House of Lords - The future of EU enlargement

The future of EU enlargement - European Union Committee Contents

Chapter 2: the enlargement agenda

7. In the Treaties on which the EU is founded, enlargement is governed by Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In practice, enlargement relies on a set of overarching criteria, known as the Copenhagen criteria, and a detailed technical process. This chapter provides an overview of the foundations of enlargement, the process by which it is achieved, and some potential pitfalls for the EU's enlargement agenda. The relevant Treaty articles and the Copenhagen criteria are set out in Box 2.

Importance of enlargement

8. As set out in the Treaties, enlargement is a reactive process; it is for individual countries to apply to become Member States, not for the EU to solicit new members. Mr Graham Avery, Senior Member of St Antony's College, Oxford, and Senior Adviser at the European Policy Centre, Brussels, explained that the EU lacked a "strategy for enlargement in the sense of a deliberate plan for future expansion". However, as one of the EU's longest standing features, there are clearly aims and aspirations behind the EU's enlargement process that mean it is accurate to speak of the EU having an 'enlargement agenda'.

9. Professor Dimitry Kochenov, Chair in Constitutional Law of the EU at the University of Groningen, drew attention to the roots of enlargement in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), signed in 1951, which provides: "Any European State may request to accede to the present Treaty. It shall address its request to the Council, which shall act by unanimous vote after having obtained the opinion of the High Authority; the Council shall also determine the terms of accession, likewise acting unanimously".[3] This early vision of enlargement has been gradually supplemented to form the current provisions, with Article 49 TEU now highlighting the importance of European values as well as geographical 'Europeanness' (see Box 2). This reflects an evolution from a Community with an economic "mission" to a Union with equal concern for promoting "peace [and] its values", and solidarity among peoples and Member States.[4]

10. The Commission has previously sought to provide guidance about what 'European' means with regards to enlargement, saying that it "combines geographical, historical and cultural elements", but noting that "the shared experience of proximity, ideas, values, and historical interaction cannot be condensed into a simple formula, and is subject to review by each succeeding generation".[5] The question 'What is a European state?' is therefore not one that can be answered with full and final clarity. Nevertheless, we will consider this question further in Chapter 5 in the section on the scope of enlargement.

11. We will discuss in greater detail the potential benefits—and dangers—of further enlargement in Chapter 4.

BOX 2

Enlargement in the EU Treaties and Council Conclusions

Article 49 TEU provides:

Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union. The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be notified of this application. The applicant State shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by a majority of its component members. The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account.

In turn, Article 2 provides:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.

Article 49 refers to "conditions of eligibility" agreed by the European Council. In Copenhagen in 1993, the European Council agreed the following criteria to be met by candidate countries before entry:

(1) Political—stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities

(2) Economic—a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with the competitive pressures and market forces within the EU

(3) Ability to take on the obligations of membership—including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union

The Copenhagen Council Conclusions also set out a fourth consideration: the Union's absorption capacity, or its ability to absorb new members without damaging the momentum of European integration. The Copenhagen criteria were confirmed by the Madrid Council in December 1995, which also stressed the importance of gradual, harmonious integration of candidate countries with the EU through the development of a market economy and administrative and judicial capacity, and the creation of a stable economic and monetary environment.

Source: 21-22 June 1993 and 15-16 December 1995 Council Conclusions

12. The current enlargement agenda has two main drivers: safeguarding stability and security within wider Europe, and achieving economic prosperity and growth. There was a consensus amongst witnesses that enlargement was a key tool for maintaining security and stability across Europe.[6] This might be called the geopolitical argument for enlargement.

13. The UK Government commented on the conflicts in the Western Balkans in the 1990s and the "continuing role" of the EU in ensuring security and stability in the region.[7] An example of this might be the EU's Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX).[8] The Czech Republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for the "moral dimension" of supporting democracy in Europe to be "revive[d]".[9] We were also reminded of the historical successes of the enlargement process in this sphere and enlargement's "remarkable" transformational power in some of the older Member States, such as Spain, Portugal and Greece, which "came out of their own dictatorships".[10] Mr Richard Howitt MEP, member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and rapporteur for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, emphasised that there was no "alternative" of status quo, warning against complacency or allowing the Western Balkans to become "a missing part of the jigsaw".[11] The Embassy of the Republic of Serbia told us that "leaving Western Balkan countries outside" the Union could be "risky" and "expensive". Other witnesses highlighted the strategic position of Turkey with regards to the Middle East.[12]

