House of Commons - Defence - Fourteenth Report

Select Committee on Defence Fourteenth Report

3 Recruitment

45. A strong and positive relationship between the Armed Forces and society is essential for healthy recruitment. Professor Strachan told us that the British Armed Forces had been held in high regard by the public, and that the public's support had changed little over time.[81] Professor Dandecker, said:

46. The Armed Forces are distinct from civilian society, largely through operational necessity. As the Armed Forces must recruit from civilian society, they must find ways of bridging that divide. Creating an understanding of the military is particularly important for 'gatekeepers' of potential recruits, parents, guardians, teachers and community leaders.[83] Recent research by the MoD found that 56% or parents or guardians would discourage their children or dependents from a career in the Army[84] and 41% would discourage a career in the RAF, in part because of the United Kingdom's involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.[85] The MoD acknowledge that events such as the Iraq war, recruit fatalities at Deepcut Barracks and allegations of mistreatment of prisoners have had a potentially negative effect on the reputation of the Armed Forces.[86] Major General Gregory, Director General Services Conditions (Army), told us that "we find that a significant proportion of [our marketing budgets] must be spent on removing ill-informed perception and opinion".[87]

47. Public understanding of the Armed Forces is not only important for recruitment, it also has implications for retention, as Dawn McCafferty, of the RAF Families Federation, highlighted when she told us that some Service families:

The Army Families Federation told us that media coverage of current operational deployments was mostly negative, and that this added to the stresses experienced by Service personnel and their families.[89] We note that the sometimes negative media coverage about the Armed Forces is detrimental to the public's understanding of the military and places unnecessary pressure on Service personnel and their families.

ENGAGING WITH THE PUBLIC

48. The visibility of the Armed Forces' in civilian society has reduced over recent years.[90] Maintaining and increasing that visibility in the future will be important for long-term recruiting success. The MoD is trying to identify ways that the Armed Forces can engage more actively with the public. Quentin Davies MP, in conjunction with Bill Clark and Air Commodore Martin Sharp was commissioned by the Prime Minister to investigate how national recognition of the Armed Forces could be increased. Their report includes practical recommendations about how contact and understanding could be improved, how support between the military and wider society could be encouraged, and how the visibility of the Armed Forces might be increased.[91]

49. The MoD told us that the Armed Forces already undertook a number of outreach activities, including performances by military bands and display teams at national celebrations and sporting events, and open days on ships, submarines and airbases.[92] The MoD notes that the number of outreach activities it can undertake is limited by finances and resources.[93] We discuss the role of school visits, Reserves and cadets below.

50. Any increase in contact between the Armed Forces and civilian society should be welcomed. We hope that the MoD gives due consideration to the proposals contained in the report on National Recognition of our Armed Forces. Budgetary constraints and the level of stretch currently experienced by the Armed Forces limit the extent to which the Services can build and maintain links with civilian society. However, we consider that these activities are central to ensuring the future success of the Armed Forces. The MoD should afford them high priority and ensure that they are adequately resourced. It is also important that decision makers in civilian society, including Members of Parliament and Local Government representatives, have an understanding of the military. We recommend that the MoD encourages more contact between the military and such groups to ensure that decisions which affect our Armed Forces are evidence based.

WORKING WITH SCHOOLS TO RAISE AWARENESS OF THE ARMED FORCES

51. The MoD says that the Armed Forces' work in schools is designed to encourage good citizenship, raise awareness of the MoD and the Armed Forces amongst young people, provide positive information to influence future opinion formers and to enable recruiters access to the school environment.[94] The Armed Forces go only to schools where they have been invited,[95] and give presentations on human rights and humanitarian aid, lead problem solving and leadership development tasks, and encourage team work.[96] The Naval Service undertook 4,000 school visits (not related to recruiting activity); the Army made 4,000 visits and the RAF made 450 visits.[97] The Armed Forces visit more state schools than private schools, at the following ratios: Naval Service 10:1, Army 13:1, and RAF 9:1.[98] The MoD also provides an online teaching resource 'Defence Dynamics'.[99]

52. We questioned officials about the geographical spread of the schools visited. Air Vice-Marshal (AVM) Simon Bryant, Chief of Staff Personnel, told us that "to a degree coverage will come down to footprint and resources".[100] We asked him whether that practice resulted in an uneven geographic coverage. He told us that:

