House of Lords - The future of EU enlargement

The future of EU enlargement - European Union Committee Contents

Chapter 5: Enlargement in the medium term

135. In Chapter 2, we set out the current position of the enlargement agenda and how the process is operating, including some of the challenges. This chapter looks ahead to how the enlargement agenda is likely to progress over the next ten years and the obstacles that it may encounter.

Pace of future enlargement

136. The 2004 enlargement was conducted as a 'big bang' enlargement with many countries acceding at once. Presently, each aspirant country's accession process is being conducted individually, on its 'own merits', with no coordinated timetable. Our witnesses evinced widespread support for this 'regatta' approach.[125] However, there was a suggestion that some countries, such as Turkey, might feel they had been 'skipped over' in the "queue" for enlargement, and it was suggested that, in the future, two or more of the Western Balkan countries' accessions could be linked.[126]

137. We strongly support enlargement being conducted under the 'own merits' principle. Although this may result in some countries progressing more quickly than others, it is the only way to conduct the process fairly and to avoid the risk of countries acceding before they are fully ready to take up the obligations of membership.

138. As part of its management of the enlargement process, the Commission produces annual Progress Reports on each of the countries currently on the path towards accession, and a Communication on its enlargement strategy. The most recent of these were published on 10 October 2012.[127] These Progress Reports indicate that the pace of reforms is highly variable across the candidate and potential candidate countries, with some countries making little progress or seeing backsliding in some areas. For example, Dr Blockmans remarked that, over the last few years, Bosnia and Herzegovina has received "stagnation reports".[128]

139. More generally, our witnesses noted that progress is likely to be slow in many of the current aspirant countries, with Dr Tannock MEP calling it "painfully slow".[129] Dr Juncos emphasised the "enormous challenges" still faced in the Western Balkans, owing to "high adoption costs", as well as the region's post-conflict "legacies" and "long-standing bilateral issues". Some witnesses suggested that further enlargement beyond Croatia and Iceland before 2020 is very unlikely, and witnesses emphasised the lengthening of the process.[130] This has been seen in Croatia's case, which saw a six-year formal negotiations process, compared to the four-year process experienced by the 2004 countries. Ambassador Drobnjak noting that Croatia had "lost a year" owing to bilateral issues, but even accounting for this, the process is moving more slowly.[131] Commissioner Füle spoke robustly about having a longer process, however, saying that four or more additional years of negotiations would be justified if they ensured that aspirant countries were "fully ready" to join.[132]

140. The longer time-scale for future enlargements is, in our opinion, justified in order to ensure that reforms are embedded and to avoid the need for post-accession monitoring in the future. Sustaining the direction of travel is more important than its speed. It is crucial that there remains a clear and definite process through which aspirant and candidate countries can progress. In order for the longer time-scale to be sustained, delays that are not related to the implementation of reforms—such as those that can arise out of bilateral issues—must be avoided.

Scope of future enlargement

141. Commissioner Füle is responsible not only for the EU's enlargement policy, but also the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The drivers of the ENP are similar to those of enlargement: the ENP aims to "avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and our neighbours and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all".[133] The ENP encompasses 16 countries around the Mediterranean and to the east. It is clear that the ENP encompasses a number of countries that would not be eligible for EU membership; indeed, Morocco's application to join the then-European Community was turned down in 1987.

142. Nevertheless, one sub-group of the ENP is spoken about frequently as offering a group of eventual candidate countries: the Eastern Partnership. This group of six countries encompasses countries in eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Many of our witnesses spoke positively about the countries of the Eastern Partnership as satisfying the geographical definition of 'European'.[134] However, Dr Tannock MEP suggested that the eligibility of the three Southern Caucasus countries might be less certain.[135]

143. Professor Mayhew cautioned that it would be wrong for the EU to rule out accession in the long term for countries to which Article 49 applies.[136] Dr Christou suggested that drawing a definite boundary was a misguided approach geopolitically, and Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne argued that "much of the allure" of EU enlargement had been the theory that it was open to all.[137] Both Dr Bozhilova and Ms Liik pointed out that many of the Eastern Partnership countries lie to the west of Turkey geographically, and so could not be excluded from the category of 'European states' on that ground.[138] Speaking more generally, Commissioner Füle said "the borders of the European Union are where the interpretation of Article 49 meets the consensus of member states", perhaps referring back to the Commission's 1992 definition of 'European', which noted that it was "subject to review by each succeeding generation".[139]

