Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160
- 179)
TUESDAY 24 JULY 2007
RT HON
BOB AINSWORTH
MP, MR DESMOND
BOWEN CMG AND
BRIGADIER CHRIS
HUGHES CBE
Q160 Mr Jenkin: Is there not a much
clearer message we should be conveying about these benchmarks—and
maybe this is one for the Minister—in that first of all
they provide an easy target for the insurgents and the terrorists
to stop us achieving. Secondly, many of them are irrelevant. Frankly,
the rights of minority parties in the legislature is not a top
military priority or a top political priority; winning the hearts
and minds of Sunni tribal leaders I would say is a massively important
priority, but it is not one of the benchmarks. Is this not a rubbish
way of organising a counter-insurgency campaign and would not
the President be pleased if the British Government said it loudly
and clearly?
Mr Ainsworth: The benchmarks have
been made and the process has started. We will have to see what
comes out of it in September.
Chairman: What a brilliant answer. Linda
Gilroy.
Q161 Linda Gilroy: I am particularly
interested if Mr Bowen has any further comments on the bridging
of the sectarian divide and one of the benchmarks which has not
been met in the interim report, which is on moving towards de-Ba'athification
law, and also whether there is any up to date information about
the questions we were asking in January, that is the release of
the Sunni detainees and whether the Iraqi Government are moving
towards that. If you have not got information to hand perhaps
you would let the Committee have an update on the situation because
that is seen as very much symbolic of the Maliki Government doing
something which it does have within its control, which would show
goodwill in that respect.
Mr Bowen: Chairman, we ought to
give you a note on that.[2]
The one thing I would say in terms of recent developments is that
the withdrawal some months ago of the large Sunni block from the
Council of Representatives was reversed in recent days, so they
have now reverted as it were to being part of that assembly. How
has that come about? By way of a long and difficult process of
political negotiation involving the Prime Minister and the Shia
parties operating together to try and bring them back into the
fold. It is not as though politics is not happening, but it is
a very complex, convoluted and long drawn-out process, so it is
worth saying that there is some movement but I do not think that
that equals reconciliation.
Q162 Willie Rennie: There has been
much said about the tribal reawakening in Anbar Province, but
do you not think we should be quite cautious because it is just
one province, we do not know how long it is going to last, and
we do not know whether we can replicate that in other parts of
the country? What is your view on the tribal reawakening?
Mr Ainsworth: There has got to
be a silent hope. There is an indication that the people themselves,
on the ground, object to al-Qaeda, in particular, in this case,
so there has to be a silent hope. Whether we can draw too many
conclusions from that that are going to be applicable in different
parts of the country has yet to be seen. Tribal structures in
the more rural areas are a lot stronger than they are in the cities,
where there is an altogether different dynamic that goes on. We
should not dismiss it.
Q163 Willie Rennie: We met Petraeus
when we were out there and I was very impressed then; I thought
he was very competent. I had the feeling, though—and I am
trying not to be a bit like Dad's Army: "We're all
doomed!"—that the die was cast and that we were kind
of going through the motions for the political domestic agenda
back in the States, and that really progress was not going to
be significantly made in the timescales that had been talked about.
Mr Ainsworth: I have not met Petraeus
yet, so I have not been able to get a handle. My visit was confined
to south-east Iraq.
Q164 Chairman: Can we move on to
the issue of Iran? Can you give us a brief assessment of the extent
of Iranian influence in Iraq?
Mr Ainsworth: The influence is
quite strong. It is long-standing. There have always been close
relationships, particularly in the south; there are people who
live on both sides of the border who choose not to recognise the
border, and that has been so for a very long time. There is clear
evidence of malign influence across the border in the Basra area.
There is little doubt, when you look at some of the munitions
that are being used against our people, to kill our people, they
are not being made in garages in down-town Basra; they are coming
from outside the area. We hope that the Iranians will take seriously
the need for their active engagement in the area and their active
effort to prevent the kind of things that are very, very clearly
happening. It cannot be in Iran's long-term interests that we
have got chaos and instability on their border; it has got to
be more important to them in many ways than it is to us. We have
got to use our efforts to try to convince the Iranian Government
that that is the case and that they could do a lot more. It is
certainly the feeling of our people on the ground that there is
lots of activity coming across the border, there is lots of effective
support being given and there needs to be more effort to control
it.
Q165 Chairman: So, clearly, you have
the sense that the Iranians are fuelling the violence. Do you
think that that would continue were multinational forces to leave
the MND (South-East) area?
