Brexit: the options for trade Contents

Chapter 6: Trade under WTO rules

171.The fourth possible framework for the UK’s future trade relationship with the EU would be to rely on the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Information about the WTO is given in Box 8.

Box 8: World Trade Organisation (WTO)

The WTO was founded in 1995 as a global framework for trade relations between countries. It aims to liberalise trade by lowering tariffs and reducing or eliminating other barriers to trade (thereby improving market access), and to create a stable and predictable trading system. Tariff reductions and increasingly the reduction of non-tariff barriers are negotiated between WTO members in ‘rounds’, such as the Uruguay Round or the current Doha Development Round.231 The WTO currently has 164 members, which account for 95% of world trade.232

In order to create a predictable trading system, the WTO applies non-discrimination principles. One of them is ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) treatment, which means that countries cannot normally discriminate between their trading partners. This includes the obligation to apply the same tariffs and to offer the same market access to all WTO members. If a country chooses to lower a trade barrier or to open up its market for one WTO member, it has to offer the same favourable conditions to all WTO trading partners. The MFN principle applies to trade in both goods and services. However, exceptions are possible, either if countries set up a free trade agreement (FTA) or customs union, or if they decide to give special trade conditions to developing countries. In services, countries are allowed to discriminate in additional limited circumstances.<233 MFN goes hand in hand with the principle of ‘national treatment’, which means that once a good or service has been imported into a market, it has to be treated like a local product.234

WTO membership consists of a balance of negotiated ‘rights’ (for example the right to be able to export to other countries) and ‘obligations’ (for example to limit restrictions on imports). Both rights and obligations work through rules which apply to all members of the WTO, as well as country-specific commitments known as ‘schedules’ (for example individual countries agreeing limits on subsidies to their own agricultural sector).235 Schedules of concessions include:

  • Maximum tariff levels for goods, which are often referred to as ‘bound tariffs’ or ‘bindings’; and
  • Tariff rate quotas (quantitative restrictions on imports and exports) and some kinds of domestic support for agricultural products.236

WTO agreements

The WTO legal order consists of a number of agreements that are annexed to the WTO Agreement. They all came into force together in 1995. Besides rules on dispute settlement under the WTO Agreements, the three main pillars of the WTO Agreements are trade in goods (GATT), services (GATS) and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS).

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

The GATT was the precursor to the WTO, and provided the rules for much of world trade from 1948 to 1994. It is binding for all members of the WTO and includes a number of agreements and annexes, dealing with the special requirements of specific sectors or issues, including: agriculture; health regulations for farm and food products; textiles and clothing; technical standards; trade-related investment measures; anti-dumping measures; customs valuation methods; pre-shipment inspection; rules of origin; import licensing; subsidies and countermeasures; and safeguards.237

The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)

The GATS came into force in 1995 and applies to all WTO members. It applies to all but two service sectors: first, those sectors where services are supplied by a Government authority neither on a commercial basis nor in competition with other suppliers (such as education or health services); and second, all air traffic rights.238

Signatories to GATS have to comply with general obligations and specify commitments for each particular service sector, detailing levels of market access and treatment under national laws. Various limitations can be imposed on the number of suppliers, employees in the sector, value of transactions and the legal form of the supplier. Members can tailor their commitments in line with national policy. While some members have only scheduled commitments for a handful of sectors, others have provided market access in over 120 of the 161 services included in GATS.239

Process of agreeing the UK’s schedules at the WTO

172.The UK is a member of the WTO in its own right. It does not, however, have individual schedules of concessions: it is part of the EU’s combined schedules. In leaving the EU, the UK will have to separate its schedules from the EU, and its new schedules will be subject to approval by all WTO members. Professor Piet Eeckhout, Professor of EU Law at University College London, explained that the UK’s WTO schedules would be the point of departure for its future trade negotiations with the EU and the rest of the world: “other parties will want to see … what the UK’s tariff commitments are under WTO law, because that is the baseline from which you negotiate a free trade agreement”.240