14. Many witnesses also suggested that enlargement could assist in developing the conditions in which Europe's economies could flourish.[13] The Serbian Embassy argued that "economic realism is certainly in favour of EU enlargement".[14] Mr Mustafa Osman Turan, the Deputy Permanent Delegate of Turkey to the EU, noted that Turkey's accession would bring 75 million consumers into the single market.[15] The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) also emphasised the importance of the single market in "open[ing] up prosperity and opportunity to hundreds of millions of people".[16] The extent of the economic impact of enlargement will be discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4.

15. European union has always been driven by a desire to bring peace and prosperity to Europe. The transformative power of enlargement has been proven through successive enlargements. The goals of security, stability of the EU's neighbourhood, democracy, and economic growth rightly lie at the heart of today's enlargement agenda.

16. Despite enlargement's importance, witnesses suggested it had slipped down the list of the EU's priorities, displaced by a greater focus on the EU's internal affairs, notably the questions about the degree of integration within the euro area.[17] Commissioner Füle cautioned strongly against the EU becoming distracted: "If you lose momentum in enlargement, I do not see how anyone or anything can get it back in the foreseeable future".[18]

17. The evidence suggested that a loss of focus was not universal across the EU institutions, but rather confined predominantly to specific Member State governments and, by extension, the Council. Mr Howitt MEP named France and Germany in particular as having lost enthusiasm.[19] By comparison, Commissioner Füle spoke with great enthusiasm about continuing to drive the enlargement agenda forward, and we heard that there were "strong" pro-enlargement majorities in the European Parliament.[20]

18. Enlargement has regrettably slipped down the Council agenda in recent years, with countries such as France and Germany redirecting attention towards the EU's internal affairs. Although vital institutional and governance questions are being asked as a result of the euro area crisis and the EU's economic and financial difficulties, neither the Council nor individual Member States can afford to ignore the enlargement agenda. We strongly support the commitment of this Government, and previous governments, to promoting the enlargement agenda.

Principles of enlargement

19. The Copenhagen criteria, summarised in Box 2, derive from the Conclusions of the June 1993 Council in Copenhagen. They set out three key areas where a candidate country must meet the EU's set standards in order to be eligible for membership: politics, economics, and a willingness and ability to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership. In addition, the Conclusions stressed the EU's ability to meet the demands of including a new member, known as its absorption capacity.

20. The Copenhagen criteria make clear that widening the EU should not jeopardise the Union's internal development: the ability to sustain the momentum of European integration is thus made an important factor in the decision to enlarge the EU. In practice, widening and deepening are often cyclical.[21] For example, the signing of the ultimately unratified Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in October 2004 followed close on the heels of the May 2004 enlargement that brought eight further countries into the EU.

21. The Copenhagen criteria were set out in anticipation of the Central and Eastern European enlargement, and so are products of a specific political circumstance. However, our witnesses gave broad support to them as a continuing guide for enlargement, albeit as only the foundation of a more complicated process.[22] Further principles are also set out in Council Conclusions relating to specific candidate countries and enlargements, as well as the EU's association agreements with individual countries.[23]

22. Twenty years on, the Copenhagen criteria still set out the right principles for the EU's enlargement policy, but they only offer the broad brushstrokes of a more complicated enlargement picture.

23. Our witnesses commented on the flexibility provided by the Copenhagen criteria. Professor Alan Mayhew, Jean Monnet Professor at the University of Sussex, said that they "have the advantage of being so vague that the EU can interpret them as it wishes", and Associate Professor Susan Senior Nello of the University of Siena noted the "political leeway" in how they are applied.[24] Several witnesses commented on the question of whether Romania and Bulgaria had satisfied the Copenhagen criteria prior to accession, drawing attention to the judiciary and the fight against corruption (and, in Bulgaria's case, organised crime), which continue to be monitored under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) post-2007.[25] Commissioner Füle acknowledged that there was still significant progress to be made in Romania and Bulgaria some six years after their accession.[26]

24. The EU's failure to apply the Copenhagen criteria rigorously led to the entry of Romania and Bulgaria before they were ready to meet the full obligations of membership. This has led to an unsatisfactory post-accession mechanism—the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism—needing to be put into place for these countries. In the future, the EU must resist the watering down of the criteria, and should apply them rigorously.

