Chapter 3: Northern Ireland
The political context
38.The main political parties in Northern Ireland were split in their positions during the Brexit referendum. The largest unionist party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), argued for a vote to leave, whereas its then partner in the Northern Ireland Executive (and the largest nationalist party), Sinn Féin, was pro-remain. The three largest opposition parties, the Ulster Unionist Party, the SDLP and the Alliance Party, were all pro-remain. Smaller parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly took a variety of positions.
39.The referendum saw a majority of votes cast in Northern Ireland for remain (55.8%), albeit on the lowest turnout (62.7%) of any of the constituent parts of the UK. Unionist-dominated voting areas tended to vote to leave, while nationalist-dominated areas tended to vote to remain. Professor Jonathan Tonge, Professor of Politics at the University of Liverpool, and Director of the Economic and Social Research Council’s 2010 and 2015 Northern Ireland Westminster election surveys, told us that statistical analysis indicated that:
“89% of nationalists voted to remain, against only 35% of unionists. Some 88% of those identifying as Irish identify as having voted to remain, against 38% of British identifiers. Some 85% of Catholics, against only 41% Protestants, voted to remain; 86% of Sinn Féin voters, against only 30% of DUP voters; and 92% of SDLP voters, against 46% of UUP voters [voted to remain]. So the binary divide is being reinforced in Northern Ireland by Brexit.”21
40.Immediately after the referendum, Sinn Féin called for a border poll on a united Ireland, and has subsequently argued that Northern Ireland should have ‘special status within the EU’. The DUP has rejected both propositions. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Rt Hon James Brokenshire MP, said in the House of Commons on 1 February 2017 that “concepts of special status are the wrong approach. It is rather about looking at special factors and special circumstances and dealing with them effectively”.22 On 14 March, the Prime Minister told MPs that “the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has looked at this issue and it is not right to have a border poll at this stage”.23
41.Notwithstanding their different positions, in August 2016 the then First Minister of Northern Ireland, DUP Leader Arlene Foster, and the then deputy First Minister, Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness, wrote to the Prime Minister to set out their concerns over the implications of Brexit for Northern Ireland. They reiterated their “full commitment to achieving the best possible outcome for the people of Northern Ireland”, and welcomed the Prime Minister’s commitment “that we will be fully involved and represented in the negotiations on the terms of our future relationships with the EU and other countries”. The letter set out five key issues:
- The Irish land border, in particular the need to ensure that the movement of people, goods and services is not impeded, that criminal justice and crime-fighting are not compromised, that an incentive is not provided for those who wish to undermine the peace process, and the need to bear in mind the consequences for the agri-food sector and for cross-border workers.
- The need to retain business competitiveness and to retain as far as possible the ease of trade with EU Member States and access to labour.
- The need to ensure that the Irish energy market is not undermined.
- Uncertainty around the future of EU funding; and
- The importance of the agri-food sector, which is “uniquely vulnerable both to the loss of EU funding, and to potential tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade”.
The letter also stressed the importance of proactively seeking opportunities in any new arrangements “that would be of benefit to the UK and its regions. No doubt each region will have its own priorities.”24
42.No further official statement or overarching paper on Brexit was forthcoming from the Northern Ireland Executive. In January 2017, Martin McGuinness resigned as deputy First Minister following the Renewable Heat Initiative controversy.25 This led to an early Assembly election on 3 March. The DUP and Sinn Féin were returned as the largest unionist and nationalist parties, while Sinn Féin came close to overtaking the DUP as the largest party. At the time of writing, efforts to re-establish the Northern Ireland Executive continue.
43.At the June 2017 general election, the DUP won 10 seats and, after the election resulted in a hung Parliament, found itself in a key position in ensuring that the Conservative Government could remain in office. Prior to the confidence and supply agreement being announced on 26 June, the DUP leader in the House of Commons, Nigel Dodds MP, went on record as follows:
“There are special circumstances in Northern Ireland and we will try to make sure these are recognised. As regards demands for special status within the European Union, no, because that would create tariffs and barriers between Northern Ireland and our single biggest market which is the rest of the United Kingdom. While we will focus on the special circumstances, geography and certain industries of Northern Ireland, we will be pressing that home very strongly. Special status however within the European Union is a nonsense. Dublin doesn’t support it. Brussels doesn’t support it. The member states of the EU would never dream of it because it would open the door to a Pandora’s box of independence movements of all sorts. The only people who mentioned this are Sinn Féin.”26
44.Sinn Féin won seven seats at the general election, but its MPs do not take their seats. None of the other parties in Northern Ireland won any seats,27 with the result that no nationalist MPs sit in the new House of Commons.
