House of Commons - Defence - Fourteenth Report

Select Committee on Defence Fourteenth Report

2 Recruitment and Retention overview

14. The target number of military personnel in the Armed Forces is based on a forecast of the military force that will be required in the future. These forecasts are set out in the Defence Planning Assumptions. The last major review of Defence Planning Assumptions, and therefore of the structure and size of the Armed Forces, took place in 2004 in the White Paper, Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities.[16] That policy review, in conjunction with an analysis of the Armed Forces equipment programme, led the MoD to conclude that a smaller, lighter and more capable force would create better policy outcomes.[17] It announced that:

as a norm, and without creating overstretch, we should be able to mount: an enduring medium scale operation, simultaneously with an enduring small scale operation; and a one-off small scale intervention operation;
we should be able to reconfigure our forces rapidly to carry out: the enduring medium scale operation and an enduring small scale operation simultaneously with a limited duration medium scale intervention operation; and
given time to prepare, we should be capable of undertaking: a demanding one-off large scale operation while still maintaining a commitment to, a simple small scale peace support operation.[18]

15. The Defence Intent for Reserves—based on the Defence Planning Assumptions—identified three key roles for Reserves:

to provide additional military capability for large scale operations;
to augment and reinforce Regular Forces on enduring operations that are small or medium scale where Defence Planning Assumptions have been exceeded; and
to provide specialist capabilities not available in the Regular Forces as and when required for all types of operation.[19]

16. Table 1 shows the Regular Forces personnel requirements, derived from the Defence Planning Assumptions, since 2004. Between 1 April 2004 and 1 April 2008, as a result of a series of managed restructuring and efficiency programmes, the required number of personnel has fallen across the Armed Forces by 8.23%. The Naval Service requirement has reduced by 6.35%, the Army requirement has reduced by 4.62%, and the RAF requirement, subject to the largest restructuring programme, has fallen by 17.4%.

Table 1: Regular military manpower requirement

2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08

Naval Service 38,720 38,190 36,830 36,800 36,260

Army 106,730 104,170 101,800 101,800 101,800

RAF 49,890 48,730 47,290 45,020 41,210

Total Regular Force
Requirement
195,340 191,090 185,920 183,620 179,270

Source: Ministry of Defence * Reductions in numbers of Service personnel during this period are the result of managed restructuring and efficiency programmes

17. Reserve Forces are an integral part of the MoD's capability plans and contribute significantly to operations at home and abroad. During the last 10 years, approximately 10% of all forces deployed on operations have been Reservists.[20] After leaving Service life, former members of the Regular Armed Forces—the Regular Reserves—have a liability to be mobilised. Volunteer Reservists typically train in their spare time; in the evenings and weekends and at an annual two week training camp.[21] All Reservists have a liability to be deployed alongside Regular Forces, although the MoD endeavours to mobilise only willing Reservists and to deploy Reservists no more than one year out of five.[22] Regular Reserve strength and Volunteer Reserve requirements since 2004 are set out in Tables 2 and 3.

Table 2: Regular Reserve strength

Regular Reserves 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07

Naval Service 10,700 10,530 10,400 9,600

Army 31,220 31,420 32,100 33,800

RAF 9,520 8,440 7,800 7,300

Total Regular Reserves 51,440 50,390 50,300 50,700

Source: Ministry of Defence

Table 3: Volunteer Reserve Military manpower requirement

Volunteer Reserves 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08

Naval Service 3,820 3,740 3,040 2,940 2,360

Army 30,270 30,270 30,270 30,270 30,270

RAF 2,220 2,215 2,210 2,100 2,000

Total Volunteer Reserve Requirement 36,310 36,225 35,520 35,310 34,630

Source: Ministry of Defence

Assessing recruitment and retention performance

18. The MoD assesses its performance relating to recruitment and retention against the 2004 Spending Review Public Service Agreement (PSA) Target 5, "to recruit, train, motivate and retain sufficient military personnel to provide the military capability necessary to meet the Government's strategic objectives". In 2006-07, the MoD assessed Target 5 as "on course with some risk".[23] The MoD recently said that the target was "likely only to be partially met" in 2007-08.[24]

19. The MoD manages recruitment and retention against a regular turnover of personnel entering and leaving the Services. It achieves a more detailed assessment of performance against PSA Target 5 by collecting the following data (although performance is assessed solely against meeting the manning balance target):[25]

recruitment: the number of civilians joining the Armed Forces;
gains to the trained strength: personnel who have completed Phase 2 training and have the necessary skills to join their chosen trade or specialisation on the front line;
manning balance: a tolerance band of +1% to -2% of the trained strength requirement; and
voluntary outflow rates: the number of personnel who choose to leave the Armed Forces before the end of their engagement.

