Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations
Chapter 2: The enlargement area
IMPORTANCE OF ENLARGEMENT
212. European union has always been driven by
a desire to bring peace and prosperity to Europe. The transformative
power of enlargement has been proven through successive enlargements.
The goals of security, stability of the EU's neighbourhood, democracy,
and economic growth rightly lie at the heart of today's enlargement
agenda. (paragraph 15)
213. Enlargement has regrettably slipped down
the Council agenda in recent years, with countries such as France
and Germany redirecting attention towards the EU's internal affairs.
Although vital institutional and governance questions are being
asked as a result of the euro area crisis and the EU's economic
and financial difficulties, neither the Council nor individual
Member States can afford to ignore the enlargement agenda. We
strongly support the commitment of this Government, and previous
governments, to promoting the enlargement agenda. (paragraph 18)
PRINCIPLES OF ENLARGEMENT
214. Twenty years on, the Copenhagen criteria
still set out the right principles for the EU's enlargement policy,
but they only offer the broad brushstrokes of a more complicated
enlargement picture. (paragraph 22)
215. The EU's failure to apply the Copenhagen
criteria rigorously led to the entry of Romania and Bulgaria before
they were ready to meet the full obligations of membership. This
has led to an unsatisfactory post-accession mechanism—the
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism—needing to be put
into place for these countries. In the future, the EU must resist
the watering down of the criteria, and should apply them rigorously.
(paragraph 24)
THE CURRENT ENLARGEMENT PROCESS
216. The current benchmarking system can provide
stepping-stones towards implementing—and demonstrating—reforms.
It can provide certainty to all parties and a clear route for
candidate countries to follow in order to achieve reforms during
a long and sometimes difficult process. (paragraph 33)
217. Although it is quite right that the enlargement
process has become more rigorous and structured, the effort required
from the aspirant countries should not be underestimated. Many
of the aspirant countries have further to go in order to meet
the Copenhagen criteria than during previous enlargement rounds,
and on a technical level more is being asked of them than of any
former enlargement country. While aspirant countries must play
their part fully, the EU must ensure that this does not place
an insurmountable burden of work upon candidate countries. (paragraph
34)
218. We support the new approach to Chapters
23 and 24 (Judiciary and fundamental rights, and Justice, freedom
and security) that will prioritise the implementation of reforms.
This is an important lesson learned after the most recent enlargements
and will help to ensure that irreversible reforms are achieved
in these crucial areas. (paragraph 36)
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR ENLARGEMENT
219. Although aspirant countries are typically
middle-income countries, we believe that a substantial Instrument
for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) is essential to prepare countries
for membership. The next IPA should focus more closely on the
strategic aims of the EU's enlargement policy and maintain the
flexibility necessary in order to meet individual countries' needs.
In turn, this should lead to the more effective use of money,
with a greater percentage of committed funds being translated
into actual spending that will benefit the aspirant countries.
(paragraph 41)
CONDITIONALITY
220. The EU must maintain a system of tough conditionality
that requires genuine reform before moving on to the next step,
always keeping in mind the need for implementing, as well as adopting,
the acquis. In this way, conditionality—and the associated
benchmarking procedure—can serve as a tool both for the
EU and for the governments of aspirant countries. (paragraph 46)
221. The EU must require genuine reforms at each
step; conversely, the EU must meet its obligations to allow candidates
to progress if reforms have been made. Failure to do so diminishes
the EU's influence and damages the credibility of the enlargement
process. (paragraph 47)
POST-ACCESSION CONDITIONALITY AND MONITORING
222. Progress still needs to be made on judicial
reform and corruption in Romania and Bulgaria, as well as on fighting
organised crime in Bulgaria. The last six years indicate that
post-accession conditionality achieves only slow progress. In
future accessions, every effort must be made to ensure that all
reforms are irreversible prior to accession, as post-accession
mechanisms are both undesirable and unlikely to prove effective.