173.There are two options for amending schedules: rectification and modification. Rectification is possible for “rearrangements which do not alter the scope of a concession … and other rectifications of a purely formal character”. Modification of schedules implies a substantive change of a concession.241

174.Mr Eglin explained that if the Government amended the UK’s schedules by means of a rectification of the EU’s schedules, this process could be completed in “three months in the case of the goods schedule and 45 days in the case of the services schedule.”242 He added: “there is nothing in the WTO rules that says you cannot adopt somebody else’s schedule.”243

175.Lord Price agreed that “one of the first things we have to do” is “go through the technical process of adopting our own schedules.”244 He continued: “the advice we have is that what we intend to do is predominantly technical, moving from an EU schedule to a UK schedule.”245

Issues in agreeing the UK’s schedules

176.Witnesses recognised that a number of factors might complicate negotiations on the UK’s schedules. Mr Eglin remarked: “I do not want to make it sound easy. A good deal of negotiation is going to be involved—probably clever negotiation as well, in parts”.246

Dividing up Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) and subsidies

177.Before presenting its schedules to WTO members, the UK will have to negotiate formally with the EU to separate out its TRQs and levels of subsidies from those currently shared between the EU’s 28 Member States.247

178.TRQs provide lower duties on limited quantities of goods imported into a country. By way of example, Mr Peter Ungphakorn, former Senior Information Officer WTO Secretariat, explained that in the latest EU schedule for goods there was a TRQ for approximately 280 tonnes of duty free lamb shared out among Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand, Uruguay and nine others. The EU and the UK would need to agree how to divide this quota between them—a process that Mr Ungphakorn expected to be contentious: “TRQs are on the front line in the battle between exporters with offensive interests and import markets with defensive interests.”248

179.Professor Eeckhout highlighted that the EU and the UK would also have to divide those quotas that currently enable the EU to export to third countries on preferential terms. The question was: “Would the European Union keep those quotas and would the United Kingdom have to negotiate preferential access itself?”249

180.The UK and the EU would also have to agree on how to divide the entitlement to domestic subsidies (most commonly agricultural subsidies), known in the WTO as the aggregate measurement of support (AMS). Mr Ungphakorn told us that “the appropriate basis for extracting the UK’s AMS entitlement” was subject to “on-going discussion among legal and trade experts”; however, as the EU was currently well below its agreed limit, “some ‘ballpark’ calculation for the split ought to be agreed without too much difficulty”.250

181.Mr Eglin noted a trade-off between TRQs and agricultural subsidies: “On the face of it, the EU presumably will want to give us as much of the tariff rate quotas as possible and as little of the farm subsidies as possible.” Mr Eglin said negotiations on these issues “would have to be done before we could complete our [goods] schedule and present it in the WTO.”251

182.Lord Price said the European Commission was aware of the UK’s need to divide up TRQs and subsidies with the EU, and had been “constructive in early conversations.” He told us the EU “wants to be supportive of our finding our own schedules”.252

183.Mr Eglin also noted the wide constituency of domestic interests affected by an amendment to the UK’s WTO schedules: it was essential that the Government was “joining … up” information about what effect changes to tariffs for goods might have on farmers, regulators, and customs authorities ahead of negotiations. Negotiators would end up “covering almost every ministry, every department”, and thus “clear instructions are absolutely paramount”.253

The views of other WTO members

184.Having divided up TRQs and domestic subsidies with the EU, the UK would then be in a position to present its schedules to other WTO members. Mr Eglin noted that they “will see opportunities … for better access to the UK market.” He imagined a situation where another WTO member would feel that it had negotiated a concession with the EU on the “presumption that the UK was part of the EU market”, and while it had provided a lot of market access to the UK, the UK “on its own” no longer provided a “reciprocal benefit”.254 Professor Eeckhout described the possible imposition of tariffs between the UK and the EU as a “modification in the terms of trade from the perspective of exporting nations to the UK and to the European Union”.255

