48.The impact of Brexit on continued UK participation in Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 will differ significantly, depending on whether the UK leaves the EU under the terms of the November 2018 Withdrawal Agreement (or an amended Withdrawal Agreement), or under a ‘no deal’ scenario.
49.A Withdrawal Agreement was agreed at negotiator level on 14 November 2018 and endorsed by leaders at a special meeting of the European Council (EU-27) on 25 November 2018. If this agreement is ratified, little will change with regard to UK participation in Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 until the end of the programme period, which coincides with the expected end of the transition period on 31 December 2020. Article 137 of the Withdrawal Agreement states:
“The Union programmes and activities committed under the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014–2020 (‘MFF 2014–2020’) or previous financial perspectives shall be implemented in 2019 and 2020 with regard to the United Kingdom on the basis of the applicable Union law.”
50.While participation at the practitioner level would remain much the same during the transition period, Article 138 of the Withdrawal Agreement indicates that the UK’s strategic influence would be diminished, as UK representatives would only attend meetings of committees that assist in the management of EU programmes exceptionally, “upon invitation”, and without voting rights.
51.Any extension to the transition period would not encompass continued participation in the Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 successor programmes: Article 132(2)a of the Withdrawal Agreement confirms the UK would be “considered as a third country for the purposes of the implementation of the Union programmes and activities committed under the [2021–2027 MFF]”.
52.Witnesses generally welcomed the short-term certainty that the Withdrawal Agreement would bring, in terms of the UK’s continued and full participation in Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 until the end of these programmes. Nonetheless, Newcastle University noted: “Due to uncertainties in the immediate future we remain extremely cautious.” With regard to Erasmus+, the Russell Group was concerned that UK students and researchers might not be aware there were no restrictions to UK participation during the transition period, and called on the Government and the Commission to “help communicate this message as clearly and as widely as possible”.
53.Under the terms of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, the Withdrawal Agreement may only be ratified after it has been laid before both Houses of Parliament, debated by the House of Lords on a ‘take note’ motion, and approved by a resolution of the House of Commons. In line with Article 50 TEU, the agreement also requires the consent of the European Parliament and must be adopted by the Council by qualified majority. Failing this—and if no extension to the UK’s EU membership under the terms of Article 50 is sought or agreed—the UK will leave the EU with ‘no deal’, and the EU Treaties will cease to apply to the UK from 29 March 2019.
54.While the Government has confirmed its priority is to secure a negotiated exit under the Withdrawal Agreement, it has taken steps to prepare for the possibility of a ‘no deal’ outcome. In December 2018 the Cabinet agreed to accelerate and intensify these preparations. In addition to bringing forward legislation and committing additional funding, the Government has published more than 100 technical notices to help citizens and businesses prepare for a ‘no deal’ Brexit. The Government has also issued an underwrite guarantee for projects that are successful in securing funding from EU programmes until the end of 2020, which would cover funding for the lifetime of those projects.
55.The Government’s technical notice on Erasmus+ in the UK if there’s no Brexit deal confirms that the underwrite guarantee depends on the Government reaching an agreement with the EU to allow UK organisations to continue to participate in Erasmus+ projects, and to bid for new funding, until 2020. The notice says that the Government is seeking to discuss and agree terms for this with the EU, and that—if these discussions are unsuccessful—the Government intends to “engage with member states and key institutions to seek to ensure UK participants can continue with their planned activity”.
56.For its part, the Commission has attached the following note to the Erasmus+ Programme Guide:
“FOR BRITISH APPLICANTS: Please be aware that eligibility criteria must be complied with for the entire duration of the grant. If the United Kingdom withdraws from the European Union during the grant period without concluding an agreement with the European Union ensuring in particular that British applicants continue to be eligible, you will cease to receive EU funding (while continuing, where possible, to participate) or be required to leave the project on the basis of the relevant provisions of the grant agreement on termination.”