45.Prior to agreement being reached, nationalist parties and some other observers warned that a deal between the Conservative Party and the DUP could compromise the Government’s ability to act with “rigorous impartiality” under the terms of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. Sinn Féin went further, arguing that a deal with the DUP would put the UK Government in breach of the Agreement.
Brexit: UK-Irish relations report
46.In December 2016 the Committee published a report on Brexit: UK-Irish relations. Although the report examined UK-Irish relations in their entirety, it emphasised the implications of Brexit for Northern Ireland. We found that the economic consequences for Northern Ireland were significant, particularly given the extent of cross-border trade and the agri-food sector’s reliance on EU funding. We also found that there could be a negative impact on the free movement of goods and people, significant consequences for the open Irish land border, and uncertainties regarding the future of the Common Travel Area and the right of the people of Northern Ireland to Irish (and therefore EU) citizenship.
47.The report concluded that Brexit could have an impact on political stability in Northern Ireland, and in particular on the confidence of both communities that their interests and aspirations are being respected. It also stated that, just as any undermining of the current open land border would be economically, politically and socially unacceptable, so strengthened checks at the sea boundary between Northern Ireland and Great Britain would be politically divisive and inherently undesirable.
48.Although we did not advocate ‘special status’ for Northern Ireland, we called on all parties to the negotiations, the EU institutions as well as the Member States, to give official recognition to the special, unique nature of UK-Irish relations in their entirety, including the position of Northern Ireland, and the North-South and East-West structure and institutions established under the Belfast/ Good Friday Agreement. We identified a number of key objectives:
- Maintenance of the current open land border between the UK and Ireland, as well as of the ease of movement across the sea boundary between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK.
- Maintenance of the current Common Travel Area arrangements, and the right of free movement of UK and Irish citizens between the jurisdictions.
- Maintenance of the right of UK and Irish citizens to reside and work in each other’s countries.
- The retention of rights to Irish (and therefore EU) citizenship for the people of Northern Ireland.
- In the event that the UK leaves the customs union, a customs and trade arrangement between the two countries, subject to the agreement of the EU institutions and Member States.
- Consideration of whether the Northern Ireland Executive should be granted devolved powers to make decisions about the free movement of EU workers within its jurisdiction.
- Reaffirmation by both the UK and Irish Governments of their commitment to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and subsequent agreements, including continued support for existing cross-border cooperation.
- Continued access for cross-border projects to EU funding programmes.
The present inquiry gave us an opportunity to explore these issues further.
The impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland
49.We heard a range of views about the impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland. The former First Minister of Northern Ireland and former leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Lord Trimble, saw no difficulty with the Common Travel Area continuing to operate. He thought that checks on illegal movement by non-UK and non-Irish citizens could be conducted largely electronically without significant road checks or border posts. He argued that, even if tariffs were imposed on the EU side, the UK should not reciprocate, thus obviating the need for UK customs installations on the north side of the Irish land border.28
50.Lord Trimble said that the impact of the imposition of tariffs on goods would be greater for the Republic of Ireland than for Northern Ireland, because 65% of the Republic’s exports went to Great Britain: “The really big trade takes place east-west.”29 Lord Trimble said that EU regional funds had not worked satisfactorily from Northern Ireland’s point of view.30
51.Sammy Wilson MP, representing the DUP, was also sceptical that Northern Ireland benefited from EU funding to the extent that was suggested.31 He argued that Northern Ireland, and the UK as a whole, stood to benefit from being freed from the constraints of EU environmental and agricultural regulation, and that new trade deals would present opportunities for the agri-food sector in particular.32
52.Mr Wilson acknowledged that leaving the EU created some problems in relation to the Irish land border, but was confident that electronic surveillance could be used to monitor the movement of goods across the border, and across the Irish Sea. While he thought that a totally frictionless border was unlikely, he pointed to examples of borders across Europe (including light-touch customs arrangements on the Sweden-Norway border) that allowed for the free movement of goods without long delays.33
53.Some other witnesses expressed greater concerns about the impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland. Former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Lord Hain, cited his amendment during consideration of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, which had sought to draw attention to the particular consequences of Brexit for Northern Ireland.34 He argued that no answers had been given as to how a frictionless border could be retained, and whether it would be the external customs frontier of the EU. He also expressed his fears about the impact of Brexit on the peace process, and on the continued confidence of the nationalist and republican communities.
