CHAPTER 5: Conclusions and recommendations
Chapter 2: The New Organisation
166. We recognise that the EEAS is still a young
Service. In its first two years the EEAS had to create a new service
and structure in order to become fully operational, but it should
now put that period behind it and focus on delivering results.
This is extremely important, since it is essential that the EEAS
delivers added value to the EU's external action. There were differences
of view amongst our witnesses on the extent to which the EEAS
had done so up until now. (Paragraph 13)
167. The EEAS should not, however, seek to project
its own foreign policy. The Common and Foreign Security Policy
should remain under the control of the Member States. (Paragraph
14)
168. We agree that the triple-hatted High Representative/Vice-President
position brings many advantages for the coherence of the EU's
external relations. However, it does also bring a number of problems
which make it difficult for the incumbent to undertake the role
effectively. (Paragraph 19)
169. The triple-hatted HR/VP role has led to
overload, especially given the inevitable amount of travel involved.
We believe that serious consideration should be given to a whole
range of possible solutions to this problem during the two year
review of the EEAS and when appointments are made to the new Commission
and the High Representative post in 2014. (Paragraph 23)
170. The Commission Vice-Presidency role of the
High Representative should be used more rigorously to ensure that
there is greater liaison between the policies managed by the Commission
and those offered by the EEAS, and thereby enhance coherence in
the EU's external relations. (Paragraph 24)
171. We recognise the problem of setting up a
new service and the additional investment that has been required,
and that efforts have been made to restrain the budget and abide
by the injunction to achieve budget neutrality. However, budget
neutrality has not been achieved. We recommend that, while the
EU Member States have to observe budgetary restraints, there should
be zero real growth in the EEAS budget. (Paragraph 33)
172. We fully agree with the intention of the
EEAS to continue cooperation with Member States to identify where
resources can be shared to achieve savings in national budgets.
The aim should be to provide benefits for all Member States. Achievement
in this area should become a key indicator of performance by the
EEAS. (Paragraph 34)
173. We have heard evidence that salaries are
overgenerous in comparison with Member State diplomatic norms.
It is very difficult to substantiate this because of the difficulties
of establishing comparable grades, but we recommend that the general
principle should be that salaries are broadly comparable with
those of the larger Member States for officials in equivalent
diplomatic service positions. This is especially important while
many Member States face particularly severe budgetary constraints.
(Paragraph 35)
174. We recognise that EEAS salaries are based
on Commission staff regulations and that, if they are reduced,
this may lead to the loss of good staff to other EU institutions,
However, the appropriate way to resolve this would be to reduce
the higher-level salaries within the institutions across the board,
or to recruit a larger proportion of staff from national diplomatic
services. (Paragraph 36)
175. The EU, and hence also the EEAS, have a
very wide range of potential interests spread across the entire
globe. The prioritisation of aims and objectives must be a core
part of the review of the EEAS, but it must also take account
of the need to adapt to unforeseen circumstances and situations.
(Paragraph 37)
176. In the vast majority of cases delegations
have been inherited from the previous system of Commission representations.
The location of delegations should not be driven by history but
be subject to regular and rigorous review to assess their current
usefulness for the EU's overall priorities, leading, if necessary,
to closures. (Paragraph 53)
177. Member States differ in their preferences
for delegations, but they should take responsibility for the collective
decision on their location. Where a delegation closure is decided,
a lead Member State with an Embassy or High Commission in the
third country should provide a focus for EU work, if necessary
with supplementary personnel and funding resources from the EU.
Clearly, this should be at a significantly lower cost. (Paragraph
54)
178. We consider that Commission business such
as trade and development can benefit from being set in a political
context, which can be provided by the EEAS. However, in cases
where a delegation's work is limited to these issues, we do not
believe that there is a need to establish or continue a resident
EEAS presence. Trade or development offices should be used instead,
and political reporting should be handled by a mix of visiting
EEAS political officers, connected to the relevant desk in Brussels,
and a lead Member State in the area. (Paragraph 55)
179. There are already instances where Member
States share diplomatic premises in third countries with each
other or with the EEAS. The HR/VP should look in the review at
how this practice could be taken further for mutual benefit. Where
two EEAS delegations exist, they should be amalgamated as soon
as is feasible. (Paragraph 56)
180. In countries where there are no EEAS delegations,
the coordination role they perform for information exchange and
crisis management should continue to be undertaken by the Member
State holding the rotating presidency or, in their absence, by
a nominated Member State appropriate to that location. This would
place an additional resource burden on larger Member States, for
which they should receive financial compensation from the EEAS.
