Memorandum by Dr Vladimir Baranovsky,
assisted by Sergey Utkin, Russian Academy of Sciences
1. The request for evidence announced by
the House of Lords is a timely effort to look again at the complex
relationship between the European Union and its biggest neighbour—Russia.
Due to its immense role in Russia's foreign policy, trade, investments,
tourism and other areas, the EU constantly attracts attention
of experts, journalists and NGOs in Russia.
THE NATURE
AND OBJECTIVES
OF THE
EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS
2. The demand for a certain degree of interaction
between the EU and Russia is obvious, but the most appropriate
format for the interaction is not yet found. In legal terms, the
time is perfect for re-thinking of the relations—the EU-Russia
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) is about to complete
its initial period of action that lasted for ten years. Although
the mechanism of an automatic renewal excludes a threat of a legal
vacuum, the PCA is gradually loosing its meaning, since both Russia
and the EU have changed significantly in the last years.
3. The PCA plays a role of a substitute
to the missing WTO membership for Russia. The latter is now expected
to join this organisation in the nearest future, although the
final negotiations may still last for some time. However, this
is not an obstacle for Russia and the EU to go forward in their
talks in order to prepare a new agreement, since the conditions
for further trade arrangements have already been agreed upon.
4. Although political dialogue and cooperation
should be organic part of Russia-RU relations, the economic chapters
will most probably stay as the key component of the new EU-Russia
agreement. The feasible objective of the negotiations is to ensure
a reciprocal access to each other's huge internal markets. The
unimpeded flows of investments, business-actors and people would
be the best environment for a strategic partnership to thrive.
THE INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK
5. The new partnership agreement would be
an asset for the EU-Russia relationship, but it would be a wrong
approach to wait until the single new document will move us ahead.
A painstaking process of negotiations and ratification will take
time, while many improvements can easily be made under the existing
PCA.
6. The four Common Spaces could become a
long-standing framework for the EU-Russia relations. This formula
possesses all advantages and disadvantages of a broad, flexible
and non-binding approach. Some parts of the Road Maps represent
an insufficiently structured bunch of wishful clauses, and seem
to be written in haste. Some fields of possible cooperation envisaged
by the Road Maps lack notable substance. Their practical implementation
has not been so far very impressive. Revising, broadening and
promoting the implementation of the Road Maps could be a practical
interim solution for a while, till the new Agreement is not yet
prepared.
7. The Northern Dimension concept is a promising
initiative. But its results seem to be conditioned by a constant
support on political level. The recent decision to rebuild the
Northern Dimension, so that it could reflect the Common Spaces
on a regional level, can help to harmonize these two concepts.
The regional programmes can bring the EU-Russia high politics
closer to people. This is even more so if the EU-Russia cooperation
could provide economic development, safer environment and interaction
of civil societies on the local level.
8. The institutions set up for ensuring
progress in the EU-Russia relations desperately lack transparency.
Neither general public, nor experts can regularly get the basic
information on the work of the numerous working groups established
between EU and Russia. The media are always ready to pay attention
to any sort of EU-Russia crises, which easily find their way to
the first page of the newspapers, but when it comes to positive
achievements, only the insiders who are personally involved in
the negotiations may possess this knowledge. EU-Russia eventual
initiatives should include an unambiguous commitment of both sides'
officials to provide information to the public.
THE PUBLIC
PERCEPTION
9. The image of the EU in Russia is basically
positive; it is perceived as a prosperous and relatively efficiently
organized area that Russia can use as a sample in various dimensions.
However, some tendencies may slightly change this attitude. The
EU is also viewed as a huge bureaucratic monster. In addition,
it is seen as accumulating certain trends generated by some EU
member-states which have disagreements or conflicts with Russia.
The most notorious cases are the situation with Russian minorities
in Latvia and Estonia, and historical and trade-related arguments
with Poland.