54.Lord Hain argued that, while number plate monitoring technology might be acceptable, any physical border controls that affected, for instance, animal movements on farms that straddle the border, or which were perceived as “a kind of security check on people who may be moving about their ordinary life”, would be “fraught with dangers”.35
55.Former deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland, and former leader of the SDLP, Mark Durkan, criticised the UK Government for conflating the Good Friday Agreement with the Common Travel Area, and for “issuing platitudes about a border that will be as seamless and inspectionless as possible that nobody really trusts anyway”.36 With regard to the cross-border movement of goods, Mr Durkan argued that ‘solutions’ around electronic tracking and avoiding border posts would not remove the impact on border communities and local businesses. He pointed out that the milk used in dairy products can cross the border up to five times, while “there is a wee carousel for pigs—they go round and round”. For some types of livestock, the processing plants were on one side of the border, while for others they were on the other side.37
56.Professor Tonge argued that maintaining the Common Travel Area was a realisable goal, but acknowledged that “we will see the return of some kind of border in Ireland, but the nature of it is a matter for technical and political resolution”.38
57.The Centre for Cross Border Studies warned of the potential for increased political division in Northern Ireland as a consequence of Brexit, and in particular the threat that any imposition of a border either between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland or between Northern Ireland and Great Britain would pose to the delicate balance achieved by the Good Friday Agreement.39
58.Academics Dr Sylvia de Mars, Colin Murray, Dr Aoife O’Donoghue and Dr Ben Warwick argued that the impact of Brexit would “fall most heavily on Northern Ireland, because of its unique historical, political and geographical situations”. In their view, it would not be possible after Brexit to maintain the open border as it exists at present in terms of goods. They feared that the return of physical manifestations of the border would act as a lightning rod to dissident republicans.40
59.Dr de Mars et al noted that Northern Ireland received a proportion of the UK’s total EU agricultural support payments three times greater than its proportion of the UK population, and was also in receipt of substantial INTERREG and PEACE IV programme funds.41
60.Dr Viviane Gravey, Dr Katy Hayward and Professor Dagmar Schiek, Queen’s University Belfast, also argued that Northern Ireland would be the most affected part of the UK as a result of Brexit. They observed that the Northern Ireland economy was heavily dependent on trade with the EU, in particular with Ireland. In sectors such as energy, agriculture and agri-food,42 and manufacturing, Northern Ireland was part of all-island supply chains. As well as the possibility of customs checks or tariffs, non-coordinated regulatory changes on either side of the border, for instance in fields such as animal welfare or waste management, would present a risk to cross-border trade.
61.Dr Gravey et al observed that the border region already suffered from elevated levels of unemployment, overcrowding, financial dependency and over-representation of declining and low-value added industries, exacerbated by its peripheral location in relation to the hubs of Belfast and Dublin. As well as regional funding, they noted that Northern Ireland received 10% of all CAP funding to the UK, with payments from the EU accounting for 87% of annual farm incomes. Northern Ireland was thus particularly vulnerable to the withdrawal of EU funding. They also noted the importance of cross-border healthcare and higher education provision.43
62.Professor Feargal Cochrane, Professor of International Conflict Analysis, University of Kent, warned of the potential for political instability and the reopening of questions of identity politics and sectarian divisions. Professor Cochrane believed that Brexit would require some level of border checks on the movement of goods and people, which, as well as being politically contentious, would “inevitably cause some level of delay, frustration and inconvenience to people moving across the border and is also likely to result in significant economic costs for Irish businesses and legal complication for energy suppliers and other public utilities”.44
63.The British Academy highlighted the impact on agriculture, the energy market (including the single Irish electricity market), the fishing industry, the position of cross-border workers and access to migrant labour. They also cited cross-border policing and security cooperation, access to public procurement, cross-border social and environmental partnerships, access to healthcare, cross-border infrastructure projects and access to research funding.45
64.Hospitality Ulster called for recognition of the “unique circumstances” of Northern Ireland’s hospitality and tourism industry. They argued that the Northern Ireland economy was inextricably linked to the economies of both Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, and that it had a unique set of circumstances in relation to access for visitors, access to labour, access for goods and services, its regulatory environment, EU funding, access by air and sea, and promotion of tourism.46
Reflecting Northern Ireland’s interests
65.We asked our witnesses how Northern Ireland’s interests could be addressed in the Brexit negotiations.
