Chapter 10: Devolution
Introduction
234.The Bill addresses devolution in two main ways. Clause 10 and schedule 2 confer on the devolved administrations power to make regulations which correspond to the powers conferred on UK ministers by clauses 7 to 9. The schedule 2 powers are however “shared” with UK ministers. Clause 11 restricts the powers of devolved institutions in relation to retained EU law, giving determining power to UK ministers and providing for joint decision making in certain situations.
235.The primary concern we have in this process is that the devolution settlements must not be undermined. We welcome the discussions that are currently taking place between the UK government and the devolved administrations to seek consensus on the approach of the Bill to meeting the challenges posed by Brexit.
Clause 10
236.Clause 10 confers powers “involving” devolved authorities rather than directly “on” devolved authorities. The clause, in conjunction with schedule 2, paragraph 1(1), provides devolved executives with powers analogous to those given to UK ministers by clause 7 to deal with deficiencies arising from withdrawal. In general, schedule 2 replicates the main provisions of clauses 7, 8 and 9, empowering devolved institutions to make similar regulations. It also contains specific restrictions, including that no regulations may be made by a devolved authority unless every provision of them is within the competence of the devolved authority. The powers are tailored to each of the devolved territories to reflect differences in competence and institutional structure. Schedule 2, paragraph 1(2) gives a parallel power to UK ministers “acting jointly with a devolved authority”.
237.We heard concerns about the lack of involvement for devolved administrations in the use of the powers in the Bill. The Faculty of Advocates stated, “There is currently no formal role for consultation with, let alone consent from, the devolved authorities to the exercise of powers by UK ministers in otherwise devolved matters.” They argued that “There is an urgent need for some form of mechanism for consultation to be agreed and adopted, and we suggest there is no reason in principle why design of that process should not begin now, even before the Bill is enacted.”173
238.Professor Mullen et. al. argued that “a formal requirement for UK Ministers to seek consent for the use of powers in devolved areas should be sought on grounds of political practice and constitutional principle.” They pointed to section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998, “which requires draft orders [devolving competence] to be approved by both Houses of the UK Parliament and by the Scottish Parliament”, and to the Sewel convention, and commented that these “formal mechanisms for consent, even where (as was the case with the independence referendum) the constitutional stakes are high, can be established in a way that engenders a productive co-operation and dialogue between the centre and the devolved institutions.”174
239.The Government explained how it envisages the parallel power being used:
“It is therefore the devolved institutions themselves who will make the amendments in the majority of cases for areas that fall within their competence. The powers conferred on UK Government ministers by the Bill can also be used to amend domestic laws in devolved areas. This reflects the approach taken, for example, in respect of s2(2) of the ECA which is used for the implementation of EU law. The power has been used in this way, for example, for reasons of efficiency where the same change is being made across all four nations. We have committed that these powers will not normally be used to amend domestic law in areas of devolved competence without the agreement of the relevant devolved administration.”175
240.At report stage in the House of Commons, the Government amended the Bill such that the devolved administrations no longer generally need to receive the “consent” of UK ministers to make regulations using these powers, however they may not proceed until after “consulting” with the UK Government.
Clause 11
241.Clause 11 amends the devolution statutes to restrict competence in relation to retained EU law. At present, under the Scotland Act 1998,176 the Northern Ireland Act 1998177 and the Government of Wales Act 1998 (substantially amended by the Government of Wales Act 2006178), the devolved legislatures cannot make law incompatibly with EU law. Each of these Acts179 is amended by clause 11 so that the restriction concerning EU law is removed, but a new restriction is introduced: an Act of a devolved legislature “cannot modify, or confer power by subordinate legislation to modify, retained EU law.” This restriction does not apply “so far as the modification would, immediately before exit day, have been within the legislative competence” of the legislature in question.