144. The values of the Union and its historic openness to enlargement mean that the EU could eventually extend to all European countries that wish to join. Any attempt to draw a boundary that would permanently exclude European countries would not be consistent with the Treaty, although the difficulties of defining 'European' remain. Drawing a boundary could also lead to countries being drawn into a Russian sphere of influence. The prospect of eventual membership does provide the EU with some political leverage as part of its work with the Eastern Partnership countries.

145. Professor Mayhew argued that, for those who may be geographically eligible to join the Union, the ENP had been used to underline the fact that accession was not an option except in the very long term. Whilst the Eastern Partnership endeavours to "accelerate political association" between the EU and the six partner countries, there is still a significant distance to be travelled before any of the six meet the political criteria for EU membership.[140] Freedom House's assessment of the six partner countries includes four "partly free" (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), and two "not free" (Azerbaijan and Belarus), although we did not explore this issue in detail, and do not necessarily endorse these assessments.[141] In a recent paper, Jana Kobzova of the European Council on Foreign Relations highlighted the importance of a "strong pro-EU constituency", which had been the key to relative success in countries such as Moldova and Georgia, in comparison with countries such as Belarus and Ukraine.[142] Our witnesses emphasised the variation between the six partner countries, with Moldova highlighted as the current "frontrunner".[143] Dr Tannock MEP emphasised that there were still political problems in the Eastern Partnership countries surrounding elections and the treatment of opposition leaders.[144]

146. Although the Eastern Partnership countries may meet the geographical criteria for EU membership, significant reforms over an extended period will be necessary before they can meet the criteria for candidate status, and so accession is an option only in the very long term. The UK Government should seek to ensure that their aspirations to eventual membership are not forgotten.

Potential barriers to enlargement

ENLARGEMENT FATIGUE

147. In Chapter 2, we referred to the cyclical nature of the widening and deepening of the EU, with enlargement being preceded and succeeded by a further integration. The phrase 'enlargement fatigue' is common in discourse following the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, expressing a general post-accession reticence within the EU towards further widening in favour of a greater focus on deepening integration across Member States.

148. There was a degree of consensus among witnesses that the EU-15 had experienced some enlargement fatigue post-2004, and that this was hardly surprising given the scale of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements.[145] Enlargement fatigue amongst the general public has been cited as a reason for the negative referenda in France and the Netherlands on the Constitutional Treaty; however, the EPC and Mr Avery both disputed this, pointing out that there was minimal opinion-poll evidence of a link between the 2004 enlargement and the negative referenda outcomes.

149. The EU is now more than six years beyond the most recent enlargement, and another accession—Croatia's—will take place later this year. In addition, several witnesses pointed out that future enlargement will be small, piecemeal and well spaced, so the phrase 'enlargement fatigue' does not have the same meaning now as after the 'big bang' enlargement.[146] Therefore, although the phrase remains current in discourse about future accessions, we queried whether the EU was actually still suffering from the malaise.

150. Numerous witnesses felt that within the EU there had been a "sharp decline" in support for enlargement, with several witnesses identifying France and Germany as less enthusiastic.[147] This was particularly true with regard to Turkey's accession, although the UK was a notable exception.[148] Nevertheless, such reticence is not necessarily fatigue. Andrew Duff MEP, substitute member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, said that he thought that post-2004 enlargement fatigue had dissipated, and that it would be more helpful to discuss the issue in different terms.[149] We are persuaded by this argument, and think it would be more productive to speak of 'enlargement reticence'. This appears to us to be a more accurate term, which encompasses some of the selective hesitance evinced by countries such as France and Germany with respect to Turkey, as well as the "fear" and "mistrust" referred to by the French Senate's European Affairs Committee.