The current enlargement process

25. Following the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, there have been changes to the enlargement process in response to lessons learned. This section briefly summarises the current enlargement process.

26. Box 3 sets out the countries currently engaged with the enlargement process and their status. In discussing the aspirant countries—that is, the candidate and potential candidate countries—throughout this report, we refer to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in accordance with the nomenclature used in official EU documents, and to Kosovo in accordance with the relevant UN Resolution,[27] without intending to indicate a position regarding either the 'name issue' between FYROM and Greece or the non-recognition of Kosovo by some EU Member States. A map of the EU and its neighbourhood, including the aspirant countries, is included at Figure 1.

27. As indicated in Article 49 TEU, the first step of the official enlargement process is an application for membership from the relevant state. In practice, an application will trigger the Council to ask the Commission to prepare an opinion regarding the applicant's ability to meet the conditions of membership. If the Commission's opinion is positive, the Council will need to agree by unanimity a negotiating mandate for formal negotiations to be opened.

28. The Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 identified the countries of the Western Balkans as 'potential candidates'. This meant that the EU had made a firm commitment to granting candidate status to each country once it had met the criteria. Four Western Balkan countries have progressed to either candidate or acceding country status, while three remain as potential candidates. Turkey's Association Agreement of 1962 also envisaged the possibility of accession.

BOX 3

Current candidate and potential candidate countries

Nine countries are currently participating in the enlargement process:

(1) Croatia (acceding) - negotiations on the final chapter were formally closed on 30 June 2011; the accession treaty is currently being ratified by the 27 Member States

(2) Iceland (candidate) - negotiations open; 11 chapters provisionally closed

(3) Montenegro (candidate) - negotiations open; 1 chapter provisionally closed

(4) Turkey (candidate) - negotiations open; 1 chapter provisionally closed

(5) Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (candidate) - negotiations not yet open

(6) Serbia (candidate) - negotiations not yet open

(7) Albania (potential candidate)

(8) Bosnia and Herzegovina (potential candidate)

(9) Kosovo (potential candidate)

Source: European Commission

29. After granting official candidate status, the Council must take a further unanimous decision in order for formal membership negotiations to be opened. Ministers and Ambassadors of the EU governments and the candidate country conduct negotiations at intergovernmental conferences regarding the EU's body of secondary legislation, the acquis communautaire. The acquis is divided into thematic chapters; there are currently 35 chapters, listed in Appendix 5. Each one is negotiated separately. Negotiations are conducted on how and when the acquis should be adopted and implemented.

FIGURE 1

Map of the EU and its neighbourhood

30. The first stage of negotiations is known as screening. The Commission and the candidate country carry out a detailed examination of each chapter to determine how well the country is prepared. If the country is sufficiently prepared, then negotiations may be opened directly, but if not the Commission may set opening benchmarks, conditions that must be met before negotiations on the chapter can begin. For example, in order to open Chapter 24 on justice, freedom and security, Croatia had to adopt an Integrated Border Management Action Plan.

31. The EU will adopt a common position on the chapter, which typically sets closing benchmarks, conditions that must be met before negotiations on the chapter can be closed. For example, in order to close Chapter 7 on intellectual property, Croatia had to ensure it had the administrative capacity to enforce rights concerning the fight against piracy of intellectual property and counterfeiting. Closing a chapter again requires unanimity in the Council. The entire negotiating process is not concluded until each of the 35 chapters has been closed in this way.

32. Negotiations are therefore inevitably a long process, throughout which interim benchmarks are also set. Mr Howitt MEP spoke of these as best seen as "stepping stones" to support reform, rather than "hurdles that countries can fail to meet".[28] H.E. Mr Vladimir Drobnjak, Head of Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the EU and former Chief Negotiator for Croatia, spoke positively about how the benchmarking system had made the process more "individualised", but pointed out the "heavy toll" it placed on the candidate country's administrative system. He suggested that this could be a hurdle, noting that in some Western Balkan countries enlargement was "still perceived primarily as a political process", with insufficient understanding of the level of legal, technical and administrative work required.[29] Dr Diana Bozhilova, Research Fellow at King's College London, argued that the EU must consider "what sort of burden it is placing on these states and how they are going to be able to match the resources required".[30]

33. The current benchmarking system can provide stepping-stones towards implementing—and demonstrating—reforms. It can provide certainty to all parties and a clear route for candidate countries to follow in order to achieve reforms during a long and sometimes difficult process.