(Paragraph 57)
181. Reporting lines from the delegations are
complex, with Commission staff working in the delegations reporting
both to the Commission and to the Head of the EEAS Delegation.
Appraisals for Commission staff in delegations are currently written
in Brussels. The Head of Delegation must have responsibility for
appraising Commission staff within the mission and reporting lines
should be clear. (Paragraph 58)
182. The budget arrangements in delegations are
complicated, as separate accounts are prepared for EEAS and Commission
expenditure. There should be one set of budgets and accounts for
delegations, with the potential for saving on accounting and administrative
expenditure. The Heads of Delegation should have complete authority,
including management and accounting responsibilities, over all
internal and external expenditure, with one set of accounts reported
to the EEAS. (Paragraph 59)
183. Our evidence shows that many smaller Member
States would find a consular role for EEAS delegations particularly
useful. This has a number of implications, not least cost, as
there is currently no such expertise in the delegations. The review
should seriously consider the possibility of the EEAS operating
in this area for States which wish to delegate some consular functions
to the EEAS. However, those Member States which wish to be assisted
in this way should meet the costs individually or collectively
of setting up and operating the service. (Paragraph 63)
184. There is still work to be done in uniting
the three staff components from the Council Secretariat, Commission
and Member State diplomatic services. Heads of Delegation need
to pay continued attention to the development of a corporate spirit
in their delegations. (Paragraph 71)
185. We recommend that greater attention should
be given to the planning and delivery of training for EEAS staff,
including in the operations of the EU for staff from national
diplomatic services, in political work for those coming from the
Commission, and in languages where relevant. In particular, the
EEAS needs more Arabic speakers if it is to capitalise on the
consequences of the Arab Spring. A larger training budget will
probably be required, which should be financed from savings elsewhere
within the EEAS. (Paragraph 72)
186. We strongly agree with the idea of seconding
EEAS staff into Member State ministries. A two-way flow would
be healthy and help to achieve the cohesion in the EEAS. (Paragraph
73)
187. The EU's Special Representatives in general
fulfil a productive and effective role. They play a particularly
important part where the issues involved are cross-border, regional
or thematic. They should, however, be more fully integrated into
the EEAS structure and their salaries rigorously reviewed (see
our earlier recommendation). (Paragraph 76)
188. The relationship between the EU Special
Representatives and the Heads of Delegation should be clarified,
as should the chain of command of the Special Representatives.
(Paragraph 77)
189. The HR/VP submits an annual report to the
European Parliament on the EEAS staffing and budget. Given the
intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, she should also submit it
formally to national parliaments. (Paragraph 83)
190. The EEAS should be required to respond to
national parliaments if they raise matters following submission
of the report. As it is clearly impractical for the HR/VP to attend
each Member State parliament or chamber, a suitable cost and resource
effective method needs to be found to achieve this. (Paragraph 84)
191. This re-balancing is particularly important
as currently the European Parliament has far more influence over
the HR/VP and the EEAS due to its ability to control budgets,
scrutinise activity directly, and call them to account. The scrutiny
role of the European Parliament should not go beyond its current
level, as foreign policy is primarily inter-governmental and scrutiny
should therefore be performed at the national parliamentary level.
(Paragraph 85)
Chapter 3: Achievements and Challenges
192. We applaud the objective of bringing together
the different streams of the EU's external work, whether in the
EEAS or the person of the HR/VP, to form a comprehensive approach
to the EU's foreign policy. This is working well in the Horn of
Africa, the Sahel and the southern neighbourhood, where different
instruments have been brought together. This should continue to
be the approach for the future. The new Comprehensive Approach
under consideration by the Commission,[306]
in conjunction with the EEAS, should be ambitious and the EEAS
should play a leading role in its formulation and implementation.
