Chapter 6: Possible alternatives
Permanent alternatives
202. Most witnesses agreed that alternative forms
of association—such as the European Economic Area or the
European Neighbourhood Policy—would not suffice in the long
term, as they might not be politically attractive to potential
candidates or effective in incentivising reforms.[206]
Historically, alternative forms have not been welcomed; the Central
and Eastern European countries rejected EEA membership in the
1990s.[207] Professor Mayhew
noted that the "search" for an "alternative goal"
that would serve as a "firm anchor for reform" in the
way full membership does currently had "so far been without
success". The Minister for Europe agreed with this assessment,
and Mr Avery said that there was "no real market for
the product".[208]
203. There was substantial discussion about the
position of Turkey. Dr Andrew Glencross, Lecturer at the
University of Aberdeen, noted the proposal in 2009 by then-French
President Sarkozy and German Chancellor Merkel to offer Turkey
a form of associate membership, and remarked that this offer "goes
against previous enlargement negotiations" and "contradicts
the current official accession negotiations". The Turkish
government confirmed that accession and eventual full membership
were important motivations for any candidate country.[209]
Dr Glencross noted that an alternative form of association
would "avoid making Turkey a key decision-making actor"
and would be "in keeping with citizens' preferences"
as they appear to stand presently. However, he said that "formally
differentiating types of EU membership would ... constitute crossing
a Rubicon".
204. Although the evidence did not rule out a
'privileged partnership' between Turkey and the EU altogether,
Mr Hakura noted that Turkey already had a privileged position
in its relationship with the EU, being part of the customs union
covering goods.[210]
Dr Blockmans noted that the idea of a privileged partnership
was "a bad label for second-class membership", and could
violate the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of
nationality.[211] Dr Tannock
MEP made a similar point regarding the idea of 'associate membership'.[212]
More generally, the Macedonian European Affairs Committee said
that the idea of a 'privileged partnership' "does not reflect
mutual political aspirations and commitments". However, Dr Glencross
did not entirely dismiss withdrawal of the offer of full EU membership
to Turkey, particularly if presented as an intermediary status,
pending periodic review from both parties.
205. Permanent alternatives are unlikely to
be politically acceptable to candidate or potential candidate
countries, as these countries would prefer to pursue full, equal
membership.
206. A withdrawal of an offer of membership
by removing candidate status would be a dramatic step with significant
political consequences. We conclude that this should only be considered
where the scale of backsliding indicates that the enlargement
process can no longer credibly continue.
A 'waiting room'
207. Most witnesses agreed that any alternatives
to full membership could function as a stepping stone on a clear
trajectory towards full membership.[213]
Dr Lazowski suggested that the EEA could be used as a tool
to develop economic integration, potentially leading to full membership
at a later stage.[214]
However, Professor Mayhew argued this would be unacceptable
to most, not least because EEA membership does not allow Members
to be involved fully in the decision-making process, and Sir Michael
Leigh questioned whether "waiting rooms or incentives for
the interim period" would still encourage the necessary reforms.[215]
Dr Lazowski suggested that the ENP was not a "strong
enough" incentive to promote significant reform.[216]
208. There was some discussion as to whether
the European Neighbourhood Policy amounted to a stepping stone
on the road to full membership. Dr Christou described the
ENP as such, but Professor Mayhew noted that the
ENP underlined the fact that accession was not an option except
in the very long term.[217]
We discussed the longer-term prospects of the Eastern Partnership
countries becoming EU candidates in Chapter 5 (paragraphs 141-6).
Whilst EU membership is highly speculative for the six partner
countries, the Eastern Partnership clearly shares objectives with
the enlargement agenda that can support them towards meeting the
criteria for candidate status.
209. The most recent Roadmap, published in May
2012, highlighted the main aim: "to accelerate political
association and deepen economic integration". The Eastern
Partnership sets outs to address "the issue of unfinished
transformation" through three primary actions: forming deeper
contractual relations between the EU and the partner countries
through Association Agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Agreements; supporting the mobility of citizens from
the partner countries through visa facilitation and readmission
agreements, with the prospect of visa-free travel in the future;
and enhancing the participation of partner countries in EU programmes
and agencies in appropriate sectors, such as the seventh EU Framework
Programme for Research and Technological Development, with which
Moldova has been associated since January 2012.[218]
210. Even outside formal programmes such as the
SAP and ENP, an Association Agreement may offer a 'waiting room'
for a potential applicant. However, Professor Mayhew described
current Association Agreements as unconvincing because key elements
remain vague. He suggested that a clearer route towards integration,
mapped out through Association Agreements, could be helpful but
was unlikely to be politically acceptable to current EU Member
States. Dr Lazowski also queried how much could be offered
and achieved with Association Agreements.[219]
211. The European Neighbourhood Policy, European
Economic Area, or an 'associate membership', could be used as
a 'waiting room' or 'stepping stone' for European countries that
eventually wish to accede. Such mechanisms can promote deep integration
in specific areas, provided that the expectations and incentives
are clearly set out, but none are a viable alternative to membership.
206 Avery, Q 29 (Blockmans), Q 68 (Bozhilova), EPI,
FCO written evidence, Q 28 (Hakura), Q 27 (Liik), Macedonian European
Affairs Committee, Wunsch Back
207
Avery, Q 60 (Lazowski), Mayhew Back
208
FCO written evidence, Avery. See also: Q 27 (Liik) and Q 94 (Duff) Back
209
Q 129 Back
210
Q 28 Back
211
Q 29 Back
212
Q 97 Back
213
Q 68 (Bozhilova), Czech government, Q 60 (Lazowski), Leruth, Wunsch
Back
214
Q 60 (Lazowski). See also: Leruth Back
215
Q 105. See also: Q 68 (Lazowski) Back
216
Q 65 Back
217
Q 68 (Christou), Mayhew Back
218
10213/12, p.3 Back
219
Q 68 Back
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