10. The most common situation where citizens
of the Russian Federation meet directly the rules and mode of
action of the EU appears first of all in the visa application
process. It remains long and difficult, in spite of the recent
efforts to ensure visa facilitation. In a similar way, Russia's
practice of issuing visas is regarded as highly unsatisfactory
in many countries of Europe. Numerous cases of humiliation and
even personal dramas are extremely harmful to the EU-Russia relations
and contribute to negative images of each other in public perceptions.
THE EURO-ATLANTIC
DIMENSION
11. The majority of Russian observers tend
to view the United States either as a dominant factor with respect
to the EU, or in the context of the US deliberate policy to limit
EU ambitions in world politics. Very often the Europeans are perceived
either as powerless victims or as submissive clients of the US
policy. The divide between the "old" and "new"
(ie pro-American) Europeans is another popular theme in Russian
political parlance on the EU and related matters. However, on
the official level critical remarks to that matter remain relatively
moderate.
12. In spite of growing anti-western phobia,
the European roots are basically recognized as common societal
and civilization parameters both for the United States and for
Russia. This promotes Russia's long-term interest in getting involved
in the processes that take place in the Euro-Atlantic area. For
the same reason, Russians may experience negative feelings when
they find themselves excluded or discriminated from the decision-making
in that area.
COMMON NEIGHBOURHOOD
AND CRISIS
MANAGEMENT
13. The post-Soviet area may become a field
of permanent rivalry between the EU and Russia, unless an appropriate
modus operandi in the region is developed. Ukraine and
Georgia have become the most noticeable examples of "black
and white" way of assessing this area by both sides. They
both have to make efforts for overcoming the inertia of thinking
in terms of confrontational stereotypes, as well as for treating
the countries of the region as respected partners.
14. The EU is about to start new large programmes
of cooperation with Central Asia. The EU officials insist that
they keep contact with Russia on these issues. This dialogue should
be constantly maintained in order to avoid another "zero-sum
game" starting in the region, which can either become a peaceful
crossroad or a source of instability for the whole Eurasia.
15. In Belarus one can see disadvantages
of mistrust to each other's actions that the EU and Russia often
show in the post-Soviet area. Both the EU and Russia know well
that their cooperation with Belarus will not go far under the
current regime in that country. However, concerns of not "giving
it up" to the competitor seem to prevail over the obvious
desirability and possibility of common approaches.
16. Crisis management is one of the main
areas where cooperation between the EU and Russia is supposed
to evolve, according to the Road Map on the Common Space of External
Security. Paradoxically, this sort of cooperation is the least
expected in practice, because the most appropriate cases for joint
crisis management exist in the Post-Soviet area, where political
disagreements give rise to competition rather than cooperation.
In European countries Russia is often seen as a major obstacle
for resolution of conflicts in Moldova and Georgia, while the
local disagreements, soured by the recent belligerent history,
are neglected. Russia, on its turn, has grievances on the EU's
alleged attempts to block approaches promoted by Moscow.
17. Russia does not seem to believe that
the EU could contribute to the post-Soviet conflict-settlement
(in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria). Their joint efforts
are not implausible, but the EU has to convince Russia that (i)
such scenario is possible and (ii) it will not play against Russia's
interests.
EU'S FUTURE
POLICY
18. The EU and Russia are on the edge of
political transformations. The EU tries to quit the tough debate
on the Constitution for Europe, and Russia is coming through parliamentary
and presidential elections. Any major improvements can hardly
be expected in this turbulent period. However, the overall result
of the "transition" stage can be predicted rather easily.
The EU is to adopt the Reform Treaty that should let the Union
to develop further on. Russia is supposed to keep the incumbent
political force at power, although slightly restructured. Thus,
there is no reason to expect some political miracles that would
turn difficult partner in an ideal one. The partners will keep
going further their ways and, notwithstanding possible quarrels,
these ways give enough space for efficient cooperation in the
future.
12 October 2007
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