Brexit: refugee protection and asylum policy Contents

Chapter 3: Brexit implications


62.An agreement on the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU was reached at negotiator level in November 2018, and endorsed by leaders at a special meeting of the European Council (EU-27) later that month.58 At the time of writing, the Withdrawal Agreement had been rejected by the House of Commons on three separate occasions but remained the only negotiated Brexit ‘deal’ on the table.

63.In March 2019, the then Immigration Minister, Caroline Nokes MP, told us that the Government’s aim was to secure the Withdrawal Agreement, under which the UK would remain part of the Dublin System during the transition period. This would provide the necessary time to negotiate an agreement on future UK-EU asylum and migration cooperation. The UK’s ultimate intention, however, would be to leave the CEAS, including Dublin, and explore a new framework for cooperation on the basis set out in the July 2018 White Paper on the future UK-EU relationship.59

64.In this Chapter, we consider the implications of leaving the CEAS, how Brexit might affect bilateral cooperation between the UK and individual EU Member States on immigration and asylum, and the particular implications of a ‘no deal’ Brexit scenario.

Leaving the CEAS

Dublin and Eurodac

65.ECRU and Liverpool Law Clinic told us that low numbers of transfers took place through the Dublin System, suggesting that the “classic rationale” for it—as a “corrective mechanism” against asylum seekers moving from the country in which they first arrived to seek protection elsewhere (‘secondary movement’)—was “not numerically significant for most Member States”.60

Table 4: Dublin transfers to and from the UK 2008–2018


Transfers in

Transfers out














































Source: Written evidence from Professor Bernard Ryan & Alan Desmond (AIP0006) Figures are based on Eurostat data for 2008–2017 and Home Office, Immigration Statistics for 2018. The published data for 2011 are incomplete.

Nonetheless, the University noted there were other motivations for continued participation in the Dublin System:

“Most significant among these, according to academic analyses, seems to be that Member States value the control that the Dublin system gives them over applicants for and beneficiaries of international protection … Analyses also point to the political benefit that Member States perceive that they derive from this performance of control before their domestic electorates.”61

66.Dr Natascha Zaun, Assistant Professor in Migration Studies at the European Institute, London School of Economics, suggested that the idea that Dublin acted as a deterrent to secondary movement was another motivating factor for countries like the UK, as its geographic location—and non-membership of Schengen—made it difficult for asylum seekers to reach without earlier being apprehended and fingerprinted in another Member State. Dr Zaun acknowledged, however, that this effect was hard to measure, as you could not know “who never came to the UK, or was deterred from coming here, because of Dublin”.62

67.On returns, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (ILPA) pointed out that losing access to Eurodac after Brexit would make it difficult to identify whether someone had already made an asylum application in another country before reaching the UK . Even if the UK discovered that an application had been made in an EU Member State, ILPA were not clear how the UK would negotiate the removal of the asylum seeker to that country in the absence of the Dublin System.63

68.Eleanor Harrison, Chief Executive of Safe Passage, was concerned that refugee children in particular would be at greater risk of being left in “extremely vulnerable situations” without the procedural safeguards the Dublin System provided on time limits, and the types of evidence and re-examination processes used in transfer cases.64

69.Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor conceded that the Dublin System had not operated as it should, but argued: “Generally speaking, even a nominal framework that does not deliver at its best is better than none. You need it because it provides a basis for further discussion and arrangements.”65

Family reunion

70.Witnesses agreed that the most significant implication of leaving the Dublin System would be for refugee family reunion. Judith Dennis told us: “There have been very positive steps towards the family unification elements of Dublin that we would be very sorry to see go.”66

71.The British Red Cross said that the UK had recently changed from a net ‘sender’ to a net ‘receiver’ of asylum seekers under the Dublin System (see Table 4). Family reunion was the “key driver” behind this change, accounting for over 80% of incoming transfers in 2018.67 The Refugee Council thought that this indicated Dublin was now “working more to prioritise the wellbeing and needs of people seeking asylum, over policy demands to increase removals”.68

72.Safe Passage pointed out that children had greater family reunion rights under Dublin III than under UK Immigration Rules.69 As we have noted, the UK’s domestic rules cover only children and their parents, while the Dublin System allows children to be reunited with other relatives including adult siblings, grandparents, aunts, and uncles (see paragraph 40).70