151. Our witnesses suggested that, in present discussions about enlargement, the phrase 'enlargement fatigue' might serve as a cover for other problems within the EU. The EPC suggested that it had "become a scapegoat for a range of deeper problems", citing mistrust towards new Member States and "recurrent problems" in Bulgaria and Romania.[150] Others argued that enlargement fatigue was reflective of general public dissatisfaction about the EU's economic state and migration in particular, as well as mistrust towards new Member States.[151] The European Affairs Committee of the French Senate said that, while public opinion in France was "rather unconcerned by the last rounds of enlargement", "the immigration question" regarding newer Member States was of "particular importance" to some French citizens.[152]

152. Concerns about migration and immigration often refer to Turkey, which if it were in the EU today would be the second-largest country by population.[153] Other witnesses highlighted possible reticence relating specifically to the Western Balkan countries. The EPC and the European Policy Institute (EPI) referred to the Balkans' "image" problem as a possible issue, particularly at a time when the EU and individual Member States were focused on the rule of law and organised corruption as issues under the ongoing CVM.

153. A degree of enlargement fatigue after the 'big bang' enlargement of 2004 was unsurprising. However, future enlargements are unlikely to take the same form, with spaced-out accessions of one or two countries predicted.

154. 'Enlargement fatigue' is, in our view, an inaccurate term six years after the last enlargement. In order to allow for an informed public debate about possible future enlargements, it is important to draw a distinction between reticence towards future enlargements and the fatigue caused by former ones.

155. Current reticence towards enlargement appears to have several causes. We would draw attention to two particularly significant issues that have dampened public enthusiasm for future enlargements: fears surrounding the impact of migration on existing Member States, particularly in the current economic climate; and concern about aspirant countries and their commitment to the values of the Union, such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

156. Commissioner Füle acknowledged that reticence towards enlargement was a significant concern, but judged that it could be overcome by improving the credibility of the process.[154] Other witnesses agreed that disengagement from the process could be a root of public reticence towards enlargement.[155] We have already noted that the rigorous application of conditionality could restore public confidence in the enlargement process. In addition, some witnesses emphasised the need for more effective communication of the benefits of enlargement, echoing the recommendation of the Commission in its 2012-13 enlargement strategy that national governments "need to inform and explain to their national audiences the decisions they collectively take" on enlargement.[156]

157. Enlargement reticence might, in the first instance, be tackled by stronger communication efforts by the Commission and national governments regarding the benefits of former enlargements and the potential benefits of future ones. The technical negotiating process should not become isolated from the population. Enlargement should be a process of engagement between peoples. It is important to communicate the process and its successes to the general public in both the Union and the aspirant countries.

158. As we noted in Chapter 2, the economic and financial crisis has also "distracted" from enlargement over the last few years.[157] Several witnesses have warned of the risk that an artificial pause until after the crisis has been resolved would be a mistake, and would risk destabilising countries hoping to join the Union.[158] Mr Howitt MEP explained that while he understood the idea of imposing a pause "intellectually", he could not understand it "when it comes to practice".[159]

159. Further progress on enlargement cannot be suspended until the economic and financial crisis is resolved. Such an artificial pause would destabilise the aspirant and candidate countries by reducing certainty about their future within the EU, and would damage the EU's credibility in conducting the enlargement process.

ABSORPTION CAPACITY

160. Like 'enlargement fatigue', 'absorption capacity' is a phrase that is used frequently in discussions about enlargement, but that has not been precisely defined. Mr Avery called it an "undefinable flying object" and notes that the Council neither approved nor disapproved the Commission's attempted definition in its Special report on the EU's capacity to integrate new members, which accompanied the 2006 Enlargement Strategy. This definition stated: "The Union has to ensure it can maintain its capacity to act and decide according to a fair balance within institutions, respect budgetary limits, and implement ambitious common policies that function well and achieve their objectives".[160]

161. Despite the lack of any formal endorsement from the Council, the three elements set out—the EU's institutions, budget and common policies—are widely acknowledged as crucial to any question of the EU's capacity to absorb or integrate new members. The European Affairs Committee of the French Senate added another element: informing public opinion "in order to avoid repeating the insufficient debate that preceded previous enlargements". However, Mr Avery noted that the idea of absorption capacity was a convenience for some Member States that "may be appealed to as an argument for delay if and when desired".