101

53. We asked officials whether consideration had been given to making school visits tri-Service as a way of extending coverage beyond the Service footprint. AVM Bryant, told us that tri-Service visits happened to a degree, for example "at school fetes we go en masse with all three Services".[102]

54. We questioned officials whether the Armed Forces school visits programme was well co-ordinated. Chris Baker, Director General of Service Personnel Policy, told us that "we have been looking at the way in which we interact with schools, recognising some of the points about the unevenness of coverage and the issues that arise because the distinction between our recruiting and outreach activities at schools may not be as clear as it might be".[103] When we sought further details, the MoD told us that in 2006 a short review of activities in schools found that there was insufficient co-ordination, a lack of central management and little prioritising.[104] The MoD asked for feedback from schools to identify how they could improve school visits. Responses included providing topical curriculum materials; good publicity; a central MoD education facility; longer term programmes; and greater co-ordination of activities, policy and strategies across the MoD. The MoD will consider these proposals shortly.[105]

55. The MoD does not appear to have adequately considered the delivery of its school visits programme, in particular how the geographical spread of visits and individual Service visits fit into broader objectives of increasing awareness of the Armed Forces. We recommend that the MoD considers the relationship between the historic geographic footprint of the Services and the benefits of school visits. We are concerned that by concentrating on those areas which already have an understanding of an individual Service—particularly for the Royal Navy and the RAF—the full benefits of working with schools to raise awareness and create links between the Armed Forces and civilian society will not be achieved.

56. We are encouraged that in 2006 the MoD investigated how the content of its school visits programme could be improved and has identified a number of methods for achieving this. Outreach school visits and recruiting visits have different purposes and we agree with the MoD that it must keep them separate. We understand that the MoD is to undertake a detailed review of its schools programme. In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to set out the terms of reference and timetable for that review. We consider that active, adventure based outreach programmes will be most successful.

57. We also discussed with Personnel officers how the MoD made contact with schools where it has had no previous links. We suggested that most MPs had excellent contacts with the schools in their constituencies, and that many would be happy to provide the Armed Forces with introductions.[106] The MoD told us that it would work with Members of Parliament to gain introductions to schools that have not developed contacts with the Armed Forces. We see this as a positive development and we look forward to working with the MoD to put it into practice.

CADETS

58. The MoD sponsors and part funds four Cadet Forces: the Combined Cadet Forces, the Sea Cadet Corps, the Army Cadet Forces and the Air Training Corps. Each Force has its own constitution. The main aim of the Cadet Forces, as set out in the Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Strategy (AFOPS) is to "achieve the maximum awareness of the Armed Forces amongst all elements of the nation's youth and their gatekeepers and to provide access for youth to high quality Cadet Forces".[107] The Cadet Forces are not part of the MoD's active recruiting strategy but contribute to the Government's youth agenda.[108] There are currently 130,000 cadets in the United Kingdom: last year there were 12,483 Sea Cadets; 44,604 Army Cadets; 29,981 Air Cadets; and 42,593 Combined Cadets. Membership has been comparatively stable over the last decade.[109] The Cadet Forces are based in 3,000 locations throughout the United Kingdom, some in schools, the majority in the community.[110] The size and geographical spread of the Cadet Forces gives them an important role in developing links between the civilian public and the Armed Services.

59. The MoD told us that of the 260 Cadet Forces based in schools, 200 were located in private schools, and 60 were located in state schools.[111] It told us that it planned to increase the numbers of Cadets over the next decade and had entered into discussions with other Government departments about how this would be achieved:

as yet

112

The MoD also notes that new Cadet Forces would be based in schools and academies in disadvantaged areas, because this is where they would have the most impact.[113]

60. We welcome the positive impact that the Cadet Forces can have on the lives of young people and we acknowledge the hard work of all those involved in making the Cadet Forces a success. We note that the MoD, in partnership with other Government Departments, is seeking to increase the number of Cadet Forces based in state schools. This is a welcome development which we feel will bring benefit to the young people concerned. It will also help to provide more opportunities for the public to engage with the Armed Forces. In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to set out its plans and timetable for increasing the number of Cadet Forces based in state schools. We will monitor the MoD's progress carefully.

