CHAPTER 6: Summary of Recommendations
Ministerial responsibility for the civil service
114. We conclude that the convention that ministers
are constitutionally responsible for all aspects of their departments'
business is an essential principle underlying the arrangements
that enable Parliament properly to perform its function of holding
the Government to account. The convention is clear, straightforward
and leaves no gaps. (Para 12)
115. We maintain our view that there is no constitutional
difference between the terms responsibility and accountability.
(Para 17)
Accountability of civil servants to ministers
116. However the existing appointments process
for permanent secretaries may be modified, it must continue to
conform fully with the constitutional principles of integrity,
honesty, objectivity and impartiality. In particular, any modified
process should protect the principle of appointment on merit,
on the basis of fair and open competition. (Para 29)
117. The Government should set out, in detail,
the nature of the temporary appointments scheme they envisage.
They should put in place safeguards to ensure that those civil
servants on fixed-term contracts possess the civil service attributes
set out in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010:
integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality. Ministers should
be limited to requesting the category of expertise which they
consider is required; the decision on which individual to appoint
should rest with the relevant departmental permanent secretary,
with the approval of the Civil Service Commission. (Para 35)
118. It would be entirely inappropriate for ministers
to be formally empowered to make disciplinary decisions about
civil servants in their departments. We recognise, however, that
ministers have an important and legitimate consultative role in
the performance management of civil servants. Accordingly, we
support the Government's proposal to allow ministers to contribute
to the appraisal of certain civil servants. (Para 39)
119. We recommend that there should be a presumption
that a single senior civil servant will lead the implementation
of a major project from beginning to end. This will enhance the
ability of Parliament, through its select committees, to hold
the executive to account for the success or failure of such projects.
(Para 44)
120. The power to seek a ministerial direction
is therefore a significant one, and its very existence no doubt
prevents impropriety in some cases. (Para 49)
121. We do not recommend any additional powers
for the civil service to act as a check on the constitutionality
of ministerial actions. However, we would expect ministers to
treat advice that they may be acting unconstitutionally with the
utmost seriousness. (Para 53)
122. In our view, the constitutional position
as regards special advisers is clear: ministers are responsible
for the actions of their special advisers. Ministers have a duty
to ensure their special advisers abide by the Code of Conduct
for Special Advisers at all times. (Para 59)
Accountability of civil servants to Parliament
123. The Osmotherly rules are an executive document
offering guidance to civil servants—and no more. They in
no way have the effect of imposing restrictions on the activities
of select committees. It is for Parliament to determine how it
scrutinises the executive. (Para 70)
124. However, in view of the importance of the
Osmotherly rules in guiding civil servants in their dealings with
select committees, we recommend that future revisions of the rules
should be published in draft to enable scrutiny by Parliament
and its select committees. Whatever the outcome of that scrutiny,
the rules will remain an executive document and should not be
taken to have the formal approval of Parliament. (Para 71)
125. We recommend that where a select committee
requests evidence from a named senior civil servant the Government
should accede to that request unless there are exceptional reasons
not to do so. Taking evidence from civil servants is complementary
to, not a replacement for, the accountability of ministers. We
recommend that the revised Osmotherly rules incorporate this change
in emphasis. (Para 79)
126. We agree with the proposal in the Civil
Service Reform Plan to allow former Accounting Officers to
give evidence to select committees on major projects and policies
on which they had formerly worked. We recommend that this principle
should be extended so that, where select committees request evidence
from other former senior civil service post holders (whether or
not they are still in the civil service) on policies or projects
on which they used to work, the expectation is that such requests
will be acceded to. (Para 85)
127. We do not think it satisfactory that select
committees are deemed by the Osmotherly rules to have weaker rights
of access to civil service policy advice than those making a request
under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. We recommend that a
select committee should be able to request access to relevant
policy advice given by civil servants to ministers, on the rare
occasions where it considers it essential to its examination of
an issue. The decision on whether to disclose policy advice should
be taken by a minister, consistent with the tests in the Freedom
of Information Act 2000. The minister may decide to disclose a
summary or relevant extracts rather than the whole of the advice.
Select committees should be judicious in requesting such advice;
in return, the Government should consider each request on its
merits and not reject them out of hand. (Para 92)
128. For the avoidance of doubt, civil servants
themselves should not, and should not be invited to, disclose
the policy advice they give to ministers: it is for ministers,
not civil servants, to waive the confidentiality of such advice.
(Para 93)
129. We are conscious that select committees
are not disciplinary tribunals and do not contain the safeguards
that employees are entitled to in a disciplinary process. However,
when the evidence a committee receives leads it to conclude that
a particular civil servant has been at fault, that committee should
not be precluded from expressing criticism and, in extreme cases,
recommending that the department consider appropriate disciplinary
procedures. (Para 99)
130. Select committees should only take such
action where there are strong grounds for doing so. The decision
on all such disciplinary matters should remain within the relevant
department. (Para 100)
Arm's-length bodies
131. We recommend that the Government publish,
maintain and make available to Parliament a full diagram of the
central state, similar to an organisational chart. (Para 106)
132. The accountability mechanisms of ALBs are
a supplement to ministers' constitutional responsibility to Parliament,
not a replacement for it. The primary means by which public servants
in ALBs are held to account is via the convention of individual
ministerial responsibility. (Para 113)
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