242.The restriction also does not apply so far as Her Majesty may by Order in Council provide. Therefore, where the UK Parliament and the relevant devolved legislature agree, areas of legislative competence can be released to the devolved administrations, permitting them to modify retained EU law.180 The Government explained:
“The purpose of the power is to provide an appropriate mechanism to broaden the parameters of devolved competence in respect of retained EU law. It therefore adopts a similar approach to the established procedure within the devolution legislation for devolving new powers (e.g. s.30 orders in the Scotland Act 1998). Without the power it would be necessary for the UK Parliament to pass primary legislation (having sought Legislative Consent Motions from the relevant devolved legislatures) in order to release areas from the new competence limit.”181
Constitutional implications
243.In our interim report, we noted that “the UK’s departure from the European Union will have profound consequences for the devolution settlement within the UK. The ambiguities and uncertainties in the Bill extend to issues of devolved competence and this has implications for the balance of the power within the Union and the future of the devolution settlements.”182 The Government argued that “The current devolution settlements were agreed after the UK became a member of what is now the EU and reflect that context. As a Member State of the EU we did not need to consider where the powers exercised at EU level would sit within the UK if we were not a member. However, now, as we leave the EU, that is a question we do have to consider.”183
244.We heard arguments that the Bill fails to recognise the constitutional significance and autonomy of the devolved institutions.184 Professor Richard Rawlings, Professor of Public Law, University College London stated:
“when clause 11 is put together with the future trumping by Parliamentary Sovereignty of retained EU law, and more particularly with the central capacities to add to, or otherwise modify, that newly classified body of law, the scale of the potential shift in the constitutional balance as between the three Celtic lands and the UK Government and government of England is made apparent. At one and the same time, Westminster and Whitehall are freed up to shape a post-Brexit world in crucial respects, and the devolved institutions are locked down and required to wait for partial release. However nicely dressed up, this is formal recentralisation of power and exercise of constitutional hierarchy in spades … the dry and technical language cannot disguise the constitutional and political significance of proposals pursued in the name of legal certainty and continuity.”185
245.We also heard arguments that “As powers are ‘released’ piecemeal from Westminster, this would be a move towards a conferred powers model, in contrast to the original reserved powers model.”186 Professor Mullen et. al. went further and argued that clause 11 alters:
“the framework of the devolution settlements by replacing a cross-cutting constraint on devolved competence with what is effectively a new set of reservations. It would also overlay the current reserved powers model of devolution with a conferred powers model in relation to retained EU law. This is not a mere technicality; rather the reserved powers model is a central element of the constitutional strength of the current devolution arrangements.”187
246.However, the Bill minister Robin Walker MP told us:
“The Orders in Council power is modelled on the power in the Scotland Act, which is very clearly a reserved powers model and not a conferred powers model … maintaining that framework first and foremost is the logical conclusion of a Bill designed to provide continuity and certainty, but we are clear that there are mechanisms in the Bill to increase the competence of each of the devolved Administrations through that power … We think that it reflects the existing constitutional arrangements, but we want to provide the maximum reassurance possible.” 188
He added, “there is no question of intruding on that or on the existing competence of the devolved Administrations. It is very important to reflect that the Bill explicitly protects their existing competence.”189
247.This view was not shared by committees of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. The Finance and Constitution Committee of the Scottish Parliament said, “Clause 11 represents a fundamental shift in the structure of devolution in Scotland” and its effect “will be to adversely impact upon the intelligibility and integrity of the devolution settlement in Scotland.”190 The External Affairs and Additional Legislation Committee of the National Assembly for Wales advised removing “the clause 11 restriction on the devolution settlement … [as it] places a new and significant constraint on the devolution settlement and shifts the power dynamic around setting common UK frameworks firmly in the direction of the UK Government.”191
248.While amendments to clause 11 were defeated during committee stage in the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for Scotland said that the Government would table its own amendments to clause 11.192 However, no Government amendments were tabled at report stage and clause 11 remains unchanged.
249.Clauses 10 and 11 create an area of joint responsibility. While the Government has clarified aspects of how joint responsibility will operate, there remains significant uncertainty as to how and when these joint powers will be exercised. We are left only with assurances from the Government that it hopes to identify quickly, in consultation with the devolved administrations, which powers can be transferred to the devolved institutions.
250.Clause 11 has significant potential consequences for the devolution settlements if the transfer of powers and competences from the EU level to the devolved administrations does not take place swiftly and smoothly post-Brexit. We urge the Government to work closely with the devolved authorities to secure agreement on a revised clause 11.