61. The MoD told us that it recognised that there was greater need for co-ordination across the Cadet Forces; and that, in particular, the fact that the Cadet Forces have different constitutions made sharing resources difficult. The MoD have identified that improvements are necessary in easing the administrative burden for the 26,000 adults who volunteer to run the Cadets, and to make sharing facilities easier.[114] We also welcome the fact that the MoD recognises that it needs to make changes to the constitutions of individual Cadet Forces to enable them to work together more easily. We believe that these changes will benefit future growth in the Cadet Forces. However, we do not consider that these changes will be possible unless the Cadet Forces are funded appropriately and that that funding is equitable across the four Cadet Forces.

RESERVES

62. Volunteer Reserves are based at approximately 400 locations across the UK. According to Future use of the UK's Reserve Forces, part of the Volunteer Reserve's function is to maintain links between both military and civilian communities through their training centres and personnel who overlap civilian and military society.[115] Vice Admiral Wilkinson said that "we realise that for many parts of the country it is only via the Reserve Forces that the average citizen has any contact with the Armed Forces at all. I think there has been a slow realisation of the importance of that particular role for the Reserves".[116] We asked Major General Simon Lalor, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff, Reserves and Cadets, to what extent this aspiration would be determined by resources. He told us that the forthcoming review of the Reserve Force would:

117

We support the MoD's proposals to do more to encourage links between military and civilian society through the Reserve Forces. We look forward to the publication of the MoD's review of the Reserve Force and its findings about the Reserves role in developing the relationship between the Armed Forces and civilian society.

Recruiting environment

63. As set out in Part 2 of this Report, the MoD needs to achieve its recruitment targets in order to keep the Armed Forces supplied with manpower. While all three Services have been relatively successful in this, they are not meeting their recruitment targets consistently. The NAO concluded that the following factors made recruitment difficult for Armed Forces:

recruitment is influenced by the performance of the economy and is easier in times of higher unemployment;

an ageing population will mean a decline in numbers of individuals of working age over the long term;

there will be an increasing proportion of ethnic minorities amongst the recruiting target age group because the ethnic minority population is growing faster than the United Kingdom's population as a whole;

the proportion of women within the United Kingdom workforce is predicted to reach 50% by 2030;

increasing levels of obesity and resulting health problems will reduce the number of young people able to join the Services;

young people are less interested in a career for life.[118]

If current trends continue as predicted, the recruiting environment in the future will be even more challenging for the MoD.

64. The MoD accepts that these are challenges which it must address.[119] Vice Admiral Wilkinson told us that "we have to look across the whole community to find recruits for three Armed Services…but I think we are as proactive as we can be in trying to make all sections of the community aware of the opportunities that a career in the Armed Forces offers".[120] Mr Baker said that "I absolutely endorse that…We market our offer in line with contemporary commercial advice, identify different societal sectors and address the aspirations of each separately. We place the motivation of the individual increasingly at the centre of our offer".[121]

65. We note that the MoD is recruiting in a challenging economic environment. It is not consistently meeting its recruitment targets and therefore sufficient numbers are not entering the Armed Forces. We acknowledge that the MoD is trying to respond to a changing recruiting environment, although we do not think that it is responding quickly enough. We believe that current recruiting shortfalls will be even greater in the future, unless the MoD increases its success rate in recruiting women and ethnic minorities. We are also concerned that the MoD has not demonstrated that it is responding to changes in society, such as an ageing population and a growing demand for more flexible careers. If it is to remain an attractive employer, it needs to do so.

66. We were told that a number of recent EU migrants to the United Kingdom had expressed an interest in enlisting in the British Armed Forces. In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to provide us with an assessment of the impact that opening recruitment to EU migrants could have on the manning situation in the Armed Forces.