73.SOS Children’s Villages UK told us:

“[Our] experience tells us that all children need stable, resilient relationships in order to thrive, and that these are best developed in a caring family environment. Children who have been separated from their families are some of the most vulnerable, having lost the people primarily responsible for making decisions on their behalf, guaranteeing their safety and supporting their development to adulthood. Yet under the current rules, and if the Dublin routes are no longer available, unaccompanied children in the UK will be expected to integrate and succeed with no familial support—causing significant emotional trauma and challenges for their successful transition to adulthood. This is certainly not in the best interest of the child.”71

Standards and procedures

74.As the UK only participates in the first iterations of the CEAS Directives on reception conditions, qualification for international protection, and asylum procedures, Brexit will only affect asylum standards and procedures in the UK insofar as they relate to these instruments. Consequently, several witnesses questioned the extent to which withdrawal from these Directives would affect standards in the UK.72

75.Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor saw no reason why the UK’s “very long and proud tradition of offering sanctuary” should change as a result of Brexit, noting that the UK had played a leading role in the development of the Refugee Convention and supported the UN Global Compact on Refugees agreed in December 2018.73 Prof Guild pointed out that the standards of the EU Directives would only fall away where they did not express standards already established in international law—including the Refugee Convention, CAT, and ECHR—and said there was no indication the UK intended to denounce these treaties.74

76.On international law, Prof Ryan and Alan Desmond commented:

“This means, for example, that the refugee definition in the Refugee Convention would continue to apply to the UK. Similarly, key protections set out in the Refugee Convention such as non-refoulement and non-penalisation for illegal entry or stay in a country would continue to bind the UK. The European Court of Human Rights in its supervision of the ECHR has also articulated a number of important rights for asylum-seekers which will continue to apply to the UK at the international level.”

They cautioned, however, that these instruments did not provide “the same level of detail and clarity concerning the standards of protection for asylum seekers and refugees” as the CEAS.75 ILPA agreed, noting as an example that there was no provision in the ECHR regarding the right of asylum seekers to remain in the country where they have applied for asylum until their claim has been decided. This right is guaranteed under the 2005 Asylum Procedures Directive and 2003 Reception Conditions Directive.76

77.Refugee Rights Europe was concerned that Brexit “may lead to a weakening of protections afforded to refugees and asylum seekers” in the UK,77 while Judith Dennis observed:

“[The] thing to fear when there is no framework of standards to adhere to is retrograde steps. A lot of what we do as NGOs in this country working on asylum is trying to stop the proposals that we think will take us backwards on standards. Obviously if you are not part of a framework of standards, that is a risk.”78

Other measures


78.Both the British Red Cross and the Refugee Council were concerned about losing access to the EU’s Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), which was established in April 2014 to cover the period 2014–20. They noted that the UK had been the largest recipient of AMIF funding, and was allocated €370 million to spend on national priorities such as improving Home Office processes and the returns programme, and in support of refugee resettlement programmes and integration measures. On the impact of losing AMIF, Judith Dennis told us: “Both in the Home Office and in programmes it has funded, it certainly would not be insignificant.” Jon Featonby, Policy and Advocacy Manager at the British Red Cross, noted continued uncertainty over whether the Government would replace the AMIF at the national level and, if so, what the priorities of this fund would be.79

Box 3: Examples of UK activities funded by the AMIF

New Roots

A partnership project between the Refugee Council, Refugee Education Training Advice Service, Humber Community Advice Services, Path Yorkshire and the Goodwin Trust to roll out a model of integration for refugees in London, Leeds, and Hull. The project aims to engage with more than 3,500 refugees over two years, providing a range of support to improve the integration of people with multiple and complex needs including:

  • Specialist casework
  • Social integration, language and wellbeing activities
  • Training, volunteering and employment opportunities


A two-year partnership project between the Red Cross Societies in the UK, Ireland, Italy, and Latvia to build on the experiences of refugees and asylum seekers and increase their participation and representation in their new local communities. In the UK, AVAIL aims to empower refugees to develop connections with local people by recognising their untapped skills, including projects where refugees and asylum seekers:

  • teach their languages and skills to host communities;
  • are supported to bring about changes in policy and practices through advocacy and media work;
  • co-deliver sessions for new arrivals on the realities of life in their new community on the basis of their first-hand, lived experience.