Common frameworks
251.The Government’s principal policy objective, in connection with clauses 10 and 11, is to identify areas which need a common approach across the UK and then to release areas of competence “where it is agreed that a common approach established by EU law does not need to be maintained and can be changed.”193 The Government produced a list of the existing EU competences that interact with the devolved settlements, to inform discussions about common frameworks. It identifies 111 areas for Scotland, 64 for Wales and an estimated 149 for Northern Ireland.194
252.Following a meeting of the Joint Ministerial Committee (EU Negotiations) in October 2017, the Government and the devolved administrations agreed the principles which should govern the establishment of common frameworks. The communique explained:
“As the UK leaves the European Union, the Government of the United Kingdom and the devolved administrations agree to work together to establish common approaches in some areas that are currently governed by EU law, but that are otherwise within areas of competence of the devolved administrations or legislatures. A framework will set out a common UK, or GB, approach and how it will be operated and governed. This may consist of common goals, minimum or maximum standards, harmonisation, limits on action, or mutual recognition, depending on the policy area and the objectives being pursued. Frameworks may be implemented by legislation, by executive action, by memorandums of understanding, or by other means depending on the context in which the framework is intended to operate.”195
253.However, the Faculty of Advocates said:
“the list of areas where the UK government considers that a common policy framework may be required is long, and its content is very broadly drawn. Some of the 111 areas listed are so imprecise as to be incapable of meaningful understanding, for example ‘land use’. If this list is the basis for identifying where proposed legislation of the Scottish Parliament post exit may involve an area that ‘need(s) a common framework’, it threatens to encroach on matters that are already devolved and legislated on by Holyrood under the current settlement. Moreover, the Faculty entertains considerable doubt that identification and release of areas that matter to the Scottish administration could take place ‘rapidly’.”196
254.Professor Tom Mullen et. al. said:
“While there are good arguments in principle for the development of new mechanisms to ensure co-ordination between the UK and devolved levels in order to replicate the unifying force currently exerted by EU law, this does not justify the allocation of all repatriated EU competences to the UK level. It is implausible to suggest that common UK frameworks are required in all areas currently governed by EU law.”197
255.Sir Keir Starmer QC MP told us, “essentially where competence has been devolved, the powers coming back from Brussels ought to go to the devolved Administrations … Rather than holding it, we would devolve it, but we accept that there needs to be a framework for dealing with areas where different considerations apply.”198
256.The Government pointed out that the arrangements are only intended to last until decisions on common approaches are taken: “Where frameworks are not needed, policy areas can be released from the transitional arrangement in the Bill, including through the Order in Council procedure.”199 Robin Walker MP told us “there is an understanding that many of the various lists of the powers … would not require common frameworks.”200
257.However, Professor Rawlings said that:
“this process does not establish positive duties on the part of the UK Government to devolve. Legally-speaking, suggested ‘transitional’ elements could so easily become permanent features. Nor need one be an expert in game theory to appreciate the way in which clause 11 stacks the cards in favour of the centre when negotiating the different design choices with common frameworks.”201
258.The External Affairs and Additional Legislation Committee of the National Assembly for Wales explained that, whilst UK-wide frameworks will be necessary in a number of policy areas, “these should be agreed on a parity of esteem basis between the governments and legislatures of the United Kingdom and not imposed by the UK Government, even on a time-limited basis.”202
259.Professor Anthony suggested that one way of improving clause 11 “might be to replace it with a series of discrete clauses that deal with common frameworks and which are negotiated in advance of ‘exit day’. The primary advantage here would be that such clauses might (at least partly) democratise the Bill from a devolved perspective. The primary challenge with such an approach would be timelines and the need to work within those presently associated with Brexit.”203
260.The agreement of common frameworks is essential to ensure that those areas that are currently governed by EU law return to the UK in a way that both maintains a common UK approach where needed and respects the principles of the territorial constitution. Securing such agreement will also help assuage concerns over the possible ramifications of clause 11 and may help secure legislative consent to the Bill by the devolved legislatures. It is important that all parties to the negotiations have similar incentives and work constructively to reach an agreement on the approach to common frameworks. We urge the UK Government and the devolved administrations to seek swift and tangible progress towards such frameworks in their negotiations.