We review information about each of these points below.

20. Data relating to the recruitment and retention of Volunteer Reservists does not contribute to the assessment of the MoD's PSA Target 5 and is not presented alongside data about the Regular Forces in the MoD's performance reports.

RECRUITMENT TARGETS

21. The MoD measures recruitment at the point at which a recruit begins initial training.[26] All three Services recruit against targets and have been relatively successful in an increasingly challenging recruiting environment. Figures 1 and 2 summarises each Service's performance against its target. The Naval Service (Royal Navy and Royal Marines) met, or came within 2% of its recruiting targets between 1 April 2002 and 1 April 2006. However, during 2006-07, recruitment fell 6% below target. The Army met or exceeded its recruitment targets in four out of the last six years, falling 4% below target in 2004-05 and 5% below target in 2005-06. Since 2001 the RAF has consistently failed to meet its recruitment targets, falling between 9% to 11% below target in four out of the last six years.

Figure 1: Tri-service and Army intake to UK regular forces from civilian life against target since 2001

Figure 2: Naval Service and RAF intake to UK regular forces from civilian life against target since 2001

22. In its Recruitment and Retention in the Armed Forces report, the NAO provides several examples of how cutbacks in recruiting activity or failure to meet recruitment targets can have long term consequences. A downturn in recruitment to the Army between 1992-1995 led to a serious shortfall in personnel in the Army's Recovery Mechanic trade. The Army's decision to reduce its marketing activity when there was considerable interest in enlisting in the Army was "one of the factors which has contributed to the current recruiting problems in the Infantry".[27] Reducing recruitment activity also has serious consequences on experience levels in the Armed Forces; "reduced intake [between 1992-2003 and 1995-2006 has] created a gap in required experience profiles across the Royal Navy…the effects of which will be felt for around 20 years as personnel move through the rank structure".[28] We discuss the recruiting context, the current recruiting environment, and specific recruiting strategies in Part 3 of our Report.

GAINS TO THE TRAINED STRENGTH

23. The MoD defines gains to the trained strength as personnel who have successfully completed the necessary training to begin employment in their chosen trade or specialisation.[29] On enlistment all recruits go through Phase 1 training, a 12 week course in basic military skills. Phase 2 training provides specialist training and can vary in length according to specialisation—lasting from a few weeks to over a year.[30] The MoD sets targets for gains to the trained strength which are based on a detailed assessment of the number of trained recruits required by each Service each year.[31] Figure 3 shows the MoD's performance since 1 April 2005. The RAF exceeded its targets for both officers and other ranks in 2006. In 2007 results fell by 22% for officers and 19% for other ranks. The outturns predicted for 2008 show some signs of improvement but are still well below target. The outturn for the Naval Service is similarly inconsistent with a 21% variation in the officers cadre over the period and a 17% variation in the other ranks cadre. The Army consistently achieved a 90%-95% outturn for the officer cadre and a 83%-84% outturn for the other ranks cadre.

Figure 3: Gains to the trained strength by Service

24. Shortfalls in providing recruits to the front line can have serious consequences for the structure of the Forces as deficits progress through the rank structure.[32] As noted above, the 2004 review led to a greatly reduced requirement for the RAF. As part of the management of this reduced requirement, the RAF closed some trades in 2004-05 leading to a delay in training for 2,000 recruits.[33] We discuss training and trained intake into the Armed Forces further in Part 3 of our Report.

MANNING BALANCE

25. Manning balance provides an indication of the stretch the Armed Forces is experiencing. The MoD defines "manning balance" as "between -2% and +1%" of the military personnel requirement[34] and measures manning balance against the military personnel requirement of the time. The 3% tolerance band allows the MoD a degree of flexibility to accommodate structural and organisational changes. The MoD's performance since 2004 is shown in Figure 4 below.

Figure 4—Percentage of overall personnel requirement achieved by Service

26. The Royal Navy has not been within manning balance since before 2003[35] and at the start of 2008 was 1.5% below manning balance.[36] The Army has been outside manning balance since October 2006[37] and is currently 1.6% below manning balance.[38] The RAF was last in manning balance in April 2006[39] and is currently 0.3% outside manning balance.[40] In its Spring Performance Report, the MoD states that:

27. The NAO attributes the Armed Forces' difficulties in achieving full manning to two factors. Firstly, it is not simply enough to have the right number of personnel, there must also be the correct balance of experience throughout the different trades and branches of the Armed Forces. Secondly, because the Armed Forces are only funded for a finite number of recruits each year, they cannot easily recover previous shortfalls.[42] We discuss the retention consequences of being below manning balance in Part 4 of our Report.