We see this as a major area of further added value. (Paragraph
92)
193. The EEAS, in support of the HR/VP, has made
a noticeable impact in a number of foreign policy areas. These
include policy towards Iran, the EU's reaction to the Arab Spring
and the relations between Serbia and Kosovo, where the EU's ability
to speak with one voice has been enhanced. We hope that, once
the EEAS is fully established, the time of the HR/VP will be freed
to give greater focus to these and other key areas. (Paragraph
100)
194. The EEAS can only act under the Common Foreign
and Security Policy if the EU's Member States agree. The Member
States are able to find a common position on many subjects, including
on difficult issues of sanctions on third countries. However,
differing policies, based on different national interests, inevitably
persist, including on key issues. The EEAS should make every effort
to find and build on common ground to enable Member States to
agree united positions. (Paragraph 107)
195. We welcome the fact that the EEAS regularly
brings together a further 11 non-Member States as a part of common
positions at the United Nations and more broadly. We encourage
the EEAS to continue and extend this aspect of its work. (Paragraph
108)
196. It is understandably difficult to reconcile
the national priorities of 27 equal Member States, and reduce
them to manageable proportions. Nonetheless, this should be done
by the HR/VP in collaboration with the Member States, and should
determine where the EEAS focuses its resources. (Paragraph 112)
197. We consider that the EEAS should focus on
areas of greatest security and economic importance to the Member
States, and where it can make the most impact, in particular by
deploying its civilian or mixed military/civilian missions and
employing its new comprehensive approach. This will inevitably
mean that there will be more concentration on issues which are
geographically closer to the Member States, rather than distant
ones. Relations with the emerging powers which have been chosen
as the EU's strategic partners should also be prioritised. (Paragraph
113)
198. The EEAS can and should play a major part
in furthering the EU's human rights principles, which should continue
to form part of all the EU's relationships. (Paragraph 114)
199. Despite the progress that has been made
in setting up the institutions in the new service, problems remain
in the lines of communication. The review should look at whether
decision-making within the EEAS could be simplified so that implementation
of actions can take place more speedily. The Member States also
have a major role to play in this. (Paragraph 117)
200. Our evidence suggested that, despite progress
in coordination, there were still "turf wars" between
the EEAS and the Commission in handling external relations in
Brussels and in the delegations. It is simply not acceptable that
already complex bureaucratic procedures result in a loss of efficiency
and effectiveness for the EEAS. This problem must be overcome,
and an excellent opportunity to do so will arise when the new
Commission and the new High Representative/Vice-President take
up their appointments in 2014. Solutions include ensuring that
policy coordination meetings of external commissioners, in particular
the Commissioners for development, neighbourhood policy and enlargement,
and the HR/VP take place regularly during the year. As we have
advocated above, the EEAS should work towards unified reporting
structures, both in terms of personnel and finance, and the withdrawal
of EEAS staff where the mission is purely technical. (Paragraph
121)
201. It is important to distinguish between trade
promotion and trade policy. It is clear that the main forum for
promoting the trade of individual companies will remain national
missions and embassies. (Paragraph 127)
202. Trade policy is a competence of the European
Union, on which the Commission leads. Our evidence indicates that,
thus far, the EEAS has had no significant effect on the way in
which the EU handles trade policy. We consider that, while duplication
should be avoided, the EEAS could play a useful role in providing
a diplomatic perspective on trade policy, and the EEAS delegations
should be proficient at providing a strong local political context
for trade negotiations. The review should consider how to ensure
that the EEAS starts to play this constructive role in assisting
trade policy. (Paragraph 128)
203. The Commission should continue to lead on
development, which is where development expertise lies within
the EU. However, the review should consider in detail how the
EEAS can better contribute to the development of policy and ensure
that all programmes are set in a political context. (Paragraph
136)
204. In disbursing aid, the EEAS needs to focus
on enforcing mutual accountability, which should continue to be
an important part of the EU's message in its aid work. A special
remit could be given to the Court of Auditors to ensure that these