57.Although witnesses to this inquiry welcomed the Government’s efforts to provide reassurance and continuity for Erasmus+ participants, they were extremely concerned about the prospect of a ‘no deal’ Brexit and the fact that the underwrite guarantee would be contingent on reaching a further agreement with the EU. Amatey Doku pointed out that Erasmus had not always been a priority in Brexit talks to date: “If a no deal comes about because negotiations have completely failed … the idea that this will be top of the agenda of things to be sorted out is completely ridiculous.” MillionPlus believed a ‘no deal’ Brexit would cause “inevitable disruption”, which the Government could only seek to mitigate.
58.Universities UK told us that, “to maximise certainty and stability”, the Government needed to provide further information on the practical operation of the underwrite guarantee. The Universities of Surrey and Newcastle agreed that the Erasmus+ UK National Agency should manage the distribution of underwrite funds and highlighted the importance of ensuring there was continuity in the timeframe of grant payments and in reporting systems. The UK in a Changing Europe pointed out that Erasmus grants were staggered over the lifetime of the project:
“The government would need to have a mechanism for establishing how much money has already been given to projects prior to withdrawal and how much (if any) might have to return to the EU, in order to be able to fulfil its commitment to cover any spending gap.”
59.The Erasmus+ UK National Agency confirmed that they had provided the Government with information on projects that would be “in motion” at the point of Brexit, which they estimated at about 2,000 ‘live’ projects with a total value of €278.9 million. Jane Racz also said that the National Agency was “working on the assumption that [they] would be best placed and would support in delivering that guarantee”.
60.The University of Cambridge noted that the success of Erasmus+ funding applications made in February 2019 would not be confirmed until May, after the UK had left the EU, at which point continued participation in Erasmus+ might not be possible if the UK and EU had not reached an agreement on the application of the underwrite guarantee. The University believed there was a “very short timeframe available to have these discussions and finalise arrangements”, as students would need to finalise their mobility plans for the 2019–20 academic year and travel abroad from the early summer.
61.Several witnesses commented on the impact of ongoing uncertainty over the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The University of Nottingham suggested that school age students might be deterred from taking up degree pathways that involved mobility to Europe, from fear of the “many unknowns that a no deal Brexit would deliver”. The British Library told us they were awaiting a decision on an application to extend their Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs exchange programme, and had been informed that activities involving UK partners in the scheme would “cease immediately” under a ‘no deal’ Brexit. John Latham said his organisation had been invited to participate in fewer Erasmus+ projects this year, which he put down to “the uncertainty over Brexit” and people “erring on the side of caution” due to the substantial amounts of money involved in partnership projects. UNA Exchange told us that ongoing uncertainty was causing such anxiety that they anticipated some Erasmus+ participants would finish their placements early and return home in April 2019.
62.Amatey Doku highlighted the potential impact of sudden changes to the immigration status of Erasmus+ participants abroad at the point of a ‘no deal’ Brexit: “We may see a situation where embassies and high commissions in Europe get involved in trying to get people back home and vice versa.” Mr Doku described a ‘no deal’ Brexit as “catastrophic”, and said that the Government’s underwrite guarantee had not sufficed to reassure Erasmus+ applicants and students.
63.The University of Nottingham regarded a transition period as “vital” to give the Government and UK participating organisations time to liaise with Erasmus+ partners in Europe to secure cooperation and to advise on any immigration status changes.
64.The Government’s underwrite guarantee, described above, applies to Horizon 2020 and would cover funding for UK participants in consortia which submit successful bids to Horizon 2020 before the UK leaves the EU for the full duration of the projects. As with Erasmus+, this is subject to the UK reaching an agreement with the EU on the continued eligibility of UK participants.
65.The Government’s technical notice on Horizon 2020 funding if there’s no Brexit deal notes other potential issues with the application of the underwrite guarantee, including in cases where UK participants lead a consortium and distribute funds to other participants, and the implications for consortia which would not comply with EU Member State participation thresholds after the UK becomes a third country. The notice says that the Government is seeking to discuss how to address these issues with the Commission to ensure UK organisations can apply to and participate in Horizon 2020 calls from March 2019, with funding provided through the underwrite guarantee.
66.The technical notice acknowledges that the underwrite guarantee would not cover some major components of Horizon 2020—including European Research Council (ERC) grants, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA), and the SME pillar—as they are not open to third country participation. It confirms the Government is “considering what other measures may be necessary to support UK research and innovation” if UK organisations become ineligible to receive funding from these programmes in the event of ‘no deal’.