185.Mr González García thought reaching an agreement in the WTO on TRQs “will potentially become a problematic exercise”, because some third countries “will feel they deserve a bigger share of the UK or EU market”.256 Mr Ungphakorn agreed: “most, if not all, countries that currently use the TRQs have an interest in negotiating the UK’s, plus possibly some new players”.257

186.In such situations, Mr Eglin advised the Government to “show openness, to listen to anybody who comes to us and says that they want bigger access for their beef, butter, milk or whatever”.258 Mr Eglin also said that if WTO members seriously wished to renegotiate parts of the UK’s proposed schedules, then the Government should see this as an opportunity for “opening [up] free trade negotiations” outside the WTO.259

187.Professor Eeckhout said he was “uncertain” how far WTO members might insist on knowing the outcome of wider trade negotiations between the UK and the EU before certifying the UK’s schedules. He said it made “a massive difference” whether the UK remained part of the EU’s customs union, concluded a FTA with the EU, or traded under WTO rules only.260 In the case of Japan, he said:

“If there is an add-on tariff when they want to export the car to the European continent, they might want to negotiate on the tariffs on imports. They might want to ask the United Kingdom, ‘Could you please bring down your tariffs on the components of cars so that we do not suffer from the fact that those cars no longer have free access to the European market?’”261

Modifying or rectifying the EU and the UK’s schedules?

188.Bearing these factors in mind, some witnesses believed that the UK adopting the EU’s schedules went beyond the simple ‘rectification’ outlined in Mr Eglin’s opening remarks, to a ‘modification’ of the EU’s schedules. Mr González García told us that rectification of schedules “can only occur in situations of [a] ‘purely formal character’ … The UK’s negotiation will alter the EU[‘s] schedules and therefore cannot be considered a rectification.”262 Mr Ungphakorn agreed that other countries might see separating out the UK’s TRQs as a modification of the EU’s schedules.263 Mr Ungphakorn also noted that the UK might wish to modify the EU’s schedules to take into consideration the views of other members of the WTO or to meet domestic demand from UK retailers or consumers to have lower tariffs and cheaper products.264

189.Whatever the reason, Mr Ungphakorn said a modification of the EU’s schedules would affect the format of negotiations, and could lead to a “lengthier process, with more specific requirements”. He said it could lead to “a triangle of external negotiations between the UK, EU … and non-EU exporting countries”.265 Mr Eglin said it would be easier to agree changes that ‘liberalised’ the schedules (that is, that reduced tariffs), whereas increasing trade restrictions would be more difficult, requiring the UK to make concessions elsewhere: “the exchange would be that you would have to lower a tariff somewhere else”. This would require “reciprocal bargaining”.266

190.Asked whether the Government had decided to modify the EU’s schedules, Lord Price said that “the simplest thing would be to adopt the current tariffs that we have with the EU”. However, it was “fair to say that, as of today, we have not resolved how [tariff rate quotas] should fall out.” He continued:” If you want me to say today that we have agreed that it is X, Y and Z, I simply cannot do that, because we have not begun the formal process of those conversations.”267

Certifying the EU’s current schedules

191.To allow for the EU’s enlargement to 28 Member States, the EU’s current schedules have not been formally ‘certified’ (agreed by WTO members).268 Professor Eeckhout and Mr Eglin did not see this as a complicating factor, but rather a “narrow legal issue”.269 Mr González García, though, was less certain:

“The EU-28 schedule has not been agreed and it is managed by the EU Commission on a bilateral basis in a non-transparent manner. This is likely to trigger further discussions between the WTO members and the EU which will have an impact in the UK’s WTO renegotiation.”270

Mr Ungphakorn pointed out: “If other countries wanted to be difficult they might insist on knowing the schedules and negotiating from official versions.” He added that “we don’t know how it would turn out”.271

What if there is no agreement to the UK’s schedules?

