Summary
Effective biosecurity measures are critical to protecting animal health, plant health and human health. This, in turn, protects our environment, our economy and our food supply chain. Recent history shows the devastating impact that the spread of animal and plant diseases can have. The 2001 foot and mouth disease outbreak in the UK led to more than six million animals being slaughtered and is estimated to have cost over £8 billion. The outbreak of Dutch elm disease that began in the 1960s destroyed millions of elm trees in the UK, and now there are fears that the current outbreak of ash dieback could kill half of the UK’s 120 million ash trees.
Biosecurity measures range from banning the import of animals or plants that are considered to pose a particular risk; inspections at borders, farms and nurseries; imposing quarantines; treating or destroying affected plants and animals; and monitoring emerging disease risks worldwide. The UK currently follows EU legislation on biosecurity, with decisions on implementing biosecurity measures made predominantly at an EU level. The UK also benefits from EU-wide intelligence gathering and disease notification systems, systems for tracing plant and animal movements, and coordinated research efforts. When the UK leaves the EU, it will no longer automatically be part of this framework.
Geographical proximity means that the EU will always be a key source of biosecurity risks to the UK, and so shared intelligence and continuing cooperation post-Brexit will be essential. In summary, we have identified at least seven areas where Brexit could lead to a shortfall in the UK’s biosecurity:
- Access to research funding;
- Enforcement of biosecurity legislation;
- Information sharing;
- Capacity in the veterinary sector;
- Inspections and audits;
- Capacity within Government departments and agencies; and
- The legislative framework.
We urge the UK Government to negotiate continued participation in as many of the EU’s notification and intelligence sharing networks as possible. We note also the significant work that remains to be done to ensure the UK has a replacement legislative framework in place, along with the monitoring, inspection and enforcement mechanisms, staff and IT systems to support it, by the time the UK leaves the EU. It seems doubtful this could all be achieved by March 2019, when it would be needed in the case of a ‘no deal’ Brexit, potentially leaving the UK’s biosecurity compromised.
On the other hand, leaving the EU also offers the UK the opportunity to improve its biosecurity, for example by tailoring lists of restricted species to better reflect the risks posed to the UK, or increasing checks at ports and airports. Such measures, however, are likely to conflict with the Government’s stated intention of continued frictionless trade with the EU. It is likely that the only way the free-flow of goods could be maintained is for the UK to remain aligned with the EU’s biosecurity policy and legislation, even if it can no longer influence it: any deviation in standards or practice would result in the EU insisting on additional checks and paperwork for UK products while any more stringent measures the UK sought to introduce would, by their very nature, restrict the movement of goods across UK-EU borders. The need to facilitate trade post-Brexit must not be allowed to compromise the UK’s biosecurity.