Examination of Witnesses (Question Numbers
1-19)
RT HON
JOHN HUTTON
MP, LIEUTENANT GENERAL
PETER WALL
CBE, RT HON
DAVID MILIBAND
MP AND SIR
MARK LYALL
GRANT
28 OCTOBER 2008
Q1 Chairman: Good afternoon everybody.
Will members of the public please switch off their mobile phones
or put them on silent mode? This afternoon, we have a joint session
of the Select Committees on Defence and on Foreign Affairs. We
did the same thing about a year and a half ago, with the then
Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, and the then Defence Secretary,
Des Browne. Today, we are delighted to have with us two Secretaries
of State who are new to the joint session. I understand that this
is the Defence Secretary's first appearance before the Defence
Select Committee. You have the bonus of the Foreign Affairs Committee
as well—so, welcome to you. The Foreign Secretary is well
known at least to us on the Foreign Affairs Committee, and we
welcome you once again. I also thank your colleagues, Lieutenant
General Wall and Mr Lyall Grant, for joining us today. This question
and answer session focuses specifically on Iraq and Afghanistan.
We might stray on to some related issues, but we will try hard
to focus on those two areas. Let me begin by asking about Iraq.
What is your assessment of the current security situation in Iraq
generally and in the area around Basra where our British forces
are?
John Hutton: Thank you for that
introduction, Mike. I was in Basra last week, so I can report
what I saw for myself in and around the city. In the context of
Basra and the southern part of Iraq, the security situation is
probably better than it has been for some considerable time. Committee
members will be very aware of the reasons for that. The security
situation generally in the south of Iraq is significantly better.
That has been brought about by a combination of reasons, and UK
forces have played a sterling role in bringing about that transformed
situation. Operation Charge of the Knights was a critical event,
as were the Sons of Iraq, the Awakening movement and efforts at
political reconciliation and broadening the depth and base of
Iraqi civil society. There is no doubt in my mind that the situation
in and around Basra has been completely transformed. I was able
to spend an afternoon in Basra. I sat down and had tea, coffee
and dates with local Basrans, while my security was provided entirely
by Iraqi security forces. There are reasons for us to be optimistic
and confident about the security situation in Iraq generally and
particularly in the south. That is not to say that al-Qaeda and
the other militias do not continue to pose a real and serious
threat, because they do. We know, for example, that they are capable
of launching spectacular untargeted attacks against civilian populations,
but the general situation is better than it has been for several
years. That gives us all grounds for optimism and confidence about
the future direction of policy in Iraq.
Q2 Chairman: Foreign Secretary, do
you wish to add anything?
David Miliband: No, I agree with
that.
Q3 Sir Menzies Campbell: For how
long do you expect the present level of British troops to be maintained
in Basra?
John Hutton: For as long as is
necessary on the basis of the advice that we receive from our
military commanders on the ground. In his statement to the House
in July, the Prime Minister made it clear what the two significant
roles for British forces now are in Iraq. We must complete the
training and mentoring of the Iraqi 14th Army Division. That work
is progressing well. It is a capable unit that is taking on more
and more front-line security responsibilities. I met the commanding
officer, who is a very fine man with very capable commanders.
Our military transition teams on the ground are doing a fantastic
job of working with and helping the 14th Division to take on an
increasing security responsibility. That work is going well and
will be linked to the advice that we receive. The work will be
largely completed by early next year. The other principal role
and mission is to complete the handover of Basra International
airport. I hope, touch wood, that that will be largely completed
by the end of the year. Our security presence in the south of
Iraq is conditional on the situation on the ground, but, as the
Prime Minister said in July, we can look forward to a significant
change of mission for UK forces in Iraq during the first half
of next year. That remains on track.
Q4 Sir Menzies Campbell: My difficulty
with that answer is that the word "necessary" is capable
of subjective meaning and interpretation. What is the Government's
definition of what is necessary, if that is the target for the
maintenance of the existing level of troops? What is necessary
in that context?
