Select Committee on Defence Fourteenth Report

4  Retention

105. The number of personnel leaving the Forces before the end of their agreed term has been rising since 2004. There are a wide range of factors which cause members of our Armed Forces, both Regulars and Reserves to leave service prematurely. We consider the key retention challenges below.

Regular Forces' retention challenges: conditions of service and welfare

b)  Impact on family and personal life

106. In its report on Recruitment and Retention in the Armed Forces, the NAO concluded that the most common factors which persuade personnel to leave relate to the impact of Service life on family life, work life balance and the ability to plan ahead.[176] In 2007 a survey found that 83% of Royal Navy and 94% of Royal Marine personnel intending to leave reported that the impact of Service life on their personal life had increased or strongly increased that intention to leave.[177] For RAF personnel the negative impact on family and personal life was the second most common reason for leaving the Service. The impact of Army life on family and personal life was "the number one negative retention factor for officers and soldiers", with married leavers twice as likely to cite quality of life issues as the reason for leaving the Army.[178] A 2007 survey found that 54% of Royal Naval personnel, 41% of Royal Marine personnel, 41% of Army personnel and 59% of RAF personnel reported that operational commitment and stretch increased their intention to leave the Armed Forces.[179] Approximately a third of personnel felt that operational tours were too frequent[180] and that their workload was too high.[181]

107. We sought further information about the impact that Service life can have on family life and how this in turn affects retention. Dawn McCafferty told us that:

where the Harmony Guidelines are being breached routinely, it is the partners and spouses who are the ones who are saying, 'Enough's enough'. The individual very often, the Serviceman, is quite happy to deploy. He is enjoying it, he is putting his training to good use and he is getting a great deal of job satisfaction out of area, but the family are then faced with him coming home, unpacking his bags and …he is off again in another six months or so.[182]

108. The memorandum we received from the Army Families Federation included details about the consequences of increased levels of Separated Service and Unit Tour Intervals on Service personnel and their families. Single soldiers expressed concern about managing relationships during long absences, while families found it difficult to switch between single parenthood and a partnership. Both the Army and RAF Families Federations said that unpredictable hours of work, aggravated by stretch, made it difficult for spouses to work; that transport difficulties and extra childcare costs could make it difficult for families to manage their finances during operations; and that the costs of moving outstrip allowances which do not compensate for the difficulties of finding new accommodation, schools, dentists and doctors.[183] The Federation also noted that "the nature of present operational deployments means that the soldier who leaves home is not always the same soldier who returns".[184]

109. Liz Sheldon of Soldiers, Sailors, Airman Families Association Forces Help (SSAFA FH) told us that

our statistics show that there has been a massive increase in marital breakdown, relationship problems and emotional issues that people are bringing to us, possibly exacerbated by operational tours, but that is not to get away from the fact that the constant sorts of stresses and pressures of Service life on families put those relationships under enormous stress.[185]

110. Postings on our web forum provided direct examples of how increased levels of Separated Service, narrowing Unit Tour Intervals and stretch can affect personal and family lives:

People are getting sent away Out of Area last minute with a days notice in some cases. This can put a lot of pressure on a service person and their families…adequate time should be allowed to say good bye properly. As harsh as it seems, some men and women may not come back from war. They should be given sufficient time before deploying to spend quality time with their families and to mentally prepare themselves and organise themselves for the detachment ahead of them.

My husband is currently deployed again his third since 2005. In that time we have moved house 3 times and moved country twice. My husband has only managed 10 months off between tours, so our 4 children barely know him and he the same. I do not know where I am in our relationship sometimes wonder if we still have one.

111. The evidence we have received reinforces our conclusion that failure to meet Harmony Guidelines and the resulting pressure has serious consequences for retention in the Armed Forces. Given the demands placed on our Service personnel from the current level of operations, the Armed Forces are unlikely to achieve their Harmony Guideline targets in the near future. This continues to put Service personnel and their families under considerable strain.