Inter-governmental relations
261.Effective inter-governmental relations will be crucial in identifying those areas to be released to devolved competence. We have commented in previous reports204 on the need for more effective inter-governmental relations. In our report on Inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom we concluded, “The operation of the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) structure is not well regarded—at least in the eyes of the devolved administrations. The plenary JMC meeting of heads of government is seen as ineffective while its Domestic subcommittee does not appear to serve a useful purpose.”205
262.Unlock Democracy and Client Earth commented on the Joint Ministerial Committee. Both suggested that its current operation was inadequate and that new mechanisms for communication, consultation and power-sharing were required.206 We noted in our Sessional report 2016–17207 that a joint letter from Scottish and Welsh ministers to the UK Government in June 2017 had identified ways to improve the operation of the JMC, such as scheduling regular meetings, agreeing agendas further in advance and ensuring that the devolved administrations could initiate policy proposals.208
263.Robin Walker MP told us:
“The initial agreement on the JMC process, on the principles under which some powers would be agreed for shared frameworks and some released so as to increase the competence of the devolved Administrations in this respect, is really important. That process is running alongside this legislation, but, clearly, progress with that will allow us to provide further reassurance. I said to the Scottish Parliament’s committee on delegated legislation that by taking forward the JMC process and the conversation about where frameworks need to be shared and where they do not, where they need to be legislative and where they do not, we can significantly limit the scope of Clause 11 of the Bill, which I think will answer a lot of the questions and concerns that have been raised.”209
264.Effective inter-governmental relations are essential to achieve a smooth transfer of competences from the EU level to the devolved administrations and to agree new common UK frameworks. We urge the Government and the devolved administrations as a matter of urgency to work cooperatively to improve the operation of the Joint Ministerial Committee as the primary forum for these discussions.
Legislative consent and the Sewel convention
265.The UK Parliament, having regard to the Sewel convention, does not normally legislate within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales or the Northern Ireland Assembly without the consent of the relevant legislature. As we have previously explored in other reports, the limits of the Sewel convention are unclear; in particular, it is not clear to what extent the convention also applies to alterations to the powers of these legislatures themselves.210 The explanatory notes referred to “the practice of the Government to seek the consent of the devolved legislatures for provisions which would alter the competence of those legislatures or of the devolved administrations” and stated that the Government would seek legislative consent for certain provisions in the Bill.211
266.In their initial assessments of the Bill, committees of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales did not recommended granting legislative consent.212 The First Ministers of Scotland and Wales said in a joint statement: “the Scottish and Welsh Governments cannot recommend that legislative consent is given to the Bill as it currently stands.”213
267.A number of witnesses addressed the Sewel convention.214 Professor McMullen noted that the convention applies in ‘normal’ circumstances and said:
“it might be argued that such a step would be justifiable as Brexit constitutes an abnormal situation falling outwith the scope of the Sewel Convention. There is no clear constitutional understanding as to what circumstances are sufficiently abnormal to justify ignoring a refusal of devolved consent as the situation has never arisen before. However, it is at least arguable that, given the seriousness of the constitutional issues at stake, lack of devolved consent should only be overridden in cases of necessity, or … where a devolved legislature is acting in an manner which constitutes an abuse of its power. Clearly, it is not necessary that the EUW Bill be enacted in its current form in order to secure an orderly Brexit; nor can it reasonably be suggested that the devolved legislatures are abusing their powers by withholding consent to the Bill.”215
268.Professor Anthony said that consent could be problematic in relation to Northern Ireland:
“the issue is of course complicated by the absence of a sitting Executive and Assembly, which gives rise to a number of queries. One is whether the consent of the Assembly might in any event be sought, as the Assembly has not been suspended and is, in theory at least, able to reconvene at any moment. Another query concerns what would happen if the Assembly did meet and whether a vote would be carried.”216
269.The UK Supreme Court made clear in Miller v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union that the Sewel convention is not legally enforceable.217 However, as we noted in our interim report, “While the legislative consent of the devolved institutions may not be legally required, as the UK Parliament remains sovereign, the political and constitutional consequences of proceeding with the Bill without consent would be significant and potentially damaging.”218 This view was shared by a number of our witnesses. Professor Paul Craig, University of Oxford, said “if compromise is not reached on this issue then the likely outcome will be legislative override by Westminster to force through changes to the devolution legislation, which the devolved administrations are not willing to accept. The constitutional ramifications of this would be serious; the political consequences unpredictable.”219 Professor Tom Mullen et. al. told us that it would be a “major constitutional step to override a refusal of devolved consent.”220
270.However, for the Government Robin Walker MP said:
“It is absolutely our intention to work with the devolved Administrations. I have referred to the JMC process and the agreement on where there are going to be common frameworks and where there are not. We can and will seek consent through that process and I think we can get it. We are committed to the Sewel convention. We as the Government helped to write it into legislation in the Wales Act 2017 and the Scotland Act 2016.”221
271.The constitutional consequences of proceeding with the Bill without legislative consent from the devolved legislatures would be significant and potentially damaging, both to the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union and to the union of the United Kingdom. It is imperative that the Government brings forward amendments to clause 11 and works through the Joint Ministerial Committee to ensure an agreed approach to the return of competences from Brussels and pan-UK agreement on common frameworks.