John Hutton: I do not think that
it is entirely subjective. The two principal missions that we
are there to fulfil—the completion of the training of Iraqi
security forces in the south and the handover of Basra International
airport—will be met by objective criteria. We will work
closely with the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi security forces
on both of those things. We have no intention of maintaining forces
in Iraq other than those necessary for the completion of the mission
that we have set out. Last week in Baghdad I spoke to the Iraqi
Defence Minister Abd al-Qadir about what might be an ongoing role
for UK forces as we move to a more normal, bilateral defence relationship
with the sovereign state of Iraq. I assure hon Members and the
public that our mission is clear. It will be completed, I hope,
in the early part of next year. The only sensible caveat for me
to put on the table is the obvious point about security conditions
on the ground. If the security environment were to deteriorate,
we would have to look seriously at all those issues. At the moment
we are on track and we have two finite and clear missions that
are progressing well. We hope that in the early part of next year,
we can make significant decisions about UK force levels in Iraq.
Q5 Sir Menzies Campbell: May I
assume from that answer that if the next general election were
held in 2010 on the last day possible, we could expect British
forces to have been substantially withdrawn from Basra?
John Hutton: Yes.
Q6 Sir Menzies Campbell: Is it
conceivable that the present Government would wish to fight that
election without British forces having been withdrawn from Basra?
John Hutton: Well, that question
is probably above my pay grade in government.
Sir Menzies Campbell: Do not sell yourself
short, Secretary of State.
David Miliband: It sounds like
a bid to come on to our campaign committee. We will certainly
consider all your suggestions for our campaign strategy. Surely
the important point is that we move as a country from thinking
about Iraq in terms of Basra's security and the role of our forces
there, towards thinking about a security strategy and an economic
and political strategy for the whole of Iraq—its diverse
regions, north and south, as well as in the centre and Baghdad.
That is the transition to a "normal" relationship that
one would like to have with a range of friendly countries. It
is a significant step and will mean that the debate on Iraq moves
to a broader base.
Q7 Mr Arbuthnot: Secretary of
State, in view of what you have said about staying for as long
as is necessary, how did you react to the Iraqi Prime Minister's
comment, "I think that their stay is not necessary for maintaining
security and control"?
John Hutton: I had the chance
to meet Prime Minister al-Maliki when I was in Baghdad last week
and I raised the issue directly with him. He is obviously aware
of the mission and the role that we have, together, set for UK
forces in Iraq. Completing that mission is something that he wants
us to do—training the 14th Division and the transfer of
Basra International airport. So he is completely satisfied with
role and the mission of UK forces. We are capable, given the force
deployment that we have there, of supporting Iraqi security forces
in hard operations, if that is necessary. But we are at one about
the next few months on what the UK forces should be doing and
on how we are working with our Iraqi partners in preparing the
ground for this fundamental change of mission. I take from the
conversation that I had with the Prime Minister nothing other
than a union of minds and an agreed position about what UK forces
are doing and how we can work together for the significant change
of mission next year. There is nothing between the Prime Minister
and Government in Iraq and the points that our Prime Minister
made in the House in July.
Q8 Mr Arbuthnot: Really?
John Hutton: Yes.
Q9 Mr Arbuthnot: It sounds a bit
strange when you say that it is necessary to keep forces into
the new year and he says it is not.
John Hutton: The point that I
am trying to make, James, is that, in order to complete the two
missions that I have described, that is going to be necessary.
So on that basis we have a union of minds between ourselves and
the Iraqis on the current level of UK forces.
Q10 Mr Arbuthnot: How did you
react to his comment that the British troops stayed away from
the confrontation, giving the gangs and militia the chance to
control the city? Did you find that a bit strange, as we did?
John Hutton: Yes. It is not true
to say that UK forces did not help and support Charge of the Knights;
we did. We provided substantial support for those operations,
which the general might want to enumerate. Our withdrawal from
Basra city was done in and with the full agreement of the Iraqi
Government and our coalition partners. My view on all those matters
remains as I said in my opening remarks. I think that UK forces
have played a sterling role in making progress in dealing with
the security problems in and around Basra. British forces need
and deserve credit, not criticism, for that work.
Q11 Mr Arbuthnot: I agree with
that, but do you think that, in what he said, he was perhaps displaying
over-confidence that might make a new status of forces agreement
that much more difficult, both for the British to create with
Iraq and for the United States to create with Iraq?
