Summary of conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1.Plant and animal diseases, and invasive non-native species, are a constant threat to the UK’s ecology and economy. Ensuring effective biosecurity measures are in place is therefore of great and lasting importance. (Paragraph 5)
2.While operating under a global framework, and with some opportunities for national measures, much of the UK’s biosecurity currently depends upon cooperation with the EU. (Paragraph 12)
Legislation
3.While the Government has stated that all EU biosecurity legislation will be transposed into domestic law using powers under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, the loss of the role of EU institutions enshrined in the legislation will create gaps that need to be filled. UK bodies will need to be given the necessary powers to carry out important biosecurity functions currently undertaken at EU level. We ask the Government to confirm whether the powers conferred on Ministers by Section 8 of the EU (Withdrawal) Act to address “deficiencies dealing with withdrawal” will be sufficient to enable Ministers to set up new agencies, or whether further primary legislation is needed. (Paragraph 23)
4.One biosecurity function that will need to be repatriated is food safety risk management. We call on the Government to provide clarity to the industry and the wider public on how this will be conducted when the UK leaves the EU, and when, if necessary, any legislation will be brought forward. It is important that the principle of keeping food safety decisions at arm’s length from those Ministers who are responsible for dealing with the interests of food producers is maintained. (Paragraph 24)
5.We call on the Government to clarify how the list of Invasive Alien Species of Union concern, which is central to the Invasive Alien Species Regulation, will be updated and administered when the UK leaves the EU. (Paragraph 30)
6.We further recommend that, where bringing across EU biosecurity law through the EU (Withdrawal) Act requires the UK to replicate functions previously performed by EU institutions, the Government should commit to replicating the same level of rigour, transparency and accountability as exists at present. (Paragraph 31)
7.We welcome the commitment made by the Minister that the new EU Plant Health Law will be implemented in the UK, and call for similar clarity in respect of the EU Animal Health Law. (Paragraph 36)
8.As in other policy areas, the EU’s biosecurity legislation includes a range of reporting requirements and checks to ensure Member States are complying with the law. The Commission also has the power to take legal action against countries that are failing to comply, including referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union, which can impose financial penalties. (Paragraph 41)
9.As we concluded in our Brexit: environment and climate change report, as well as bringing EU biosecurity legislation into UK law, the Government must establish independent and effective domestic enforcement mechanisms to take on the role currently filled by the Commission. (Paragraph 42)
UK-EU cooperation
10.Given geographical proximity and the volume of trade and travel between the UK and the EU, continued cooperation is critical to the UK’s future biosecurity. (Paragraph 49)
11.As an EU Member State, the UK currently receives pest and disease notifications that assist in maintaining the UK’s biosecurity. While EU notifications are often made publicly available, relying on this after we leave the EU would mean the UK receiving notifications more slowly than it currently does as a Member State. (Paragraph 57)
12.We urge the Government therefore to seek continued participation in EU disease notification systems. Detailed provision also needs to be made for how the UK could maintain its biosecurity without full access to these systems. With only months to go before the UK leaves the EU, it is concerning that these provisions are not already in place. (Paragraph 58)
13.If the UK is unable to maintain access to the EU’s disease notification systems, it will be able to draw on international sources of information. It is not clear, however, whether these would enable the UK to maintain its current level of biosecurity. (Paragraph 62)
14.The ability to trace the movements of animals and plants (and plant and animal products) is an important component of biosecurity. (Paragraph 66)
15.We note that work has already begun to create a UK replacement for the EU’s TRACES system. Given the crucial role the system plays in minimising the biosecurity risks of trade and managing a disease outbreak when it occurs, it is crucial that the replacement system is ready by the time the UK leaves the EU in March 2019. (Paragraph 67)
16.Given that a stand-alone UK system would not benefit from the EU-wide intelligence contained in TRACES, the Government should also explore the potential to link a UK system to TRACES. (Paragraph 68)