67.The Government issued a further update in December 2018, which confirmed that UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) will manage the underwrite guarantee for Horizon 2020 projects. The update invited current UK recipients of Horizon 2020 funding to register their details through a dedicated portal—as data on programme participants is held by the European Commission—and said UKRI would keep them informed about the implementation of underwrite payments.
68.The European Commission has published a note for UK applicants on the Horizon 2020 ‘participant portal’, which confirms:
“If the United Kingdom withdraws from the EU during the grant period without concluding an agreement with the EU ensuring in particular that British applicants continue to be eligible, you will cease to be eligible to receive EU funding (while continuing, where possible, to participate) or be required to leave the project on the basis of Article 50 of the grant agreement.”
69.Professor Andrew Thompson, Executive Chair of the Arts and Humanities Research Council, and representing UKRI, estimated there could be 10,000 UK “live participations” and “a number of in-flight [UK] applications” to Horizon 2020 on 29 March 2019. He set out three potential scenarios for the operation of the Government’s underwrite guarantee:
(a)the Commission would agree to administer the underwrite on the UK’s behalf (in Prof Thompson’s view, the “optimal scenario”);
(b)the Commission would require the UK to administer the underwrite but would provide data on UK Horizon 2020 participants to enable it to do so;
(c)the Commission would not administer the underwrite or provide the UK with relevant data.
Prof Thompson acknowledged it was “challenging” for UKRI to plan for all these scenarios, but thought they were “as on top of it at the moment as you reasonably or realistically could expect us to be”. He reported the Commission had been unwilling to discuss the technicalities of possible ‘no deal’ scenarios with the UK, as it was focused on the Withdrawal Agreement.
70.Newcastle University thought the “least disruptive” way of managing the underwrite guarantee would be for the funding to be channelled through the Commission, which would then be “reimbursed” by the UK. Imperial College London recommended that underwrite funding should be paid in euros and should be subject to the same terms and conditions—and grant disbursal and reporting timetables—set out in the original Horizon 2020 funding calls and individual grant agreements.
71.Notwithstanding the need to secure the EU’s agreement to continued UK eligibility, Universities UK were reassured that the underwrite guarantee would ensure the “vast majority” of Horizon 2020 projects involving UK researchers would not be affected in a ‘no deal’ scenario. Nonetheless, they observed:
“The uncertainty created by the possibility of a no deal Brexit has had a negative impact on the willingness of EU researchers to collaborate with UK counterparts in EU funding calls. This is demonstrated by the drop in funding received by UK researchers through collaborative projects in the ‘Societal Challenges’ pillar of Horizon 2020.”
72.Vivienne Stern, the Director of Universities UK International, told us that the underwrite guarantee had been “good up to a point”, but further detail was now needed about how the “flows of money” would work in practice and on other technical issues like grant audit requirements. Ms Stern also highlighted the issue of the UK becoming ineligible, as a third country, to access ERC and MSCA, which she said accounted for “about 60% of all the funding that the UK wins” from Horizon 2020.
73.The Royal Society put the value of these programmes to the UK at approximately £0.5 billion per annum. They added: “It could take years to develop alternatives, meaning that valuable research could be stopped in its tracks and the UK risks losing valuable people and projects.”
74.Dr Beth Thompson, Head of UK & EU Policy at the Wellcome Trust, said the Government’s underwrite guarantee had not succeeded in “stemming all the uncertainty” surrounding a potential ‘no deal’ scenario. Dr Thompson described anecdotal reports of UK researchers receiving “signals” from EU colleagues that they should not attempt to lead—or even that they should step away entirely from—Horizon 2020 consortia bids.
75.The University of Cambridge told us:
“Despite recent announcements of the Government’s guarantee to underwrite UK participation, EU partners are increasingly concerned about including UK partners in project proposals and are attempting to withhold payments.”
