Conclusions and recommendations
The NATO Summit at Bucharest
1. We
do not share the Secretary of State's confidence that the last
NATO Summit at Riga was a success. We recognise that some important
progress was achieved, particularly in endorsing the comprehensive
approach in Afghanistan and in agreeing the Comprehensive Political
Guidance. Nevertheless, we believe that, overall, Riga was a disappointment
and that the forthcoming Summit at Bucharest needs to set a clear
path to achieving far more. (Paragraph 10)
2. The Government's
stated priorities for the Bucharest Summit, and the criteria by
which its success will be judged, are unambitious and disappointingly
vague. They do not provide Parliament with a sufficiently detailed
breakdown of the UK's aspirations which limits our ability to
measure the success of the summit. (Paragraph 13)
3. We are also concerned
that the Government fails to list seeking improvements in the
relationship between NATO and the EU as one of its key priorities
for the summit. We believe that improving that relationship is
essential for the future effectiveness of both NATO and the EU.
(Paragraph 14)
4. We call upon the
Government, in its response to this report, to provide us with
a comprehensive, detailed and frank assessment of the successes
and shortcomings of the Bucharest Summit. (Paragraph 15)
The evolution of NATO's role and purpose
5. The
possibility of a global NATO—with a global mission and global
partnerships—remains deeply contentious within the Alliance.
Agreeing the scope and nature of NATO's mission should, arguably,
be one of the highest priorities at the Bucharest Summit, with
that agreement defined clearly in a new Strategic Concept. (Paragraph
40)
6. Given the global
nature of the threats we face, we believe there is no alternative
to the Alliance fulfilling a global role. Its willingness and
ability to act on a global basis to tackle threats where they
arise is fundamental to NATO's continued relevance. If NATO limits
itself to a regional role in defence of the territory of the North
Atlantic area alone, its value will be diminished, particularly
to the United States, and its future will be in doubt. (Paragraph
41)
Uncertainty about the current role and purpose
of NATO
7. During
the Cold War, defining the role and purpose of NATO was straightforward:
to contain and counter the Soviet threat. In the post-Cold War
world, NATO faces a far more diverse range of security challenges.
As a result, NATO's role and purpose is far harder to define.
Consequently, there is a lack of understanding, amongst the public
in Europe and North America and within the Alliance itself, about
the purpose of NATO in the 21st Century. We call upon the governments
of all NATO countries to do more to explain to their citizens
the relevance of NATO in today's uncertain world. If people do
not understand what NATO is for or why it is important to them,
their support for it will inevitably decline. (Paragraph 50)
The need for a new Strategic Concept
8. We
believe that NATO needs to revise its Strategic Concept as a matter
of the highest priority. The new Concept should define, far more
clearly, the role, purpose and relevance of the Alliance in the
context of today's security challenges. The new Strategic Concept
should also reflect the fact that, in terms of its operations,
NATO is about more than the projection of military force alone;
it is about implementing the Comprehensive Approach, and providing
the stability in post-conflict situations to allow reconstruction
and development to take place. NATO should launch a review of
the Strategic Concept at the forthcoming Bucharest Summit for
agreement at its 60th anniversary summit in 2009. (Paragraph 60)
NATO and the United States
9. United
States support for NATO is fundamental to the continued existence
of the Alliance; without it NATO would become redundant. But the
US will only support NATO if the Alliance serves the national
interests of its members, and particularly the United States.
To remain relevant to the United States, and to demonstrate that
relevance to the American people, the Alliance must be capable
of tackling today's and tomorrow's security challenges. To do
so, NATO must become more capable, more deployable and more flexible,
and the European Allies together need to demonstrate clearly what
they contribute to NATO. (Paragraph 65)
NATO and the UK's national interests
10. We
are committed to NATO and believe it continues to serve the UK's
national interests. The UK's support for the Alliance should not
be uncritical or unquestioning, and there are important areas,
such as force generation, burden-sharing and capabilities, where
NATO must improve. However, we believe NATO remains an indispensable
alliance, the essential embodiment of the transatlantic relationship
and the ultimate guarantor of our collective security. NATO must
remain at the heart of the UK's defence policy. (Paragraph 69)
The NATO mission in Afghanistan
11. The
purpose of the NATO-led ISAF mission is to achieve stability and
security in Afghanistan, to deny al-Qaeda and the Taliban the
environment in which to operate, and to implement the Comprehensive
Approach by delivering the security necessary to enable reconstruction
and development to occur. This requires a sustained, long-term
military and financial commitment by all contributing nations.
