Predictable conversion difficulties
were under-estimated
15. Alongside development of the Bowman CIP equipment,
the contractor faced a major task in converting up to 20,000 land
vehicles, as well as various naval platforms and helicopters,
to carry the system. Poor data on the exact configuration of vehicles
meant that conversion was both slower than anticipated and more
expensive. Though it was well-known that there was a culture within
the Army of modifying vehicles in service, the Department decided
against a full survey and instead chose to rely on a small sample
of "representative vehicles" on which the contractor
would base its estimates of time needed to install the system.
This proved to be a wholly unsatisfactory basis for planning the
conversion programme. The Department now realises that the fleet
of vehicles varied more than it had expected, some being variations
that had been built in at the time of manufacture and some of
which were built in over time. With hindsight the Department acknowledged
that it ought to have undertaken a larger survey of vehicles.
The contractor has now improved the conversion rate being achieved
to a peak of 84 a week, and fewer than 6,000 vehicles remain to
be converted. On this basis the Department estimates that the
conversion programme will be completed by the end of 2007, though
with so many forces on operations there is always a risk of slippage.[20]
16. The Department intends to gain a much better
understanding of the configuration of vehicles in future as it
adds further complex digital systems to its platforms. Besides
the new JAMES2 database which will define what is standard in
each vehicle, the Bowman programme includes a system that will
record what radio is fitted and with what standard of software.
This information will be essential in planning future incremental
upgrades of Bowman. But more fundamentally, it hopes that modern
manufacturing techniques and improved configuration control will
mean that, in future, the fleet of vehicles will not vary as much
as this one did.[21]
User requirements were not fully
considered
17. It is essential in any programme, but particularly
important with a programme of the magnitude of Bowman CIP, that
the end product delivered meets the requirements of the end users.
One of the lessons learned from the Bowman programme is that the
Department did not do enough to take on board the real requirements
of the Armed Services. In the case of the radio provided for dismounted
infantry, since the late 1990s successive Army Directors of Infantry
had stressed that any increase in size or weight of the radio
would be unacceptable. The Integrated Project Team did not, however,
obtain Director of Infantry's acceptance of the size, ergonomics
and weight of the Bowman radio and the radio finally produced
fails to meet the Army's requirements for use by dismounted soldiers.
The weight requirement was balanced against the radio performance
required since it was clear by the time the contract was let that
the contractor could not achieve both criteria. The Department
chose to give priority to the performance criteria and so the
radio produced, along with associated equipment including batteries,
aerials, carrying equipment, user terminal and display, proved
too heavy for the dismounted infantry, even though the contractor
had met the contract requirement. A separate stream of work is
now to be put in place to develop something light enough to use
and fit for purpose.[22]
18. The size and weight of the Section Radio is crucial
to the infantry, since a bigger, heavier device means soldiers
are able to carry less other equipment and ammunition. The Department
said that it had decided to deploy the Bowman Section Radio in
the form it had been developed to provide the benefits to as many
users as possible and then to set in hand a separate stream of
work to develop something that will be light enough to meet the
infantry's needs. The Department believed this option was better
than denying all users the benefits of the radio whilst a smaller
version was developed for dismounted infantry.[23]
15 Q 2 Back
16
Qq 62, 156 Back
17
Qq 24, 32, 47 Back
18
Q 101 Back
19
Qq 86-89 Back
20
C&AG's Report, paras 3.16-3.20; Qq 11, 73 Back
21
Qq 10-11, 151 Back
22
Qq 16-17, 19-20, 48, 144 Back
23
Q 144 Back
