House of Lords - The EU's External Action Service

The EU's External Action Service - European Union Committee Contents

Chapter 4: Differing approaches to the EEAS

The UK

146. We sought the views of the Minister for Europe, and officials at the FCO and the DfID, about the EEAS. The Minister for Europe's view was that the EEAS "should complement and support, not replace, the diplomatic services of other Member States." He saw no area where the UK might be prepared to hand over some tasks to the EEAS, as the UK had a global diplomatic network at its disposal. The EEAS should be more effective, and should focus on practical, achievable improvements without going into further debate about institutions.[275] The review should set clear priorities and target resources where EU action could add most value, strengthen policy coherence and embed the comprehensive approach to crisis management, and improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of working practices.[276] Hugo Shorter cited the relations that the EEAS was developing with strategic partners[277] and its peace building work, especially in Africa, as examples of where the EEAS complemented the UK's efforts. The Service should only operate where it was authorised to do so, and within its budget, and should not replace the work of the FCO. The UK Government would continue to exert influence on the action and priorities of the service so that it contributed to British security, prosperity and values.[278]

147. The EEAS told us that UK nationals were strongly represented in the EEAS at all levels, as diplomats and permanent officials. Overall, including all categories of staff, there were 150 British nationals working in the EEAS.[279] 20 British diplomats had been recruited to the EEAS as Temporary Agents, in addition to 49 permanent officials at AD level; 15 were in management positions in Headquarters, 11 were Heads of Delegation and two were deputy Heads.[280] Mr Shorter said that the UK identified posts in the EEAS which they would aim to fill, but they did not necessarily attempt to place diplomats in countries where the UK was not represented.[281]

148. Hugo Shorter told us that the UK believed that the Service had "navigated a pretty pragmatic and sensible path through the competing demands of EU partners."[282] Not surprisingly, he told us that, in his view, the EEAS had been most effective when it had "worked with the grain of our own interests and objectives" and had helped to advance those interests.[283] He said that the UK would like to see the EEAS focus on developing more strategic relations with emerging economies and established powers and use the full range of its tools, policies and capabilities to influence them in line with agreed Council purpose and direction. Relations with Brazil and India were going well: in the latter the EU should focus on trade, climate change and security, where it could best add value. With China, the EU value could be added by prioritising and coordinating EU positions on economic and political issues, leveraging its strength as one of China's largest markets.[284]

149. We also heard that difficulties had arisen for the UK during the establishment of the EEAS. Hugo Shorter told us that there had been a process of "refining our understanding" of precisely where competences lay under the Lisbon Treaty, involving a difficult negotiating process, and disagreements about the EU's relationship with the UN. The problem had now been resolved "to our satisfaction".[285] The Minister for Europe explained that the EU Member States had unanimously agreed arrangements for the EU Delegation to the UN to represent Member States in negotiations on budgetary matters in the UN Fifth Committee, where there was Member State competence. On speaking and observer rights at the UN General Assembly, it had been agreed to continue with the EU's observer status. The EU Delegation had the same rights as had been previously exercised by the Member State in the rotating presidency. He said that the approach had avoided a shift of competence, while in practical terms trying to make it possible for the EU to speak on a position which had been agreed collectively.[286] Graham Avery said that the UK had been among the strongest of the Member States in refusing to permit the role of the EEAS to be upgraded; this problem had sometimes been referred to by others as "the UK issue."[287]

150. Dr Bicchi thought that it was in the UK's interests to work with the EEAS; the new emphasis on political reporting in the EEAS meant that there was a significant difference in the way Member States participated in EU foreign policy-making, with some states relying on the EEAS for information. This created the opportunity for countries with a global reach, such as the UK, to work closely with EU delegations to contribute significantly to the direction and content of EU foreign policy. She believed that, in this way, the UK could contribute and multiply the UK's political leadership in the world and make the UK a more attractive partner for the US.[288] The Brussels and Europe Liberal Democrats commented that the UK Government should take a more positive attitude towards the EEAS, and that this included helping the EU carry more weight in its own right in the UN system.[289] Graham Avery also pointed out that the EEAS offered the UK opportunities to promote its interests through designing European foreign policies which coincided with its own, as France had done in agriculture with the Common Agricultural Policy.[290]