34. Although it is quite right that the enlargement process has become more rigorous and structured, the effort required from the aspirant countries should not be underestimated. Many of the aspirant countries have further to go in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria than during previous enlargement rounds, and on a technical level more is being asked of them than of any former enlargement country. While aspirant countries must play their part fully, the EU must ensure that this does not place an insurmountable burden of work upon candidate countries.

35. Lessons learned from Croatia's accession process and the need for the CVM post-2007 mean that an exceptional procedure has been proposed for Chapters 23 and 24 regarding the judiciary and fundamental rights, and justice, freedom and security. In future negotiations, these chapters will be opened on the basis of action plans, with interim benchmarks set regarding their implementation. Only later will closing benchmarks be set. Witnesses strongly supported this new approach.[31]

36. We support the new approach to Chapters 23 and 24 (Judiciary and fundamental rights, and Justice, freedom and security) that will prioritise the implementation of domestic reforms. This is an important lesson learned after the most recent enlargements and will help to ensure that irreversible reforms are achieved in these crucial areas.

Financial assistance for enlargement

37. The EU's Multiannual Financial Framework includes an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) that seeks to provide financial support for the aspirant countries' reforms. This includes technical assistance and funding projects aimed at developing the structures necessary for the implementation of the acquis. The IPA allocates funding specifically to individual aspirant countries, or else to multi-beneficiary programmes, such as those that involve transition assistance, institution building, or cross-border cooperation.[32]

38. Box 4 provides a short summary of the structure of the IPA.

39. The Rt Hon David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, told us that twinning—bilateral projects between a Member State and an aspirant country—was a "key component" of the IPA, giving the example of a project in Kosovo to assist in strengthening the rule of law in carrying out their Integrated Border Management strategy and the fight against drug trafficking, which was run by Northern Ireland Cooperation Overseas.[33] He reiterated the Government's view that the IPA needed to be more flexible to account for individual countries' needs, and better aligned to strategic aims.[34]

40. According to the latest multi-annual indicative financial framework, the IPA will have programmed €11.5 billion over the 2007-13 period, with €9.95 billion of that allocated to country-specific programmes.[35] The most recent Annual Report on financial assistance for enlargement reviews expenditure and activity during 2011. We note with concern the failure to convert funds from commitments into actual spending in many cases, ranging from zero per cent in the case of Iceland to 59.1 per cent for multi-beneficiary projects under Component I.[36]

BOX 4

The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA)

The IPA has five separate Components:

(I) Support for transition and institution-building;

(II) Cross-border cooperation;

(III) Regional development;

(IV) Human resource development; and

(V) Rural development.

Potential candidate countries (i.e. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo), are eligible for funding under Components I and II, but may benefit from assistance similar to the latter three under Component I's transitional assistance.

Components III-V are aimed at the candidate countries (i.e. Montenegro, Turkey, FYROM, Serbia and previously Croatia) with a view to supporting preparations to participate in the relevant EU funds and policies, such as cohesion policy and the Common Agricultural Policy.

Owing to its extensive alignment with the acquis and its level of economic and social development, Iceland receives financial support exclusively through Component I.

The current IPA makes the following national funding allocations:

(Figures in October 2012 current prices to the nearest million)

Albania: €595 million

Bosnia and Herzegovina: €656 million

Croatia: €998 million

FYROM: €615 million

Iceland: €30 million

Kosovo: €635 million

Montenegro: €236 million

Serbia: €1,386 million

Turkey: €4,795 million

Source: Revised multi-annual indicative financial framework, October 2012 (14962/12).

41. Although aspirant countries are typically middle-income countries, we believe that a substantial Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) is essential to prepare countries for membership. The next IPA should focus more closely on the strategic aims of the EU's enlargement policy and maintain the flexibility necessary in order to meet individual countries' needs. In turn, this should lead to the more effective use of money, with a greater percentage of committed funds being translated into actual spending that will benefit the aspirant countries.