(Paragraph 83)
12. There is currently
some disagreement between the NATO allies about the objectives
of the ISAF mission and the means of achieving them. All agree
on the importance of the Comprehensive Approach, but there are
differences in the interpretation of its meaning and implications.
Achieving a common understanding of ISAF's mission in Afghanistan
should be a key priority for NATO at the Bucharest Summit. This
is essential if there is to be greater strategic coherence to
the Alliance's operations. (Paragraph 84)
Force generation in Afghanistan
13. Succeeding
in Afghanistan is, and must remain, at the top of NATO's agenda.
All 26 members of the Alliance contribute to the ISAF mission,
and their efforts—together with those of the 14 non-NATO
nations who participate in ISAF—are vital to the stabilisation
and reconstruction of the country. It is essential the Alliance
works together in delivering the Comprehensive Approach—creating
the secure and stable conditions to enable reconstruction and
development to take place and to allow space for political progress
to be achieved. (Paragraph 92)
14. This also underlines
the importance of clarifying the ISAF mission in a way that is
compatible with the Comprehensive Approach and which all NATO
member states will support. A number of issues need to be urgently
addressed: the appointment of a UN international coordinator,
a divided military command chain, differing perspectives on the
mission amongst ISAF troop contributing nations, confusion about
dealing with narcotics, the effectiveness of the civil aid effort
to win hearts and minds, and corruption within elements of the
Afghan administration. Indeed, a clearer definition of success
in Afghanistan at Bucharest would be extremely welcome. (Paragraph
93)
15. Failure in Afghanistan
would be deeply damaging for the people of that country. It would
have serious implications for the Alliance's cohesion and credibility.
But NATO's continued existence does not depend upon the outcome
of its operations in Afghanistan. In any circumstance it would
have a role because of its command structure, its mechanisms for
harmonising equipment and promoting interoperability between its
members, and its function as a political forum for essential discussions
about defence and security. However, if the Alliance cannot demonstrate
its ability to undertake expeditionary operations, the support
of the United States for NATO over the long-term will be diminished.
(Paragraph 94)
16. NATO has encountered
substantial difficulties in generating sufficient forces for Afghanistan
and there are large disparities in troop contributions between
different members of the Alliance. In some of the larger troop-contributing
nations, there is a perception that the burden in Afghanistan
is not equitably shared and that some countries are making sacrifices
that others are not prepared to accept. (Paragraph 95)
17. We recognise that
not all members of NATO have the capabilities to deploy their
forces on expeditionary operations and that some have found it
hard to obtain the popular or parliamentary support required to
increase their deployments. We welcome, in particular, the pledges
made recently by Denmark and the Netherlands to the ISAF mission
which show how such barriers can be overcome. (Paragraph 96)
18. More troops are
needed in Afghanistan if the ISAF mission is to succeed. We look
to our other allies to make additional contributions where they
can, be it through increased force levels, pledges of military
equipment, or by offsetting the costs of operations. We hope that
further progress in force generation can be achieved at the Bucharest
Summit. Such progress will be essential to the future of the ISAF
mission. (Paragraph 97)
National caveats
19. The
ultimate decision over whether to deploy forces on operations
is, and must remain, a matter for each sovereign member state
of the Alliance. UK Forces are deployed in Afghanistan without
any caveats imposed upon their use, but the public and Parliament
maintain a close interest in how those forces are used. The ability
of any nation to commit its forces on operations is governed by
the willingness of the public to sustain those commitments and
by ability of any nation to sustain expeditionary operations.
However inconvenient, caveats are an inevitable part of military
life. The real challenge is to prevent them from impairing operational
effectiveness. There is no doubt that caveats can have a detrimental
effect on the coherence of NATO's operations. Although some important
progress has been made in removing these restrictions there remains
a long way to go. Further progress is essential at Bucharest.
(Paragraph 111)
20. The debate on
national caveats would benefit from greater clarity about which
countries do and do not impose caveats on their force commitments
to ISAF. We call upon the MoD, in its response to this report,
to provide a full breakdown of the national caveats imposed by
each member of the Alliance on the use of their forces in Afghanistan
and to state which countries impose no restrictions. (Paragraph
112)
Afghanistan and the future of Alliance military
transformation
21. NATO's
experience in Afghanistan since 2003 has served to highlight areas
in which the Alliance needs to improve. It has revealed the need
to equip NATO better for expeditionary operations, to improve
further defence planning and force generation processes, and to
improve significantly its expeditionary military capabilities.