RECRUITING DIVERSITY

67. The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) told us that it considered that a recruitment strategy which ensured fair recruitment and welcomed all was preferable to one which focussed solely on the issue of ethnic minority recruiting.[122] We agree. The EHRC explained that it would "expect measures to improve the recruitment and retention of ethnic minority servicemen and women to figure prominently in the current and future equality priorities of the MoD and the individual Armed Forces, under the race and gender duties".[123]

68. In its Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07, the MoD set out its performance against ethnic minority recruiting targets.[124] Details are shown in Table 8 and 9 below:

Table 8: Overall Service ethnic minority strength (including Commonwealth recruits)

2006-07 2005-06 2004-05

Naval Service 2.7% 2.6% 2.5%

Army 8.4% 8.0% 7.6%

RAF 2.3% 2.4% 2.5%

Total 5.8% 5.5% 5.3%

Data source: Ministry of Defence

Table 9: Armed Forces United Kingdom ethnic minority recruitment

2006-07
Target
2006-07
Percentage achieved
2005-06
Target
2005-06
Percentage achieved
2005-06
Target
2004-05 Percentage achieved

Naval Service 3.5% 2.1% 3.5% 2.0% 3.0% 2.3%

Army 4.1% 3.8% 3.9% 3.6% 3.4% 3.7%

RAF 3.6% 1.6% 3.6% 1.5% 3.1% 1.7%

Data source: Ministry of Defence

Despite failing to meet all of its targets, the MoD says that it is making progress and that ethnic minority representation in the Armed Forces has risen from a baseline of just over 1% in 1999, to 6% in January 2008.[125] We call on the MoD to acknowledge that the figures it cites for the increase in ethnic minority representation—1% in 1999 and 6% in January 2008—are based on different data sets and are not directly comparable.

69. In our Report Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07, we expressed our disappointment at the MoD's failure to achieve its ethnic minority recruiting targets. We also expressed concern that the 60% of total ethnic minority strength comes from ethnic minorities from outside the United Kingdom, namely Commonwealth countries.[126] The MoD agreed that it needed to do more and assured us that its ethnic minority strategies were fully funded. It also pointed out that its policies were consistently well placed under the schemes 'Opportunity now' and 'Race for Opportunity'.[127]

70. We asked Professor Dandeker how he assessed the MoD's performance in recruiting ethnic minorities. He said that "it is not only that the Armed Services should be looking a their own culture and how they appear to populations…They also have to look at the attitudes and aspirations of those…looking for places of work…not every member of a minority ethnic community places the military…high up".[128] The EHRC notes that United Kingdom foreign policy; 2004 cuts to Armed Forces manpower requirements; and competition across the public services to meet PSA ethnic minority targets affect the MoD's ability to recruit ethnic minority personnel.[129]

71. Professor Dandecker told us that the MoD had made serious efforts to become a more appealing employer to recruits from ethnic minority backgrounds. He told us that while the MoD had undergone a major internal culture change, it had to "overcome points of resistance, and points of resistance come at middle management, not least amongst the NCOs".[130]

72. The MoD described some of the practical steps it had taken to meet the needs of ethnic minority personnel including the provision of food for religious requirements; and provisions to allow Service personnel to keep religious traditions—except when not compatible with operational or health and safety considerations—for example, neatly trimmed beards, yarmulke, and the hijab.[131] The MoD has also appointed religious leaders from the Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim and Sikh faiths to act as advisers on matters of religious requirements; as well as appointing civilian chaplains from those communities to enable all people to practice their faiths.[132]

73. Despite these measures, and the MoD's work with gatekeepers and ethnic minority communities to raise awareness of Armed Forces' careers, the MoD is not meeting its targets. The RAF and the Naval Service, in particular, have failed their targets by a wide margin.[133] The EHRC set out the factors which it considered contributed to these failures: the perception that harassment and discrimination remained within the Services; a lack of robust monitoring data which made it difficult for the MoD to identify and address specific problem areas; and the long-term nature of many of the MoD's initiatives—such as working with 'gatekeepers'—meaning that results would not be achieved quickly.[134]

74. The EHRC expanded on the importance of data collection. It said that a more rigorous and sophisticated approach to the collection and analysis of data would lead to better informed decisions about the steps needed to improve ethnic minority recruitment. It provided specific examples of how the MoD's data collection did not meet its expectations: data about racial groups was not collected consistently—sometimes 14 categories were used and sometimes three were used ('ethnic minority', 'white' and 'unknown'); and 15% of staff were from an 'unknown' racial group, making meaningful analysis of the data impossible.[135]

75. We asked the MoD whether it had improved the quality of the ethnic minority data collected. Vice Admiral Wilkinson said that "we are well aware that the veracity of the data is important, both for them [the EHRC] and for us. We are using their skills to help us improve wherever we can."[136]

76. We are concerned that there is evidence which suggests that there is a widespread culture of complacency at many levels across the Armed Services about the value of ensuring that the make-up of the Armed Forces reflect the United Kingdom's ethnic diversity. An internal communications strategy is required to ensure that all personnel in the MoD understand the importance of diversity to the long term credibility and legitimacy of the Armed Services.