Source: Q 8 (Judith Dennis), RETAS, ‘What is New Roots?’: [accessed 6 August 2019], and Red Cross EU Office, ‘Promoting integration and diversity across Europe’: [accessed 6 August 2019]

Readmission agreements

79.Prof Ryan and Alan Desmond noted that the EU had concluded a number of Readmissions Agreements with third countries to facilitate the return of non-EU nationals who did not have the legal right to stay in the EU, including rejected asylum seekers. It did not appear “legally possible” for the UK to rely upon these agreements after Brexit, and so the UK would need to negotiate new agreements with countries it wished to continue cooperating with on returns.80

‘No deal’

80.In the context of a ‘no deal’ Brexit scenario, witnesses’ key concern was the potential impact on the reunion of separated refugee families. Dr Zaun warned that the UK’s sudden departure from the Dublin System with no replacement framework for family reunion could leave families in “legal limbo”.81 Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor was concerned about disruption while new arrangements were negotiated:

“Think about having to support yourself and maybe your children when there is no system … It takes months and months even for an application for family reunion, which, by the way, you are entitled to, and you are stuck in some kind of legal twilight zone. You have to survive somehow. Most people have already depleted their resources, to the extent that they had any, on the journey. That creates by and of itself a major risk in ensuring their survival and that of their family. The risks come from the gaps in the system.”82

81.Refugee Rights Europe thought that a ‘no deal’ Brexit would leave a specific gap in provision for unaccompanied minors seeking to reunite with family in the UK, which could “lead to more vulnerable children taking increasingly desperate and dangerous journeys in order to reach the UK”.83 As Lord Dubs explained, the Dubs scheme would not be a legal path for these children, as it is “primarily intended for children with no family [in the UK]”.84


82.The British Red Cross told us that the Government had introduced the Immigration, Nationality and Asylum (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 to mitigate the impact of an abrupt exit from the CEAS. However, this only committed the UK to continue considering “cases already in the Dublin System”, where a take charge request had been received or sent prior to exit day. They therefore believed that a substantial number of people seeking family reunion could still be affected, thanks to the significant delays in accessing asylum systems in some EU countries. Those affected could include those who had made an initial asylum application, but were waiting for a take charge request to be processed at the point of a ‘no deal’ Brexit.85

83.Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor suggested a temporary extension of current arrangements for UK-EU asylum cooperation “to make space for renegotiation”. Dr Zaun believed this would be “the most feasible option” as it was “already there, so you could draw on it and extend it”. Dr Zaun said the UK and EU had “shared interests” in continuing asylum cooperation: “Both sides would have to be open to compromise, but their preferences are not so divergent on this as perhaps in other areas.”86

84.On the other hand, Jan Bayart, Deputy Head of Mission at the Belgian Embassy in the UK, warned:

“In a no deal Brexit … it might be erroneous to assume that the EU would then engage in negotiations on co-operation in various matters, simply forgetting about the issues addressed in the withdrawal treaty—contentious or not.”87

85.Eleanor Harrison told us: “One of my critical concerns is that, in other people’s priorities in negotiations in the event of no deal, asylum is not at the top of the list.”88

Bilateral cooperation

Juxtaposed border controls

86.The UK has particularly close bilateral relations on border cooperation with France and, to a lesser extent, Belgium. The key feature of this relationship is the operation of juxtaposed border controls, whereby the UK completes checks on passengers and freight bound for the UK at the ports in Calais and Dunkirk, the Eurotunnel terminal in Coquelles for vehicles, and in Paris Gare du Nord, Lille, Calais-Frethun and Brussels Midi stations for Eurostar passengers. French border officials also complete Schengen Area entry checks in the UK.89 The principal bilateral and tripartite agreements which underpin these arrangements are outlined in Box 4.