192.Mr Eglin was not concerned at the prospect that the UK’s schedules might not be certified by all WTO members by the end of the two-year negotiating period under Article 50: “Does it pose a problem? In my view, no, none whatsoever.”272 He said the UK could continue to trade on the basis of its proposed schedules: “Our proposal, as a schedule, is the terms on which we continue to trade regardless of whether [they have] been certified or not—that is our MFN schedule—and nobody is going to object to that.” He said these were “fine points of law”, and that fundamentally the WTO was a “commercial contract”, which existed “for the benefit of all members’ businesses.” He continued: “Chaos would break out if anybody were to suggest that the UK does not have a schedule … it would be absolute pandemonium”. As a result, he argued, “it is not going to happen”. While it might take many years for there to be consensus on the UK’s proposed schedules, and therefore, for final certification, the UK “would continue to trade on the terms in which we proposed we should trade, as long as they were reasonable”.273

193.Mr Ungphakorn was more cautious, noting that such an approach could be disputed by a WTO member, and that the UK might not prevail: “the complexity of WTO and international law” and “adjudicators’ individual thinking” meant that “WTO dispute rulings are unpredictable.” As the argument in favour of the UK simply adopting the EU’s schedule was “based largely on law”, it overlooked “processes, politics and diplomacy in the WTO”, all of which would be in play.274

194.As we have already noted, Lord Price regarded the process as “predominantly technical, moving from an EU schedule to a UK schedule”. He and the Secretary of State had already met Mr Roberto Azevêdo, Director-General of the WTO, and spoken to “19 Trade Ministers in the EU and outside”, who were all “very supportive of the need in the first instance for us to have our own schedules”. Following these discussions, Lord Price was “not anticipating any major issues”, and he felt that this work would be completed in “good time”.275 Agreeing the UK’s schedules was also “entirely doable … [the] WTO and the Commission are both saying that this is a reasonably straightforward thing that they want to help us to do”.276

Trade defence measures

195.As well as renegotiating its schedules, the UK will also have to consider its trade defence measures. Professor Eeckhout was “uncertain” about what would happen to the current anti-dumping measures that the EU applied to WTO members, which were the consequence of EU-wide investigations into dumping: “Whether the United Kingdom could simply continue to apply those or would not apply them may also be an issue that comes up in defining the UK’s WTO status”.277 Mr Eglin agreed that if the UK were to try and impose EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese steel imports, for example, the Chinese could “object vigorously” and demand that the UK “carry out a new investigation and demonstrate domestic injury and unfair trade.”278

196.Mr Eglin said “the biggest problem” was re-establishing an investigating authority in the UK that was “capable of undertaking trade remedy investigations and protecting the UK’s interests”.279 There was an acute need for “capacity-building”280 in an extremely specialised area of work, and he noted that “dispute settlement lawyers do not grow on trees.”281

Trade with the Single Market

197.Trading with the EU on the basis of concessions set at the WTO would provide the UK with a baseline of tariffs for trade in goods: the UK would have to apply those tariffs to imports from the EU. EU imports from the UK would, similarly, face EU tariffs. Trading under WTO rules would also provide limited commitments on services, as contained in the GATS. It would not provide the UK with any preferential access (which might be possible under a Free Trade Agreement or EEA membership) to the Single Market. Compared to the status quo of EU membership, Mr Eglin said: “We will be inferior if we are trading on WTO terms, MFN terms, with the EU, there is no question about it, both for goods and services.”282 He added that the “biggest problem” for the UK in trading with the EU under WTO terms would be that “we will not be able to influence future regulations”. He commented that it would be “good to find a way, if we can, of maintaining some influence over those rules”.283