17.We call on the Government to seek continued involvement in the Working Party of Chief Veterinary Officers (and the Working Party of Chief Plant Health Officers), so that both formal and informal biosecurity information sharing can continue. (Paragraph 71)
18.Assessing the risks posed by various biosecurity threats, and then deciding on an appropriate response, are functions currently undertaken predominantly at EU level. Post-Brexit, the UK will no longer be able to rely on the EU’s risk assessment and risk management expertise. We urge the Government to ensure that the relevant UK bodies are adequately resourced, and have the necessary legal powers, to undertake these functions from March 2019. (Paragraph 79)
19.Collaborative work with researchers from across the EU strengthens the UK’s biosecurity knowledge and expertise and can be an effective channel for informal information sharing. (Paragraph 88)
20.We note that the Government’s proposal for the future UK-EU relationship includes continued cooperation on research and participation in EU research funding programmes, and we welcome this inclusion. Given that such an agreement cannot be guaranteed, however, we call on the Government to evaluate the impact on the UK’s biosecurity of any loss of joint EU research funding and to ensure alternative sources of funding are available to mitigate any risks identified. (Paragraph 89)
21.When the UK leaves the EU, UK laboratories will lose EU Reference Laboratory status. They will also lose the funding associated with that status, so it is paramount that the Government ensures UK laboratories are adequately funded to enable them to provide the necessary level of expertise to maintain the UK’s biosecurity, and to support their continued work with other EU and international Reference Laboratories. (Paragraph 95)
22.As Reference Laboratories all have their own disease specialisms, the Government needs to ensure that the international Reference Laboratory network it will be relying on covers the full range of diseases in which the UK has an interest. (Paragraph 96)
23.We note the concerns over the loss of EU funding for environmental, nature conservation and climate action projects, many of which have significant biosecurity components. The Government will need to consider what additional resource is needed to continue the biosecurity activity currently funded by the EU. (Paragraph 99)
Trade and inspections
24.While phytosanitary certificates offer a high degree of biosecurity, they also entail a more rigorous administrative and inspection process than the plant passports currently used for the trade of plants between the UK and EU. Both Government and businesses will need to ensure they have sufficient resource to implement the change in regime at the point the UK leaves the EU. (Paragraph 105)
25.The UK will have to carry out more inspections of products at its borders post-Brexit to ensure it is not exposed to higher biosecurity risks. (Paragraph 113)
26.Doubt has been cast on whether there is sufficient infrastructure to carry out biosecurity inspections on goods arriving from the EU. We call on the Government urgently to clarify its plans for ensuring the necessary facilities will be available to maintain the passage of goods across the UK’s borders. (Paragraph 114)
27.The need for these inspections could, however, be reduced if the Government were to place minimal checks on imports from the EU. We note, however, that the UK Government would at the very least be obliged to comply with WTO rules. In our Brexit: food prices and availability report we urged the Government to publish exactly what customs and border requirements it would put in place on EU food imports in that situation. We repeat that recommendation. (Paragraph 115)
28.A decision to place minimal checks on imports from the EU would need to be accompanied by a mechanism for monitoring the risks of such an approach as UK and EU rules diverge over time. (Paragraph 116)
29.Although Brexit provides an opportunity for the UK to pursue trade deals with countries outside the EU, it is vital that these deals do not compromise the UK’s biosecurity. Any new trade deals must include measures to protect the UK from their biosecurity risks. (Paragraph 121)
30.As an EU Member State, the UK currently relies on EU inspections and audits to ensure biosecurity standards in non-EU countries are being met, reducing the biosecurity risks posed by trade. We anticipate that the Government will need to resource its own audits post-Brexit, but the extent of this obligation will depend on the details of the final trade agreement between the UK and the EU, and on the terms of trade agreements struck with third countries. (Paragraph 125)
Staff
31.In our report Brexit: agriculture, we brought the Government’s attention to the overwhelming reliance of the agricultural sector on EU citizens providing official veterinarian services. These veterinarians also play vital roles throughout the process of maintaining the UK’s biosecurity. We call on the Government to take steps as a matter of urgency to ensure that both the public and private sectors are able to retain or recruit qualified veterinarians to maintain the UK’s biosecurity post-Brexit. (Paragraph 129)
