
consult closely on issues of common concern before reaching major
bilateral agreements with Russia, such as the project to construct
the North European Gas Pipeline.
— The Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement—The attitude of the EU cannot be to seek a
replacement to the PCA at any cost. Russia's status as a strategic
partner has to be conditional on its willingness to respect treaty
commitments and observe good relations with EU member states.
It should not have been left to Poland and Lithuania to object
to the start of negotiations on a new agreement and a cessation
of Russia's embargoes against those countries should be a firm
precondition for talks to begin. The EU also needs to insist on
the inclusion of clear provisions relating to energy. References
to the rules and principles of the ECT would be helpful provided
it is made clear that Russia is already legally bound by the treaty.
Without this Russia may interpret the agreement as an alternative
to the ECT and thus a loosening of its legal obligations.
— Energy and trade—The
EU is the largest single market in the world as well as Russia's
most important export market. The prospect of closer economic
integration, including a EU-Russia Free Trade Area, should be
on offer, but only if Russia is willing to respect fair market
rules. Energy is by far the biggest single component of bilateral
EU-Russia trade, so it is essential that a link is made between
closer economic relations and the need for Russia to end its monopolistic
and abusive behaviour as an energy supplier. The proposals contained
in the Commission's Third Energy Package include the suggestion
of a "reciprocity" rule restricting the ability of companies
from third countries to own energy transmission networks within
the EU except where an agreement with the relevant third county
exists. This would allow the EU to restrict Russian investments
in the downstream European energy market unless Russia is willing
to open its own energy sector on a similar basis. This proposal
should be adopted, with ECT compliance becoming a baseline requirement
for third country agreements.
— Human rights—As
a member of both the OSCE and Council of Europe and a party to
the PCA, Russia has accepted a wide range of human rights obligations.
These should not be treated as discretionary. The EU-Russia human
rights consultations that have been taking place twice a year
since 2005 have failed to result in substantive progress and have
reached a "dead end" according to leading Russian human
rights activists.[16]
Little information is made available about the meetings, which
have assumed a rather ritualistic character. This process needs
to be reinvigorated and made more transparent with NGOs formally
involved in line with best international practice. If the Russian
government will not accept this, the EU delegation should make
a point of consulting NGOs formally before each meeting and debriefing
them extensively afterwards. The EU should also publish detailed
progress reports prior to each meeting and provide a full written
report on the discussions afterwards. More generally, the EU's
human rights and democracy promotion efforts in Russia need to
be stepped up in the face of increased threats to the independence
of Russian civil society. Consideration should be given to establishing
a European equivalent to the US National Endowment for Democracy
to carry out this work at one remove from the EU institutions
and member states.
— Ukraine—Getting
the EU's policy towards Ukraine right is critical to influencing
Russia in a positive direction. Many Russian liberals believe
that the successful completion of Ukraine's democratic transition
would encourage political change in Russia by demonstrating the
absence of a cultural barrier to the western model of democracy.
Unfortunately the EU, in a mood of caution and introspection,
has failed to seize the opportunity presented by the Orange Revolution
to consolidate democratic change by putting Ukraine on track for
eventual membership. This is a missed opportunity. Ukraine's integration
into the EU would also signal the refusal of European leaders
to accept a relationship with Russia based on spheres of influence
and open up the Black Sea region as a potential alternative energy
corridor. President Yushchenko and other regional leaders met
in Krakow to discuss this idea in May 2007, but the EU declined
to send an observer to the summit. The formation of a new Orange
government in Kiev and the prospect of a new gas dispute with
Russia over the coming winter are further reasons why the EU needs
to take a more ambitious and involved approach to Ukraine in the
future.
CONCLUSION
The next few years could prove to be a critical
turning point in relations between the EU and Russia. President
Putin is set to leave office in March 2008, creating opportunities
for change in the direction of Russia's leadership. Although most
observers expect that Putin and his supporters will attempt to
hold onto power behind the scenes, his departure from the Kremlin
means a loss administrative control and it is possible that the
new president will prove to be less compliant than expected. It
is worth recalling that Yeltsin selected Putin in the belief that
it would secure his political legacy.
There are also reasons to believe that the limits
of Putin's statism and energy nationalism will start to become
apparent in ways that affect Russia's perceptions of its national
strength over the next decade. The Russian state is not capable
of exploiting its natural resources effectively without western
investment and technology and there are already signs that production
levels are falling to an extent that raises questions about Russia's
ability to meet its domestic and international supply commitments.
Even if energy prices remain high, it is likely that Russia is
going to feel the squeeze, either through domestic prices hikes
or falling export earnings, or possibly a combination of both.
This represents an opportunity for the EU to
frame a common policy towards Russia that is firm and constructive
in establishing a framework for bilateral relations that meets
the interests of both. It essential that the EU recognises this
as one of the most important foreign policy challenges ahead of
it.
October 2007
1 The views expressed in this submission do not necessarily
reflect those of the Russia Foundation or individual members of
its Advisory Council. Back
2
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on relations with Russia, COM(2004) 106, 9/2/04-http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/russia_docs/com04_106_en.pdf Back
3
EU-Russia relations at "low ebb", BBC News Online, 20/4/07-http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6574615.stm Back
4
Hansard, 16 July 2007. Back
5
Amnesty International press release, 13 October 2006-http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGEUR460482006 Back
6
Vladimir Putin, Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the
Russian Federation, 25 April 2005-http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml Back
7
Vladislav Surkov, Sovereignty is a Political Synonym of Competitiveness,
22 February 2007-http://www.edinros.ru/news.html? id=111148 Back
8
Bobo Lo, Evolution or Regression?: Russian Foreign Policy in Putin's
Second Term, in Helge Blakkisrud (ed), Towards a Post-Putin Russia,
pp 57-77-http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/research/rep/R0506Lo.pdf Back
9
Vladimir Putin, Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the
Russian Federation, 25 April 2005-http://kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml Back
10
Ivan Krastev, Russia vs Europe: the sovereignty wars, openDemocracy.net,
5/9/07-http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/globalisation/institutions_government/russia_europe Back
11
Marko Mihkelson, Peril of using energy as an instrument of political
pressure, Report to the Political Affairs Committee of the Council
of Europe Assembly, 20 December 2006-http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc06/EDOC
11116 .htm Back
12
Dr Alan Riley, The Coming Russian Gas Deficit: Consequences and
Solutions, CEPS Policy Brief No 116, October 2006. Back
13
English translation published in Problems of Post-Communism,
vol 53, no 1, January-February 2006. Back
14
International Gas Report, Anna Shiryaevskaya, 26 March 2007, Russia
extends strategic reserves. Back
15
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6203721.stm Back
16
Activists Say EU-Russia Rights Dialogue at "Dead End",
RFE/RL, 3/10/07-http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/10/D264D180-8A70-4CC6-92E1-A0B0894184D1.html Back
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