Mr Ainsworth: I do not think it
would necessarily end. It might (and this is one of the things
that General Mohan says) help him to be able to focus the minds
of the Iraqi Shia in Basra themselves as to where their loyalties
ought to lie, because most of them are loyal to the Iraqi State;
they are fundamentally nationalist in their outlook. Therefore,
if it gives him more space, if he is able to say: "Right,
the British have pulled out of Basra Palace, there is no British
presence in our city now"—if he is able to say that
to elements of the militia and able to say: "What's your
excuse for the continuing violence" then that might give
him the ability to make some progress in some of the dynamics
he is trying to achieve on the ground.
Q166 Chairman: The Iraq Commission
suggests that the UK should seek to promote the constructive engagement
of Iraq's neighbours. Does that mean that you should be talking,
do you think, to the Iranian Government?
Mr Ainsworth: I think we should
talk to the Iranian Government. It is essential that we talk to
the Iranian Government, but I think it is important that the Iraqi
Government talks to the Iranian Government as well, and that they
build a strong relationship. It is one of the most key relationships
in the area, so Iranians can be a force for good. They can also
create a huge problem, and that problem is not going to benefit
them in the long-term. Whether they see it that way I am not at
all sure, but dialogue would do us no harm whatsoever.
Q167 Mr Havard: That leads me on
to the question about the United Nations, because I agree with
all of that and I think the question of how you incentivise the
neighbours in a constructive way to help solve the problem is
a huge discussion. Quite clearly, the military utility of what
we are doing is coming to an end and, therefore, the politics
need to be taken forward. I just love the whole thing, Desmond,
about the benchmarks not being an "optimal" way and
Bernard's contrast of "it's a pile of rubbish"! He has
obviously cancelled his subscription to the American Enterprise
Institute's journals now, which is a good thing.
Mr Ainsworth: That was not what
he was trying to achieve! I did not read it that way, anyway.
Mr Jenkin: It was congressional benchmarks.
Q168 Mr Havard: Yes, written by the
American Enterprise Institute. The criteria by which all these
things are going to be judged in terms, however, is not just in
America; it is going to be in the United Nations because, at the
moment, we have a coalition of the willing, essentially, prosecuting
a UN mandate to help to do two things in Iraq: help the Iraqis
and, also, fight al-Qaeda. The Americans see it as part of, whatever
it is—the War on Terror, or whatever. So there is confusion,
and that confusion will reflect itself within the UN in the renewal
of the mandate discussions before the end of the calendar year,
which are of crucial importance not least to us because it gives
us a legitimacy there both domestically in politics but, also,
practically, on the ground for things like running detention centres
and so on. So how is it going to be internationalised—and
it is going to be highly politicised? Can I just raise a question:
it is not all going to run on the timetable of the renewal of
the next President of America; there is a debate that is going
to involve beyond the coalition of the willing and the Iraqi Government
at that point. What is going to happen in terms of the renewal
of that UN mandate discussion before the end of the calendar year?
Without it what are we going to do then? If we do not get it are
we going to come out?
Mr Ainsworth: I am sorry, Dai,
I am struggling to understand what the question is. The question
is: do we need a renewed mandate? Yes, we do. Can we operate without
one? No, we cannot. So we are operating, as are the Americans,
under a UN mandate that runs out on 31 December and we need a
new mandate. All the rest of it is politics, is it not? We have
our own politics to deal with, the Americans have their politics
to deal with—that is not going to change. However, we need
a new UN mandate and we need that renewed on the 31st.[3]
Q169 Chairman: What will be the factors
in helping to decide whether we get it?
Mr Ainsworth: I would suppose
the factors are going to be the UN's view of what can be achieved
ongoing, the necessity for our continued presence and the continued
powers that they have effectively given us. I do not know what
more I can say, other than those ought to be the factors.
Mr Havard: Can I ask you a direct question?
In a sense, if General Mohan is successful, if the economic engine
of the country, which is the South East, is helped to be secured—all
the attention at the moment is about the nihilistic violence in
Baghdad—is it not the case that, in fact, these questions
about what happens in the South East are actually probably going
to become more important in determining what comes out of that
process (or equally) than some of the things that are happening
in Baghdad?
Q170 Chairman: That is a "Yes"
or "No" question.
Mr Ainsworth: A big part of the
renewal process is going to be the Iraqi Government and whether
or not they see the need for renewal and the method of renewal.
If they want us to continue to do the job that we are doing they
are going to have to support renewal. We hope they do see the
necessity for that.
Q171 Mr Havard: How we configure
ourselves and what we do in that intervening period—whether
it is withdraw troops, come down, move out—is taking on
a different significance, is it not?
Mr Ainsworth: I think that is
not what is steering our policy at the moment. What is steering
our policy at the moment is our assessment of the situation on
the ground in the South East and whether or not we are in a position
to hand over control of that fourth province to the Iraqis. That
is at the forefront. Everybody I talk to—that is what they
are focused on.
Chairman: This is obviously a matter
of great importance to us.
Mr Havard: And General Dannatt's assessment
of whether it will "break" the Army.