John Hutton: I very much hope
not, because we need such an agreement. Again, I raised that point
specifically with the Prime Minister and his colleagues when I
was in Baghdad last week. I can relay to Committee members the
clear view of the Prime Minister of Iraq, which is that it will
be necessary to reach an appropriate agreement before the end
of the UN mandate at the end of the year. That was his clear view,
expressed to me, and we obviously welcome that. There has to be
a proper understanding about the legal framework within which
UK and coalition forces operate in Iraq as we approach the end
of the year. It would not be sensible for there to be any problem
in reaching an agreement in the appropriate time scale. I did
not detect—again, I have to tell the Committee how I saw
it and how it appeared to me, on the ground—anything other
than a willingness on the part of the Iraqi authorities to reach
an agreement that is acceptable to both sides in an appropriate
time frame.
Q12 Mr Jenkin: Would not it be
true to say that, however brilliant our armed forces have been
in Basra, the limitation on the size of the deployment, and on
some of the things that they were allowed to do for political
reasons, has tested the patience of the Baghdad Government and
of our American allies in Baghdad, which is why the conclusion
now is that, sizeable as our footprint is there, it is really
just too small to make a practical impact in terms that Baghdad
feels and understands? That was particularly evident when, during
Charge of the Knights, we did not feel we had the capacity to
deploy on to the streets of Basra when the Americans did.
John Hutton: No, I do not agree
with that. I think that our forces and the size of our deployment
in Iraq and around Basra now are appropriate for the mission that
they are discharging. I also do not believe that it is true or
a fair presentation to say that the UK made a minimal or ineffective
contribution to Charge of the Knights or in any way contributed
to the deterioration of security in and around Basra. I do not
accept those criticisms at all. As far as our coalition partners
are concerned, we act in close co-operation and agreement with
them about tactics and deployments. We have done so throughout
the period that you have described, Bernard, and we will continue
to work closely with our allies on all those points to ensure
that our mission is effective in Iraq. It has to succeed, it is
succeeding and I believe that UK forces on the ground in Basra
continue to discharge their role and function with extraordinary
professionalism, which I am sure that everyone in this Committee
and in the country will be proud of.
Q13 Mr Jenkin: Nobody doubts the
last point; that is not the point at issue. However, there is
a sense that British armed forces in Basra have not been fully
in the loop of decision making in Baghdad. For example, can you
tell us the date on which British armed forces in Basra were informed
about Charge of the Knights?
John Hutton: That might be something
that General Wall will address.
Lieutenant General Wall: Operation
Charge of the Knights is something that we could spend a lot of
time on. We found out about the operation at approximately the
same time that General Petraeus discovered it. It was a hastily
put together operation, as we all know. Fortuitously, it turned
out to be very successful. I think that, as it unfolded, we were
probably apprehensive that it would not work as well as it has.
In fact, it has changed the landscape in Basra very considerably,
and you have seen that for yourselves. We could get into a lengthy
discourse about what happened on the day; the extent to which
British people were bypassed and then pulled into the conduct
of the operation, and the extent to which American people, who
were mentoring the Iraqi formations that were brought down to
Basra to increase the size of Iraqi forces there to make the operation
a success, were actually outpaced by the speed at which the Iraqis
themselves moved and took a bit of time to catch up. We could
go into all of that. The fact is that, as the Secretary of State
has articulated, we now have an extremely vibrant relationship
between our forces and the Iraqi 14th Division and a number of
other Iraqi agencies around Basra. That relationship is bought
into completely by General Austin, the corps commander, and General
Odierno, the force commander who recently succeeded General Petraeus,
who himself opined that the way that our forces had tailored themselves
to the post-Operation Charge of the Knights situation in Basra
was a model for the conduct of the mentoring of Iraqi forces around
the rest of the country. So, I do not think that we have anything
to be circumspect about in that respect. I think that the size
of the force that we have is entirely appropriate for the task
that we are seeking to complete. The assessment of the Iraqi 14th
Division is very positive. Those who have been down there recently
and had a chance to say, "Look at the situation three months
ago and compare it with what's going on now", will have seen
an exponential increase in the confidence and competence of the
Iraqi 14th Division. Things are set fair for our aspirations,
as articulated by the Prime Minister in July, to be delivered
in the fairly near future.
