Select Committee on Intergovernmental Organisations Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 340 - 359)

MONDAY 10 MARCH 2008

Dr Christopher Conlon, Dr Maureen Baker, Dr Helen Williams and Dr Imelda Bates

  Q340  Chairman: So it is essentially identifying it and stopping it at source?

  Dr Conlon: Yes. A good example, although it is a much less contagious disease in terms of zoonoses, is the ebola virus that has been happening in Uganda recently. It is contagious locally with poor infection control but by getting in there, finding the disease and controlling it locally—which is what has happened—it is less likely to spread beyond that, but you cannot do that without having the infrastructure locally.

  Q341  Baroness Falkner of Margravine: I would just like to pick up the point you made about having travel restrictions against citizens. As I understand it, the United States does. The Disease Control Center at Atlanta can, in fact, issue a travel ban against individuals?

  Dr Conlon: Yes, and it was clearly circumvented by a lawyer with TB without any clear repercussions last year.

  Q342  Baroness Falkner of Margravine: Yes, that is the case I am thinking of. The State does have the power.

  Dr Conlon: Yes, but that is for one individual with a known, declared disease. When you start to talk about large populations who are incubating a disease, it is very hard to stop people travelling because you think they might have something.

  Q343  Baroness Falkner of Margravine: Would you recommend, in the case of people who are beyond the incubation period, that there should be rules to prevent them from travelling?

  Dr Conlon: I think that, if somebody is actively ill with a contagious disease which is a public threat, then yes, I do. You can do that but I think it is very hard to implement because of the incubation period. In a pandemic flu setting, if somebody has a high fever, is coughing and looks terrible, you can stop them getting the airplane, but the guy behind him who has the same infection but is not symptomatic, how do you stop him? That is where I think the intergovernmental organisations would have a hard time stopping a pandemic.

  Q344  Baroness Whitaker: There might be an area where an intergovernmental organisation could come in. I have been reading an article in The Economist about something called the Global Viral Forecasting Initiative, which is a chap in America who wants to spot the virus which is going to jump from the animal to the human species. I am not competent to know whether this is feasible, but he has a great programme for that. Is that the kind of thing, do you think, that WHO could reasonably commission research in? Is that the sort of thing they should be looking at because it is not just human, it is looking at the actual virus; it is virus hunting rather like butterfly hunting, as it were?

  Dr Conlon: I think the concept of WHO initiating research is just wrong; they do not do it to any degree that is helpful. If research has been done, more commonly initiated by Research Council money or Wellcome Trust money or something like that, then that research can be made more useable and made more applicable to the local scene.

  Q345  Baroness Whitaker: They could facilitate the transmission of knowledge about such a programme; they could not initiate such a programme?

  Dr Conlon: They could but they do not; that is not how they are designed to work.

  Q346  Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Is the question not more where the powers lie to impose restrictions on travelling, whether they rely exclusively with 192 independent governments or whether they lie partly with intergovernmental organisations like the WHO and behind it other UN organisations like the Security Council? These are not totally impossible concepts but they are very difficult concepts. Surely what we are talking about is not so much organising research about how to do this—although that would be necessary but not done by these intergovernmental organisations—but whether or not there should be powers to do this and, if so, how should they be exercised in relation to the powers that governments do have to quarantine situations. Do we need world quarantine guidelines, arrangements or what have you?

  Dr Conlon: There are guidelines for travelling with TB, but the WHO has no powers to implement them, so they can only advise either governments or regions how to do that. I am not an expert on international law, so I would not know how it is actually effected, but the WHO would have no power to do anything; they can only recommend things.

  Q347  Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Unless they were given it?

  Dr Conlon: Yes, but I cannot see that happening; maybe I am wrong.

  Q348  Lord Geddes: Both Dr Conlon and Dr Bates have advertised very strongly that it is not up to WHO to instigate research, is that right?

  Dr Bates: I think they can identify the question but they should not do it; they should then commission academic institutions to do the research.

  Q349  Lord Geddes: I think your two views are slightly at odds because I thought I heard that they should not instigate research, but actually what you are saying is that they should instigate the research and get somebody else to do it.

  Dr Bates: What they need to do is to say, "We have a policy for malaria but we do not have any evidence around this bit of treatment, so we need evidence"; and they can then commission some research to fill that gap. They would not know the exact research questions to ask.

  Q350  Lord Geddes: Would you go along with that?

  Dr Conlon: I think they are not actually sufficiently academic to even commission research in the way I think you are interpreting Imelda's comments. I think what they should say is, "There is a problem and we would like research done in this area; it would be nice if somebody did that", but the WHO very rarely is going to commission basic science or basic clinical research. They might look at operational research as to how it is employed in the field; that is how I would see it.

  Q351  Baroness Eccles of Moulton: This, then, comes to the question of funding. You can only commission if you can pay. I thought commissioning meant you could actually say, "Do this and what's it going to cost?" and get people to tender. Can they actually do that?

  Dr Bates: The WHO do not have any money but what they can do is lever money from other organisations.

  Q352  Baroness Eccles of Moulton: So they turn the idea out and hope somebody picks it up?

  Dr Bates: Yes.

  Q353  Chairman: Do they approach organisations or countries or whatever?

  Dr Bates: Sometimes but mostly not, in my experience.

  Q354  Chairman: They just put the idea out there most of the time and hope somebody responds. Is that your experience is it?

  Dr Bates: Yes.

  Q355  Lord Desai: I would have thought that other people are also picking up and throwing out ideas; WHO is not the only one. It must be a very collective effort.

  Dr Bates: In practice the way it works is that WHO themselves do not know where the evidence gaps are because they may not be academic enough to see the holes in the policy. What tends to happen is that other organisations proactively go to WHO and say, "Look, your policy does not add up; you need some more evidence around this area". Sometimes it is picked up and sometimes it is not, and sometimes they will pick it up but there is no funding.

  Q356  Lord Desai: If you want money to do research that you have identifoed, does it help to say, "WHO supports us"?

  Dr Bates: Absolutely. If you can go with WHO to a funding agency you stand a much better chance of getting money.

  Q357  Chairman: Moving onto bioterrorism, I think the Royal College of Physicians were rather dubious about the problem of spreading pathogens by artificial means. Can you say a little more about why that is? I would also like to know whether, when you talk about pathogens, you are talking about the human variety or indeed the variety that applies to crops.

  Dr Conlon: The argument is based on human pathogens, and I think most of us would think that biological warfare in that sense is pretty inefficient and, therefore, is unlikely to be a major player in a terrorism event. If you were going to cause terror, it is much better to have dirty radiation rather than smallpox or something that is not that easily transmissible. I think the argument we put forward is that quite a lot of effort went into this a few years ago, a lot of us got vaccinated, there is a lot of money going into education about smallpox and seminars on bioterrorism, whereas in fact MRSA and CDiff and things like that were getting less attention at the time and are much more of a problem.

  Q358  Chairman: What about wheat germ, foot and mouth, and things of that nature? Do you take a similar view?

  Dr Conlon: I take a pretty similar view. They are all pretty inefficient ways of terrorising countries.

  Q359  Chairman: That is, presumably, because of the problem of weaponising these things and transporting them, as opposed to chemicals or radiation, which is so much easier to transport?

  Dr Conlon: Yes, and disseminate.


 
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