Box 4: Juxtaposed controls

Juxtaposed controls began in 1994, when the Sangatte Protocol to the 1986 Treaty of Canterbury between the UK and France established the application of all categories of border control to people travelling through the Channel Tunnel. In May 2000, a second agreement between the UK and France authorised pre-boarding immigration controls at Eurostar stations. In 2003 the UK and France concluded the Le Touquet Treaty, which provided for immigration controls to be conducted by the country of arrival at designated control zones in the country of departure at both French and UK sea ports, including Calais, Dunkirk and Dover. A 2004 tripartite agreement between the UK, France, and Belgium introduced pre-boarding immigration controls on departures from the Brussels Eurostar station.

Source: Bernard Ryan and Valsamis Mitsilegas, Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Legal Challenges, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) p 16

87.While these agreements are not EU-related, their continued operation has come under scrutiny in the context of Brexit. Following the 2016 referendum, there were increased calls in France to scrap Le Touquet and bring juxtaposed border arrangements to an end—including from the then French Presidential candidates Alain Juppé and Emmanuel Macron, and from the Mayor of Calais.90

88.Prof Guild explained:

“One of the outcomes of the [Le Touquet] agreement is the build-up of pressure in the Calais region of people who seek to come to the UK but who do not fulfil immigration requirements and are unable to seek asylum in the UK from France. However, the continuous establishment of unregulated camp sites for people in this position is an irritant in French politics.”

Prof Guild argued that the issue of juxtaposed border controls was “more pertinent” than any implications of leaving the CEAS in the context of Brexit, as the UK depended on the good will of French authorities to keep migrants (mainly potential asylum seekers) out of the UK.91

89.Refugee Rights Europe suggested that the UK had not fulfilled its responsibility to “meaningfully address the precarious and untenable bottle-neck scenario”, which had been “unfolding in northern France for decades”. They noted that this situation had recently spread, with asylum seekers gathering in other European cities such as Brussels and Paris in the hope of travelling to the UK.92

The Sandhurst Treaty

90.Several witnesses reflected on the recent UK-France agreement to address migrant camps and reinforce their commitment to Le Touquet at the January 2018 Sandhurst Summit. This agreement contained new declarations on security cooperation and a treaty concerning coordinated management of the shared UK-French border (underpinned by an additional commitment of €50 million from the UK).93

91.Dr Beirens believed that the adoption of the Sandhurst Treaty was “really important”, and indicated that there was a “willingness to cooperate”, in order to achieve “deeper integration” and to balance “the interests of the UK and some of the concerns on the part of France”.94

92.Prof Ryan and Alan Desmond explained that the Sandhurst Treaty had made provision for the “speedy resolution of Dublin applications made in France for individuals to join family members in the UK”.95 On the success of these measures, Jon Featonby said:

“We have certainly seen a change since the Sandhurst Treaty came in, in that we have successfully been able to work quite closely with the Home Office on a number of cases of separated children that might previously have been refused through the Dublin mechanism.”96

93.On the other hand, the Refugee Council told us that the Treaty’s commitment to decrease waiting times for family reunification from six months to 30 days for adults and 25 days for children had not “carried over to full changes on the ground”. They also criticised the focus on border security over the “wellbeing and access to rights of people seeking asylum”.97

94.Refugee Rights Europe noted that £3.6 million of the UK’s overall financial commitment had been allocated to a ‘Dublin development fund’ for joint projects to improve the efficiency of the Dublin process between the UK and France. They called for 10% of this funding to be allocated to support unaccompanied minors in the border area, and for 10% of the total Sandhurst funding commitment to be ring-fenced for humanitarian purposes, including:

The 2019 joint action plan

95.Prof Ryan and Alan Desmond highlighted another recent agreement on UK-France cooperation, the January 2019 joint action plan.99 This plan aims to build on the Sandhurst Treaty to tackle the trend of asylum seekers and other migrants attempting to reach the UK by crossing the Channel in small boats. It provides that:

96.Prof Ryan and Alan Desmond welcomed the joint action plan’s affirmation of international and EU law in relation to the rescue and potential return of migrants to France or elsewhere.101 Refugee Rights Europe, however, felt that the plan alluded to the “interception and blanket return of asylum seekers”, which they found “deeply concerning”. They argued that the UK was obliged by international law to “allow asylum applicants to have their asylum claims assessed on an individual basis”. Returning people to France failed to take into account the living conditions of refugees and displaced people in northern France, and “the wider context of overstretched asylum systems elsewhere in Europe”.102