112. The MoD told us that it was trying to reduce the pressures of Separated Service and Unit Tour Intervals in a number of ways, but that "mobility is an inevitable and necessary part of Service life, because of our geographical spread and the requirement to post people to achieve career development and generate military capability".[186]

113. The MoD is engaged in a number of activities to minimise the impact of mobility and increase stability. Royal Navy base porting policy has been developed to increase stability and the Navy had instigated 'Project Fisher' to develop a system that will enable ships to be deployed as long as necessary whilst still giving naval personnel sufficient time at home with families and the stability of knowing when and for how long they will be separated.[187] The Army points to Super Garrisons as evidence of their recognition that family stability is important and say that the Super Garrison concept will eventually increase home ownership and allow for higher second incomes[188] as Service partners are able to establish careers that are not disrupted by frequent moves. In the future the RAF will concentrate on fewer main operating bases.[189] It will reduce the number of new 'Out of Area' posts, and it has established the Harmony Working Group to improve the management of deployment turnaround times.[190]

114. In evidence to us, Professor Strachan questioned whether the measures that had been introduced had made a discernible difference in increasing the stability of Service personnel's lives, or whether progress was being made quickly enough:

In some ways the regimental reorganisation has not yet delivered in terms of what it should have done or what it promised to do as far as bringing people back home is concerned. We have pressures in relation to operational tours actually to increase the length of tours in terms of getting greater expertise in theatre, particularly at senior command levels, which will only further undermine the Harmony Guidelines if you are going to meet operational requirements.[191]

115. We strongly support Service personnel and their families in their calls to have greater stability. If the MoD is to succeed in its efforts to retain Service personnel, it must urgently seek ways to lessen the impact of stretch on Service personnel and their families. We have seen some evidence that the Services have recognised the importance of stability in the personal and family life of Service personnel, but this needs to be given greater priority. In particular, the MoD should examine how greater advance notice of postings and deployments could be given to Service personnel, so they and their families have more time to prepare. In its response to our Report we expect the Government to set out what measures it plans to introduce to create greater stability for Armed Forces personnel and the timetable for doing so, and in particular, how the development of Super Garrisons contributes to those plans.

WELFARE PROVISION

116. In the NAO's 2006 survey of personnel leaving the Armed Forces, a lack of operational welfare support, unit based welfare support, and welfare support for families were cited by over a quarter of respondents as important or very important factors in their decision to leave.[192] In 2007, 60% of Royal Naval personnel, 38% of Royal Marine personnel, 34% of Army personnel and 72% of RAF personnel were not sure or did not agree that they had easy access to a Welfare Officer.[193] Dawn McCafferty told us that the welfare umbrella covered a wide spectrum, such as children's education, support finding accommodation, moving house, and financial problems and that these issues could all contribute to reasons for leaving the Armed Forces.[194]

117. Many of the postings to our web forum explained that the welfare support offered by the MoD to Service personnel and their families did not meet their expectations:

The Armed Forces are without doubt overstretched, and no doubt fine people will continue to serve and do a first class job with whatever limited resources are afforded them. However I implore the committee to consider the cumulative effect … on not only serving personnel, but equally as importantly, on service families. Arguably a serviceperson will struggle to maintain focus on the task in hand when on operations, if phone calls home reveal concerns about the level of support the family is receiving in their absence. This can be anything from the inability to find a dentist for a child to problem with service families accommodation, but the effect these things can have is considerably amplified when serving away from the family.

With increasing Ops and Training for Ops our families are also being placed under strain. At present I can expect at least 5 of every 12 months away from the UK and have done this for some 10 years now. This is shortly likely to increase to 8 from 12. ... Currently I have been away from home 5 weeks and my wife has not even received a letter from my unit asking if all is well. While she…is independent that little bit of thought could go a long way.

118. We asked the RAF and Army Families Federations and SSAFA FH what could be done to improve the provision of welfare support. SSAFA FH told us that:

the MoD do not have the capacity really to handle many of the welfare issues that come to their door, and really what they need is to have a welfare support infrastructure which provides seamless support to families wherever they go and servicemen and which also embraces the wider family. We are getting many, many parents now contacting us because they just feel completely out of the loop and they are parents of many of the younger recruits that people are concerned about.[195]