162. Our witnesses argued that the EU has a responsibility to maintain its absorption capacity as part of a credible enlargement process, including positive but realistic communication with citizens to explain the benefits of enlargement and the risks of not progressing the enlargement agenda.[161]

163. Absorption capacity is a vague concept that can be used, like 'enlargement fatigue', in order to veil reticence towards enlargement for other reasons. Nevertheless, the Union's capacity to accommodate an additional Member State within the institutions, the EU budget, and policy discussions is a relevant consideration in the context of further enlargement.

164. If the enlargement process is to be credible, the EU must address its absorption capacity and be seen to do so. Claims that the EU has a limited absorption capacity can be used to delay progress towards enlargement when the EU should in fact be tackling the issue. The Commission—and Member State governments—should make every effort to communicate both the benefits of enlargement and the costs of non-enlargement.

THE EU INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY-MAKING

165. In Chapter 4, we considered the impact of previous enlargements on some of the EU's key policy areas, concluding that there was no clear evidence that the EU's ability to make decisions had been negatively impacted. Nevertheless, the question of how the EU can maintain an effective and smooth decision-making process as it enlarges remains significant for the Union's absorption capacity.

166. The French Senate's Committee on European Affairs noted that, in the context of the anticipated accession of the smaller states that are currently candidates or potential candidates, the EU had to find a "delicate balance" between the "core principle of equality between states" and "the necessities of policy-making". Ambassador Drobnjak acknowledged that the length of discussions during some negotiations was already significant, but said that the Union was able to absorb "one country at a time".[162] At the same time, however, the French Committee argued that some studies had shown that enlargement "may even have helped to shorten some negotiations". The picture is therefore mixed with regards to the impact of enlargement on EU-level negotiations.

167. The Minister for Europe told us that in his experience decision-making had not become more difficult. He noted that, on matters requiring unanimity, such as common foreign security policy and common security and defence policy, "the politics" of the policy areas meant that Member States with significant global diplomatic networks proposed a way forward and other countries would "go along with that".[163] Amongst our witnesses, there was a broad consensus that the Lisbon Treaty provided an adequate institutional framework for further enlargement, although the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey to the UK argued that the Treaty would need to be "fine tuned".[164] The Minister for Europe noted that qualified majority voting had ameliorated some of the potential problems with "having a larger number of people round the table".[165]

168. Mr Turan acknowledged that the "main problem" for some of the bigger countries in the EU, such as France, in considering Turkey as a prospective member was "power sharing" and "who is going to take decisions", with other issues being raised, such as "cultural differences" "a pretext".[166]

169. It is inevitable that enlargement will lead to lengthier discussions as more Member States must air their views. However, it appears that the decision-making process is still working well, particularly in the light of many decisions requiring only qualified majority voting, and could continue to do so after the relatively small enlargements that are anticipated over the medium term.

170. A bigger enlargement, such as the accession of Turkey, would necessarily impact the balance of decision-making within the EU. However, the Union benefits from the diversity of its members, and this need not be feared. We would emphasise that the first enlargement, which brought the UK, Denmark and Ireland into the Union, was the largest proportional increase of any enlargement, but the change was successfully navigated.

171. Following any future accessions, substantial re-distribution of seats in the European Parliament and Committee of the Regions will be required. As the Minister for Europe noted, this would depend on the size of the acceding country or countries. With regards to the size of the Commission, although the Lisbon Treaty allowed a mechanism to move away from one-Commissioner-per-country and towards a rotational system, the Minister for Europe said that "there has been no chance whatever" of obtaining unanimous agreement to implement this, and it would be "important for our interests that we have a UK Commissioner".[167]

172. Dr Tannock MEP also noted the administrative burden of "language proliferation", if post-enlargement the Western Balkan countries required simultaneous translation into four separate languages—Serbian, Bosnian, Montenegrin and Croatian.[168] Arguably, however, on a regatta approach, it would be difficult to prevent this; it would be perverse to require Croatia to begin using a synthetic compromise language in anticipation of the entry of its neighbours.