Conditionality

42. The enlargement process is underpinned by the principle of conditionality, which means that progressing to the next step of the enlargement process is made dependent upon meeting certain prior conditions. This allows the EU to confirm that at each stage an aspirant country is making concrete progress towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria and is adopting and effectively implementing the acquis so that reforms are entrenched.

43. The principle of conditionality has long guided the enlargement process, but there have been changes in the way it is used following lessons learned from the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds.

44. Professor Kochenov argued that during previous enlargement rounds "the Commission failed to capitalise on the opportunities offered by the principle of conditionality", and several witnesses suggested that reforms had previously been made on paper, that is on the face of legislation, but had not actually been implemented on the ground. Commissioner Füle himself acknowledged this as a problem with previous enlargements.[37]

45. There was broad agreement among witnesses that the application of conditionality had become more exacting in order to address this issue,[38] and this was widely supported.[39] The more rigorous system of conditionality includes the need for countries to demonstrate a strong track record in implementing reforms, as indicated by the new approach to Chapters 23 and 24 (see paragraphs 35-6), which offers further time for candidate countries to establish and demonstrate reforms.[40] The European Integration Committee of the Croatian Parliament and Ms Kadri Liik, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, explained how conditionality and benchmarking could be useful tools for candidate countries, giving clarity on what had to be achieved.[41]

46. The EU must maintain a system of tough conditionality that requires genuine reform before moving on to the next step, always keeping in mind the need for implementing, as well as adopting, the acquis. In this way, conditionality—and the associated benchmarking procedure—can serve as a tool both for the EU and for the governments of aspirant countries.

47. The EU must require genuine reforms at each step; conversely, the EU must meet its obligations to allow candidates to progress if reforms have been made. Failure to do so diminishes the EU's influence and damages the credibility of the enlargement process.

Post-accession conditionality and monitoring

48. The evidence we received was mixed on how effective the post-2007 CVM for Romania and Bulgaria has been. H.E. Mr Konstanin Dimitrov of the Republic of Bulgaria said that it had proved a "useful instrument" and had supported the Bulgarian government in carrying out necessary reforms, but Professor Andrew Taylor of the University of Sheffield suggested that the CVM had not fully delivered, showing the limits of the Commission's ability to drive through change in the face of domestic inertia.

49. The Liberal Democrat European Parliament Party (LDEPP) pointed out that the existence of the CVM had led to Romania and Bulgaria feeling "second rank" within the EU.[42] Looking forward, Commissioner Füle expressed the desire to erase any need for post-accession monitoring in future so as to avoid the impression of there being "two sorts" of Member States. On the other hand, Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne, former MEP and rapporteur for Romania's accession in 2007, argued that such processes should be "institutionalise[d]" in order to give the EU a "policy of conditionality with strength".[43]

50. Progress still needs to be made on judicial reform and corruption in Romania and Bulgaria, as well as on fighting organised crime in Bulgaria. The last six years indicate that post-accession conditionality achieves only slow progress. In future accessions, every effort must be made to ensure that all reforms are irreversible prior to accession, as post-accession mechanisms are both undesirable and unlikely to prove effective. Consideration should be given as to how best to ensure that the reforms are justiciable and, where applicable, are embedded in the constitution of the applicant country.

Credibility and pitfalls of the enlargement process

51. The enlargement process must be credible in order to effect change in the aspirant countries and maintain support for enlargement amongst the publics of both the aspirant countries and the current Member States.[44] Although this latter issue is explored in greater detail in Chapter 5 regarding enlargement and accession fatigue (see paragraphs 147-59 and 181-95), we comment here on some potential pitfalls directly relating to the enlargement process and how it is conducted.