All the witnesses from these organisations agreed that more investment in welfare provision was required. Dawn McCafferty suggested that in particular, funding for service community officers was needed, people on the ground who could talk to the families and serving personnel about what concerned them.[196] She also identified the need to provide Relate relationship counselling to all military units.[197] Julie McCarthy from the Army Families Federation suggested that the improvements would flow from unit welfare officers being funded and resourced adequately.[198]

119. Liz Sheldon told us that the Welfare Service was stretched.[199] This impacts on the level of support and advice available to Service personnel and their families. Dawn McCafferty told us:

welfare and community support for families gets squeezed out…we do feel that the resources need to go in to put back what they have already taken out.[200] In the past you would have had several people working in an office, looking at postings for people, or assignments…basically having that human interface…before you actually pressed the button to say you are posted from A to B, there would be somebody…talking to the warrant officer or the sergeant to find out what the impact might be on that individual, asking questions such as 'has anything changed recently?' They do not have the manpower to do that now, so, more and more, people feel they are being posted and promoted by computer. They are not. There are still people there doing the work, but there are fewer of them hence it is very difficult for people to feel there is a human being actually managing their careers anymore[201]

120. We also heard that differences between the provision of welfare in each Service, highlighted during joint operations, created discontent:

The issue is that at the moment we have got three Services which operate their personal welfare support differently. At the moment, this is accepted by MoD under the Armed Forces' personnel overarching strategy, for good reasons, I am sure, but it means that there is not a continuity, there is not a sort of streamlined approach to handling welfare issues and, when you have got people moving in and out of joint operations, back-filling between different units, it actually can bring an incredible hardship and an inconsistency sometimes in the way in which rules are applied.[202]

Dawn McCafferty gave us an example of a member of the RAF who was deployed overseas, but serving in a joint unit where the Army was responsible for providing welfare support. The family "felt very isolated, very left out and…contacted us for help and advice…Actually, it was not that the Army were not providing [support] it is just that they did it in a different way which was not necessarily conducive to what the RAF family felt they needed and were used to".[203]

121. The MoD acknowledges that more should be done to support Service personnel and their families, it has already improved the Operational Welfare package.[204] On 8 November 2007, it announced that "the first ever cross-Government Strategy for supporting Service personnel, their families and veterans will be published in the Spring".[205] The Minister told us that "I think all things around, for instance, welfare support, including housing conditions, general support for families—all these thing we are working on. I think that is where we have a number of issues at the moment".[206] The MoD's Service Personnel Strategy will be published on 17 July 2008.

122. The importance of first class welfare support for our Service personnel and their families cannot be overstated. They deserve nothing less. We commend organisations such as SSAFA FH and the Army, Naval and RAF Families Federations for the excellent work they do in this area. We acknowledge the recent improvements the MoD has made to the operational welfare package. However, it needs to do more. We are concerned that a reduction of Armed Forces Welfare Officers has had a detrimental affect on the quality of welfare support provided to Service personnel and their families.

123. We welcome the publication on 17 July 2008 of the Service Personnel Strategy. We plan to monitor its implementation and we will be seeking regular updates from the MoD on the progress being made and how the proposals in the strategy address the current shortcomings in the provision of welfare support.

Co-ordinating welfare support

124. Welfare support to veterans, Service personnel and their families is currently provided by the MoD and by approximately 120 Charities. The Confederation of British Service and Ex-Service Organisations (COBSEO) co-ordinates information, acts as a contact for external agencies, identifies issues of common concern and represents the needs of its member organisations at central and local government level.[207] Within the MoD there is a staff officer with responsibility for linking charitable activities to government priorities. Liz Sheldon of SSAFA FH told us that this "is an area which needs a lot of work".[208]

125. We asked the Minister whether, given the shortfalls in the provision of welfare to Service personnel and their families, enough was done to co-ordinate the work of the Armed Forces and their support organisations, and specifically whether the Service Personnel Strategy would address this issue. He told us that:

I am not going to pre-empt what … [the strategy] will say at the moment but clearly it is going to be a very important paper in terms of defining where we are in terms of support, what we can do further and what is possible…[in terms of welfare provision]. Whether it was truly joined up, whether it was ensuring that gaps were being plugged, the honest answer to that is that it was not. If you look at the range of people who are involved, from the Ministry of Defence, the single Services, the regimental associations, the many ex-Service charities…I suspect they are in the hundreds, I asked the question of myself, 'Why should there be anyone falling through the gaps, given that there are lots of resources around, whether it is within government or outside government? There are lots of people who want to do good. What can we do about this?', so last year, along with the Chief of General Staff, we organised a welfare conference which brought all these bodies together to look at how we could improve that[209]…COBSEO are doing a really good job in this line and they are working very well with the organisations, and I think it is a much more joined-up approach.[210]

126. We acknowledge the important work undertaken by the voluntary sector to support current and former Service personnel and their families. However, we are concerned that more could be done to make its assistance more coherent. We welcome the MoD's recent innovation of welfare conferences, but look to the MoD, in its response to this Report, to make a clear statement about its future plans to ensure there is a framework which provides a better focus for co-ordinating welfare support. We are particularly concerned that the boundaries between the welfare support provided by charities and that provided by the MoD has become blurred.

Focus of welfare provision

127. SSAFA FH was concerned that welfare currently focused on the demands of Command structure, rather than the needs of the individual.[211] We put this concern to the Minister. He told us that:

Clearly the Command has an absolute duty to ensure that welfare support is provided for the Service personnel; it is important that the structure is in place, and if it has meant that it is too much around what they specifically want and not enough around what families want I am not sure I go along with that. I think SAFFA themselves have been very much involved in welfare … As to whether that can be improved, I accept it probably can … we recognise this...Yes, there clearly is room for more improvement but whether it is in some way stymied because it is based on the Command structure, I would not necessarily accept that".[212]

128. Liz Sheldon told us that some people were resistant to seeking welfare support, particularly if it came from a uniformed source. She said that "we have a confidential support line which we provide under contract to the MoD and many of our contacts voice their concerns about actually contacting the system direct…they just feel they have more confidence going into an external agency which is independent of the Chain of Command".[213]

129. We accept that the Command structure has an absolute duty to provide welfare support, but, at a time of high operational tempo, we are concerned that welfare support is not always being delivered in the way that personnel and their families require. The MoD recognises that welfare support can be improved. In its response to our Report, we call on the MoD to set out the specific improvements it plans to introduce, and how those changes will place the individual at the centre of welfare provision.

HOUSING

i.  Standards of Service Housing

130. Many of the contributors to our web forum identified housing as a 'retention negative' factor:

Do something positive and quickly about soldiers' accommodation, not just the quarters but the single accommodation and messes as well … I wash and shave every single day in orange rusty water.

Defence Housing. Simply put is CRIMINAL.

131. We have recently examined the issue of housing in our Report The work of the Defence Estates[214] and noted that accommodation was a significant factor in levels of retention. We found that the standard of some accommodation was appalling, although we welcomed the improvement and modernisation of some Single Living Accommodation. In its response to our Report, the MoD agreed that good quality housing was a fundamental part of the welfare package, but said that upgrading Service accommodation was "a very substantial task given that MoD manages some 71,000 family properties and 165,000 single bed-spaces worldwide and that MoD is reversing a legacy of decades of under-funding".[215] The Government recognised that there was still much work to be done and said that "over the next 10 years we expect to spend more than £5 billion on accommodation".[216]

132. In a recent interview, General Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff said:

we have got some very good estates, we have got some mediocre and we have some appalling housing and accommodation. We know that. We can't solve it overnight. My aim has always been to argue the case for additional money to go into the programme so that we can shorten the refurbishment programme and get to a higher standard for all quicker and to an extent that has started to happen over the last 18 months. More money is being put in. I would like to see even more money being put in and we can go faster.[217]

133. We have already highlighted in our earlier Report the important role that accommodation plays in the ability of the Services to retain personnel. The MoD plans to spend some £5 billion on accommodation over the next ten years. Given the importance of accommodation to family welfare and retention, we expect the MoD to ensure that this work to improve accommodation is pushed forward as quickly as possible and, where possible, further resources are earmarked for upgrading accommodation. We note that Super Garrisons provide the MoD with an opportunity to deliver high quality Service accommodation.