77. We recognise that improving ethnic minority recruiting is a major challenge and it will take some time to see the success of some of the MoD's current recruiting strategies. However, we are concerned that the MoD is not collecting the data that is required, and without this data it cannot develop well informed, evidence based policies. The MoD told us that it was improving data collection wherever it could. We do not consider that this is an appropriate response to such an important issue. In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to set out exactly how it has improved data collection and what assessment the Equality and Human Rights Commission has made of those improvements.

78. The EHRC also said that there was a "tendency for the Services to see themselves as monolithic thus relying on the same methods to deal with under-representation but not necessarily recognising their difference in terms of, for example, the types of work undertaken by each service and entry requirement".[137] We note the Equality and Human Rights Commission's conclusion that recruiting strategies based on the individual characteristics of each Service may improve the MoD's success in recruiting ethnic minorities to the Armed Forces. We recommend that the MoD work with the EHRC to identify such strategies.

RECRUITING CAMPAIGNS AND RESOURCES

79. Tables 10, 11 and 12 set out overall spending on recruitment for each of the Services since 2004. The Naval Service increased its spending by 12.8% between 2004-2008; the Army increased its spending by 11.5% during that time; and the RAF's spending increased by 14.8%.

Table 10 Naval Service spending on recruitment

2004-05
£M
2005-06
£M
2006-07
£M
2007-08
£M

Manpower - - 16.26 16.25

Marketing and publicity - - 10.25 12.68

Advertising - - - -

Recruitment offices - - 2.0 2.04

Other costs - - 4.4 4.19

Total 32.25 34.76 32.91 35.16

Source: Ministry of Defence

Table 11: Army spending on recruitment

2004-05
£M
2005-06
£M
2006-07
£M
2007-08
£M

Manpower 32.21 35.50 37.59 38.63

Advertising 15.95 21.35 23.25 26.05

Offices 6.77 6.60 5.38 5.16

Regional Marketing - - - 8.57

Bursaries - - - 2.53

Regimental Corps Army Recruiting Teams - - - 1.90

Army Development and Selection Centres - - - 2.62

IT Systems - - - 1.11

Other costs 27.46 25.52 24.88 8.60

Total 85.38 88.97 91.10 95.17

Source: Ministry of Defence

Table 12: RAF spending on recruitment

2004-05
£M
2005-06
£M
2006-07
£M
2007-08
£M

Manpower, Inspector of Recruiting 13.49 14.56 15.08 15.45

Manpower, Selection Centre 2.78 3.21 3.13 3.21

Manpower, College 2.80 3.21 3.10 3.17

Marketing 9.37 7.57 10.64 12.89

Armed Forces Career Office running 0.95 0.87 0.68 0.80

Armed Forces Careers Office lease 0.73 0.71 0.78 0.70

Other costs 5.95 7.02 5.08 5.20

Total 36.07 37.14 38.49 41.42

Source: Ministry of Defence

80. The MoD has programmes to monitor the effectiveness of its marketing campaigns and recruitment spending[138] but ultimately success is judged on the level of interests generated in Service careers.[139] The RAF told us that in response to its most recent campaign, recruiting enquiries had increased by 35%, as had public awareness. Out of the available 37 trades, 19 had take up rates of 100%, 8 had take-up rates of between 90-99%, with 10 trades "undershooting" 90%.[140]

81. The Armed Forces use market research to inform recruitment campaigns.[141] The Naval Service told us that in January 2006 it surveyed its key target audience of 15-24 year olds about their perceptions of the Royal Navy; 56% identified the Royal Navy with "a big grey ship becalmed on a dull grey sea" and that often the Royal Navy was seen as "nothing more than a carrier service for the other Armed Forces—carrying supplies to the Army and acting as landing platforms for the RAF".[142] The Royal Navy's response was its Life without Limits campaign designed specifically to address these perceptions. The Army has a good understanding of why young people want to join the Army—lifestyle factors, such as travel, fitness, adventure, learning new skills, further education and leadership training—and it uses this information to shape its recruitment campaigns.[143]