198.Mr Eglin said the EU’s MFN tariffs “vary enormously”, with a division primarily between industrial goods, with an average tariff of 4.5%, and agricultural goods, with an average tariff of 14.5% and schedules “riddled with quantitative restrictions”.284 The graph below provides an indication of this variation. The figures are based on average tariffs per category; actual tariffs vary still more widely.285

Figure 1: Average final bound tariff rates applied by the EU by broad category of goods

Bar chart showing average final bound tariff rates applied by the EU by category of goods

Source: WTO, EU: and Q8 (Mr Eglin)

199.In relation to industrial goods, Mr Eglin highlighted that automobiles were a “heavily restricted sector”, with a 10% tariff on cars and a 22% tariff on trucks and lorries.286 Similar tariffs apply throughout the supply chain, and Dr Christos Tsinopoulos, Senior Lecturer, Durham University, explained that “trade barriers and more specifically, tariffs, are often seen as a key issue in the decision making process of location of a part of the supply chain. Such barriers increase costs, and complicate decision making.”287

200.Mr Eglin noted that trading under WTO rules would also affect the cost of agricultural imports to the UK: “There will be much more severe restrictions in certain sectors, primarily agriculture, than we face at the moment as a member of the Single Market.” In the food processing sector, for example, the average tariff for beverages and confectionery was in the region of 45%, and it was much higher on certain products such as poultry, where the ad valorem tariff (a tariff based on the determined value of the item being taxed) was over 200%.288 While the UK could unilaterally decide to lower its tariffs on agricultural goods, this could complicate the process of agreement to its schedules (as a modification rather than rectification) and reduce its leverage in future FTA negotiations, as the UK would be less able to offer preferential terms to other countries. It would also have deleterious implications for the UK’s agricultural industries.

201.But tariffs are just one aspect of the restrictions that would be placed on UK exports to the Single Market under the WTO model. A host of other factors, including regulation, geographic indicators and standards, are largely untouched by WTO agreements.289 Regulatory restrictions (such as those on car emissions standards) “generally are much more important than the tariffs”, and are “important for goods, both agricultural and manufactured”, according to Mr Eglin.290

202.Although the UK would not need to comply with EU standards when exporting to non-EU countries, the EU would remain a major player in setting global standards. Professor Eeckhout noted that the EU sought “convergence on regulatory issues”, and even attempted to be “hegemonic”, trying “to persuade other countries around the world to adopt concepts of EU regulation”.291


203.Professor Eeckhout explained that when the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was agreed in 1995, it aimed to capture “the current state of domestic liberalisation”, but did not strive to be “a major liberalising force”.292 Nevertheless, Mr Eglin said that there had “been a great deal of liberalisation” in the EU, and that it was no longer the “Fortress Europe” it was considered to be 20 years ago.293

204.The extent of market access in services provided by WTO agreements varies sector by sector, but both witnesses agreed that some industries would feel a significant impact. Professor Eeckhout gave the example of aviation, which “is hardly touched upon by WTO commitments”. There were no commitments regarding the right to fly between WTO members, whereas in “huge contrast”, in the Single Market “you have a full single market in aviation”, where “any EU airline … can perform freely any flights across the European internal market”.294

205.In order to understand which sectors “are relatively open” and which “are relatively closed”, Mr Eglin urged the Government to “talk to business and find out which services are affected, the main restrictions that will face the service suppliers and how they can be overcome … all those things need to be calculated at a very detailed level. Before you go into the negotiation, you need … to know exactly what you want”.295

206.Professor Eeckhout also suggested that the UK would “potentially … have to negotiate its entry” into the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).296 This was not part of the package of WTO agreements, and the European Union signed and concluded it, not individual Member States. The GPA covers 47 WTO members (counting the EU and its 28 Member States as one). It aims to open up the government procurement markets among its parties. Following several rounds of negotiations, signatories to the agreement have opened up procurement activities estimated to be worth $1.7 trillion.297 Mr Eglin agreed that the UK needed to become a signatory, but did not see it as “a big problem”. Nor was it “contingent upon us having first reached agreement with the EU.”298

Dispute resolution

207.If a member of the WTO feels that a fellow member has violated trade rules, it can use the WTO’s multilateral system of handling disputes, rather than taking unilateral action. More information can be found in Box 9.