151. Professor Whitman did not think that the UK was making the most of the EEAS; its approach was piecemeal, connected to the ambition of individuals, rather than targeted. In his view the UK had difficulties in general in placing diplomats in EU institutions. He suggested that the UK should invite EEAS staff for secondments to London, "so that they get a better sense of us, what we want and the way that we operate."[291]

152. We believe that there are benefits for both the EEAS and the UK in high quality British diplomats working in the EEAS, in particular in areas where the UK has both experience and interests. We agree this offers the UK an opportunity to take a lead in developing European policy.

153. The Government should ensure that, when UK diplomats return to their national careers at the end of their secondment, their careers should not be disadvantaged. This will benefit the UK's diplomatic service.

154. The UK public sector, including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, is under strong budgetary pressures. Given the existence of the EEAS, the Government should look anew, and constructively, at ways in which the presence of the EEAS could be used to the UK's advantage in terms of saving costs, or increasing influence at no additional cost. This should not be the exclusive preserve of smaller Member States.

Other Member States

155. We asked how Member States viewed the EEAS, and found that views differed considerably, depending in large part on the size of the country and, consequently, of its diplomatic service. The EEAS believed that the creation of the EEAS had strengthened relations with the diplomatic services of Member States at headquarters and delegation level. They attributed this to the new role of the HR/VP in chairing different formations of the Council, which was mirrored in the PSC and Council working groups in Brussels, as well as in the work of EU delegations. The growing presence of national diplomats in the EEAS also helped relations with Member States. On the other hand, there were issues concerning the role and competence of the EU Delegations to some multilateral organisations, such as the UN and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), where there was "work in progress."[292] Pierre Vimont told us that the twice-yearly meetings with Permanent Secretaries of the 27 Member States took place to discuss the relationship between the EEAS and the national diplomatic services. At the next meeting the 27 would give an assessment of the first two years of the EEAS.[293] His counterparts in Member States were happy with the way the EEAS delegations were working, apart from a few possible personality problems.[294] Heads of Delegation had been asked to maintain direct contacts on the ground with the embassies of Member States to exchange information. However, some Delegation Heads had complained that this was a one-way street.[295]

156. David Spence also thought that relations between the EEAS and Member States' embassies were good and that the embassies liked the continuity which the Delegations brought. He said that some foreign affairs ministries, such as the Dutch and the Swedes, were looking at the nature of their own ministries to see how the EEAS could benefit them.[296] Professor Whitman believed that a fairly small number of Member States saw the EEAS as a direct challenge to their diplomatic services. The predominant view was that it existed and they would like to see it thrive so that they could derive some national advantage, particularly in terms of spending less.[297]

157. We asked the ambassadors of three smaller Member States, represented in London, for their views of the EEAS: Ambassador Asta Skaisgiryté Liauškiené of Lithuania, Ambassador Miroslav Wlachovsky of the Slovak Republic, and Ambassador Iztok Jarc of the Republic of Slovenia. These ambassadors expressed strong support for the EEAS and outlined its advantages for smaller states. Ambassador Wlachovsky´ told us that the difference between larger and smaller states was one of capacity; Slovakian embassies did not cover the world and information provided by the EEAS therefore helped to shape Slovakia's foreign policy. One of the benefits of "the club" was that it was represented around the world. [298]

158. This view was echoed by Ambassador Skaisgiryté Liauškiené for Lithuania, and Ambassador Jarc for Slovenia. Ambassador Skaisgiryté Liauškiené told us that Lithuania only had 40 bilateral embassies, of which 26 were in other EU Member States, and the presence of EU delegations in all the countries where it had no representation was "absolutely crucial." Information sharing on, for example, Burma and Guatemala, was very important: before that, "we did not have a clue what was going on."[299] Ambassador Skaisgiryté Liauškiené gave a positive overall view of the EEAS which had achieved greater visibility, although not always unity. She thought its strengths lay in its single structure, planning and the network of delegations. She believed the new system for representation was an improvement on the rotating presidency system. Its weakness was that it did not have the ability to achieve united positions on all subjects.[300]