82. The Army has recently introduced Pathfinder, an interactive online test which divides respondents into categories based on answers to questions about attitudes to education, work and leisure time, family, future goals, career ambitions and steers potential recruits towards appropriate career options. The Army say that before the introduction of Pathfinder, its approach to potential recruits "was beginning to fail".[144]

83. The Armed Forces also target pinchpoint trades in their marketing strategies. The Naval Service ran campaigns highlighting Aircrew, Royal Marine and Submariner pinchpoint trades. The four month campaign targeting aircrew resulted in over 100 candidates, the six month campaign targeting Royal Marines resulted in a 50% increase in inquiries and the five month campaign targeting submariners resulted in "significant numbers of PDF downloads".[145] Despite the general success of the RAF's recent marketing activity, only 50-60% of vacancies in pinchpoint trades were filled.[146]

84. We commend the MoD on its recruitment campaigns and marketing strategies and we welcome the Armed Forces' use of online resources to engage their target audiences. We also welcome the Armed Forces targeting individual pinchpoint trades as part of their marketing campaigns, but note that on the basis of available evidence, success has been limited. We recommend that the MoD develops a more systematic approach to recruiting to pinchpoint trades.

One Army Recruiting

85. The Army launched One Army Recruiting on 1 April 2007, integrating Regular and Territorial Army recruiting. It was intended to create a more coherent and effective recruiting process.[147] The MoD's memorandum sets out the main components of One Army Recruiting: putting applicants at the centre of the process; delegating responsibility for recruiting to the Regional Chain of Command; professional recruiting teams; and using technology to speed the processes and achieve broad coverage.[148]

86. Major General Gregory told us that:

149

He also told us that one year into the programme was too early to be able to share the detailed lessons learnt.[150] 'One Army Recruiting', integrating Regular and Territorial Army recruiting, has been in operation for more than 12 months, and has been in development for several years. We are surprised that the Army was unable to share with us its initial lessons learned about this major change in its recruiting methodology. We expect the MoD to provide us with such an analysis in its response to our Report.

87. We asked SaBRE (Supporting Britain's Reservists and Employers) what impact One Army Recruiting had on recruiting in the Territorial Army. Mr Corry told us that "we work quite closely with the reserve forces cadet associations...who traditionally had the role of specifically recruiting reservists. That was something they were particularly good at. They are waiting to see whether or not One Army Recruiting will produce results. Depending on those to whom you speak, anecdotally they are not all convinced yet".[151]

88. A contribution to our web forum from someone involved in One Army Recruiting suggested that it had not been positive for Territorial Army recruitment:

From my own experiences I can say that national TA recruiting has almost ceased. I would say that this is due to a lack of knowledge of the national TA by regular army recruiters…For TA recruiters—it is just not feasible to expect someone who...is only a part-timer to be able to enlist regular soldiers, inform [them] about apprentice college, the different regiments and events. There is a place for the 'one army concept' but the recruiting world is not it. A TA soldier is a different kettle of fish to the regular soldier. Mostly they are older, have different outlooks on life and will never be understood by the regular recruiter. Equally the TA soldier will not be able to correctly empathise with a potential regular recruit.

89. Some evidence we received suggests that One Army Recruiting has had a detrimental affect on Territorial Army recruiting. In its response to this Report, we expect the MoD to provide us with its assessment of the affects that One Army Recruiting has had on Territorial Army recruiting.

RECRUITING AND SCHOOLS

90. The Army's recruitment activity in schools takes place in partnership with career guidance co-ordinators. Kieran Gordon, from the Institute of Career Guidance Councillors, told us that in his experience the Armed Forces were well trained and had a high level of expertise.[152] He also said that:

153

Kieran Gordon also told us that there were now more opportunities for young people to get direct experience of the Armed Forces through work experience and enterprise programmes.[154]

91. We asked the MoD how it ensured that they delivered a consistent performance between the three Services and across the United Kingdom. It told us that "the Armed Forces cannot guarantee consistency in respect of geographical coverage as some schools and Local Education Authorities are more supportive of the military than others. However, all three Service share best practice through normal communication at Armed Forces Careers Offices and at regular conferences".[155] The MoD also told us that it did not favour tri-Service recruiting in schools because, in its experience, the best recruiting results were achieved through separate visits presenting a clear choice of Service environment; and that because tri-Service school visits would involve more personnel in each visit, the number of visits which could be undertaken would necessarily be reduced.[156]

92. We have concerns that the MoD may be missing opportunities though a lack of co-ordination of its recruitment activities in schools. We recommend that the MoD's review of its school programme considers how recruiting visits could be better co-ordinated. We commend the Armed Forces on its work experience and enterprise programmes for young people interested in a career in the Armed Forces. We consider that first hand experience of Service life is a positive recruitment tool.