Box 9: Dispute resolution at the WTO

The process for handling disputes is that, first, parties have to engage in consultation in order to determine whether their dispute can be settled. If this fails, then a panel of three to five experts is appointed to hear the case from both parties. On the basis of the evidence received, the panel makes recommendations to the Dispute Settlement Body at the WTO (which is the General Council), which then decides whether or not to adopt these recommendations. Both parties can appeal the outcome within 90 days via the permanent seven-person Appellate Body at the WTO. The whole process should be completed within one year to 15 months.

If a member that has been found guilty of violating trade rules fails to take corrective action within 20 days of the adoption of the panel’s report, the complainant can request permission temporarily to suspend their schedule of concessions in relation to the violating country.

Source: WTO, ‘Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes - A unique contribution’ (2016): [accessed 7 November 2016]

208.Professor Eeckhout highlighted “an enormous difference” between dispute resolution within the Single Market and under WTO rules. Single Market rules were “part of domestic law”, so businesses in the Single Market could “use domestic courts to enforce any rights [they] have.” In contrast, complaints to the WTO could only be brought by governments, which were understandably “somewhat selective”. It followed that the WTO did not have the “capacity” to deal with the “myriad trade issues that may arise for companies in different markets”. While dispute settlement at the WTO level was generally felt to be a “very robust system”, which worked “reasonably well”, there was no “automatic enforcement” of a final decision—members had to rely on others to comply under international law, or applied pressure through trade sanctions, which could take “many years” and were “of uncertain effect”.299

Conclusions and recommendations

209.If a preferential trade deal were not reached with the EU, then WTO rules would govern trade between the UK and the EU. Of all the trading frameworks considered in this report, reliance on WTO schedules would lead to the most dramatic change in the UK’s terms of trade with the EU.

210.Trade in goods would face significant tariffs, and trade in services would be subject to much greater restrictions. Regulatory restrictions, geographic indicators, and standards are largely untouched by WTO agreements. If it were to trade with the Single Market under WTO rules, the UK would therefore face a significant number of non-tariff as well as tariff barriers.

211.In order to have a trade policy independent of the EU, the UK will have to negotiate and secure agreement to its schedules of concessions (the commitments countries make at the WTO on tariffs, quotas and subsidies). We welcome the fact that the Government has begun to engage with the EU and the WTO about developing and securing UK schedules of concessions.

212.Although the Government is confident that this process will be purely technical, a number of political factors could complicate certification. For example, the views of other WTO members, particularly on tariff rate quotas, and on whether the UK and the EU’s actions could be considered to be a ‘modification’ rather than simply a ‘rectification’ of the EU’s schedules, may complicate agreement.

213.Under WTO rules, the UK would only have to comply with EU standards and regulations in those goods and services it traded with EU Member States. However, we note that the EU has played an important role in setting global standards: EU standards have been accepted by third countries with which the UK might wish to trade.

214.While the WTO has its own dispute resolution mechanisms, they are only accessible to businesses and individuals through governments and the process is often lengthy. Unlike in the EU, breaches cannot be remedied in the national courts, and it may take many years to change the practices of a trading partner through sanctions.

215.Whatever framework the Government adopts, it will also need to establish a domestic authority for trade remedy investigations, to replace the work currently undertaken by the Commission on behalf of EU Member States. This will require capacity-building in a specialised area of law. This may take a considerable time, and should therefore be an early priority in preparing for Brexit.