134. In our inquiry into The work of Defence Estates we found that the contractorisation of maintenance had created some confusion about whose responsibility it was to ensure that things were repaired or replaced. In particular, we were concerned that the absence of a local estates manager responsible for sorting out problems had led to confusion. In our Report we considered that "if the problems we encountered are representative of the situation across the MoD's built estate, then it is a serious failure of policy. It is exacerbated by an alarming lack of recognition at senior levels that these problems are more than minor difficulties".[218]

135. The Government's response to our Report stated that:

MoD considers that the problems reported to the Committee are neither a fair reflection of the overall position nor a reflection of a serious policy failure. Repair levels, quality and customer satisfaction for the Housing Prime Contract have improved significantly over the past 12 months.

The MoD does not agree that the power to resolve maintenance issues has been removed from Defence Estates. That organisation provides a housing service in Great Britain that includes maintenance and…Defence Estates retains full command & control and direction over that contractor's activities...Moreover, we provide a freephone Helpdesk—which is in operation 24 hours a day, 7 days a week—to assist occupants in resolving their repair issues; and this is supplemented by face-to-face contact between our housing and maintenance representatives at regional and local levels.

We do accept that some of those involved in providing the housing service below the Area Housing Manager level have felt disempowered by the changes to the way in which business is now conducted. Consequently, Defence Estates has recently given greater financial and commercial delegations to its local housing staff, so empowering them to resolve local issues more quickly. These issues are fully recognised by senior managers within the organisation and Defence Estates continues to work to engender a culture in which individuals at all levels take responsibility for the service that they provide.[219]

136. Submissions to our web forum—and our own discussions with serving personnel—suggest that the MoD is wrong in its assessments of customer satisfaction levels. We received numerous complaints about difficulties in finding accommodation, the quality of the maintenance service and the lack of customer focus. For example:

Previously my married quarters…had the boiler condemned while I was on Ops, none of the unit personnel cared and DE [Defence Estate] had insufficient funds to make this urgent. It was a week before my wife had hot water to wash…The excuse was lack of money to call the boiler people on a special call. It is this…that puts additional pressure on individuals from the family point of view to leave the service.

It took 15 years to change our old carpets. When they finally booked to change the carpets they did not turn up after we had come home early from our holiday. We had a plumber 'fix' a problem in our water tank. The next evening water was leaking from the tank and dripping down a light bulb. The emergency plumber then went to the wrong house and turned around and went home despite having our contact number; we had to phone and ask where the plumber was. This is typical of the service we get. Everyone blames everyone else.

Availability of quarters seems to be worsening last year. We had difficulty in obtaining our quarter and only secured it a month before we moved, many families are finding themselves in this situation and this aggravates the whole moving process and creates more unwanted stress. Also add in the factor of trying to secure your children a school place without an address.

I am currently living in Service Family Accommodation. I will be leaving this soon due to relocation of jobs. Yes my request for SFA at my new place of work has been processed well…but nothing is simple anymore. I will move several days before I can hand over the house, why? Because they are too busy, they will only carry out handovers on Tuesdays in my area. [I informed] them my new position commences on the Tuesday to be told "well that's not my fault…we are not here to work around you." So if they are not there to provide a service to the Serving family, then who do they work for?

137. We put these concerns about the poor quality of repairs and the length of time taken to make them to the Minister. He said that:

if repairs are not done on time it is not acceptable, full stop. There have been problems, as you rightly point out, but we are continuing to improve the responsiveness and ensure that these repairs get done. There will always be cases. What we need to make sure is that we learn from any of those to make sure that we put the solution in place first time. I think you will find that our response times now are significantly improved, so at a ministerial level I can assure you—and I ask some very serious and searching questions and I get the regular monthly reports about repairs that we continually want to drive up the responsiveness for them.[220]

138. We were very disappointed that the Government response to our Report on The work of Defence Estates failed to acknowledge the serious shortcomings in the administration and maintenance of Service accommodation. It is now one year since we published our Report, and we are still receiving evidence that the standard of maintenance repairs and level of customer service falls well below the expectations of Service personnel and their families. We note that the Under-Secretary of State for Defence finds this unacceptable. So do we. We recommend that the MoD seeks advice from Local Government Housing Associations about how Defence Estates can move towards a customer-centred approach and we plan to monitor the MoD's progress in doing so.