66.Sammy Wilson MP stressed that the referendum was a UK-wide decision that should be abided by.47 He welcomed the notion that “we will all be leaving the EU on the same terms”, and did not wish to see a political distinction emerge between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. On the other hand, he acknowledged that Northern Ireland would be affected by Brexit “in a different, or perhaps in a more concentrated, way” than other parts of the UK. But he argued that these impacts could be addressed “without special status being conferred on Northern Ireland”.48
67.In contrast, Lord Hain argued that “Northern Ireland definitely needs some kind of special arrangement to be negotiated over the border and over its trade and increasingly integrated economic relationships between both parts of the island of Ireland”.49
68.Mark Durkan said that the negotiations should take due account of “the different dimensions of our circumstances”. These included Northern Ireland’s unique ability automatically to rejoin the EU as part of a united Ireland, should the people of Ireland, North and South, so decide.50 Likewise, Northern Ireland was unique because its people could elect to be citizens of an EU Member State.51 He was concerned, however, that “Northern Ireland is constantly caught behind the Scottish question. It is clear to us that often the reason why UK Government Ministers do not want to concede anything special in relation to Northern Ireland … is because they are afraid of detonating some run of claims in respect of Scotland.”52
69.Mr Durkan suggested that the terms of Strand 2 of the Good Friday Agreement might need to be changed to take account of the fact that the UK and Ireland would no longer have common membership of the EU,53 a point also made by Professor Tonge.54 Mr Durkan argued that the Good Friday Agreement offered a potential toolkit for responding to the challenges of Brexit. For instance, the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference provided a mechanism for the two Governments to discuss sovereign matters, including Brexit-related issues. Similarly, Strand 2 of the Agreement provided for defined areas of North-South cooperation. He suggested that the EU’s Chief Brexit Negotiator, Michel Barnier, was open to Northern Ireland continuing to receive EU funding,55 and that Strand 2 “could provide a basis whereby Northern Ireland could have a lean-to arrangement with the Republic as far as certain EU programmes were concerned, at least in certain sectors, and potentially for customs union equivalence”. He suggested that Northern Ireland could continue to receive PEACE IV and INTERREG funding.56
70.The former Leader of the Alliance Party, and former Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly, Lord Alderdice, noted that the UK was not a homogeneous entity, and regretted the notion that there needed to be one homogeneous model for Brexit, particularly given that the UK and Ireland already had special arrangements within the EU. He called for a “flexible and creative” approach, citing the Nordic Council (which consists of EU and non-EU States) as a model.57
71.Lord Alderdice suggested that “there could be a case for identifying the goods on which you would be particularly careful not to have tariffs developing … maybe it will be possible to negotiate for specific goods and services that are indigenous”.58 He also commented on the reliance of border communities on cross-border transport, education and healthcare provision: “If the EU is to pay attention to the needs of people in distant parts of the Republic of Ireland, at the border and in Donegal, it will have to be prepared for some kind of cross-border operation and potentially the funding of it.”59
72.Professor Tonge argued that, while the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland had ruled out ‘special status’ for Northern Ireland, “there will be a de facto special status, because if the common travel area is preserved there is, to all intents and purposes, a distinctive immigration policy for Northern Ireland”. The difficulty would be in extending this notion to tariff-free trade, because it would make it possible to circumvent the EU common external tariff.60
73.Professor Tonge said that there was acute awareness within the EU of the specific problems that Brexit presented for Northern Ireland. However, “if the UK Government are not going to ask for special status for Northern Ireland, the EU will not give it. To some extent that particular ball is batted back into the UK Government’s court. Then the EU’s response will be properly tested.”61
74.The Centre for Cross Border Studies warned the UK Government against the adoption of “entrenched positions from which it cannot accommodate the expressed needs of the devolved nations. This will mean either ensuring continued UK membership of the Single Market and the customs union, or exploring differentiated solutions for the devolved jurisdictions.” Failure to take account of these differences could “place the Union that is the United Kingdom in jeopardy”.62
75.Dr Gravey et al argued that Northern Ireland was in a unique situation because of the need to consider policy coordination on the island of Ireland as well as with Great Britain. They stressed the need to maintain an all-island perspective for economic integration, cooperation and integration of public services. They suggested that “maintaining a pocket of EU law compliance in Northern Ireland would be advantageous as it would contribute to minimising regulatory discord between Ireland and Northern Ireland”.63