Northern Ireland
272.We heard evidence on the implications of the Bill for Northern Ireland. There has not been a functioning devolved Executive and Assembly in Northern Ireland since January 2017.
273.BrexitLawNI said:
“While it may be agreed that powers can eventually be conferred on Northern Ireland … the current position does merit the ‘power-grab’ label it has been given in Scotland and Wales. There are also questions raised about whether the Bill sufficiently recognises current levels of constitutional distinctiveness as well as future issues (for example, around proposed ‘special arrangements’) that may arise under the Withdrawal Agreement. There is still a live debate on the island of Ireland and at EU level on the notion of ‘special status’ or some form of ‘special arrangements’ that reflect the unique circumstances of Northern Ireland. Nothing in this Bill should rule out or prejudge the outcome of those negotiations or those discussions.”222
274.Unlock Democracy told us that the implications of the Bill on the Northern Ireland Act 1998 were significant because the “principle of devolution was central to the Northern Ireland peace agreement.”223 Professor Anthony pointed out that “the House of Lords, in the Robinson judgment, described the Northern Ireland Act, as read with the Belfast agreement, as a constitution.”224
275.Professor Anthony said that references to the European Union appear throughout the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and that these may need to be revised:
“joint membership by the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom of the European Union was an assumed ongoing reality and determined a lot of the logic of the Belfast Agreement. Fluid notions of sovereignty, of citizenship and of national identity—if those are different from citizenship—all those things defined the Belfast Agreement and took place within a framework of EU membership.”225
276.He went on to explain that:
“subject to the terms of any withdrawal agreement, the text of the Belfast Agreement may need to be amended not just in the light of the above inconsistencies but also in the light of whatever is contained in any withdrawal agreement. While it is, again, unclear whether an agreement will be reached, it can be anticipated that, if one is arrived at, particular provision may be made for Northern Ireland. In that circumstance, it may make sense either to amend the wording of the Belfast Agreement or add an addendum on how it is to be read for the purposes of any EU-UK withdrawal accord.”226
277.Professor Anthony questioned whether, if significant changes were required, there might need to be consideration of whether it would need to be endorsed again by referendums in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, as the original agreement had been.227 He explained:
“On one reading, it might be argued that, if the Belfast Agreement is to be amended in the light of Brexit, the matter is one that should be brought back to the electorates for their approval. While this argument perhaps loses some of its force given that some (minor) aspects of the Belfast Agreement have already been changed by subsequent inter-party agreements—most notably at the time of the St Andrews Agreement of 2006—the implications of Brexit are such that they engage not only the Northern Ireland political parties but also two sovereign states. Any changes to the Belfast Agreement that are foundational may therefore require direct democratic legitimation on both sides of the Irish border.”228
278.The Bill minister, Robin Walker MP, did not think “anyone is talking about amending the Belfast agreement.”229 During committee stage in the House of Commons, he confirmed the Government’s support for the principles of the Agreement and said that the Government would work across the House “to ensure that the approach that we take is absolutely in line with the Belfast Agreement”.230
279.The implications of the UK’s departure from the European Union for Northern Ireland, given their complexity and sensitivity, require special and urgent consideration by the Government.