Brexit implications

97.There was a general concern among witnesses about the implications of Brexit for bilateral cooperation. Prof Guild, for example, told us:

“The Le Touquet agreement is undoubtedly facilitated by the fact that it is an agreement among friends—and friends who are tied in the legal framework of the European Union. With this kind of agreement, beyond or without that framework, it may be much more difficult to sustain the necessary good will.”103

98.Prof Guild emphasised the lack of support for juxtaposed border controls in the Calais region, suggesting they could, “on the turn of a pin, become a state sovereignty issue” in France. If this was the case, the UK would have “a very difficult time maintaining [Le Touquet]”. Prof Guild also highlighted the risk that intensified customs controls after Brexit could cause delays and queues of vehicles waiting to cross the Channel, possibly creating a “pull factor” for migrants to try and break into these vehicles to try and reach the UK. This would “increase the political pressure on the French Government in respect of [Le Touquet]”.104

99.Judith Dennis feared that efforts to speed up family reunification under the Sandhurst agreement would be put at risk by Brexit, as the Treaty was based on expediting Dublin transfers. As a result, the UK and France would need “a separate mechanism … to enable the bringing together of families as they do currently”.105

100.Jon Featonby said the close cooperation between the British and French Red Cross Societies on family reunification depended upon the existence of national agreements between the French and UK Governments. It was hard to predict what UK-France cooperation might look like after Brexit, but there was “certainly a danger that if that cooperation [was] not there, the impact that could have on people would be quite worrying”.106

‘No deal’

101.Dr Zaun observed that, if good will between the UK and the EU was damaged in a ‘no deal’ scenario, Member States might be less likely to “keep asylum seekers in their territories and not just wave them through” after Brexit.107 Prof Guild, however, noted that action by some Member States to move asylum seekers through their territories during the 2015 refugee crisis had been “much denounced” in the EU. She added: “The pressure to engage in these dubious practices is infinitely smaller now, because there has been an exponential increase in reception conditions across the EU.”108

102.Dr Beirens did not think that new legal arrangements would necessarily be needed to maintain bilateral cooperation on family reunion in a ‘no deal’ scenario, as long as there was the willingness to send and receive people.

103.On the other hand, Alice Lucas, Advocacy and Policy Manager at Refugee Rights Europe, suggested that a new bilateral arrangement with France would be a priority.109 Lord Dubs agreed:

“All the evidence is that we should work towards some form of bilateral agreement if we crash out without a deal, because otherwise [transfers] will not work. I hope the British Government are extending a hand of cooperation to the French on this—even now, before we have finalised our [Brexit] arrangements.”110

104.We put the possibility of new bilateral arrangements to Jan Bayart, who said that Belgium highly valued its relationship with the UK, but warned that there was “no official Belgian Government position on what would or would not be possible on a bilateral basis in the case of a no deal Brexit”. He stressed that any such arrangements could not extend to the EU security tools and measures, which had “proven to be such a cost-efficient way of cooperating in these matters”, concluding:

“So in our view, even in the case of a bilateral agreement, the result would be less desirable than it was before Brexit, or in the case of an orderly Brexit that would open the perspective on an EU-UK co-operation agreement with regard to these EU instruments.”111

105.The implications of Brexit and future options for UK involvement in EU security measures are discussed in detail in our reports on Brexit: future UK-EU security and police cooperation and Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty.112


Leaving the CEAS

106.The November 2018 Withdrawal Agreement has been rejected three times by the House of Commons. Nonetheless, it remains the only negotiated Brexit deal on the table. If approved, the Withdrawal Agreement would ensure UK participation in the Dublin System could continue until the end of the transition period, giving the UK and the EU time to negotiate new arrangements for asylum cooperation.

107.The Government has indicated its intention to establish a new strategic relationship on asylum and migration with the EU—replicating some of the key principles of Dublin—rather than seeking some form of continued participation in the CEAS after Brexit.