32.We welcome the recent recruitment within Defra to help ensure the Department is prepared to take over responsibility for both delivery and policy formation from the EU. But despite this increase in resources witnesses remained concerned about Defra’s capacity to maintain biosecurity standards post-Brexit. We call on the Department to ensure that enough appropriately-trained staff are dedicated to the issue of biosecurity. (Paragraph 135)
33.The Government must clarify and secure agreement on the division of biosecurity responsibility between central and devolved bodies, in order to enable the devolved administrations to plan effectively and recruit the necessary staff. (Paragraph 136)
34.Without adequate plant and animal health inspectors at the border, it will not be possible to maintain the UK’s biosecurity. We recommend that the Government review the skills required to maintain biosecurity, and publish its findings, and its plans for addressing any gaps, as a matter of urgency. (Paragraph 140)
35.It will be challenging to train newly-recruited biosecurity inspectors to the necessary standard by the date the UK leaves the EU. It is therefore vital that the UK’s post-Brexit immigration system allows EU nationals to continue to play a role in delivering biosecurity services, and we call on the Government to enable this. (Paragraph 142)
A pan-UK framework
36.The existence of an EU biosecurity framework helps to ensure the UK’s biosecurity measures are effective aids in establishing trade agreements to which the UK is party, and makes it easier for companies to move products within the UK without additional bureaucracy. We heard strong support for establishing a similar UK-wide framework post-Brexit. (Paragraph 155)
37.It will be important for all the relevant devolved administrations to play a full role in developing a UK-wide biosecurity framework, and for the result to allow for variations between the UK’s regions—where ecological and geographical differences give rise to different biosecurity vulnerabilities and solutions—without creating internal borders. (Paragraph 156)
38.We urge the Government to reach an arrangement which maintains the treatment of the island of Ireland as a single epidemiological unit. (Paragraph 168)
Improving the UK’s biosecurity
39.Membership of the Single Market required the UK to share a biosecurity regime with the EU. The Government will need to choose between maintaining that alignment for the sake of trade, and taking alternative approaches to strengthen its biosecurity once it is no longer constrained by EU policy. The need to facilitate trade post-Brexit must not be allowed to compromise the UK’s biosecurity. (Paragraph 172)
40.After Brexit it may be possible for the UK to respond more quickly to newly-identified biosecurity threats, rather than waiting for EU institutions and 28 Member States to agree on an appropriate course of action. (Paragraph 175)
41.Depending on the nature of the UK’s post-Brexit relationship with the EU and its agencies, the UK may be able to establish its own lists of restricted species, both removing items on the EU lists that pose no threat to the UK, and adding items where doing so would improve the UK’s biosecurity. This would, however, have implications for the UK’s ability to trade freely with the EU. (Paragraph 179)
42.Regardless of the nature of the UK’s future relationship with the EU, it is vital that alterations to the list of restricted species remain evidence-based. (Paragraph 180)
43.The UK could consider the merits of implementing far stricter biosecurity controls than are currently in place, although this would have implications for trade agreements and appears to be at odds with the Government’s proposal to share a ‘common rulebook’ with the EU. Once the scope of the UK’s ability to adjust its arrangements in the context of its future relationship with the EU has been clarified, we urge the Government to consult on and conduct a scientific assessment of areas where it might be appropriate to impose additional biosecurity restrictions, particularly in relation to the threat posed by invasive species. (Paragraph 186)
44.Brexit provides an opportunity for the Government to consider fundamentally altering its approach to managing biosecurity, moving away from a system based on a list of restricted items, which does not provide optimum protection against unknown risks, and towards a unified biosecurity policy across all sectors. (Paragraph 190)
45.The examples of Australia and New Zealand show that more restrictive regimes can be highly effective at maintaining biosecurity on remote island nations, particularly when legislation is combined with public awareness campaigns. While the UK is not so geographically isolated, and implementing a similar regime would require a substantial increase in biosecurity resourcing, the Government may wish to review the costs and potential benefits of such measures after the UK has left the EU. (Paragraph 194)