A PERCEPTION OF 'RAISING THE BAR'

52. Some witnesses suggested that a more stringent application of conditionality could undermine the credibility of the process for the leaders and publics of aspirant countries. They also expressed concern about the process becoming increasingly wide-ranging and demanding, asking new candidates to meet criteria that were not met by the existing Member States.[45] An example of this might be the decriminalisation of libel, which was set as a benchmark for Montenegro, although many EU Member States, including Denmark and Germany, retain libel as a criminal offence, and the UK only removed criminal libel from the statue books in 2010.[46] Commissioner Füle agreed that candidates should not be expected to "deliver more" than existing Member States.[47]

53. As well as the question of heightened requirements, we also heard that the way in which the process was conducted could have undesired consequences. For example, the Serbian Embassy suggested that "strict conditioning" could have "counter effects", such as "imped[ing] the integration processes and regional stability", and the European Policy Centre (EPC) noted that the "tightening" of the Commission's "oversight" over national reforms meant there was a "degree of intrusiveness in the internal affairs" of aspirant countries.

54. Dr Charles Tannock MEP, member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament and rapporteur for FYROM, acknowledged the "danger of being over-officious", but pointed out that seeing conditionality robustly applied and reforms taking place in the aspirant countries raised the credibility of the enlargement process in the eyes of the EU's citizens, suggesting that there was a delicate balancing act to be achieved.[48] Our witnesses offered some ways in which this could be done. For example, clearly communicating "the political and economic goals of enlargement" could encourage aspirant countries' citizens to "accept more rigorous terms for membership". Mr Howitt MEP suggested that the Commission's Progress Reports should "analyse the costs of non-enlargement" for the aspirant countries and warned that "the current public relations of the EU in the accession countries are pretty meagre and superficial".[49]

55. Other witnesses highlighted the importance of candidate countries embracing reform and the principle of conditionality. Ms Liik said that it was up to individual countries to "change their story" and move towards European values and EU membership if they wished, and the Minister for Europe said that there were "no shortcuts" to meeting the criteria for membership.[50] We note with concern the recent political dispute in FYROM, with the main opposition, the Social Democrats, boycotting parliament after being ejected from the assembly during a debate in December 2012. This ongoing issue led to Commissioner Füle cancelling a visit to the country in February this year.

56. Given the scale of the reforms that many aspirant countries are undertaking, it is unsurprising that this can sometimes lead to negative public perceptions of the accession process. To combat this, the EU must ensure that only strictly necessary criteria are imposed upon candidate countries and that the criteria are applied fairly across the board.

57. At the same time, candidate countries must play their part in the process fully, accepting the need for rigorous conditionality in order to achieve real reforms. This should be reinforced by the EU being willing to take action against backsliding, as such conditionality demands. This includes slowing or halting the enlargement process—and associated funding—when appropriate.

58. Both national governments and the Commission should work more proactively to communicate to citizens the long-term benefits of sometimes painful reforms. We agree that it would be beneficial for the Commission's Progress Reports to highlight the costs of non-enlargement for both the aspirant countries and the EU as a whole.

A PERCEPTION OF 'CLOSING THE DOOR'

59. A number of witnesses also argued that uncertainty about whether progress towards reforms would be met with genuine progress towards accession could give the appearance of the EU making excuses to "close the door", damaging the credibility of the enlargement process.[51]

60. Mr Fadi Hakura, Associate Fellow at Chatham House, and Dr George Christou, Associate Professor at the University of Warwick, emphasised the negative impact that uncertainty about the EU's position towards Turkey had had on that country's national reforms, although Mr Turan disputed that a slowing of the accession negotiations had affected the national process of reform, and the Minister for Europe denied that the EU was losing leverage with Turkey.[52] Mr Howitt MEP emphasised that the reform process was challenging, and that countries would only "endure that pain" when "real progress" was being made towards accession.[53]

61. Several witnesses agreed that it was the fact of progress, rather than the pace of it, that was important for the enlargement process to appear credible to candidates and potential candidates.[54] Incentives such as visa liberalisation were mentioned by several witnesses as being useful tools for demonstrating the EU's commitment to a continuing process and eventual membership. Dr Steven Blockmans, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies and Professor at the University of Amsterdam, said that, when visa-free travel had been introduced for Albanian citizens, "it was hailed by the political leadership" as though Albania had achieved membership, and Sir Michael Leigh, Senior Adviser to the German Marshall Fund of the USA and former Director-General at DG Enlargement, described visa liberalisation as the "main incentive" on offer.[55] Dr Christou suggested that partial visa liberalisation might suffice "in the short term" to incentivise further progress in Turkey.[56]

62. Conditionality can only be effective if it is genuinely conditional. The halt in Turkey's journey towards EU membership is a stark reminder of the need for a credible process that delivers progress, albeit incrementally.