Consideration should be given as to how best to ensure that the
reforms are justiciable and, where applicable, are embedded in
the constitution of the applicant country. (paragraph 50)
CREDIBILITY AND PITFALLS OF THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS
A perception of 'raising the bar'
223. Given the scale of the reforms that many
aspirant countries are undertaking, it is unsurprising that this
might sometimes lead to negative public perceptions of the accession
process. To combat this, the EU must ensure that only strictly
necessary criteria are imposed upon candidate countries and that
the criteria are applied fairly across the board. (paragraph 56)
224. At the same time, candidate countries must
play their part in the process fully, accepting the need for rigorous
conditionality in order to achieve real reforms. This should be
reinforced by the EU being willing to take action against backsliding,
as such conditionality demands. This includes slowing or halting
the enlargement process—and associated funding—when
appropriate. (paragraph 57)
225. Both national governments and the Commission
should work more proactively to communicate to citizens the long-term
benefits of sometimes painful reforms. We agree that it would
be beneficial for the Commission's Progress Reports to highlight
the costs of non-enlargement for both the aspirant countries and
the EU as a whole. (paragraph 58)
A perception of "closing the door"
226. Conditionality can only be effective if
it is genuinely conditional. The halt in Turkey's journey towards
EU membership is a stark reminder of the need for a credible process
that delivers progress, albeit incrementally. (paragraph 62)
227. We urge the Commission and the UK Government
to think carefully about how valued incentives, such as visa liberalisation,
can be used in order to counteract negative perceptions of the
credibility of, or the EU's commitment to, the enlargement process.
(paragraph 63)
228. It is right that the enlargement process
is ultimately governed by Member States through the Council. The
excessive politicisation of the enlargement process through Council-set
conditions and benchmarks can increase uncertainty about the steps
that countries must take in order to progress. So long as the
Council acts in good faith, this need not call into question the
EU's commitment to enlargement. (paragraph 66)
229. In allowing Cyprus entry into the Union
before the dispute over Northern Cyprus was resolved, the EU has
imported a bilateral dispute into the Union, transforming it into
a dispute between the EU and one of its candidate countries. This
was a grave mistake, for which both the EU and Turkey bear some
responsibility, and one that has had serious negative consequences
for both Turkey and the EU. (paragraph 69)
230. Looking forward, the EU needs to take much
more effective action to avoid importing any further bilateral
disputes—be they territorial or otherwise—into the
Union. In doing so, it is important not to give a third country
a de facto veto over the accession of a candidate country.
(paragraph 70)
231. The need for unanimity in the Council means
that bilateral issues can disrupt the enlargement process at any
stage. This is unavoidable and undesirable. We call upon the Government,
working closely with other Member States, to take a robust approach
to this issue, encouraging openness surrounding bilateral or domestic
issues and seeking to find solutions that allow the enlargement
process to continue smoothly. (paragraph 73)
232. Good neighbourly relations and the resolution
of bilateral disputes are two-way streets. Member States should
ensure that they strive for good regional cooperation and take
up proactively the resolution of bilateral disputes in good faith
whilst encouraging other Member States to act similarly. (paragraph
75)
233. We commend the Commission's proactive approach
to identifying bilateral issues amongst the Western Balkan countries
and hope that this will encourage a greater openness about these
issues so that they can be resolved more transparently through
the existing forums or international arbitration, as appropriate.
(paragraph 79)
234. A change to the way that enlargement is
handled by the Council in order to diminish the ability of individual
Member States' to veto progress on enlargement unilaterally, particularly
at the opening or early stages of accession negotiations, could
be welcome. (paragraph 80)
235. Bilateral issues should, wherever possible,
be resolved through the internationally recognised courts or resolution
procedures. They must be dealt with before accession, but should
not block the process from continuing at any stage prior to this.
(paragraph 82)
Chapter 3: Impact on candidate countries and new
member states
ECONOMIC IMPACT
236. For candidate countries, the enlargement
process can bring an influx of investment and an improved business
environment, alongside EU financial assistance to support reforms.