Gap years

93. This year the Australian Defence Force (ADF) launched a one year scheme for 700 school leavers—who might not wish to commit to a full term of Service—to experience life in the Forces. The ADF expect that some students will go on to enlist as Regulars or Reservists and intends to expand the scheme over time.[157] Until 2007, the British Army ran a similar scheme for up to 80 potential officers, and until 2005, the Royal Marines ran a scheme for 3-4 limited commission recruits.[158] The schemes were abandoned because of budgetary pressures,[159] although the Army explained that the scheme gave them access to schools which "were lukewarm to encouraging careers in the Forces", and created a positive experience amongst those who participated. Approximately one third of students completing the Army's Gap year programme went on to enlist in the Regular Army or the Territorial Army.[160] We consider that the MoD's recent decisions to close Army and Royal Marine Gap year schemes is shortsighted. We note that the Australian Defence Force has responded to its recruiting shortfalls by launching a scheme for 700 school leavers, which it plans to expand in the future. We recommend that the MoD reconsiders its policy on Gap year schemes.

EDUCATIONAL INCENTIVES

94. In its response to our Report Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07, the MoD said that "overall, recruitment is broadly satisfactory. But the recruiting market is challenging. We face stiff competition from other employers, and more young people are now opting for further education".[161]

95. The MoD list the following educational opportunities—in addition to Phase 1, 2 and trade training:

Residential courses: Army Foundation College, Harrogate, for 16-17 year olds and Welbeck, Loughborough, a two-year residential A level course.
Sixth-Form scholarships ranging from £1,050 per year to £2,000.
Degree Sponsorship (amounts depend on the course).
The Army also offers Further Education Bursaries for a wide range of courses to anyone aged between 16-32. Potential recruits get £1,000 during their studies and £1,000 on completion of the first stage of Army training.[162]

96. Professor Strachan told the Committee that he felt that the Armed Forces were not responding to opportunities to encourage recruitment through educational incentives:

it is extraordinary that the growth of higher education in this country is seen as a threat to Armed Forces recruiting rather than an opportunity. That is something which I think has to be tackled...head on…somehow you have to get into the position where...middle England…sees it as a reasonable option to join the Armed Forces as to go into any other walk of life, and that is not the situation at the moment. If there were that shift two things would follow. First of all, I think the issue of ethnic recruiting would be less important, simply because many ambitious ethnic minorities target the professions as appropriate courses for their offspring to follow and do not see the Armed Forces within that spectrum, and, secondly, there would be an opportunity to maximise the...direct military presence on almost every single campus throughout the United Kingdom in terms of the OTCs, the naval units and the air squadrons.

163

97. Professor Strachan told us that the MoD could do more to use educational incentives to draw people to the Armed Forces: we agree. The Armed Forces have a long tradition of using educational incentives to attract officers and medical staff, and we believe that this should be expanded to other ranks. We consider that the MoD could be more imaginative in developing recruitment opportunities based around education and should specifically recognise the need to adapt recruiting strategies to the recent growth in higher education.

Training

98. As we note in Part 2 of our Report, the MoD measures inflow to the Armed Forces at the point at which recruits complete initial training (Phase 1 and Phase 2). A proportion of recruits do not complete training. They leave for a variety of reasons: they may not be suited to Service life; they may sustain injuries; or they may fail to reach the required standard. The MoD recognises that the consequence of wastage "means it is proving harder to sustain our target for gains to the trained strength".[164] Wastage also has a financial cost. The NAO estimates that the average cost, across the Services, to recruit and provide Phase 1 training for one individual is approximately £92,000 for Officers and £25,000 for other ranks.[165] In 2007-08, 24% of Royal Navy recruits; 45% of Royal Marines recruits; 38% of Army recruits; and 22% of RAF recruits did not complete Phase 2 training.