63. We urge the Commission and the UK Government to think carefully about how valued incentives, such as visa liberalisation, can be used in order to counteract negative perceptions of the credibility of, or the EU's commitment to, the enlargement process.

64. Witnesses also told us that the perception of the EU closing the door had been exacerbated by increasing "nationalisation" and "politicisation" of the enlargement process, that is to say by the introduction of conditions and benchmarks by the Council, and the increasingly politicised decisions being taken about whether a candidate had met the benchmarks set.[57]

65. The EPC told us that the increase in Council-set conditions and benchmarks as a way to "control the accession process" had made the process "more unpredictable" and "raised doubts over the EU's commitment to enlargement", "feeding speculation" that conditionality was being used as "an excuse to keep the door closed". Dr Ana Juncos, Lecturer at University of Bristol, said that the introduction of "political considerations" into the process, particularly regarding the opening and closing of chapters, sent "the wrong message", giving the impression that "the 'rules of the game' change to suit the interests of the existing Member States".

66. It is right that the enlargement process is ultimately governed by Member States through the Council. The excessive politicisation of the enlargement process through Council-set conditions and benchmarks can increase uncertainty about the steps that countries must take in order to progress. So long as the Council acts in good faith, this need not call into question the EU's commitment to enlargement.

67. Some of the most problematic conditions and benchmarks introduced by the Council relate to bilateral issues between the candidate country and one or more Member States, such as the 'name issue' between Greece and FYROM, or the unilateral blocking of chapters, as in the case of Turkey's negotiations, where 10 of the 35 chapters have been blocked by France and Cyprus.[58]

68. The EU has learned some painful lessons about the problems that such disputes can throw up. The entry of Cyprus into the EU in 2004 without reconciliation between its Greek and Turkish populations has led to an entrenched dispute, diminishing the EU's leverage in encouraging both sides to reach a settlement, and consequently interrupting Turkey's accession process.[59] Looking forward to the aspirant countries and those in the Eastern Partnership that may one day wish to apply for membership, there are a number of other very substantial disputes that shuold be resolved before accession, notably:

(a) The dispute between Greece, and increasingly Bulgaria, and FYROM regarding not only the latter's name, but also the level of 'good neighbourly relations' exhibited by FYROM;

(b) The dispute between Serbia and Kosovo;

(d) The territorial disputes in the Caucasus following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

69. In allowing Cyprus entry into the Union before the dispute over Northern Cyprus was resolved, the EU has imported a bilateral dispute into the Union, transforming it into a dispute between the EU and one of its candidate countries. This was a grave mistake, for which both the EU and Turkey bear some responsibility, and one that has had serious negative consequences for both Turkey and the EU.

70. Looking forward, the EU needs to take much more effective action to avoid importing any further bilateral disputes—be they territorial or otherwise—into the Union. In doing so, it is important not to give a third country a de facto veto over the accession of a candidate country.

71. Regarding the current enlargement process, witnesses criticised the fact that bilateral issues were increasingly being raised as Council-imposed conditions on accession. The European Affairs Committee of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia said that such blocks "undermine[d] the whole process of merit-based accession", and Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne suggested that the process was being "increasingly subverted".[60] The Minister for Europe acknowledged that it was "important for the integrity" of the process that bilateral issues did not "distort" negotiations.[61]

72. A further difficulty relating to bilateral issues was raised by Mr Howitt MEP, who criticised the ease with which bilateral issues could be veiled by Council Conclusions, as Member States may be unwilling to challenge others. Ambassador Drobnjak also noted that there were "hundreds" of opportunities within the Council working group on enlargement for reticent Member States to "filibuster" under the guise of needing further time to examine whether benchmarks had been met, calling this a "grey zone" in which countries could "hide" so that "no one can blame [them] on the record". Commissioner Füle expressed this more positively, noting that this meant the process moved "through consensus", although he acknowledged that each benchmark gave the Member States a potential veto.[62]

73. The need for unanimity in the Council means that bilateral issues can disrupt the enlargement process at any stage. This is unavoidable and undesirable. We call upon the Government, working closely with other Member States, to take a robust approach to this issue, encouraging openness surrounding bilateral or domestic issues and seeking to find solutions that allow the enlargement process to continue smoothly.