108.The most significant implication of leaving the CEAS would be the loss of a safe, legal route for the reunification of separated refugee families in Europe. This aspect of the Dublin System has seen improvements in recent years, and family reunion cases now make up more than 80% of incoming Dublin transfers to the UK. We are particularly concerned about a potential reduction in the reunion rights of vulnerable unaccompanied children, who are able to be reunited with a broader range of family members under the Dublin System than under UK Immigration Rules.

109.Other benefits of the Dublin System include procedural safeguards, such as time limits, and increased control over asylum applications, including the ability to identify and return applicants who have already been registered in another European country. This is of clear interest to countries like the UK who seek to enforce the principle that those in need of protection should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach.

110.Asylum standards in the UK will only be affected by Brexit insofar as they relate to the first phase of CEAS Directives. We note concerns about the loss of procedural protections set out in these Directives, and the possibility of “retrograde steps” without the overarching EU framework of standards. Nonetheless, we are reassured that the continued application of international law—including the Refugee Convention and ECHR—should ensure there is no diminution in the treatment and protection of asylum seekers in the UK.

111.We call on the Government to offer public reassurances that it has no intention of curtailing the rights and protections afforded to refugees in the UK after Brexit. As part of these efforts, the Government should confirm arrangements to replace the EU Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, which supports vital refugee resettlement and integration projects in the UK.

112.In a ‘no deal’ Brexit scenario, the UK’s sudden departure from the Dublin System could have a significant humanitarian impact on separated refugee families, leaving them in legal limbo and at risk of falling into gaps in the system. We are not satisfied that the Immigration, Nationality and Asylum (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 provide sufficient protection against disruption to family reunion routes. We urge the UK and the EU to honour their commitment to the right of refugee family reunion by negotiating an interim agreement to maintain this right in a ‘no deal’ scenario. A temporary extension of current arrangements would be the most feasible option.

Bilateral cooperation

113.Bilateral relationships with EU Member States are essential to the effective management of UK borders, including asylum and migration flows. In particular, we highlight the system of juxtaposed border controls, which allows the UK to conduct checks on passengers and freight in France and Belgium, and France to complete Schengen entry checks in the UK.

114.These arrangements are underpinned by bilateral and trilateral agreements, but their continued operation has come under scrutiny in the context of Brexit. Juxtaposed controls are particularly unpopular in the Calais region, where they have resulted in the establishment of unregulated camps of migrants seeking to travel to the UK to claim asylum.

115.Calls to scrap juxtaposed controls, which followed the 2016 referendum, have now receded, and the UK and France have sought to reinforce their commitment to bilateral border cooperation through the recent Sandhurst Treaty and a joint action plan to tackle the rising trend in migrants attempting to cross the Channel in small boats. However, the effectiveness of these measures is questionable, and they have been subject to criticism for prioritising border control over humanitarian support.

116.Although they are not formally EU-dependent, the agreements underpinning bilateral border cooperation have undoubtedly been easier to sustain under the shared umbrella of EU membership. A disruptive ‘no deal’ Brexit could place a particular strain on these relationships. There would also be significant disruption to cooperation facilitated by EU security tools and measures, as we have noted in previous reports. The Government must make every effort to maintain effective bilateral border cooperation after the UK leaves the EU, especially a ‘no deal’ scenario, when good will towards the UK is likely to be in short supply.

59 Oral evidence taken on 13 March 2019 (Session 2017–19), Q 12 (Rt Hon Caroline Nokes MP and Glyn Williams) and Letter from Rt Hon Caroline Nokes MP, (then) Minister of State for Immigration to Lord Jay of Ewelme, 10 April 2019: [accessed 5 August 2019]

60 Written evidence from the European Children’s Rights Unit and Liverpool Law Clinic (AIP0007)

61 Written evidence from the European Children’s Rights Unit and Liverpool Law Clinic (AIP0007)

62 Oral evidence taken on 6 February 2019 (Session 2017–19), 5 (Dr Natascha Zaun)

63 Written evidence from the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (AIP0002)

64 QQ 12–14 (Eleanor Harrison)

65 Oral evidence taken on 6 February 2019 (Session 2017–19), 5 (Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor)

66 Q 3 (Judith Dennis)

67 Written evidence from the British Red Cross (AIP0008)

68 Written evidence from the Refugee Council (AIP0003)

69 Supplementary written evidence from Safe Passage (AIP0011)

70 Unicef UK, ‘Keeping Families Together: Retaining Children’s Rights to Family Reunion Through Brexit’, (June 2017):–1008748374.1565081360 [accessed 6 August 2019]