76.Cancer Research UK thought a ‘no deal’ Brexit could cause “significant immediate disruption to the collaborative research environment”, by impeding short-term travel for cross-border working, including conferences, teaching, and shared projects such as clinical trials. They were also concerned by the prospect of EU researchers becoming subject to the UK’s non-EEA immigration system from March 2019 if the UK left the EU without a deal, as they considered the system “expensive for researchers” and “resource-intensive” for employers.
77.The UK in a Changing Europe suggested that collaborative research projects could be disrupted because of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) restrictions on sharing data with third countries. They acknowledged the Government’s indication that it would not impose any restrictions on data-sharing in a ‘no deal’ scenario but warned there was no guarantee the EU would “follow suit”.
78.Dr Thompson drew our attention to the importance of regulatory alignment for cross-border clinical trials:
“At the moment we operate clinical trials under a UK regulation based on an EU directive … Broadly, the rules on clinical trials are harmonised and that makes it reasonably easy to run your trials across multiple sites … the legal status of that is going to be challenging … the UK regulator has put out no-deal guidance, but there is a lot more work to do before the people on the ground doing those trials really understand what is going to happen to them.”
79.Written evidence to this inquiry from the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and the Department for Education (DfE) emphasised that the Government was “determined to support UK science and education in all scenarios”, and that losing international mobility and research opportunities was “in nobody’s interest”.
80.The Departments confirmed that the Withdrawal Agreement would ensure the continued implementation of EU programmes under the current MFF in the UK with no restrictions until the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020. As such, they expected the “normal funding application processes” for Erasmus+ would remain the same during this period. For Horizon 2020, however, they said funding could be restricted “to a certain extent”, if it related to financial instruments decided after the Withdrawal Agreement entered into force—such as InnovFin—or if participation would grant access to “security-related, sensitive information” that was restricted to Member States.
81.Chris Skidmore MP, Minister of State for Universities, Science, Research and Innovation, confirmed that he strongly believed Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 were worthwhile for UK students and the UK’s “world leading” research communities. He stressed that ratifying the Withdrawal Agreement was the Government’s priority and underlined the “absolute importance” of achieving this to ensure the UK’s continued participation in both programmes.
82.Regarding preparations for a ‘no deal’ scenario, the Minister told us he was part of a group of ministers—led by the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union—which met weekly to “discuss arrangements”. He continued: “That is where, working with the Treasury, the nature of the government guarantees and the underwrites will become apparent, if we move into no-deal territory.”
83.The Minister told us that further information on the operation of the underwrite guarantee would be issued if ‘no deal’ became “a reality”. Sarah Redwood, Deputy Director for European Programmes (International Science and Innovation) at BEIS, confirmed:
“We are trying to keep the terms and conditions [of underwrite funding] as aligned as possible with the EU to make it as simple as possible for the beneficiaries so that the transition is as smooth as possible.”
Shahid Omer, Deputy Director for International Higher Education and EU Exit at the DfE, said the Government was ready to provide advice to Erasmus+ participants planning exchanges after exit day, but did not want people to “disrupt their plans now because the world might change in a couple of weeks”.
84.The Minister was keen to emphasise the Government’s underwrite guarantee was “for the duration of the projects”, and said he was determined to provide UK participants with certainty and the “confidence to continue”. He confirmed, however, that the underwrite guarantee did not extend to programmes not open to third countries—including the ERC and MSCA—and said he was “keen to work with the scientific community” on possible alternative funding streams.
85.On the need to reach an agreement with the EU on the continued eligibility of UK organisations to participate in Horizon 2020 and Erasmus+ in a ‘no deal’ scenario—with funding provided by the Government’s underwrite guarantee—the Minister explained that the Commission would “not actively engage in any negotiations” on this until the House of Commons had voted on the Withdrawal Agreement and it had “certainty about the UK’s position”. The Minister confirmed that he had contacted the relevant Commissioners to try to ensure a framework was in place for officials to begin work as soon as there was certainty “on the processes of what might take place”. He also expressed the hope, with regard to Erasmus+, that the fact the UK contributed “about £1.8 billion” to the programme, and got “maybe £1 billion-worth of placements back”, would lead to a “special willingness” on the part of the Commission to ensure the UK retained access to the programme after 29 March 2019.