231 Also called the Doha Development Agenda.

232 WTO, ‘Members and Observers’: [accessed 1 November 2016] and Institute for Government, ‘Brexit Brief: 10 things to know about the World Trade Organization (WTO)’ (2016): [accessed 1 November 2016]

233 Both the GATT and GATS allow countries to discriminate in limited circumstances. For instance both contain general exceptions relating to health, security and prudential measures in financial services (found in Article II of GATS). Under GATS, WTO members may, in certain conditions, diverge from their MFN obligations in order to conclude Economic & Integration Agreements (under Article V of the GATS), or under Mutual Recognition Agreements (relating to licences or certificates) (under Article VII). Rudolf Adlung and Antonia Carzangia, ‘MFN Exemptions Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services: Grandfathers Striving for Immortality?’, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 12 (2), (June 2009), pp 357-392: [accessed 28 October 2016]

234 In services this depends on the specific national treatment obligations which form part of members’ specific concessions for their services’ schedule. WTO, ‘Principles of the trading system’: [accessed 28 October 2016]

235 Institute for Government, ‘Brexit Brief: 10 things to know about the World Trade Organization (WTO)’ (2016)

236 WTO, ‘Members’ commitments’:
[accessed 1 November 2016]

237 WTO, ‘General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’, The WTO Agreements Series: [accessed 28 November 2016]

238 WTO, ‘The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): objectives, coverage and disciplines’: [accessed 25 October 2016]; Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, FAQS- Services negotiations in WTO (9 April 2009), p 4: [accessed 4 November 2016]

239 WTO, ‘The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): objectives, coverage and disciplines’

241 GATT, L/4962 1980 Decision on Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Tariff Concessions (28 March 1980): [accessed 28 October 2016]

247 Q 1 (Prof Piet Eeckhout); Q 2 (Richard Eglin); written evidence from Luis González García (ETG0006); written evidence from Peter Ungphakorn (ETG0005)

248 Written evidence from Peter Ungphakorn (ETG0005)

250 Written evidence from Peter Ungphakorn (ETG0005)

256 Written evidence from Luis González García (ETG0006)

257 Written evidence from Peter Ungphakorn (ETG0005)

262 Written evidence from Luis González García (ETG0006)

263 Written evidence from Peter Ungphakorn (ETG0005)

264 Written evidence from Peter Ungphakorn (ETG0005)

265 Written evidence from Peter Ungphakorn (ETG0005)

268 The EU had to revise its commitments as it added new members, first in 1995 (the year after the Uruguay Round talks ended, when it expanded from 12 to 15 members), then in 2004 (to 25), 2007 (to 27), and 2013 (to the present 28). The schedule for 1995 was not certified until 2010—it took 15 years to account for the addition of three countries. Peter Ungphakorn, ‘The Hilton beef quota: a taste of what post-Brexit UK faces in the WTO’, Tradebetablog (28 August 2016): [accessed 1 November 2016]

269 Written evidence from Prof Piet Eeckhout (ETG0003) and Richard Eglin (ETG0001)

270 Written evidence from Luis González García (ETG0006)

271 Written evidence from Peter Ungphakorn (ETG0005)

274 Written evidence from Peter Ungphakorn (ETG0005)

285 Members of the WTO provide information regarding their ‘bound tariffs’ in their goods schedules. However, they are able to provide more favourable ‘applied tariffs’ if this is done on an MFN basis to all other WTO members. The WTO explains: “Although major developed economies, such as Japan, the EC and the United States, have bound rates and applied rates of duty that are very closely aligned, they also have bound rates in some tariff-quota products that have large amounts of ‘water’ in these bound rates: that is, the domestic market is priced well below the level implied by the bound/applied duty. This phenomenon of ‘water’ in the tariff, which indicates that the bound rate provides ‘excess protection’ to the domestic industry, also reduces the economic value of the binding.” WTO, A Handbook on Reading WTO Goods and Services Schedules, p 15: [accessed 1 November 2016]

287 Written evidence from Dr Christos Tsinopoulos (ETG0008)

297 WTO, ‘Agreement on public procurement’, (2016): [accessed 22 November 2016]

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