28. Data regarding the Manning Balance position of Volunteer Reservists does not contribute to the assessment of PSA Target 3 and is therefore not presented against a target in the MoD's performance reports. Manning balance for the Reverse Forces is calculated as the difference between the trained strength and the trained strength requirement. Data from 2004-2007 for each of the three Services are shown in Table 4 below. After analysing more detailed data sets in 2006, the NAO cautioned that in some areas of the Territorial Army, for example the Infantry, Royal Logistic Corps, and Medical Services', shortfalls in the trained strength requirement are even greater these averaged figures show.[43] The data reveals substantial shortfalls in the numbers of Volunteer Reservists and underscores the difficulties that the MoD may have in using Reservists to augment and reinforce Regular Forces during times of overstretch in the way envisioned by the Defence Intent for Reservists.

Table 4: Trained strength as a percentage of requirement for Volunteer Reservists

Volunteer Reserves 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07

Naval Service 78% 69% 81% 77%

Army 84% 82% 84% 70%

RAF 70% 67% 65% 66%

Source: Ministry of Defence

VOLUNTARY OUTFLOW

29. Voluntary Outflow refers to the proportion of Service personnel who leave the Forces before the end of their agreed term. The MoD explains that a certain level of early exits is necessary to maintain promotion opportunities. However, it also notes that "it costs significantly more to recruit and train new personnel than it does to retain existing ones".[44] The MoD does not set targets for voluntary outflow rates, but uses guidelines derived from historic data, reflecting a balanced personnel structure and Armed Forces' the capacity to train replacements for those who leave.[45] The voluntary exit rates for each Service are shown in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5: Tri-service voluntary outflow rates

30. Voluntary outflow rates have been relatively stable over the last few years, but as at 1 April 2007, all Services and ranks exceeded guidelines and Figure 5 shows an upward trend. The MoD states that the voluntary outflow rates are "reasonable"[46] but that average voluntary outflow rates can mask higher outflow rates in certain specialisations and, can contribute to manning pinchpoints.[47] We discuss some of the factors which may contribute to voluntary outflow rates in Part 4 of our Report.

a) Harmony Guidelines

31. Harmony Guidelines are designed to ensure harmony between competing aspects of Service personnel's lives: operations, time recuperating after operations, personal and professional development, unit formation and time with families.[48] The guidelines help the MoD manage the effect of operational tempo on Armed Forces personnel and their families. Professor Dandecker, of King's College London, told us that:

32. Two measures of harmony are used: Unit Tour Intervals and Separated Service. Unit Tour Intervals measure the frequency of deployment. Separated Service measures absence from normal place of duty or lack of freedom to enjoy leisure at the normal place of duty.[50] Separated Service includes activities not captured by Unit Tour Intervals like pre- deployment training, exercises, public duties, recruitment activities, and other duties which result in personnel not sleeping in usual accommodation.[51] The MoD began consistently reporting Unit Tour Intervals and Separated Service in 2006, although some data was collected before then.[52] Each Service has different criteria for Harmony Guidelines, reflecting different operational requirements and practices.

i. Unit Tour Intervals

33. As expected, given the nature of the Navy's basing structure and its work patterns, the Royal Navy has met its targets since 2006. Unit Tour Intervals appear to have steadily worsened in the Army since 2006, with the Royal Logistic Corps, the Infantry, the Royal Artillery, the Royal Engineers, and the Royal Signals all falling below target, although the way the data is presented prior to the MoD's Annual Report and Accounts makes it difficult to fully assess the situation.[53] Similarly, the RAF's reporting of Unit Tour Intervals makes it difficult to identify clear trends.[54] The Service guidelines for Unit Tour Intervals, and the MoD's assessment of achievement against those guidelines are shown in Table 5.

ii. Levels of Individual Separated Service

34. The Royal Navy broadly meets targets for levels of Individual Separated Service with less than 1% of personnel exceed the targets for levels of Individual Separated Service.[55] The Royal Navy is able to meet its targets through front line gapping.[56] The Army has the highest level of Individual Separated Service, 13.4% of personnel exceeded guidelines as at 1 April 2007. At 1 April 2007 6.2% of RAF personnel exceeded guidelines, an increase of 1.6% on those exceeding guidelines during 2005-06.[57] The Service guidelines for levels of Individual Separated Service, and the MoD's assessment of achievement against those guidelines are shown in Table 6.