86.When asked about the possibility of securing rapid agreement on UK association or interim arrangements to preserve access to Horizon 2020 and Erasmus+ in a ‘no deal’ scenario, the Minister explained that the UK would not be able to begin discussions on association while it was still a Member State. He also noted the lack of time available to negotiate such arrangements, which he said could “take a matter of months, if not between nine months and a year”.
87.Sarah Redwood acknowledged the importance of regulatory alignment in facilitating international research collaboration. She noted the UK was already aligned with the EU on data protection, thanks to the Data Protection Act 2018, and said the UK and the EU were “ready to work quickly to sustain the flows of data that are really important”. The Government was also “committed to being aligned as much as possible with the new EU clinical trials regulation”, when that was implemented. On chemical registration, she confirmed the UK and the EU had agreed they would “explore the possibility of co-operation between the UK authorities and the relevant authorities in the EU to ensure alignment as much as possible”.
88.The Withdrawal Agreement would ensure that UK participation in Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 could continue largely unchanged but only until the end of the current Multiannual Financial Framework period, at the end of 2020. We note that uncertainty about whether this Agreement will be ratified is a matter of concern to current and potential UK participants in these programmes.
89.The Government has guaranteed to underwrite funding for successful UK bids to EU programmes until the end of 2020, if the UK leaves the EU without a deal. However, the Government still needs to agree terms with the EU for UK organisations to continue to participate in Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 projects as third country entities.
90.We note the European Commission’s current unwillingness to engage in discussions on possible actions to protect people on Erasmus+ exchanges and Horizon 2020 projects in the event of a ‘no deal’ Brexit, but urge the Government to continue its efforts to reach a resolution with the Commission to avoid disruption. We remain extremely concerned about the lack of time available to negotiate and confirm these ‘no deal’ contingency plans. If a resolution cannot be agreed, the Government should use funds set aside for the underwrite guarantee to establish replacement UK mobility and research funding schemes as quickly as possible.
91.The Government should, as a matter of urgency, provide further information on how it intends the underwrite guarantee to operate in practice, including who will disburse the funding and what terms and conditions will apply to beneficiaries. We recommend that schedules for releasing payments and monitoring and reporting systems should be as similar to those set out in the original grant agreements as possible, to provide certainty and minimise disruption for UK participants transitioning to the new system.
92.Of particular concern to the UK’s research community is the loss of access to key sources of UK Horizon 2020 funding, including the European Research Council and Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, which are not open to third country participation and so are not covered by the underwrite guarantee. We note that the Government is keenly aware of this issue and emphasise the importance of confirming replacements for these funding streams as soon as possible.
93.We welcome indications that the UK and EU are willing to work together on the free flow of data and regulatory alignment with regard to clinical trials and chemical registration. This will be essential to facilitate continued international research collaboration.
56 Department for Exiting the European Union, Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration (25 November 2018): [accessed 4 January 2019]
57 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community as endorsed by leaders at a special meeting of the European Council on 25 November 2018 (25 November 2018) p 217: [accessed 4 January 2019]
58 Ibid., p 220
59 Ibid., p 207
60 See for example written evidence from the University of Edinburgh (), Academy of Social Sciences and Campaign for Social Science (), Universities UK (), Department of Business Energy and Industrial Strategy and the Department for Education (), Russell Group ().
61 Written evidence from Newcastle University ()
62 Written evidence from the Russell Group ()
63 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018,
64 Treaty on European Union, (consolidated version of 26 October 2012). On 25 November 2018, the European Council endorsed the Withdrawal Agreement and invited the EU’s institutions (Commission, Council and European Parliament) to take the necessary steps to ensure that the Agreement is ready to come into effect on 30 March 2019. To that end, on 5 December 2018, the Commission agreed two proposed Council Decisions providing for the EU’s signature and conclusion of the Agreement which must now be agreed by the Council.