74. Particularly given the unique circumstances of the Western Balkans, resolving bilateral—or possibly multilateral—issues is no simple matter, but our witnesses indicated the importance of both sides being willing to work proactively in order to resolve them. The Minister for Europe affirmed that "regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations" "remain central to the enlargement process", agreeing that "bilateral disputes cannot be allowed to undermine these key principles or to interference with the enlargement process". Mr Howitt MEP emphasised that he wanted to see "pressure" on both Greece and FYROM over the 'name issue', saying "you have to have two good neighbours", with the suggestion being that pressure from other Member States on Greece—what Sir Michael Leigh called "moral suasion"—was necessary.[63]

75. Good neighbourly relations and the resolution of bilateral disputes are two-way streets. Member States should ensure that they strive for good regional cooperation and take up proactively the resolution of bilateral disputes in good faith whilst encouraging other Member States to act similarly.

76. There was general agreement that bilateral issues should be resolved outside the enlargement process wherever possible.[64] However, the Minister for Europe pointed out that it was "easier to exert peer-group pressure" between Member States if the candidate country had "gone methodically through the accession process".[65] There is therefore a tension between resolving issues early, in order to give candidate countries greater certainty that their progress towards membership will be unimpeded, and the opportunities available to Member States to ensure that this is so.

77. The Commission also has a role in ensuring that bilateral issues do not derail enlargement. Commissioner Füle indicated they would be offering a parallel process in order to maintain separation between bilateral issues and the enlargement process. He said the Commission had prepared an "inventory" of open bilateral issues between the Western Balkan countries and would consult the countries to determine the importance and seriousness of those issues, many of which were "being neglected".[66]

78. This is important because several witnesses identified concerns over whether Western Balkan countries that enter the Union sooner might gain leverage over their neighbours and have the opportunity to "pull up the ladder" by introducing bilateral issues into the enlargement process.[67] Mr Howitt MEP suggested that it might be possible for future accession treaties to include provisions that "either prohibit or make it more difficult" for this to happen, such as using reinforced majorities.[68]

79. We commend the Commission's proactive approach to identifying bilateral issues amongst the Western Balkan countries and hope that this will encourage a greater openness about these issues so that they can be resolved more transparently through the existing forums or international arbitration, as appropriate.

80. A change to the way that enlargement is handled by the Council in order to diminish the ability of individual Member States' to veto progress on enlargement unilaterally, particularly at the opening or early stages of accession negotiations, could be welcome.

81. There was generally strong support for the use of international forums and courts in order to resolve bilateral disputes. Mr Howitt MEP suggested that the EU should set up its own arbitration mechanism for enlargement-related disputes, while Ambassador Drobnjak explained that Croatia had gone through ad hoc arbitration with Slovenia on their border dispute. The Minister for Europe noted that, with regards to the 'Icesave case' between Iceland and the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, Iceland's leaders had found it "easier to handle the issue when it is a matter of judicial process" rather than responding to political representations.[69]

82. Bilateral issues should, wherever possible, be resolved through the internationally recognised courts or resolution procedures. They must be dealt with before accession, but should not block the process from continuing at any stage prior to this.

3 Article 98 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. The High Authority was the ECSC original equivalent to the European Community's Commission and was eventually merged with it. The Treaty establishing the ECSC expired in 2002. Back

4 Article 2 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Article 3 TEU Back

5 Europe and the challenge of enlargement, 24 June 1992, Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 3/92, Commission, p.11 Back

6 Avery, Commissioner memorandum, Croatian Embassy, Croatian European Integration Committee, Dimitrov, EPC, FCO written evidence, French Senate European Affairs Committee, Q 146 (Füle) Kullaa, LDEPP, Macedonian European Affairs Committee, Serbian Embassy, Turkish Embassy Back

7 FCO written evidence Back

8 EULEX website (http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/front/) Back

10 Q 38 (Hakura) Back

11 QQ 152, 156 Back

12 Czech government, Turkish Embassy Back

13 Avery, Commissioner written evidence, Commissioner memorandum,Croatian Embassy, Croatian European Integration Committee, FCO written evidence, Kullaa, Taylor Back

14 Serbian Embassy Back

16 FCO written evidence Back