280.We recommend that the Government publish an assessment of the effect of the Bill and the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement before the completion of the Bill’s consideration in the House of Lords.
174 Written evidence from Professor Tom Mullen, University of Glasgow, Dr Chris McCorkindale, University of Strathclyde, and Professor Aileen McHarg, University of Strathclyde (EUW0023)
176 Scotland Act 1998 section 29(2)(d)
178 Government of Wales Act 2006, section 108A
179 In the case of Wales, the 2006 Act.
180 Further ancillary provisions are inserted in the Government of Wales Act 2006 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998 as to how such Orders in Council are to be made.
182 Constitution Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: interim report (3rd Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 19), p 2
187 Written evidence from Professor Tom Mullen, University of Glasgow, Dr Chris McCorkindale, University of Strathclyde, and Professor Aileen McHarg, University of Strathclyde (EUW0023)
189 Ibid.
190 Scottish Parliament Finance and Constitution Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill LCM—Interim Report, 1st Report, 2018 (Session 5), SP Paper 255, 9 January 2018
191 National Assembly for Wales External Affairs and Additional Legislation Committee, Letter from the Chair to Welsh MPs on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, Annex 1: Objectives explained, 10 October 2017: http://www.senedd.assembly.wales/documents/s67198/Annex%201%20-%20Objectives%20Explained.pdf [accessed 24 January 2018]
192 HC Deb, 6 December 2017, cols 1019–21
194 House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Devolution and Exiting the EU and Clause 11 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: Issues for Consideration (First Report, Session 2017–19, HC 484), Appendix 1
195 Joint Ministerial Committee (EU Negotiations) Communique, 16 October 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/progress-made-at-eu-talks-with-devolved-governments--2 [accessed 24 January 2018]
197 Written evidence from Professor Tom Mullen, University of Glasgow, Dr Chris McCorkindale, University of Strathclyde, and Professor Aileen McHarg, University of Strathclyde (EUW0023)
202 National Assembly for Wales External Affairs and Additional Legislation Committee, Letter from the Chair to Welsh MPs on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, Annex 1: Objectives explained, 10 October 2017: http://www.senedd.assembly.wales/documents/s67198/Annex%201%20-%20Objectives%20Explained.pdf [accessed 24 January 2018]
204 Constitution Committee, Inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom (11th Report, Session 2014–15, HL Paper 146); Constitution Committee, The Union and devolution (10th Report, Session 2015–16, HL Paper 149)
205 Constitution Committee, Inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom (11th Report, Session 2014–15, HL Paper 146), summary
207 Constitution Committee, Sessional report 2016–17 (1st Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 6), para 28
208 Letter from Mark Drakeford AM/AC and Michael Russell MSP to David Davis MP, 15 June 2017: https://beta.gov.scot/news/scottish-and-welsh-governments-write-to-brexit-secretary-david-davis/ [accessed 24 January 2018]
210 Constitution Committee, The Scotland Bill (6th Report, Session 2015–16, HL Paper 59), para 38
212 Scottish Parliament Finance and Constitution Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill LCM - Interim Report, 1st Report, 2018 (Session 5), SP Paper 255, 9 January 2018; National Assembly for Wales Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee, The Welsh Government’s Legislative Consent Memorandum on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, December 2017
213 Scottish Government, ‘EU (Withdrawal) Bill’, 13 July 2017: https://beta.gov.scot/news/eu-withdrawal-bill/ [accessed 24 January 2018]
214 See, for example, written evidence from Dr Ludivine Petetin and Dr Annegret Engel, Cardiff University (EUW0013) and Written evidence from Professor Tom Mullen, University of Glasgow, Dr Chris McCorkindale, University of Strathclyde, and Professor Aileen McHarg, University of Strathclyde (EUW0023).
215 Written evidence from Professor Tom Mullen, University of Glasgow, Dr Chris McCorkindale, University of Strathclyde, and Professor Aileen McHarg, University of Strathclyde (EUW0023)
218 Constitution Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: interim report (3rd Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 19), para 76