159. We heard a contrary view from Tarja Cronberg MEP. In her opinion small countries, including her native Finland, had declined in influence since the establishment of the EEAS. When they had formed part of the six monthly rotating chairmanship "everybody was dynamic, thinking about new ideas and trying to do something. Now, it has decreased into a more bureaucratic mess."[301]

160. Turning to the larger Member States, Graham Avery thought that the French government, like the UK Government, had initially been sceptical about the EEAS, but used the EU as "a means of projecting national interest and national power," and believed that the EEAS had been successful. In his view, the Germans hoped that some radical ideas would emerge from the 2013 review, perhaps with a shift of competences from the Commission to the EEAS. In his view, the Germans considered themselves as one of the strongest supporters of the Service and they "want German foreign policy to be European foreign policy," for example in wanting the EU to adopt friendlier policies towards Russia. Edward Burke thought that the French would like the EEAS to play a strong political role and act with greater boldness on military operations overseas. He told us that both Germany and Sweden thought that the EEAS lacked the powers envisaged under the Lisbon Treaty and they were frustrated with the bloc building by others.[302]

161. Mats Persson thought that the EEAS had nothing new to offer to larger Member States, but that the strategic assessment was different for smaller Member States.[303] David Spence thought, however, that the EEAS also offered benefits for the larger Member States, as all ministries were under financial pressure.[304] In the view of Dr Federica Bicchi, there was a "win-win" situation for both small and large Member States. The larger states retained a de facto veto power and had the option of cooperating more closely with the EEAS to influence the direction of EU foreign policy. The small Member States had started to rely on the EEAS for the provision of crucial services and saw it as an opportunity for voicing their national concerns, for acting in crisis situations, (for which they did not have the means), and for receiving information on subjects about which they knew little.[305]

162. The importance of the EEAS for smaller EU Member States, which lack a global reach, is great as it extends their sources of information and, in some cases, informs their foreign policy. For the larger Member States, which do have a global reach, the EEAS offers the opportunity to influence the CFSP and the EU's external relations, and to make savings in their own ministries and diplomatic services.

163. Prior to the review, Member States should jointly discuss and must clarify for the HR/VP what they want the EEAS to do as it moves forward. Their views can then form part of that review and lead to the essential prioritisation of tasks and resources. The differing interests of both smaller and larger Member States should be taken fully into account.

164. It is already clear from the practice of Member States sharing embassies or buildings with common services, (for example, the "Schengen House" in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), and from the wish of the smaller states for the EEAS to provide consular activities, that in the long term there is much to be gained by better use of Europe's diplomatic resources across the globe, whether based around collections of Member States or the EEAS.

165. In conclusion, we believe that the EEAS has made a good start in its first two years. There is more to do, but it should now focus on swiftly correcting the remaining organisational problems so that its systems run smoothly, and delivering more in the areas where it has been successful. Both the review and the process of appointments in 2014 of a new Commission, including its President, of a new High Representative/Vice-President and of a new Chair of the European Council present real opportunities to address some of the shortcomings and weaknesses that have emerged during the early years of the EEAS's existence. They must not be missed. The review should focus on the ability of the Service to add value to the effectiveness of EU external policies through the addition of diplomacy to traditional Commission tasks. This will include improved collection, use and dissemination of political intelligence, better coordination of the use of the EU's different instruments within a particular region, and using the combined leverage of the EU to the advantage of all 27 Member States.

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276 QQ 261, 271 Back

277 The EU has designated the US, Canada, Russia, China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Japan and South Africa as strategic partners. Back

278 QQ 2, 3 Back

279 Figures dated December 2012 Back

280 EEAS Back

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282 Q 16 Back

283 Q 18 Back

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285 QQ 2, 4. The question of the EU's role in the UN revolved around the extent to which the EU could represent the Member States in international organisations. The EU is an observer within the UN, and has no vote, but it is party to more than 50 UN multilateral agreements and conventions as the only non-State participant. It has obtained a special "full participant" status in a number of important UN conferences. http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/articleslist_s88_en.htm Back

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