conditions are effective. (Paragraph 137)
205. We were concerned by the difficulty in obtaining
evidence from development non-governmental organisations on how
the EU's development work has changed since the establishment
of the EEAS. We conclude that the EEAS is either difficult to
access or believed to be irrelevant. The review should consider
whether these views are justified, and in what ways the EEAS could
improve its relationships with these stakeholders. (Paragraph
138)
206. There may be a number of instances where
EEAS offices deal only with the operational aspects of implementing
EU development policy. In these cases we believe that the EU should
consider withdrawing EEAS status and staff and leave the offices
under the control of the Commission. (Paragraph 139)
207. We agree that EU's humanitarian (ECHO) aid
offices should remain independent of the EEAS. (Paragraph 140)
208. Evidence from our witnesses suggested that
crisis management was an area that had as yet been given insufficient
attention by the EEAS, although it is a core activity with potential
for much added value. This is despite the fact that new structures
have been created which are intended to streamline the EU's ability
to manage crises. As this is a vital and growing area of EU external
activity, the review should ensure that the different parts of
its crisis-management structure are well integrated and work smoothly.
(Paragraph 145)
Chapter 4: Differing Approaches to the EEAS
209. We believe that there are benefits for both
the EEAS and the UK in high quality British diplomats working
in the EEAS, in particular in areas where the UK has both experience
and interests. We agree this offers the UK an opportunity to take
a lead in developing European policy. (Paragraph 152)
210. The Government should ensure that, when
UK diplomats return to their national careers at the end of their
secondment, their careers should not be disadvantaged. This will
benefit the UK's diplomatic service. (Paragraph 153)
211. The UK public sector, including the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, is under strong budgetary pressures.
Given the existence of the EEAS, the Government should look anew,
and constructively, at ways in which the presence of the EEAS
could be used to the UK's advantage in terms of saving costs,
or increasing influence at no additional cost. This should not
be the exclusive preserve of smaller Member States. (Paragraph
154)
212. The importance of the EEAS for smaller EU
Member States, which lack a global reach, is great as it extends
their sources of information and, in some cases, informs their
foreign policy. For the larger Member States, which do have a
global reach, the EEAS offers the opportunity to influence the
CFSP and the EU's external relations, and to make savings in their
own ministries and diplomatic services. (Paragraph 162)
213. Prior to the review, Member States should
jointly discuss and must clarify for the HR/VP what they want
the EEAS to do as it moves forward. Their views can then form
part of that review and lead to the essential prioritisation of
tasks and resources. The differing interests of both smaller and
larger Member States should be taken fully into account. (Paragraph
163)
214. It is already clear from the practice of
Member States sharing embassies or buildings with common services,
(for example, the "Schengen House" in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo), and from the wish of the smaller states
for the EEAS to provide consular activities, that in the long
term there is much to be gained by better use of Europe's diplomatic
resources across the globe, whether based around collections of
Member States or the EEAS. (Paragraph 164)
215. In conclusion, we believe that the EEAS
has made a good start in its first two years. There is more to
do, but it should now focus on swiftly correcting the remaining
organisational problems so that its systems run smoothly, and
delivering more in the areas where it has been successful. Both
the review and the process of appointments in 2014 of a new Commission,
including its President, of a new High Representative/Vice-President
and of a new Chair of the European Council present real opportunities
to address some of the shortcomings and weaknesses that have emerged
during the early years of the EEAS's existence. They must not
be missed. The review should focus on the ability of the Service
to add value to the effectiveness of EU external policies through
the addition of diplomacy to traditional Commission tasks. This
will include improved collection, use and dissemination of political
intelligence, better coordination of the use of the EU's different
instruments within a particular region, and using the combined
leverage of the EU to the advantage of all 27 Member States. (Paragraph
165)
306 The Commission now plans to set out the "comprehensive
approach" more formally than hitherto. Back
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