Q172 Mr Jenkins: Minister, some simple
questions on equipment. How are the new Mastiffs performing in
theatre? Do you rate them?
Mr Ainsworth: I had an opportunity
to have a look at them and talk to the people who were using them.
They appear to be a pretty impressive piece of kit to me, but,
more importantly, the people who are actually using them have
a high degree of confidence in them; they like what they have
been given; they feel that there is a level of security there
that is fitting to the job that they are being asked to do. So,
yes, they are very, very enthusiastic about not only the Mastiff
but the Bulldog as well.
Q173 Mr Jenkins: Do we have enough
of them?
Mr Ainsworth: Every army would
always like more, but we have got this new kit into the field
pretty quickly. I think that is recognised out there. Certainly
we are able to use it for the operations that are necessary.
Q174 Mr Jenkins: Every army wants
more, as you said, but there is a need to make sure they are provided
with enough to do the job.
Mr Ainsworth: Yes.
Q175 Mr Jenkins: We can replace the
soft-skin vehicles with these vehicles when they are appropriate.
So we have to make sure there are enough of them.
Mr Ainsworth: Outside of those
who involve themselves in these issues there is a notion that
there is a "one size fits all" and that certain of our
vehicles are beyond their sell-by date and have to be replaced
in their entirety. Now, as I have had explained to me over the
last few weeks and graphically on the ground by the people who
are doing these operations, that is not the case; they configure
the operations with the kit that they have got and they use the
appropriate vehicles in the appropriate circumstances. So when
we are sending convoys into Basra there is still a need for Land
Rovers to get in among the small streets in the city itself, but
they are not the front line of the approach. The convoy is constructed
in order to do the job that it is there to do. People feel—or
they certainly said to me—that they have the equipment to
do that; they are able to successfully get into the city, but,
yes, they are still using snatch vehicles, and they are needed
for certain operations.
Q176 Mr Jenkins: That was a full
answer, Minister. Very often when people talk a lot we have to
go back and have a look at what they are saying. I did ask you:
do we have enough? What I wanted to make sure is that we are not
configuring for the equipment we have got, we are configuring
for the job we are trying to undertake. Whilst we accept the Army
has a long tradition of "putting up and doing with"
equipment I want to be sure that we are not exposing them to any
greater risk than their normal job entails by saying: "Yes,
we do have enough, we believe, in theatre at the present time".
Mr Ainsworth: What I got when
I was out there was an enormous amount of pleasure at the amount
of new equipment that had been provided over the period of time.
People were very pleased at what had been got to them. If you
ask them whether or not they could do with some more, I am certain
that they would say that they could.
Mr Jenkins: You say the amount of equipment
we have got there is very appreciable. Good, because we had a
lot of trouble with our urgent operational requirements procedure,
did we not, to start with? It took a few months before we could
get up to speed. Are we satisfied now that it is performing effectively?
Before you tell me it is (which I would expect, at any rate) would
you like to send us a note on how you assess and evaluate the
effectiveness of it, how it was operating 18 months or two years
ago and what improvements have been made since then, so we can
actually see a quantifiable assessment of how effective it has
become.[4]
Chairman: This is the UORs?
Q177 Mr Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Ainsworth: Just because we
are able to raise a UOR and raise a UOR in pretty short order
does not mean to say that, hey presto, off the shelf is the stuff
that we want there and available immediately. Various stuff has
to be procured, it has to be found and it has to be bought and
shipped out to theatre. Everything that I am being told is that
that process is running reasonably smoothly and that we are able
to get the kit out to our people that they need. Everything I
saw on the ground was that they have the kit they need; that there
has been a big improvement over a period of time and they are
very satisfied with the progress that has been made.
Q178 Mr Jenkins: As I said, that
is the answer you would give me—I knew that would be the
answer.
Mr Ainsworth: So why did you ask!
Q179 Mr Jenkins: The question I asked
you is: I believe the situation has improved, but how do you,
as a department, evaluate the performance of raising these orders
and delivering them, and how has it improved over time? That is
all I am asking. If there has been an improvement you must be
able to say with confidence it has delivered—prove it in
figures. That is what I am asking, so I would be very grateful
for a note.
Mr Ainsworth: You would like some
figures?
Mr Jenkins: Yes. The next one is helicopter
availability.
2 See Ev 35 Back
3
Note by Witness: We believe that, given the current tasks and
responsibilities of the Coalition in Iraq, a UN Security Council
resolution provides the most appropriate legal framework and international
legitimacy for the Coalition's presence in Iraq. But should those
tasks and responsibilities change or a different international
political climate emerge, we and our Coalition partners could
seek an alternative legal mechanism, with the agreement with the
Iraqi Government, to enable our forces to remain in Iraq and operate
effectively according to a revised sets of tasks and responsibilities. Back
4
See Ev 36 Back
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