To this extent, Afghanistan has helped to promote the military
transformation of the Alliance, even if there remains a long way
to go. (Paragraph 115)
NATO capabilities and the Bucharest Summit
22. New
commitments to achieve real, tangible improvements in Alliance
capabilities will be a key test of the success of the Bucharest
Summit, but their worth will be measurable only in the light of
their delivery over time. (Paragraph 116)
NATO's principal capability shortfalls
23. NATO
currently faces shortfalls in military capabilities in a range
of areas, most significantly in strategic airlift, reconnaissance,
surveillance and intelligence assets, and interoperable communications.
These capabilities are fundamental to current operations in Afghanistan
and are also crucial if the Alliance is to fulfil its ambition
of having the capacity to conduct future expeditionary operations.
(Paragraph 129)
Political will and Alliance capabilities
24. In
terms of fulfilling its expeditionary role, one of the key capability
shortfalls confronting the Alliance is that of political will.
This, in turn, depends on a perception of a shared danger and
a shared requirement to respond. Expeditionary operations are
predominantly discretionary by nature; there is a choice to be
made about participation in any given mission. Alliance expeditionary
operations, such as the current Afghanistan deployment, must be
underwritten and sustained by the political will of the countries
involved, both individually and collectively. Its absence undermines
the capability of the Alliance. As important as it is to deliver
tangible military capabilities, such as strategic airlift, the
generation of the political will necessary to fulfil its expeditionary
role is the greatest challenge currently facing NATO. (Paragraph
135)
The NATO Response Force
25. The
creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) is a significant achievement
by the Alliance and promises, in theory, to help improve Alliance
capabilities in the long term. However, if the NRF is to be effective
it will be important for the Allies to achieve consensus on when,
where, and why to use it. It is also essential that the force
requirements of the NRF are met in full. (Paragraph 144)
26. We believe NATO
should abandon the present "costs lie where they fall"
arrangement for funding the NRF. We believe an appropriate alternative
would be to finance the NRF through NATO Common Funding. Putting
the NRF on a more stable financial footing is essential if it
is to be an effective force. The current arrangements impose unpredictable
financial burdens on troop contributing nations and act as a significant
political disincentive for deploying the NRF. (Paragraph 145)
The role of Allied Command Transformation
27. The
contribution made to date by Allied Command Transformation to
the improvement of the Alliance's expeditionary capabilities is
difficult to measure. We are also concerned by reports that its
focus on long-term capability development has been overshadowed
by the operational demands of Afghanistan. ACT potentially has
an important role to play in improving NATO capabilities in the
long-term and in developing the Alliance's concepts and doctrines
for the future. As important as current operations in Afghanistan
unquestionably are, ACT must not be diverted from this central
purpose. ACT must also improve its relationship with Allied Command
Operations and with the European Defence Agency. (Paragraph 151)
Defence spending and the future of NATO
28. The
ability of the NATO Alliance to deliver real and lasting improvements
in military capabilities depends on the willingness of Allies
to commit sufficient resources. There can be no greater demonstration
of political will in NATO, or the lack of it, than the amount
of money each member of the Alliance is willing to spend on defence.
There exists a clear, persistent and growing gap in defence expenditure
between the European members of NATO and the United States and
there seems little prospect of this being reversed. (Paragraph
165)
29. Despite a longstanding
commitment by all members of the NATO Alliance to spend a minimum
of 2% of their GDP on defence, only six out of the 24 European
members of NATO actually achieve that target. But defence spending
is not simply about quantity; it is about what the money is spent
on. We believe that in addition to the 2% target the Alliance
should establish detailed capability targets, and timeframes,
against which the performance of Allies could be measured. (Paragraph
166)
30. If the European
members of the Alliance want to be taken seriously, if they want
the United States to remain engaged in, and committed to, NATO,
and if they want greater influence in the overall direction of
Alliance policy, they must commit the necessary resources and
improve their capabilities. We are concerned that an Alliance
with such large, and growing, discrepancies in defence expenditure
will not be sustainable in the long term. (Paragraph 167)
Enlargement and the Bucharest Summit
31. Membership
of the Alliance within the North Atlantic area should continue
to be based on the ability of applicant countries to meet NATO's
performance-based membership criteria rather than the imposition,
by the Alliance, of arbitrary territorial boundaries. Welcoming
new members at the Bucharest Summit, or granting Membership Action
Plans to those who meet NATO's criteria, would be a powerful signal
that the Alliance remains committed to its open door policy. (Paragraph
171)
32. We call upon the
Government to state clearly, in advance of the Bucharest Summit,
which countries it intends to support in their applications for
full membership of NATO and for Membership Action Plans. (Paragraph
172)
Previous enlargements
33. Previous
enlargements of NATO have made an essential contribution to the
development of stability and democracy in Europe. Many of NATO's
newer members have made significant contributions to Alliance
operations and are improving their military capabilities. Equally
importantly, enlargement to date has played an important role
in extending and embedding democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.