After joining, new Member States can expect further economic benefits
through participation in the single market and in EU funds that
seek to support growth. It is impossible to estimate with any
accuracy an exact figure that can be gained from the accession
process, but it is hard to explain why so many countries persist
in seeking to join the EU if they were not convinced of the benefits,
both economic and political. (paragraph 89)
REQUIREMENT TO JOIN THE EURO AND SCHENGEN AREAS
The euro area
237. The requirement for Member States—excepting
the UK and Denmark—to join the euro is impossible to enforce,
as Sweden's reluctance has demonstrated. It must be recognised
that, at least in the current economic climate, joining the euro
may be a formal obligation, but is in reality an aspiration. It
is unlikely that many of those still committed to entry will join
the euro in the near future. (paragraph 96)
238. As the governance and structures of the
euro area undergo significant change, more should be done to engage
candidate and potential candidate countries so that the changes—and
the demands that will ultimately be laid on them—are clearly
understood. (paragraph 97)
The Schengen area
239. As the Schengen area expands, through enlargement
or otherwise, it is right that the rules for entry are applied
strictly in order to preserve its integrity. (paragraph 100)
POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPACT
240. The EU enlargement process and accession
can have a profound and often positive impact on aspirant countries'
national political systems. The aspiration to 'sit at the table'
as one amongst equals within the EU can generate consensus across
the political spectrum, and is a motivator that should not be
underestimated. (paragraph 104)
241. Enlargement and EU membership are grounded
in law—the acquis. Building the administrative and
judicial capacity of aspirant countries so that EU law can
be effectively applied post-accession is vital. We hope that the
new approach to Chapters 23 and 24 will ensure that such capacity-building
remains central to the enlargement process. (paragraph 106)
Chapter 4: Impact on member states and the union
GEOPOLITICAL IMPACT
242. Enlargement increases the EU's influence
on the global stage and better equips the EU to deal with its
neighbourhood. This has been seen through the 2004 and 2007 enlargements
and can be anticipated as a likely benefit of further enlargement
to the Western Balkans and Turkey. (paragraph 109)
243. Past enlargements have achieved the intended
aim of bringing lasting peace and stability to the EU's neighbourhood,
and future enlargements can be expected to extend this even further.
(paragraph 110)
ECONOMIC IMPACT
244. Although difficult to quantify precisely
in the light of other factors affecting the EU economy, enlargement
has brought economic benefits to the existing Union, expanding
the single market to nearly 500 million consumers, with a combined
GDP of around £11 trillion. (paragraph 114)
POLICY IMPACT
245. Enlargement has benefited some of the EU's
core policies, such as the internal market. From a UK perspective,
newer Member States have often served as allies on key policy
areas, including single market issues and better regulation. Predicted
negative policy impacts, such as on the Common Agricultural Policy,
have not materialised in the way that was feared, although progress
in developing a more innovative market-based CAP may have been
hindered. (paragraph 121)
246. Future enlargement is likely to have a varied
impact on EU policies. It may assist with certain areas, such
as single market rules, but could pose a risk to important areas
such as energy and climate change. We draw particular attention
to the current inertia relating to a future climate change mitigation
strategy, which we do not believe to be in line with the desired
policy outcomes of the UK and many other Member States. While
such issues can be overcome and should not deter future enlargement,
policy outcomes should form part of the enlargement debate. (paragraph
122)
INSTITUTIONAL IMPACT
247. There is no clear evidence to suggest that
the 2004 and 2007 enlargements have had a negative impact on the
EU's ability to make decisions. In our view, however, enlargement
must inevitably have added to the complexity of negotiations and
contributed to an increased reliance on informal processes in
order to reach decisions. Such processes threaten transparency
and we therefore emphasise that the Government and EU institutions
should remain alive to the need to maintain transparency in decision-making
while enlarging the Union. (paragraph 126)
FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS
248. The free movement of workers is a fundamental
Treaty right and an important element of the EU's internal market,
offering potential benefits to all EU citizens and providing motivated
migrant workers to fill gaps in labour markets that would go unfilled
by national workers. (paragraph 132)
249. We acknowledge widespread public concerns
about the impact of the free movement of persons. The seven year
transitional period allowing Member States to maintain restrictions
on the movement of workers from new Member States is, we consider,
ample time to allow for the restructuring of labour markets. If,
as we detect, Member States are supportive of the principle of
free movement, communication of the advantages is clearly an important
issue to be addressed by Member States. (paragraph 133)
250. Where the concern is directed towards the
free movement of non-workers who may be travelling to receive
social security benefit rather than engage in employment, it is
a matter for the authorities of Member States to tackle within
the framework of EU legislation. (paragraph 134)
Chapter 5: Enlargement in the medium term
PACE OF FUTURE ENLARGEMENT
251. We strongly support enlargement being conducted
under the 'own merits' principle. Although this may result in
some countries progressing much more quickly than others, it is
the only way to conduct the process fairly and to avoid the risk
of countries acceding before they are fully ready to take up the
obligations of membership. (paragraph 137)
252. The longer time-scale for future enlargements
is, in our opinion, justified in order to ensure that reforms
are embedded and to avoid the need for post-accession monitoring
in the future. Sustaining the direction of travel is more important
than its speed. It is crucial that there remains a clear and definite
process through which aspirant and candidate countries can progress.