173. On balance, the institutional framework introduced by the Lisbon Treaty suffices, at least for the moment, to cope with further enlargement. Within the European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions, a reallocation of seats will be required, but this is no barrier to enlargement. The question of language proliferation is a significant one, and is likely to increase the costs of running the EU's institutions, but it appears unavoidable.

THE EU BUDGET

174. Witnesses predicted that most countries currently on the path to accession would join the Union as net recipients; that is, they would receive more in EU funding than they would contribute to the EU budget. Further enlargement would therefore mean either redistributing agricultural and cohesion funds away from some middle-income and richer Member States, or a budget increase.[169] Some witnesses particularly emphasised that the provision of structural funds needed to be borne in mind.[170] A number of witnesses noted that the financial impact of the accession of large countries such as Turkey and Ukraine had to be considered,[171] but that the other countries that might join in the medium term were unlikely to have a significant economic impact on the EU.[172] The Minister for Europe noted that, whilst there would undoubtedly be budgetary costs related to future enlargements, these were "impossible to predict with any precision".[173]

175. The EPI noted that the Western Balkan countries did not "present a risk in economic and social terms", and that the "main challenges" in the region remained political. However, the European Affairs Committee of the French Senate suggested that lower levels of prosperity in acceding countries could "create some distortions". This is perhaps a more general expression of the view—common during the discussions leading up to the 2004 enlargement—that the impact of enlargement on the agricultural markets, and agricultural incomes, would lead to "social distortions and inequalities".[174] Mr Howitt MEP emphasised that the budget has been "roughly" one per cent of GDP "through a series of different enlargements".[175]

176. Mr Howitt MEP was robust in arguing that the EU's institutional and budgetary needs could be met even with a further enlarged Union, even going further and suggesting that "Europe needs Turkey" in terms of migration and economic dynamism.[176] This echoes the argument made in the Commission's latest enlargement strategy that Turkey's "dynamism" and "young population" offered an "opportunity" to the EU.[177] Sir Michael Leigh also emphasised the potential economic benefits of accession in terms tackling demographic issues and an ageing population within the EU.[178] The Minister for Europe phrased this more strongly, saying that it would be "an error of historic and potentially catastrophic dimensions for Europe to cold-shoulder Turkey just at the moment when she is emerging as a major player in both economic and diplomatic terms".[179]

177. Enlargement can be expected to have some impact on the budgetary receipts of older Member States, for example through the redistribution of agricultural or cohesion funds. However, this must be understood in the context of the broader economic benefits that enlargement can offer.

178. The possible economic impact of new Member States on the EU budget is a proper consideration as part of the EU's absorption capacity, but a fear of losing national receipts to a less-well-off new member is not. Transitional arrangements can be implemented in order to minimise the economic impact of enlargement on EU citizens whilst also supporting new members.

179. The enlargements envisioned in the medium term are likely to involve only one or two countries at a time, and so are unlikely to generate any significant economic impact on the existing Union, and political and institutional impacts can be managed through appropriate transition. Turkey represents a possible exception to this, but Turkey's economic dynamism also offers economic opportunities to the Union that should not be ignored.

180. As part of a proactive approach to improving the EU's absorption capacity, the EU institutions and national governments should communicate more directly and effectively with the EU's citizens in order to make clear the costs associated with non-enlargement.

ACCESSION FATIGUE

181. In Chapter 2, we considered the principle of conditionality and the potential difficulties thrown up by bilateral issues. The notion of accession fatigue, distinct from enlargement fatigue, reflects a public—and political—disenchantment with the enlargement process in the aspirant country, possibly owing to negative perceptions that the EU was 'raising the bar' or 'closing the door'.