76.They observed that “the notion of ‘special status’ implies a difference between ‘mainland’ Great Britain and Northern Ireland—a gap that unionists are wary of highlighting, particularly in the context of wider uncertainty and local instability”. Nevertheless, they noted that the future possibility of Northern Ireland rejoining the EU as part of a united Ireland meant that it would need to be treated as a pre-accession region, in contrast to the rest of the UK. They argued that “territorial differentiation” (different arrangements for different parts of a state vis-à-vis its relationship with the EU) was the most direct way of meeting the challenges that Brexit poses for Northern Ireland.64
77.In Professor Cochrane’s view, creating a “spongy frontier” in Northern Ireland was the only means of leaving the Single Market and the customs union while avoiding political complications in Northern Ireland. This would involve moving the UK border to Great Britain and allowing a semi-permeable frontier between North and South on the island of Ireland, with checks on goods and people kept to a minimum. Professor Cochrane acknowledged that this might mean people moving from Northern Ireland to Great Britain having to pass through customs and immigration controls, which would be unacceptable to unionists, and would also lead to economic complications, such as a need to monitor imports and exports between Northern Ireland and Great Britain.65
78.The British Academy argued that, while the UK had ruled out ‘special status’ if that meant Northern Ireland remaining in the EU, other options were possible, including “an off-the-peg ‘solution’”, such as Northern Ireland membership of the EEA, or a “bespoke ‘solution’”, in which each of the issues arising would be negotiated from scratch, with Northern Ireland allowed different rules from the rest of the UK.66
79.Giving evidence on 11 July, the Secretary of State, Rt Hon David Davis MP, confirmed that his aim was to open negotiations on Northern Ireland “soon”, but continued: “We do not expect to finish it until quite close to the end because of the other technical issues to be resolved … It will also depend on the final outcome on customs, free trade, citizens’ rights and so on.”67
Northern Ireland’s input into the process
80.Prior to the general election, several of our witnesses expressed concern that, given the ongoing political impasse, Northern Ireland’s interests would not be adequately represented in the Brexit negotiations. Lord Trimble said that Northern Ireland would be disadvantaged in the Brexit negotiations if the Assembly and Executive were not functioning.68 He said that the Government needed to find ways to consult political parties and others in Northern Ireland in the absence of an Executive.69 Lord Hain went further, accusing Northern Ireland’s politicians of a “dereliction of duty” in allowing a “huge vacuum to open up in which their own inputs to the vital future of Northern Ireland following Brexit are simply not being registered at all. It is another reason why it is vital to get the institutions back up and running”.70
81.Sammy Wilson MP also said that, without a functioning Executive, Northern Ireland’s formal input into the Brexit negotiations would be greatly diluted.71 On the other hand, he welcomed the bilateral engagement between the UK and Irish Governments, who had a common interest in persuading the EU to look to solutions.72
82.Lord Alderdice feared that Northern Ireland “will find it very difficult to get any look-in at all” in the Brexit negotiations, and called for the Northern Ireland Assembly to continue, even if the Executive was suspended, to enable Ministers in London to engage with Assembly members.73
83.Professor Tonge was particularly scathing in his assessment of the effectiveness of the Northern Ireland Executive:
“We have an Executive who at times resemble something of a pantomime horse with the head and the legs not always going in the same direction, with a DUP-Sinn Féin axis. Clearly they have diametrically opposed views on Brexit and it is very difficult to co-ordinate any response.”74
84.The Centre for Cross Border Studies viewed it as a matter of “grave concern” that not only had the Northern Ireland Executive been unable to set out a comprehensive position ahead of the UK Government’s negotiations with the EU, but that there was no longer an Executive in place to do so. They called on the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to establish a consultative mechanism properly to reflect Northern Ireland’s interests.75 Dr de Mars et al also stressed the need, in the absence of an Executive, for formal mechanisms to ensure that the implications of Brexit for the people of Northern Ireland were fed into the Brexit discussions.76
85.Mr Davis, in his evidence on 11 July, told us that notwithstanding the failure to establish an Executive and the result of the general election, the Government had tried “to talk to both sides”. He said that there was “no controversy” over the desirability of retaining an open land border, and confirmed that in due course the Government would “try to make arrangements to speak to both the major would-be components of the Executive”.77
Northern Ireland and the Brexit negotiations
86.The need to take account of the implications of Brexit for Northern Ireland, and for UK-Irish relations as a whole, has been acknowledged by both sides in the Brexit negotiations.
