House of Commons - Public Accounts

Select Committee on Public Accounts Fourteenth Report

1 Programme governance arrangements were not fit for purpose

1. The Bowman family of digital radios, and the associated Combat Infrastructure Platform (CIP), are central to the Department's plans to transform military communications and enable the Armed Forces to operate more effectively and at a quicker pace. The pressing need to replace the ageing analogue Clansman radios used since the 1970s with secure, reliable voice communications has been championed by operational commanders since the mid-1980s and has made Bowman one of the Army's top priorities. By enabling transmission of large quantities of electronic data Bowman is intended to provide information on the position of UK forces, and forms the underlying network to carry CIP. CIP is intended to replace and automate many existing manual processes for command and control on the battlefield. It is also key to plans for "Network Enabled Capability"; joining up military communications and electronic systems in a "network of networks". The ability to see the position of UK forces, on screens in vehicles and headquarters, can contribute to avoidance of "friendly fire" incidents. [2]

2. The combined Bowman and CIP is a wide ranging programme, with consequences across the Department and the three armed services. For example the installation of Bowman CIP across the land vehicle fleet is regarded by the Army as equivalent to a medium scale military operation.[3] The total programme involved many different parties, and the complex inter-relationships between stakeholders in the Department, the Armed Forces and Industry required programme management arrangements able to cope with complexity and change.[4]

Delays in the programme

3. Despite the benefits to be gained from the system, the development of Bowman has suffered serious delays. A mixture of technical and industrial difficulties and budgetary constraints led to postponements of the original 1995 In Service Date. In 1995 our predecessors expressed concern[5] that United Kingdom forces in Kosovo had to rely on radios that were vulnerable to enemy interception. They urged the Department to make all possible efforts to bring Bowman into service without further delay. Between 1995 and 2000 the Department pursued a non-competitive solution with the Archer Consortium,[6] finally losing confidence in that supplier's ability to deliver a system that met its requirements in the required timeframe and which offered value for money. In September 2001 it awarded a replacement contract to General Dynamics UK, maintaining the same March 2004 In Service Date as previously set for the Archer Consortium. Bowman was duly accepted in service, albeit with 27 major provisos and a number of capabilities removed from the specification, in March 2004. The armed forces are now part way through a lengthy period of conversion to Bowman and CIP. The delays since 1995 have resulted in our troops continuing to use out-dated and insecure communications, latterly at periods during current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[7]

4. It was recognised from the late 1980s that Clansman needed replacement, and the Department accepts that it would have been much better if it had been replaced more quickly. Bowman CIP was a challenging and technically demanding programme but some of the delays incurred were avoidable. The Department now accepts that the appointment of the Archer Consortium was a mistake because the consortium was unable to deliver the required product. The decision to appoint the Archer Consortium had been taken 10 years ago by an internal board of the Department, and the passage of time and changes in personnel may result in a failure to learn from mistakes. The Department believes, however, that appropriate lessons have been learned.[8]

5. In October 2005 the Department concluded negotiations with General Dynamics UK to agree a recast programme, on the basis of a further £121 million of additional funding and a two year extension to the timescale for delivery of a fully operational system. But it then took the Department a further nine months, until July 2006, to get approval for this new way forward. This time was consumed by discussions within the Department prior to approval by its Investment Approvals Board, followed by discussions with the Treasury because the adjustment required their approval. The Department recognises that its decision-making processes are more complicated than they need to be and is looking at its internal approvals process to slim down the number of layers of consideration, whilst retaining the due diligence that is needed to spend taxpayers' money sensibly.[9]

The appointment of a Senior Responsible Owner

6. In 2003 the Office of Government Commerce (OGC)[10] emphasized a number of key features of good programme management to ensure co-ordination of projects and their inter-dependencies in pursuit of agreed goals. One key aspect of the guidance is the appointment of a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) who is ultimately accountable for delivering the programme successfully. The OGC guidance also advised establishing a Programme Office to ensure that the programme proceeded coherently.[11] Key aspects of the OGC guidance are summarised in Figure 1.

7. In February 2002, prior to the OGC Guidance, the Department appointed the Assistant Chief of the General Staff as "the focus for oversight of the introduction of Bowman." He co-ordinated the various activities that needed to happen, but although widely assumed to be the SRO, he had neither funding nor the management authority necessary to fulfil the role. In mid-2006 the Department appointed the Capability Manager (Information Superiority) as SRO for all aspects of network-enabled capability, which includes Bowman CIP. With this appointment, the Department considers that it has significantly clarified the situation regarding high level governance, and that it has learned lessons. Whilst not specifically designated as SRO for Bowman itself, the SRO oversees all defence programmes including Bowman. Within the SRO's team, a Director of Equipment Capability, supported by a small staff in the programme office, is the single point of accountability for Bowman.[12]

8. The Department acknowledges the shortcomings in the way Bowman CIP has been managed and agrees that the handling of the programme would have been better had there been an identified SRO in place earlier in the programme. One factor was confusion about whether the SRO role should lie with the central equipment sponsor of the equipment programme, or the eventual equipment user. The Department now believes that, given its organisational and budgetary structures, the central sponsor is best placed to fulfil the role.[13]

9. Looking beyond this programme to the implications for Defence procurement generally, the Department accepts the OGC guidelines, but considers that these are not straightforward to implement consistently in the MOD because it has so many projects. It recognises that it needs a clear picture of who owns which risks, while ensuring that risk-owners are identified. The Department intends to routinely appoint SROs in future who are manifestly and obviously in charge, sufficiently senior to carry authority, and who are well placed in the Department with a good view of the various strands of activity that need to be brought together. The SRO will need to be supported by an integrated project team and have the trust of and lines of communication with people, both inside the Department and principal contractors. These principles are set out in the Department's procedures, but, as Bowman shows, are not consistently applied. [14]

Figure 1: Responsibilities of an SRO

The SRO is the individual responsible for ensuring that a project or programme of change meets its objectives and delivers the projected benefits. The SRO should be the owner of the overall business change that is being supported by the project; and should perform the following functions:

- ensure that a project or programme of change meets its objectives and delivers the projected benefits;
- ensuring that the project is subject to review at appropriate stages;
- own the project or programme brief or business case;
- development of the project or programme organisation structure and logical plans;
- monitoring and control of progress;
- formal project closure;
- post implementation review;
- problem resolution and referral.

In carrying out the role, an SRO must be someone who can:

- take responsibility;
- have a good understanding of the business issues associated with a project;
- be a senior reputable figure approved by the Department Board;
- be active;
- have sufficient experience and training to carry out SRO responsibilities;
- be able to broker relationships with stakeholders;
- deploy delegated authority;
- provide advice and guidance to project managers;
- acknowledge their own skill / knowledge gaps and structure the project board and project management team accordingly;
- give the time required to perform the role effectively;
- negotiate well and influence people;
- be aware of the broader perspective and how it affects the project;
- network effectively;
- be honest and frank about project plans.