182. Our witnesses suggested that aspirant countries could turn away from the EU if they felt that the process were being undermined by 'nationalisation', or 'enlargement fatigue' and the EU's 'absorption capacity' were dominating discussions of the process.[180] Ms Liik drew attention to the "permanent blinking yellow light on the European side" of discussions about progress towards membership, and the Croatian Embassy emphasised that the level of popular support for EU membership in Croatia showed "the steepest dips" when the process "was being used by individual Member States to resolve bilateral issues".[181] Other witnesses emphasised the need for the EU to—in the Minister for Europe's words—"deliver on its side of the bargain".[182]

183. Accession fatigue can pose a more serious risk to the enlargement process than simply slowing it down. The Minister for Europe said that, were there to be a "serious setback", there was "an inherent risk" of "some populist movement" that would reject the EU.[183] The EPC stated that "the goal of EU membership has been losing lustre among people and seems to be breeding populist ... politicians in the Balkans", while the EPI called the rhetoric of enlargement fatigue "a discouraging message". Ambassador Dimitrov also warned that "isolation" would lead to "nationalism, xenophobia and slow economic development".

184. Professor Kullaa suggested that any "freeze" in the process "could change the pattern of sought after alliances by smaller states with global and European powers". This is a particular concern in the east, where Russia has attempted to exert her influence by exploiting energy dependency and the attraction of a customs union and other integrated models.[184] The Minister for Europe acknowledged historical links between Russia and the Western Balkans, particularly with Serbia, but said that any "clear-sighted Serbian politician would know that it makes no sense for Serbia to become a non-EU hole in the Western Balkans".[185] Dr Blockmans was also more positive, saying that Serbia had "almost an inherent ambition" to "make good on what was lost over the last two decades" and to show themselves to be a centre of power.[186]

185. Our witnesses appeared to agree that, for the Western Balkan countries, accession fatigue had not increased significantly.[187] Nevertheless, witnesses suggested that the Commission could do more to promote 'bottom-up' reform, strengthening and communicating better with civil society and social movements in order to anchor a drive for reform more firmly within each country.[188]

186. Ms Liik told us that the crisis had not had "as big an impact as people think" because the candidate and potential candidate countries "are economically integrated with Europe anyway". She said that "for many countries from eastern Europe it was very existential and seen as either a cultural return to Europe or a security issue". She noted that receipts from the EU budget were secondary to a desire for access to the single market and freedom of movement.[189]

187. Accession fatigue is a genuine risk. Although it has not yet damaged the EU's activities in the Western Balkans, and the decision to join the EU is one for the candidate country, the EU must acknowledge the risks that accession fatigue poses to the credibility and effectiveness of the enlargement process.

188. It is important that the requirements of the enlargement process are justified and clearly communicated to candidate countries and their publics. This is the responsibility of both the national governments and the EU itself. The Commission in particular should do more to promote 'bottom-up' reform by increasing civil society's engagement with the reform process, and national governments could seek to promote this through the twinning projects.

189. Although we are sympathetic to the view that funds under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance must be more targeted towards non-state actors, reserving a percentage of the available funds for these recipients would run counter to the need to make the IPA-II more responsive to individual countries' needs. Instead, we urge the EU to take a longer-term view and proactively to encourage the participation of non-state actors', rather than relying upon a quota.

190. Accession fatigue is more prevalent in Iceland and Turkey. Many of our witnesses acknowledged the uncertainty about whether Iceland would choose to join the EU in a public referendum after the end of accession negotiations, although Sir Michael Leigh spoke with confidence that Iceland would ultimately accede.[190]

191. Several witnesses told us that Turkey was becoming increasingly frustrated with the duration of its accession progress and was less inclined to join than it had been in the past.[191] The Minister for Europe described how Turkey's leaders might "feel bruised" by the slow pace of their accession process. However, he indicated that he found that both Turkey's Prime Minister and the Minister for Europe were positive about Turkey continuing towards the ultimate goal of membership.[192] Mr Turan told the Committee that "the sceptical comments are due to the fact that Turkey has been engaging more than ever with different parts of the world" and that "our orientation has always been towards Europe".[193]

192. Mr Turan also told us that the "stalemate" in Turkey's accession negotiations was "also spilling over the other aspects of our relationship with the EU".[194] In addition, Mr Hakura argued that accession fatigue could lead to backsliding, saying there were "clear and visible signs of retreat in reforms in Turkey".[195] The Commission's most recent enlargement strategy noted "a lack of substantial progress towards fully meeting the political criteria" for membership, highlighting restriction of the freedom of the media and the Kurdish issue.[196] Turkey's process towards EU membership has been by far the longest running; the association agreement was signed almost 50 years ago, and Turkey has been an official candidate for 13 years.