87.In her 29 March letter triggering Article 50, the Prime Minister stated:
“We must pay attention to the UK’s unique relationship with the Republic of Ireland and the importance of the peace process in Northern Ireland. The Republic of Ireland is the only EU member state with a land border with the United Kingdom. We want to avoid a return to a hard border between our two countries, to be able to maintain the Common Travel Area between us, and to make sure that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU does not harm the Republic of Ireland. We also have an important responsibility to make sure that nothing is done to jeopardise the peace process in Northern Ireland, and to continue to uphold the Belfast Agreement.”78
88.The then Irish Taoiseach, Enda Kenny, stated:
“I will do my best to put forward the interests of the North in the Brexit negotiations. I will defend the Good Friday Agreement, in its spirit as well as its letter. The Irish Government will oppose a hard border, argue for free movement on this island, seek EU funding for cross-border projects and protect the right of EU citizens, whether from North or South. But this requires the support of all strands of opinion if we are to succeed.”79
89.The European Council Brexit negotiation guidelines, published in draft following the UK’s notification under Article 50 and agreed by the EU 27 on 29 April, stated:
“The Union has consistently supported the goal of peace and reconciliation enshrined in the Good Friday Agreement in all its parts, and continuing to support and protect the achievements, benefits and commitments of the Peace Process will remain of paramount importance. In view of the unique circumstances on the island of Ireland, flexible and imaginative solutions will be required, including with the aim of avoiding a hard border, while respecting the integrity of the Union legal order. In this context, the Union should also recognise existing bilateral agreements and arrangements between the United Kingdom and Ireland which are compatible with EU law.”80
90.The European Council agreed the following statement in the minutes to the agreement:
“The European Council acknowledges that the Good Friday Agreement expressly provides for an agreed mechanism whereby a united Ireland may be brought about through peaceful and democratic means; and, in this regard, the European Council acknowledges that, in accordance with international law, the entire territory of such a united Ireland would thus be part of the European Union.”81
91.The European Parliament resolution on negotiations with the United Kingdom, agreed on 4 April, stated that:
“The European Parliament is especially concerned by the consequence of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union on Northern Ireland and its future relations with Ireland … in that respect, it is crucial to safeguard peace and therefore to preserve the Good Friday Agreement in all its parts, which was brokered with the active participation of the Union.”82
92.The EU has made clear that it expects the implications of Brexit for Ireland, North and South, to be addressed early in negotiations, before wider discussions can begin on the terms of the UK’s future relationship with the EU. In contrast, the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, Rt Hon David Davis MP, has said that it is “wholly illogical” to separate border issues from a trade deal: “How on earth do you resolve the issue of the border unless you know what the customs agreement is, what the free trade agreement is, whether you need to charge tariffs at the border?”83 The terms of reference for the Article 50 negotiations, agreed between the UK and the EU on 19 June, stated that “a dialogue on Ireland/Northern Ireland has been launched under the authority of the Coordinators”.84 However, the Secretary of State repeated that the issue of the Irish land border may not be settled until the end of the process, when the UK’s trade relationship with the EU is agreed.85
Conclusions
93.Northern Ireland’s distinctive geographical, historical, political, and (in the context of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement) constitutional circumstances mean that it will be profoundly affected by Brexit. There will be a significant impact, including on cross-border trade, the agri-food sector, energy, transport, fisheries, access to EU labour, healthcare provision, tourism, and police and security cooperation.
94.It also appears that the Brexit debate has undermined political stability and exacerbated cross-community divisions, contributing to the collapse of the Northern Ireland Executive and the calling of an early Assembly election. At the time of writing, the power-sharing institutions have yet to be restored. This, together with the appointment of a new Irish Taoiseach, the Conservative-DUP confidence and supply agreement at Westminster, and the fact that no nationalist MPs have taken their seats in the new Parliament, has created new uncertainty, underlining the fragility of the political settlement in Northern Ireland.
95.The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement established a delicate equilibrium, encapsulated in the power-sharing institutions, and the mechanisms for enhanced North-South and East-West cooperation. It is imperative that Brexit does not weaken this equilibrium or the commitment and confidence of both unionist and nationalist communities in the political process. While the agreement between the Conservative Government and the DUP provides an opportunity for Northern Ireland’s interests to gain attention and prominence, the Government must also take account of the interests of the nationalist community, in order to maintain its confidence. Political stability in Northern Ireland must not be allowed to become ‘collateral damage’ of Brexit.