(Paragraph 176)
The prospects for further enlargements
34. The
performance of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia in meeting the criteria
for NATO membership will be assessed at the Bucharest Summit.
Providing they meet those criteria there is no reason why they
should not be admitted into the Alliance. (Paragraph 181)
35. Georgia's ambitions
for joining NATO will depend upon its performance in meeting the
Alliance's criteria for participation in a Membership Action Plan.
Although we are not in a position to judge for ourselves whether
Georgia currently meets those criteria, we support, in principle,
its long-term ambition to join the Alliance. (Paragraph 189)
36. Before joining
NATO, Georgia must demonstrate clearly and unambiguously the strength
of its commitment to democracy and further democratic and political
reform. It must also work to resolve the conflicts in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, though much depends on the willingness of Russia
to play a constructive role. For NATO, there are real and legitimate
concerns about admitting a country with unresolved conflicts within
its borders. But if NATO insists upon the resolution of the conflicts
before Georgia is allowed to join NATO, this will effectively
hand Russia a veto over Georgian membership of the Alliance. (Paragraph
190)
37. Although Ukraine
has indicated its desire to be considered for a Membership Action
Plan, it seems highly unlikely that NATO will decide to make such
an offer at the Bucharest Summit. The Ukrainian population is,
at best, seriously divided on joining NATO and, at worst, opposed.
For NATO to accept as a new member a country whose population
did not support such membership would in our judgement exacerbate
the problems considered earlier in this report. While in principle,
if Ukraine demonstrates its commitment to the principles of the
Alliance and fulfils the criteria for membership outlined by NATO,
the Alliance should consider an application for membership, that
application should in the longer term be determined only after
great weight has been given to the wishes of the people of Ukraine.
(Paragraph 195)
The future of the Alliance's open door policy
38. NATO
should continue to be open to the acceptance of new members in
the Euro-Atlantic area. The promise of NATO membership provides
the Alliance with a means of encouraging countries on its borders
to embrace internal democratic reform and the reform of their
armed forces; it is a powerful tool of defence diplomacy. However,
it is important that as new members join the Alliance they bring
with them additional capabilities or, at the least, a commitment
that would add to NATO's capabilities in future. New members cannot
only be consumers of security; they must also contribute to the
common defence. (Paragraph 199)
39. Membership of
NATO should continue to be performance-based; if a country meets
the criteria for membership, it should be permitted to join. We
believe it is essential that NATO's open door policy is maintained
on this basis. Ending the Alliance's open door policy on membership
is not in the interests of the Alliance itself or European stability
as a whole. Signalling that the Alliance has reached its outer
limits, or ruling out further expansion, would consign those countries
left outside NATO's borders to an uncertain future, potentially
creating instability on the Alliance's Eastern fringes. Perpetuating
this instability is not in the interests of any member of the
NATO Alliance. (Paragraph 200)
NATO Partnerships
40. NATO
should continue to work closely with nations beyond its borders
and should work to enhance further its relationships with Australia,
New Zealand and Japan. Formalising the relationship between NATO
and these countries is desirable, but this need not involve full
membership of the Alliance. Extending full NATO membership beyond
the Euro-Atlantic area carries distinct risks; there is a danger
it could dilute the coherence of the Alliance, create yet more
questions about its role and purpose, or complicate decision-making.
However, NATO should continue to embrace the concept of global
partnerships and seek to intensify cooperation with like-minded
allies. (Paragraph 210)
The development of the European Security and Defence
Policy
41. EU
Battlegroups are a significant innovation and promise, in theory,
to improve European capabilities, force generation and interoperability.
Given the poor level of European capabilities and the difficulties
encountered in generating sufficient forces for Afghanistan, such
improvements can only be welcome and would represent a significant
capability gain. A key test of whether Battlegroups represent
a useable military capability will be the ability of these force
packages to fight, but, as in Afghanistan, this requires a level
of political will on the part of the troop-contributing nations
that may not exist. We also doubt whether the creation of Battlegroups
will lead to any increases in European defence budgets, which
is the key to improving military capabilities. (Paragraph 233)
42. The fact that
EU Battlegroups are intended to perform some of the more robust
elements of the Petersburg Tasks suggests some degree of overlap
of role and responsibility with the NATO Response Force. Any duplication
must be avoided. However, if Battlegroups help European nations
to improve significantly their force generation processes, this
is likely to help NATO meet the force requirements of the NRF.