193. Nevertheless, Sir Michael Leigh spoke positively of the agenda with Turkey being revived in 2013, and the Minister for Europe said that Turkey had a "strategic commitment" to membership.[197]

194. Should Iceland or Turkey fall out of the enlargement process, the EU will not only be denied the benefits that their accessions could bring, but risks losing its soft power.

195. Without denying the many remaining obstacles to its accession, we note with concern the risk of Turkey's enlargement process stagnating owing to accession fatigue and a lack of EU-leverage in order to promote further reform and rebuild momentum. We therefore welcome recent indications that accession negotiations could gain some positive momentum during the Irish Presidency.

Innovations

196. Witnesses were positive about innovations such as the 'positive agenda' with Turkey and the High Level Accession Dialogue with FYROM, saying that in the short-term they can allow momentum to be maintained in the technical process while political blocks are in the way.[198] However, these innovations are only small measures. Mr Turan called the positive agenda "useful but … not sufficient", saying that it would not provide the "necessary impetus for the future".[199]

197. The Commission's innovations, such as the High Level Accession Dialogue with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), are to be commended. In a lengthy and detailed technical process, they allow momentum to be maintained at reform level when political blocks, such as bilateral issues or blocked negotiating chapters, prevent official progress. However, they offer only short-term incentives, and cannot counteract accession fatigue in the medium term. In particular, a further major effort should be made to open accession negotiations with FYROM.

198. The Committee heard some evidence that monitoring should be consistently applied to both candidate and Member States, either to ensure that each candidate is being asked to meet standards truly set by the Member States, or in order to ensure that there is no 'backsliding' after entry into the Union.[200] The context for this includes the CVM and a "populist turn" in several of the 2004 countries a few years after membership.[201]

199. The EU has some formal tools to police commitment to EU values after a country has joined, such as Article 7 TEU, under which the Council may determine that there is a "clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2", and make recommendations to the Member State; or that there is a "serious and persistent breach" of Article 2, and suspend certain membership rights. However, these mechanisms are generally not used.[202] Under Article 7, the Council Professor Mayhew suggested it could be made easier for the Court of Justice to take measures against Member States that had, for example, violated the terms of Article 2. However, Sir Michael Leigh explained that, irrespective of Treaty provisions and the Court's powers, "there will always be a reluctance" from Member States to "impose strong measures" on a Member State that is backsliding.[203]

200. The EPC commented on the proposed EU-wide anti-corruption reporting mechanism and 'justice scoreboard', calling them "only the initial timid steps in building a proper strategy and capacity for action at European level" on such issues.[204] Mr Duff MEP noted that the Commission had become "far more forthright in its scrutiny and critique of what is happening inside Member States than ever before" and pointed to the Fundamental Rights Agency as another tool for monitoring Member States' compliance with EU values.[205]

201. The EU demands that candidate countries comply with the Copenhagen criteria, and so it is important that Member States also meet the standards set out for those that wish to join. However, a permanent EU-wide monitoring system resembling the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism is not politically feasible. Instead, the EU should be more willing to make use of the mechanisms already at its disposal, such as the European Court of Justice.

125 Q 156 (Howitt), Q 87 (Tannock) Back

126 Q 52 (Christou), Q 87 (Tannock) Back

127 14853/12, 14854/12, 14855/12 (Iceland), 14856/12 (Montenegro), 14857/12 (Turkey), 14860/12 (FYROM), 14861/12 (Serbia), 14862/12 (Albania), 14863/12 (Bosnia and Herzegovina), 14864/12 Back

128 Q 13 Back

129 Q 87 Back

130 Q 58 (Christou), Croatian Embassy, Duff, Tannock, Q 86 (Tannock) Back

131 Q 73 Back

132 Q 136 Back

133 European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy website (http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm) Back

134 QQ 57, 65 (Lazowski), Q 106 (Leigh), Q 169 (Lidington), QQ 6, 8 (Liik), QQ 101-2 (Tannock) Back

135 Q 102 Back

136 Mayhew Back