96.Our December 2016 report on Brexit: UK-Irish relations called for all parties to the negotiations to give official recognition to the special, unique nature of UK-Irish relations in their entirety, including the position of Northern Ireland, and the North-South and East-West structure and institutions established under the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement.
97.We are therefore heartened by the statements by the Prime Minister, the Irish Government, the European Council and the European Parliament, all expressing a commitment to protect the achievements of the peace process and to seek to avoid the imposition of a hard border on the island of Ireland. We also welcome the European Council’s statement that “the Union should also recognise existing bilateral agreements and arrangements between the United Kingdom and Ireland which are compatible with EU law” as an indicator that it will not stand in the way of retention of the Common Travel Area, which predates either UK or Irish EU membership and which benefits all communities across these islands.
98.‘Special status’ is a politically contentious term in Northern Ireland, and we acknowledge the unionist community’s concerns that no aspect of the Brexit negotiations should undermine Northern Ireland’s ties to the rest of the UK. Yet at the same time, the specific circumstances in Northern Ireland give rise to unique issues that will need to be addressed during the Brexit negotiations.
99.As we concluded in our December 2016 report, the unique nature of UK-Irish relations necessitates a unique solution. We welcome the European Council’s commitment to seek “flexible and imaginative solutions”, and call on the UK Government to work with the EU negotiators to identify and outline such solutions as a matter of priority.
24 Letter to the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Theresa May MP from the First Minister and deputy First Minister of the Northern Ireland Executive, dated 10 August 2016: https://www.executiveoffice-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/execoffice/Letter%20to%20PM%20from%20FM%20%26%20dFM.pdf [accessed 30 November 2016]
25 Sinn Féin, ‘Martin McGuinness announces resignation as deputy First Minister’ (9 January 2017): http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/42984 [accessed 20 June 2017]
26 ‘DUP leader Arlene Foster vows to bring stability to UK with Conservatives’, The Guardian (9 June 2017): https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/09/theresa-may-reaches-deal-with-dup-to-form-government-after-shock-election-result-northern-ireland [accessed 20 June 2017]
27 One independent MP was elected in Northern Ireland, Lady Sylvia Hermon in North Down.
34 HL Deb, 27 February 2017, cols 590–594
42 Issues relating to agriculture across the UK are covered in more detail in the European Union Committee, Brexit: agriculture (20th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 169).
45 Written evidence from the British Academy, the Royal Society of Edinburgh and the Learned Society of Wales (DEV0020)
51 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
66 Written evidence from the British Academy, the Royal Society of Edinburgh and the Learned Society of Wales (DEV0020)
78 Rt Hon Theresa May MP, ‘Letter to Donald Tusk triggering Article 50’, 29 March 2017: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-to-donald-tusk-triggering-article-50/prime-ministers-letter-to-donald-tusk-triggering-article-50 [accessed 10 July 2017]
79 An Taoiseach Enda Kenny, ‘Address to the IIEA: Ireland at the heart of a changing European Union’, 15 February 2017: http://www.iiea.com/news/taoiseach-addresses-the-iiea [accessed 10 July 2017]
80 European Council, European Council (Art. 50) guidelines for Brexit negotiations, (29 April 2017): http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/29-euco-brexit-guidelines/ [accessed 10 July 2017]
81 European Council, Minutes of Special meeting of the European Council (Art.50) held on 29 April 2017 (23 June 2017): http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/XT-20010–2017-INIT/en/pdf [accessed 10 July 2017]
82 European Parliament, resolution on negotiations with the United Kingdom following its notification that it intends to withdraw from the European Union (2017/2593(RSP))
83 Quoted on 14 May 2017: BBC, ‘David Davis voices concern over EU border plan’ (14 May 2017): www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39915364 [accessed 16 June 2017]
84 Department for Exiting the European Union, ‘Terms of reference for the Article 50 negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union’ (19 June 2017): https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/620409/Terms_of_reference_for_the_Article_50_negotiations_between_the_United_Kingdom_and_the_European_Union.pdf [accessed 5 July 2017]
85 BBC, ‘Brexit negotiations: Barnier rules out “concessions”’ (19 June 2017): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-40321271 [accessed 5 July 2017]