Q14 Robert Key: May I return briefly
to the status of forces agreement? Are we negotiating that agreement
unilaterally, or in parallel with the United States? Will we have
to wait for the United States to conclude their agreement before
we conclude ours? Please could you explain how the agreement is
operating, because there are only eight weeks to go?
John Hutton: We are discussing
that agreement with the Iraqi Government, in parallel with the
discussions that they are having with the Americans. We intend
to use the basic text that is being settled between the Iraqis
and the US forces as the basis upon which we ourselves would reach
an agreement with the Iraqis.
Q15 Robert Key: How will that
affect the coalition navies—the Royal Navy, the US Navy
and of course the Australian Navy—that are, of course, fulfilling
a vital role at the moment in securing the waterways and also
in training the Iraqi navy? Do you anticipate that our British
naval forces will stay in those waters after the withdrawal of
the British Army?
John Hutton: The agreement would
cover the Iraqi territorial waters, of course, and we will obviously
have discussions with the Iraqis about the precise nature and
mission in support of the Iraqi Navy. However, the status of forces
agreement will have to be comprehensive and cover every territorial
dimension.
Q16 Mr Keetch: I want to ask a
question about what we have heard from my colleagues about the
sense that British forces were bypassed and that the Iraqi Prime
Minister said that he wants them to leave the country. My constituents
ask—I am sure that all constituents ask this—"What
are we still doing there?" If our mission is only to train,
which is important, and to do movement of the air base, would
it not be better to take the troops and put them into Afghanistan,
where they are needed all the time?
John Hutton: I dare say that we
shall talk about Afghanistan in more detail in a second, but the
force levels in and around Basra are necessary for the completion
of the mission in the context that I have described. Assuming
that we are successful in the two outstanding missions and, as
we begin to draw down our forces, which I hope that we shall be
able to do early and into next year, what then happens to the
forces is a decision that we shall have to make. As for deployments
into Afghanistan, if that were an issue, we would turn to our
military advisers for advice on whether additional forces were
needed in Afghanistan and, if so, what additional forces. There
is a strong case to be made for additional helicopter assets in
Afghanistan, and obviously there is the opportunity to transfer
the Merlin fleet from Iraq for those purposes. There is an obvious
need for more helicopter assets in the theatre at Helmand and
across Afghanistan as a whole, but we have not made decisions
about future and further UK troop deployments into Afghanistan.
As for Iraq, we are focused on completing the mission and getting
the guys home as soon as that is possible.
David Miliband: Chairman, I wonder
whether there is not a missing element in some of our discussion
on the three issues that have been raised so far, such as the
decision in December in respect of provincial Iraqi control. The
whole purpose of provincial Iraqi control was to set the stage
for Iraqis to make decisions about their own force deployments
and the promotion of security. I am sure on the Defence Select
Committee—certainly on the foreign affairs side—there
were extensive debates in the run-up to December about the basis
on which the provincial Iraqi control decision would be taken.
Was it one that included the Americans? Was it one that included
the Iraqis? The answer is both cases was yes. Was it based on
objective criteria? Yes. Of course, the most extensive discussion
was whether it would work. When British forces vacated the Basra
palace, would it be maintained by Iraqi security forces or would
it be overrun by militia forces? That decision was taken very
carefully and it was taken rightly, as has now been proved, because
the training of the 10th Division of the Iraqi army and the partial
training of the 14th Division had built up Iraqi capacity to such
an extent that they were able to make key decisions and take control
of their own affairs. That does not mean that the work is complete,
because there remains the work with the Iraqi 14th Division and
the airport work. It is important to say that, in respect of Operation
Charge of the Knights and whatever the ins and outs of who knew
what, and when, it is significant that, after 15 December, we
wanted the Iraqis to take those sorts of decisions.
Chairman: We will come to some of the
political issues in a minute, but on this area I call Dai Havard.
Q17 Mr Havard: Can I return to
the status of forces agreement? If there is not one, the UN mandate
expires and there is nothing. Is there a prospect of that being
extended? In all the discussions, we have been running a detention
facility, part of which has been an internment facility. In terms
of the legality of the process of our people on the ground, how
is that being catered for in the discussions, and should there
not be a status of forces agreement, how will that be protected?