71 Written evidence from SOS Children’s Villages UK (AIP0012)

72 See for example written evidence from Professor Elspeth Guild (AIP0001) and Q 2 (Jon Featonby).

73 Oral evidence taken on 6 February 2019 (Session 2017–19), Q 3 (Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor). See also: UNHCR, ‘The Global Compact on Refugees’: [accessed 6 August 2019].

74 Written evidence from Professor Elspeth Guild (AIP0001) and Q 31 (Professor Elspeth Guild)

75 Written evidence from Professor Bernard Ryan & Alan Desmond (AIP0006)

76 Written evidence from the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (AIP0002)

77 Written evidence from Refugee Rights Europe (AIP0009)

78 Q 3 (Judith Dennis)

79 Written evidence from the British Red Cross (AIP0008) and QQ 5–8 (Judith Dennis, Jon Featonby)

80 Written evidence from Professor Bernard Ryan & Alan Desmond (AIP0006)

81 Oral evidence taken on 6 February 2019 (Session 2017–19), Q 8 (Dr Natascha Zaun)

82 Oral evidence taken on 6 February 2019 (Session 2017–19), QQ 8–11 (Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor)

83 Written evidence from Refugee Rights Europe (AIP0009)

84 Q 13 (Lord Dubs)

85 Written evidence from the British Red Cross (AIP0008). See also Immigration, Nationality and Asylum (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (SI 2019/745).

86 Oral evidence taken on 6 February 2019 (Session 2017–19), Q 11 (Dr Natascha Zaun and Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor)

87 Q 53 (Jan Bayart)

88 Q 16 (Eleanor Harrison)

89 Home Office, ‘Factsheet: The UK’s juxtaposed border controls’ (11 July 2017): [accessed 7 August 2019]

90 Home Affairs Committee, Migration Crisis, (Seventh Report, Session 2016–17, HC 24)

91 Written evidence from Professor Elspeth Guild (AIP0001)

92 Written evidence from Refugee Rights Europe (AIP0009)

93 Written evidence from the Refugee Council (AIP0003), Professor Bernard Ryan & Alan Desmond (AIP0006), Q 6 (Judith Dennis, Jon Featonby), Q 24 (Dr Hanne Beirens). The documents agreed at the Sandhurst Summit are available from HM Government, UK-France Summit 2018: documents (18 January 2018): [accessed 7 August 2019]

94 Q 24 (Dr Hanne Beirens)

95 Written evidence from Professor Bernard Ryan & Alan Desmond (AIP0006)

96 Q 6 (Jon Featonby)

97 Written evidence from the Refugee Council (AIP0003)

98 Written evidence from Refugee Rights Europe (AIP0009). See also Home Office, ‘Fact sheet on the UK’s support for asylum-seeking and refugee children in Europe’ (19 January 2018): [accessed 7 August 2019]

99 Written evidence from Professor Bernard Ryan & Alan Desmond (AIP0006)

100 House of Lords Library, English Channel Migrant Boat Crossings, Library Briefing, LLN 2019/0029, March 2019

101 Written evidence from Professor Bernard Ryan & Alan Desmond (AIP0006)

102 Written evidence from Refugee Rights Europe (AIP0009)

103 Q 35 (Professor Elspeth Guild)

104 Q 35 (Professor Elspeth Guild)

105 Q 6 (Judith Dennis)

106 Q 6 (Jon Featonby)

107 Oral evidence taken on 6 February 2019 (Session 2017–19), Q 5 (Dr Natascha Zaun)

108 Q 34 (Professor Elspeth Guild)

109 Q 28 (Alice Lucas, Dr Hanne Beirens)

110 Q 16 (Lord Dubs)

111 QQ 51–53 (Jan Bayart)

112 European Union Committee, Brexit: future UK-EU security and police cooperation (7th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 77) and Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty (18th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 164)

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