In order for the longer time-scale to be sustained, delays that
are not related to the implementation of reforms—such as
those that can arise out of bilateral issues—must be avoided.
(paragraph 140)
SCOPE OF FUTURE ENLARGEMENT
253. The values of the Union and its historic
openness to enlargement mean that the EU could eventually extend
to all European countries that wish to join. Any attempt to draw
a boundary that would permanently exclude European countries would
not be consistent with the Treaty, although the difficulties of
defining 'European' remain. Drawing a boundary could also lead
to countries being drawn into a Russian sphere of influence. The
prospect of eventual membership does provide the EU with some
political leverage as part of its work with the Eastern Partnership
countries. (paragraph 144)
254. Although the Eastern Partnership countries
may meet the geographical criteria for EU membership, significant
reforms over an extended period will be necessary before they
can meet the criteria for candidate status, and so accession is
an option only in the very long term. The UK Government should
seek to ensure that their aspirations to eventual membership are
not forgotten. (paragraph 146)
POTENTIAL BARRIERS TO ENLARGEMENT
Enlargement fatigue
255. A degree of enlargement fatigue after the
'big bang' enlargement of 2004 was unsurprising. However, future
enlargements are unlikely to take the same form, with spaced-out
accessions of one or two countries predicted. (paragraph 153)
256. 'Enlargement fatigue' is, in our view, an
inaccurate term six years after the last enlargement. In order
to allow for an informed public debate about possible future enlargements,
it is important to draw a distinction between reticence towards
future enlargements and the fatigue caused by former ones. (paragraph
154)
257. Current reticence towards enlargement appears
to have several causes. We would draw attention to two particularly
significant issues that have dampened public enthusiasm for future
enlargements: fears surrounding the impact of migration on existing
Member States, particularly in the current economic climate; and
concern about aspirant countries and their commitment to the values
of the Union, such as democracy, human rights and the rule of
law. (paragraph 155)
258. Enlargement reticence might, in the first
instance, be tackled by stronger communication efforts by the
Commission and national governments regarding the benefits of
former enlargements and the potential benefits of future ones.
The technical negotiating process should not become isolated from
the population. Enlargement should be a process of engagement
between peoples. It is important to communicate the process and
its successes to the general public in both the Union and the
aspirant countries. (paragraph 157)
259. Further progress on enlargement cannot be
suspended until the economic and financial crisis is resolved.
Such an artificial pause would destabilise the aspirant and candidate
countries by reducing certainty about their future within the
EU, and would damage the EU's credibility in conducting the enlargement
process. (paragraph 159)
Absorption capacity
260. Absorption capacity is a vague concept that
can be used, like 'enlargement fatigue', in order to veil reticence
towards enlargement for other reasons. Nevertheless, the Union's
capacity to accommodate an additional Member State within the
institutions, the EU budget, and policy discussions is a relevant
consideration in the context of further enlargement. (paragraph
163)
261. If the enlargement process is to be credible,
the EU must address its absorption capacity and be seen to do
so. Claims that the EU has a limited absorption capacity can be
used to delay progress towards enlargement when the EU should
in fact be tackling the issue. The Commission—and Member
State governments—should make every effort to communicate
both the benefits of enlargement and the costs of non-enlargement.
(paragraph 164)
The EU institutions and policy-making
262. It is inevitable that enlargement will lead
to lengthier discussions as more Member States must air their
views. However, it appears that the decision-making process is
still working well, particularly in the light of many decisions
requiring only qualified majority voting, and could continue to
do so after the relatively small enlargements that are anticipated
over the medium term. (paragraph 169)
263. A bigger enlargement, such as the accession
of Turkey, would necessarily impact the balance of decision-making
within the EU. However, the Union benefits from the diversity
of its members, and this need not be feared. We would emphasise
that the first enlargement, which brought the UK, Denmark and
Ireland into the Union, was the largest proportional increase
of any enlargement, but the change was successfully navigated.
(paragraph 170)
264. On balance, the institutional framework
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty suffices, at least for the moment,
to cope with further enlargement. Within the European Parliament
and the Committee of the Regions, a reallocation of seats will
be required, but this is no barrier to enlargement. The question
of language proliferation is a significant one, and is likely
to increase the costs of running the EU's institutions, but it
appears unavoidable. (paragraph 173)
The EU budget
265. Enlargement can be expected to have some
impact on the budgetary receipts of older Member States, for example
through the redistribution of agricultural or cohesion funds.