Support for Service personnel to own their own homes

139. The difficulties that Service personnel experience buying their own homes can be an important factor in their decision to leave the Armed Forces. 69% of Royal Naval personnel, 82% of Royal Marine personnel, 80% of Army personnel and 82% of RAF personnel felt that frequent moves made it difficult for them to own their own home.[221] The Army Families Federation told us that:

home ownership is the aspiration of the vast majority but turbulence, separation, low second income and lack of certainty about future mobility all make purchasing a house difficult to achieve…One of the reasons families are turned down for Shared Equity Home Ownership Schemes are high debt levels. Some families suffer negative credit ratings from high mobility and from living in MoD accommodation with a high number of previous occupants.[222]

140. The MoD announced, on 19 March 2008, a £20 million pilot scheme to assist Service personnel in achieving their home ownership aspirations: "in the coming months we will work with commercial providers and public bodies to identify the most suitable approach, which is likely to be based on shared equity or rent to buy arrangements and will involve an element of MoD investment".[223] In addition to this announcement, MoD point to the recently uplifted Commitment Bonus of up to £15,000, the Government's Key Worker Living Programme and Long-Service Advance of Pay Scheme as measures to help Armed Forces personnel achieve home ownership.[224] We also expect that the MoD's future plans for a more stable basing will help Service personnel to achieve home ownership.

141. While we recognise the great value in welfare terms of the close-knit community that Service provided accommodation ensures, we support the MoD's recent initiatives to help members of the Armed Forces achieve home ownership. We consider that moves towards more stable basing of Armed Forces personnel will provide the MoD with more opportunities to develop new home ownership initiatives. It is vital that the MoD begin work on developing new initiatives now, that it works in partnership with the social housing sector, and that the resources to ensure their success are committed early.

PAY AND ALLOWANCES

142. Competitive pay rates are an important part of attracting recruits with the appropriate skills, abilities and attitudes and retaining those personnel over time. Recommendations about Armed Forces pay (up to and including the rank of Brigadier, Commodore and Air Commodore) are made by the independent Armed Forces Pay Review Body (AFPRB). In making recommendations the AFPRB is required take account of recruitment, retention and motivation of personnel, and pay comparisons with civilians; in addition to Government policies, its inflation target and departmental affordability. It also considers issues like manning, working hours and leave. The AFPRB receives written and oral submissions and visits overseas and operational units.[225]

143. As of 1 April 2007:[226]

• other ranks salary in initial training begins at £13,013, rising to between £16,227 and £27,559 in Pay Range 1 (OR 2-3: Able Rating, Marine, Lance Corporal, Private, Aircraftman and Junior Technician);
• other ranks salaries in Pay Range 5 (Other Ranks-9: Warrant Officer I) start at £36,812 rising to £44,588;
• officer University Cadet Entrants earn £11,719 in their first year of studying rising to £16,492 in their fourth year;
• officers salaries start at £14,852 (Officer-1: Sub-Lieutenant, Lieutenant, Flying Officer) rising to £31,188;
• officers at Commodore, Brigadier and Air Commodore ranks earn up to £96,288;
• bespoke pay scales operate for specialist staff like Chaplains and Officers Commissioned From the Ranks (OCFR); and
• specialist pay and compensatory allowances exist for skilled trades like flying (additional daily allowances range from £4.62 to £57.22 depending on rank, trade and experience), diving (additional daily allowances range from £4.05 to £31.21 depending on rank, trade and experience), and submariners (additional daily allowances range from £2.31 to £25.43 depending on rank, trade and experience).[227]

144. These salaries include the 'X-factor', introduced in 1970 in recognition of the disadvantages of service life, such as: danger; turbulence; separation; hours of work; restrictions on leave and access to trade union membership; impact of the job; and social aspects of the job. The rate of the X-factor is reviewed every 5 years by the AFPRB. In 2008 the AFPRB recommended that the X-factor be increased by 1% to 14% of base salary.[228] This percentage is included in the salary range examples set out above.