John Hutton: There has to be an
understanding between ourselves and Iraq about the status of our
forces come the end of the year. That was the view of the Prime
Minister of Iraq, and it is also our view. As I said in relation
to Robert's question, we are proceeding with detailed negotiations
that started after my visit to Baghdad last week to agree terms
of reference points on the compass with the Iraqi Government about
what a UK SOFA would cover. That work is under way and, as I said,
we would use the Iraqi-US text as the benchmark for a UK-Iraq
status of forces agreement. Obviously, if we get closer and closer
to the end of the year and a status of forces agreement does not
look like it is materialising, we will have to look at other options,
including the prospect of the roll over of the UN mandate. Clearly,
we should conduct the negotiations with the Iraqis in good faith.
The Iraqis are very clear and were very clear to me and the Prime
Minister that an agreement has to be reached before the end of
the UN mandate. We are proceeding on that basis. In the situation
you also referred to, Dai, in the context of detention, we have
two detainees. Obviously the legality of that detention has to
be properly secured. We would like to return those two to the
appropriate jurisdiction of the Iraqi criminal courts. They are
accused of murdering two British soldiers several years ago. Their
families and all of us in this country want those people to stand
trial for the murder of two British servicemen. As members of
the Committee will be aware, there is legal action in the court
to test the legality of the transfer of those two detainees into
the Iraqi criminal courts. I hope that we can find a way of resolving
that pretty quickly. The families need to see justice done. We
have clear assurances from the Iraqis about how those two detainees
will be treated. We have a clear understanding about the applicability
of the death penalty, but I think very, very strongly—it
is impossible to put this into words—it is time these two
stood trial. That is what we must focus on. Assuming that we can
get these issues resolved and the two transferred to Iraqi criminal
jurisdiction, we will have no detainees in Iraq.
Q18 Sir John Stanley: When the
sum is finally made of the political benefits or otherwise of
our entry into Iraq, it will rest for most people on what has
happened to human rights. It is not difficult to think of some
very big human rights pluses as a result of the removal of the
nasty, semi-terrorist, one-party regime of Saddam Hussein, but
equally some glaring minuses have occurred. Hundreds of thousands
of innocent Iraqis have lost their lives; millions have been turned
into refugees; religious minorities, not least the Christians,
who were tolerated under Saddam Hussein, are now persecuted and
terrorised; women's rights have gone backwards; and large numbers
of the population have been exposed to rampant criminality. What
confidence do you have, Foreign Secretary, that when we leave
we will, in human rights terms, be able to say that we have left
Iraq better than we found it?
David Miliband: It is important
to try to disaggregate different aspects and to look at different
parts of the community. If you go to Erbil and talk to the people
there about the sense of security that the Kurds feel in the north
of Iraq, you will get a very clear picture of the improvement
in their human rights and their position. If you talk to people
caught up in the sectarian feuding in Baghdad, you will obviously
get a different impression. The commitment to an inclusive political
system is very strong. The fact that Iraq is helped by the huge
revenues that are coming from increasing oil production encourages
the spirit of compromise. The legislative achievements over the
past three or four months, notably in respect of provincial elections
and other provincial powers, suggest that although you are right
to say that the historical ledger will be balanced and there will
be some very negative things on the ledger, equally there will
be some significantly positive aspects on it, too. I have always
said that, in the end, our job is not to review the rights and
wrongs of the past five years; it is to make sure that the next
five years take forward the positive trends and tackle the negative
ones—we have to be open about the fact that there are negative
trends as well as positive ones. Not only on the security side,
but on the political and economic side there are positive trends
on which to build and, gradually, they can surpass the negative
ones.
Q19 Sir John Stanley: Taking your
invitation to look forward, what confidence do you have that the
half of the population that is female will fare better under a
Shi'a Government in Iraq than under the secular Government that
preceded it?
David Miliband: The greatest protection
is the equal rights that they are afforded under the Iraqi constitution.
It is vital that we ensure that that is followed through in all
of our dealings with the Iraqi Government—and, it should
be said, in our dealings with Iraq's neighbours, too. That is
part of the geopolitics aspect, and it is relevant. The stability
of Iraq depends in part on the way its neighbours engage, but
the greatest protection for women or for minorities in Iraq—Kurds,
Christians and others—comes from their constitutional status
and the ability of the Iraqi state to enforce those rights.
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