However, this must be understood in the context of the broader
economic benefits that enlargement can offer. (paragraph 177)
266. The possible economic impact of new Member
States on the EU budget is a proper consideration as part of the
EU's absorption capacity, but a fear of losing national receipts
to a less-well-off new member is not. Transitional arrangements
can be implemented in order to minimise the economic impact of
enlargement on EU citizens whilst also supporting new members.
(paragraph 178)
267. The enlargements envisioned in the medium
term are likely to involve only one or two countries at a time,
and so are unlikely to generate any significant economic impact
on the existing Union, and political and institutional impacts
can be managed through appropriate transition. Turkey represents
a possible exception to this, but Turkey's economic dynamism also
offers economic opportunities to the Union that should not be
ignored. (paragraph 179)
268. As part of a proactive approach to improving
the EU's absorption capacity, the EU institutions and national
governments should communicate more directly and effectively with
the EU's citizens in order to make clear the costs associated
with non-enlargement. (paragraph 180)
Accession fatigue
269. Accession fatigue is a genuine risk. Although
it has not yet damaged the EU's activities in the Western Balkans,
and the decision to join the EU is one for the candidate country,
the EU must acknowledge the risks that accession fatigue poses
to the credibility and effectiveness of the enlargement process.
(paragraph 187)
270. It is important that the requirements of
the enlargement process are justified and clearly communicated
to candidate countries and their publics. This is the responsibility
of both the national governments and the EU itself. The Commission
in particular should do more to promote 'bottom-up' reform by
increasing civil society's engagement with the reform process,
and national governments could seek to promote this through the
twinning projects. (paragraph 188)
271. Although we are sympathetic to the view
that funds under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance must
be more targeted towards non-state actors, reserving a percentage
of the available funds for these recipients would run counter
to the need to make the IPA-II more responsive to individual countries'
needs. Instead, we urge the EU to take a longer-term view and
proactively to encourage non-state actors' participation proactively,
rather than relying upon a quota. (paragraph 189)
272. Should Iceland or Turkey fall out of the
enlargement process, the EU will not only be denied the benefits
that their accessions could bring, but risks losing its soft power.
(paragraph 194)
273. Without denying the many remaining obstacles
to its accession, we note with concern the risk of Turkey's enlargement
process stagnating owing to accession fatigue and a lack of EU-leverage
in order to promote further reform and rebuild momentum. We therefore
welcome recent indications that accession negotiations could gain
some positive momentum during the Irish Presidency. (paragraph
195)
INNOVATIONS
274. The Commission's innovations, such as the
High Level Accession Dialogue with the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia (FYROM), are to be commended. In a lengthy and detailed
technical process, they allow momentum to be maintained at reform
level when political blocks, such as bilateral issues or blocked
negotiating chapters, prevent official progress. However, they
offer only short-term incentives, and cannot counteract accession
fatigue in the medium term. In particular, a further major effort
should be made to open accession negotiations with FYROM. (paragraph
197)
275. The EU demands that candidate countries
comply with the Copenhagen criteria, and so it is important that
Member States also meet the standards set out for those that wish
to join. However, a permanent EU-wide monitoring system resembling
the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism is not politically
feasible. Instead, the EU should be more willing to make use of
the mechanisms already at its disposal, such as the European Court
of Justice. (paragraph 201)
Chapter 6: Possible alternatives
PERMANENT ALTERNATIVES
276. Permanent alternatives are unlikely to be
politically acceptable to candidate or potential candidate countries,
as these countries would prefer to pursue full, equal membership.
(paragraph 205)
277. A withdrawal of an offer of membership by
removing candidate status would be a dramatic step with significant
political consequences. We conclude that this should only be considered
where the scale of backsliding indicates that the enlargement
process can no longer credibly continue. (paragraph 206)
A 'WAITING ROOM'
278. The European Neighbourhood Policy, European
Economic Area, or an 'associate membership', could be used as
a 'waiting room' or 'stepping stone' for European countries that
eventually wish to accede. Such mechanisms can promote deep integration
in specific areas, provided that the expectations and incentives
are clearly set out, but none are a viable alternative to membership.
(paragraph 211)
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