(Paragraph 234)
43. The EDA potentially
has an important role to play in improving European capabilities,
but the suggestion that the Agency lacks structure and orientation
is worrying. The EDA should focus more narrowly on delivering
real improvements in capabilities, interoperability and deployability.
For the EDA to make a really useful contribution, it needs to
be integrated with NATO's effort in this area, so interoperability
extends throughout the EU and NATO. Yet, in light of its limited
resources, we are not convinced that it can make a great difference.
(Paragraph 243)
44. We believe it
is essential that, in promoting the development of European capabilities,
the EDA should not duplicate the work of NATO's Allied Command
Transformation. The Defence Procurement Code of Conduct must not
become a vehicle for European protectionism by excluding American
products. (Paragraph 244)
45. Turkey's exclusion
from membership of the European Defence Agency is deeply regrettable.
Turkey has an enormous amount it could contribute to Europe's
capabilities and its defence spending is among the highest of
all NATO states. We believe Turkey should be admitted to the EDA
as a matter of priority. (Paragraph 246)
The relationship between NATO and the EU
46. A
close relationship between NATO and the EU is essential. The lack
of it is inexcusable given the importance of NATO to EU security.
In practice, the relationship between NATO and the EU is fraught
with difficulties. It is plagued by mistrust and unhealthy competition,
and characterised by a lack of communication and cooperation.
Little progress has been achieved in recent years in improving
a relationship which remained stalled and inefficient. (Paragraph
250)
47. There is a pressing
need for a stronger, expanded and more cooperative relationship
between NATO and the EU. This is essential for both organisations.
(Paragraph 264)
48. We do not believe
a grand bargain between NATO and the EU in which NATO provides
the hard power and the EU a soft alternative is either feasible
or desirable. It would be the antithesis of the comprehensive
approach which is so vital to current operations, such as Afghanistan.
Nor do we believe that NATO should be confined merely to territorial
defence of the Euro-Atlantic area. (Paragraph 265)
49. We believe improving
the NATO-EU relationship should be a key priority for NATO at
the Bucharest Summit. Although the relationship is unlikely to
improve radically in the short-term, the Summit represents an
opportunity to set a new long-term course in NATO-EU relations.
This should involve an expanded strategic dialogue between NATO
and the EU, possibly by reinvigorating the contacts between the
North Atlantic Council and the EU's Political and Security Committee,
and by identifying a series of small-scale and pragmatic initiatives
to foster greater trust and cooperation between the two organisations.
(Paragraph 266)
The Lisbon Treaty and the future of NATO and European
defence
50. The
provisions for permanent structured cooperation in the Lisbon
Treaty promise to enhance European defence capabilities and expenditure.
If the Treaty can deliver such long overdue improvements, which
can be called on for EU and NATO missions, they can only be welcome.
Improving military capabilities throughout Europe is in the interests
not only of the EU but also of NATO. However, we remain to be
convinced that PSC will deliver such improvements in practice.
European nations have so far shown little appetite in investing
sufficiently in defence. (Paragraph 274)
51. It is essential
that permanent structured cooperation does not lead to the development
of a two—or three—tier Europe in defence matters.
This would be counter to the interests of NATO. (Paragraph 275)
52. How permanent
structured cooperation will work in practice remains unclear.
We call upon the MoD, in its response to this report, to state
clearly how it expects PSC to work in practice. (Paragraph 276)
53. The establishment
of an EU mutual defence clause by the Lisbon Treaty overlaps,
to some extent, with the provisions of Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty. This should be clarified at Bucharest. Although
this ensures that non-NATO members of the EU are now committed
to each other's defence, we believe it is essential that nothing
in the Treaty undermines the primacy of NATO for its members.
There must be no unnecessary duplication of commitments or roles
which undermine the common defence. (Paragraph 281)
54. We believe that
the key test of the Lisbon Treaty will be the extent to which
it makes a real difference in increasing European military capabilities,
which so starkly lag behind those of the United States, and in
improving the deployability of European forces. We are sceptical
that the Treaty will itself achieve such improvements. This requires
European countries to decide to spend more o n defence—decisions
they have so far been reluctant to take. (Paragraph 282)
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