35. Professor Strachan, of Oxford University, cautioned us against placing too much weight on the MoD's failure to meet Harmony Guidelines: "how do you meet Harmony Guidelines when you are sustaining two operations concurrently as well as other deployments?"[58] He went on to say "do we think we are in a state of war, in which case Harmony Guidelines would seem to be less relevant, or do we think we are not in a state of war but in a state of peace, which underpins much of the expectation driven by Harmony Guidelines? In which case, of course, there are real issues to address".[59] We discuss these issues, and the impact of Harmony Guidelines on retention further in Part 4 of our Report.

Table 5: Performance against Unit Tour Intervals (UTI) guidelines by service

Guidelines 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07

Naval Service Fleet Units to spend maximum of 60% deployed in 36 months. Reporting mechanism under development. Able Ratings averaged 169 days over 36 months. Reporting mechanism under development, breeches judged to be isolated. The RN broadly to met UTI guidelines, only the Submarine fleet breached UTI. The RN broadly to met UTI.

Army 24 month average interval between unit tours. Average tour interval 23.3 months. Royal Armoured Corp 14 months, and the Infantry and Royal Artillery 18 months. Average tour interval improved. Infantry 21 months (Armoured Infantry most affected) and Royal Artillery 19 months. Infantry 20.6 months; Royal Artillery 19 months; Royal Engineers 31 months; Royal Armoured Corp 24 months; Royal Signal 27.6 months; and Royal Logistic Corp 23.7 months. Infantry 21 months, Royal Artillery 20.7 months, Royal Engineers 21.2 months, Royal Armoured Corp 28.6 months; Royal Signals 18.4 months; and Royal Logistic Corp 23.3 months.

RAF 16 month average interval between Unit tours. No data Reporting mechanism under development, UTI breeched by some Force Elements and specialist Cadres. RAF Regiment 12 months. RAF Regiment 10.5 months, Air Combat Support and Service Support Units breached UTI. Nimrod, Air transport, Air to Air refuelling units were heavily tasked.

Source: Ministry of Defence

Table 6: Performance against Levels of Separated Service guidelines by Service since 2004

Guidelines 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07

Naval Service In any 36 month period, no one to exceed 660 days Separated Service. No data Reporting mechanism under development, breeches judged to be isolated. Fewer than 1% of Royal Navy personnel exceeding 660 days Separated Service. Fewer than 1% of Royal Navy personnel exceeding 660 days Separated Service.

Army In any 30 month period, no one to exceed 415 days Separated Service. No data Reporting mechanism under development. 14.5% of Army personnel exceeding 415 days of Separated Service. 13.4% of Army personnel exceeding 415 days of Separated Service.

RAF In an 12 month period, not more than 2.5% of personnel to exceed 140 days Separated Service. 5.4% of RAF personnel exceeding 140 days of detached duty. 3.9% of RAF personnel exceeding 140 days of detached duty. 4.6% of RAF personnel exceeding 140 days of detached duty. 6.2% of RAF personnel exceeding 140 days of detached duty.

Source: Ministry of Defence

PINCHPOINT TRADES

36. Each Service has a number of trades which are substantially undermanned. These trades are classed as pinchpoints and represent serious manning shortfalls in the Armed Forces. The MoD defines pinchpoints as trades or areas of expertise where there is not enough trained strength to perform operational tasks without encroaching on the time provided between deployments for recuperation, training and leave.[60] The MoD divides pinchpoints into two categories: Operational Pinchpoints—a shortfall in trained strength which has a detrimental impact on operational effectiveness; and Manpower Pinchpoints (or Critical Manning Groups)—trades facing structural manning issues and requiring recruitment and/or retention measures for resolution.[61] Table 7 sets out numbers of pinchpoint trades since 2006. We are disappointed to note that between 2004 and 2008, the number of pinchpoint trades have increased across all Services. In the Army pinchpoint trades have increased by 15.4%, in the RAF by 63%, and in the Naval Service by 150% so that there are now 30 pinchpoint trades in the Army, 31 in the RAF and 25 in the Naval Service.