65 House of Commons Library, What if there’s no Brexit deal?, Briefing Paper , December 2018
66 Department for Exiting the European Union, UK government’s preparations for a ‘no deal’ scenario, (updated 21 December 2018): [accessed 4 January 2019]
67 Department for Education, Erasmus+ in the UK if there’s no Brexit deal (23 August 2018): [accessed 3 January 2019]. The notice also clarifies that, with regard to Erasmus+, the underwrite guarantee applies to funding for both centralised and decentralised actions, and whether or not the UK is the lead partner.
68 European Commission, ‘Erasmus+ Programme Guide: Eligible countries’: [accessed 3 January 2019]. On 30 January 2019, as this report was being agreed, the European Commission published proposed ‘no deal’ contingency measures relating to Erasmus+. This proposal establishes that in, a ‘no deal’ scenario, all mobility activities under the current Erasmus+ programme that started before 30 March 2019 will be funded until they are completed (for a maximum of up to 12 months). This will include UK participants engaged in mobility activities in the EU countries and vice-versa. This legislation will need to be approved and adopted by the European Parliament and the Council before 30 March 2019 to avoid any disruption to Erasmus+ placements in the event of a ‘no deal’ Brexit. Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down provisions for the continuation of ongoing learning mobility activities under the Erasmus+ programme in the context of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (“United Kingdom”) from the European Union,
69 See for example written evidence from the Association of UK Higher Education European Officers (HEURO) (), the University of Surrey (), Newcastle University (), and The Royal Society of Edinburgh ().
70 (Amatey Doku)
71 Written evidence from MillionPlus ()
72 Written evidence from Universities UK ()
73 Written evidence from the University of Surrey () and Newcastle University ()
74 Written evidence from the UK in a Changing Europe ()
75 (Madeleine Rose). See also supplementary written evidence from the Erasmus+ UK National Agency ().
76 (Jane Racz)
77 Written evidence from the University of Cambridge ()
78 Written evidence from the University of Nottingham ()
79 Written evidence from the British Library ()
80 (John Latham)
81 Written evidence from UNA Exchange ()
82 (Amatey Doku)
83 Written evidence from the University of Nottingham ()
84 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy,’ Horizon 2020 funding if there’s no Brexit deal’ (August 2018): [accessed 9 January 2019]
87 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, UK participation in Horizon 2020: UK government overview (December 2018) p 10: [accessed 9 January 2019]
88 European Commission Participant Portal H2020 Online Manual, ‘Find partners or apply as individual’: [accessed 14 December 2018]
89 Project “participations” refers to the number of times UK entities are involved in Horizon 2020 projects, rather than the number of individuals working on those projects. There are therefore no exact figures for the number of individuals that will be involved in UK Horizon 2020 projects on 29 March 2019. Supplementary written evidence from Chris Skidmore MP ()
90 (Prof Thompson)
91 Written evidence from Newcastle University ()
92 Written evidence from Imperial College London ()
93 Written evidence from Universities UK ()
94 (Vivienne Stern). We note that the Government’s figures indicate ERC and MSCA grants account for approximately 44% of total UK receipts from Horizon 2020 to date. Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, ‘UK participation in horizon 2020: September 2018’ (November 2018): [accessed 24 January 2019].
95 Written evidence from The Royal Society ()
96 (Dr Thompson)
97 Written evidence from the University of Cambridge ()
98 Written evidence from Cancer Research UK ()
99 Written evidence from The UK in a Changing Europe (). See also European Union Committee, (3rd Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 7).
100 (Dr Thompson)
101 Written evidence from the Department of Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy and the Department for Education (BEIS/DfE) ()
102 Written evidence from BEIS/DfE (). InnovFin—or EU Finance for Innovators—is a joint initiative launched by the European Investment Bank and the European Commission under Horizon 2020 to facilitate and accelerate access to finance for innovative businesses and other innovative entities in Europe. European Investment Bank, ‘InnovFin: EU Finance for innovators’: [accessed 11 January 2019]
103 (Chris Skidmore MP)
104 (Chris Skidmore MP)
105 (Chris Skidmore MP)
106 (Sarah Redwood)
107 (Shahid Omer)
108 (Chris Skidmore MP)
109 (Chris Skidmore MP)
110 (Chris Skidmore MP)
111 (Chris Skidmore MP)
112 (Sarah Redwood)