99. Our predecessor Committee found that some Phase 1 and Phase 2 trainers were frustrated by the lack of basic personal and social skills new recruits possessed,[166] levels of discipline were also lower, as were levels of physical fitness.[167] The Army notes that young people tend to be less deferent to authority and have a greater awareness of their individual rights.[168] Despite these challenges and the difficulties the Armed Forces face in attracting sufficient numbers of recruits, the MoD told us that recruitment selection standards have not been reduced and the quality of those joining remained high.[169]

100. We do not doubt that the quality of recruits leaving initial training. Christopher Beese, of ArmorGroup, a security company which employs Armed Forces personnel after they have left the Services, told us that "in our experience…[Armed Forces personnel] consistently improve; they are better today than they have ever been".[170]We also note that Armed Forces training, in particular remedial education programmes, provide recruits with basic literacy and numeracy skills and self-confidence where the education system has failed.[171]

101. We believe that initial training should ensure that as many recruits as possible succeed. High wastage rates during initial training suggest that there is a serious weakness in initial training programmes or that the recruitment process does not adequately predict those unsuitable for life in the Armed Forces. We note that there is a balance to be struck in ensuring that the pool of potential recruits is not unnecessarily limited and that resources are not wasted. However, we also believe that it is important that recruits who are unhappy are given opportunities to leave training. As our predecessor's Report on Duty of Care noted, remaining in the physically and mentally demanding training environment against a recruits will, creates risks for his/her well being.[172]

102. As part of its efforts to improve wastage rages, the Army has introduced the Potential Soldier programme to confirm physical, mental, emotional and domestic readiness for the Army selection and training process.[173] The Look at Life programmes in the Naval Service and the Army are also designed to give potential recruits a realistic idea of what life in the Services is like.[174]

103. We asked the MoD how its wastage rates compared to those of our major allies. This data is set out in Table 13. The MoD cautioned that different methods of wastage calculation, selection processes, entry standards, the handling of injury during training, and back-classing policies affects exit rates and makes direct comparisons difficult.[175] Nevertheless, in every category the United Kingdom experiences higher wastage rates than our major allies:

Table 13: Wastage rates from UK Phase 1 and 2 training and at the 12 month point in Canada, the USA and Australia

2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08

UK RN 26% 24% 22% 21% 24%

RM 47% 41% 47% 47% 45%

Army 31% 26% 28% 36% 38%

RAF 15% 21% 19% 20% 22%

Canada Navy 8.4% 12.2% 13.0% 18.8% -

Army 18.9% 20.0% 21.3% 25.3% -

Air Force 3.3% 7.2% 9.0% 9.2% -

USA Navy 13% 14% 14% - -

Marines 14% 14% 16% - -

Army 21% 18% 13% - -

Air Force 11% 13% 13% - -

Australia Navy 16% 17% - - -

Army 21% 21% - - -

Air Force 12% 13% - - -

Data Source: Ministry of Defence, Note: UK data is single Service sourced and has not been not validated by DASA

104. We are concerned at the high wastage rates in Phase 1 and 2 training and, in particular, by the increases in wastage rates since 2005. The Royal Marines' wastage rates have been consistently close to 50% for the last 5 years, although we note that the standard required by the Royal Marines is very high. In its response to this Report we expect the MoD tell us how many Royal Marine recruits who do not complete training enlist in other parts of the Armed Services. Both the Army and the RAF's wastage rates are creeping upwards. In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to set out the causes of such high wastage rates, the factors which have contributed to the pattern of increase in the last five years, and the reasons why our wastage rates appear to be so much higher than our major allies.

81 Q 6 Back

82 Q 7 Back

83 Q 214 ff. Back

84 Ev 100 Back

85 Ev 101 Back

86 Ev 98 Back

87 Q 221 Back

88 Q 64 Back

89 Ev 139 Back

90 Report to the Prime Minister, National Recognition of our Armed Forces, May 2008, available on the Ministry of Defence's website, www.mod.uk (National Recognition of our Armed Forces), p 3. See also HC (2000-01) 29. Back

91 National Recognition of our Armed Forces, May 2008 Back

92 Ev 95 Back