Table 7: Number of pinchpoint trades by Service

2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07* 2007-08

Naval Service 10 pinchpoints 12 pinchpoints 12 pinchpoints 11 pinchpoints 25 pinchpoints (17 operational pinchpoints and 9 critical manning groups)

Army 26 pinchpoints 25 pinchpoints 24 pinchpoint 27 pinchpoints 30 pinchpoints. (8 operational pinchpoints and 22 manning pinchipoints)

RAF 19 pinchpoints 23 pinchpoints 21 pinchpoints 14 pinchpoints 31 pinchpoints, (15 operational pinchpoints, and 16 manning pinchpoints)

Source Ministry of Defence; * data supplied as 'latest position' in November 2007

37. Pinchpoints present significant risks to operational capability.[62] Rear Admiral Montgomery, Chief of Staff (Personnel), told us that "manning balance is not the issue which really keeps me awake at night. What keeps me awake at night is the…key pinchpoints where we are short".[63] Vice Admiral Wilkinson, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel), told us that:

38. The NAO highlighted the difficulties the MoD faces in reducing the number of pinchpoint trades:

Pinchpoints are created through a combination of factors: failure to recruit adequate numbers of personnel; personnel leaving the Service before their agreed terms; and the affects of operational tempo on some trade groups. Modern warfare has led to an increased requirement for specialisations and manning strengths have not matched that growth in demand.[66] We discuss some of the measures that the MoD is taking to address pinchpoints in Part 3 of our Report.

Assessing Armed Forces responsiveness

39. The MoD assesses its performance in relation to responsiveness against the 2004 Spending Review Public Service Agreement (PSA) Target 3, "to generate forces, which can be deployed, sustained and recovered at the scales of effort required to meet the government's objectives".[67] In 2006-07 the MoD assessed Target 3 as being at "some risk".[68] The MoD assess that the Target "will not be met" in 2007-08, and explained that:

The performance indicators relating to this Target are:

to ensure that more than 73% of force elements show no serious or critical weakness against required peacetime readiness levels;
to ensure that more than 71% of force elements report no serious or critical weaknesses against the ability to move from peacetime readiness to immediate readiness for deployment on operations; and
to ensure that the assessed ability of the MoD physically to deploy its forces operations at what is likely to be the most demanding level, sustain them in theatre and thereafter recover then to their home bases.[70]

The MoD does not define what it means by critical or serious weakness.

PEACETIME READINESS LEVELS

40. Peacetime readiness levels require that Armed Forces are ready to respond to events at the levels set out in the Planning Assumptions; from humanitarian support to war fighting.[71] The Spring Performance Report notes that 98% of the Armed Forces reported no critical weaknesses against these criteria. However, between January to December 2007, 42% of force elements reported serious weaknesses against their peacetime readiness levels—15% below target.[72] The MoD attributes this to the fact "that the Armed Forces have now been engaged at or above [Defence Planning Assumption] levels for long enough that peace time readiness levels dropped significantly".[73]

ABILITY TO GENERATE FROM PEACETIME READINESS TO IMMEDIATE READINESS

41. Between January to December 2007, 43.5% of force elements reported serious weaknesses against the ability to generate from peacetime readiness to immediate readiness[74]—14.5% below target. The MoD's attributes this to "the result of the pressure on the Armed Forces resulting from operations above Defence Planning Assumptions, particularly in the Land environment, and the constraints of conducting collective training over and above that required for current operations until commitments return to the levels within Defence Planning Assumptions".[75]

ABILITY TO DEPLOY, SUSTAIN AND RECOVER FORCE ELEMENTS

42. The target measures the MoD's ability to deploy, sustain and recover force elements at the most demanding level of the Defence Planning Assumptions (two medium scale and one small scale operation concurrently). The MoD assesses its performance as remaining consistent at 79% against a target of 85.2%.[76]

43. In our Report on the Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07 we expressed our deep concern that overall, Target 3 was unlikely to be met.[77] In its response to our Report, the MoD told us that:

44. We are concerned that, on the basis of the information presented about PSA Target 3, Armed Forces Responsiveness, the Armed Forces have limited ability to meet future, as yet unknown, obligations. The Minister responded to our concerns by telling us that the Armed Forces "have been able to react to these changing situations, albeit we are asking an awful lot of them. We have got the leadership in place, we have got the programmes in place to improve...It is not that we are sitting here as ministers saying, 'Just get on with it'".[79] The Minister told us that he did not accept the suggestion that the MoD was about to fail or could not meet its obligations.[80] The MoD has said that PSA Target 3 provides an assessment of the level of pressure experienced by the Armed Forces and does not reflect on their ability to sustain current operations. As the MoD cannot predict or control the exact nature and timing of future operational requirements, we believe that its failure to meet this target points to a potentially serious weakness in the future capability of the Armed Forces. Furthermore, we question the purpose of a target which, given recent operational tempo, the MoD has no chance of meeting.