145. The AFPRB told us that Armed Forces' pay was broadly comparable with other young people and graduates in civilian employment. Its focus in recent years has been to improve the salaries of the most Junior Ranks (who were awarded pay rises of 9.4% in 2007),[229] and to increase new entrants' pay.[230] Its detailed assessments were that 'Other Ranks' starting pay was comparable with average civilian starting salaries up to the age of 21. Between ages 22-29 comparability varied, and was behind civilians for Privates/Lance Corporals (and equivalents) but ahead for Corporals. It said that because of the rapid progression available to officers, their pay, while below graduates entering civilian employment, was comparable with the public sector.[231]

146. RAND Europe was commissioned by the MoD to identify the views of serving personnel of the pay and allowance package provided by the MoD. The study of 162 personnel in 27 focus groups concluded in 2007 that that the current basic pay package and pension scheme were satisfactory.[232] The RAF Families Federation told us that it did not sense that financial issues were a strongly negative retention factor, except where the cost of house purchase is concerned.[233] However, in 2007, 45% of Royal Naval personnel, 64% of Royal Marine personnel, 46% of Army personnel and 40% of RAF personnel said that their salary levels increased their intention to leave.[234]

147. Some of the contributors to our web forum cited their remuneration package as a positive aspect of being in the Services, and that remuneration in the Armed Forces was not simply a question of salary:

All the benefits…to the services shouldn't need mentioning but we seem to forget about these when we look at our adequate—barely!—wage packets. Work out the costs of gym memberships, meals, accommodation, med&Dent, uniforms, MMA, School Allowance ad infinitum!! then add them on to your net rate!!

The positives are being paid 7 days a week, paid time off for AT; when you can get it, cheap accommodation (sometimes there are holes though); no medical bills and a pension if you live long enough to collect it.

148. General Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff, said recently that:

I am pleased that we had above inflation pay rises over the last couple of years. I think this year's pay rise reflected an increase in the X-factor, the additional bit of money that servicemen are paid and I think it was appropriate to do that. I think we need to keep service pay constantly under review and I would like to see it going up above inflation for the next couple of years. If you compare a traffic warden and a police constable on overtime I think you will find that an individual serviceman gets paid quite a lot less.[235]

149. We found General Dannatt's comparison of the Armed Forces personnel pay with traffic wardens and police constables unhelpful. Pay is only one component of Service personnel's remuneration package which makes such comparisons far from straight forward. It is vital that remuneration remains competitive and does not deter people from considering a career in the Armed Forces or from remaining in the Services. Our Armed Forces are among the best in the world and their pay should reflect this. We note that the overall basic pay package does not appear to be a major cause of Armed Forces personnel leaving the Services.

Allowances

150. Allowances comprise an important part of the remuneration package and cover many aspects of Service life. The AFPRB's 2008 report lists the following compensatory allowances: longer separation allowance, unpleasant work allowance, Northern Ireland resident's supplement, London recruitment and retention allowance, experimental test allowance, experimental diving allowance.[236] In addition, the MoD's website lists provisions for subsistence; overseas postings; travel; clothing; lodging; children's education allowance; relocation allowance; council tax refund; long service advance pay; domestic assistance; and Service risk insurance.[237] The MoD's commissioned study of Service personnel's attitude to remuneration reported that nearly all focus groups described the current pay and allowance package, particularly allowances, as complex, difficult to understand and determine eligibility and entitlement.[238]

151. We questioned the Minister about these difficulties. He told us that "we have just introduced a ready-reckoner which I think 26,000 Service people have accessed…you can go through a series of screens telling you what allowances you will be entitled to, depending on what you are doing at a particular time…We can always do more on that".[239] We pressed the MoD further about whether the ready-reckoner responded to a breakdown between policy and administration or whether it responded to the fact that the allowance system was too complex. Vice Admiral Wilkinson said that "all these [questions] are covered annually in what used to be the Single Service Attitude Surveys and we are now awaiting the results of the first Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey".[240] The Minister's response was more helpful:

it is not a case of 'everything is fine'. It has not been raised with us as being a major issue. It clearly is an issue…knowing what you are entitled to…we want to try and improve that recognition, but, as a number of Service people have said to me, they tend to be pretty good at finding out what allowances they should be entitled to. That is not being complacent because some people will have problems and…the ready-reckoner is one way of improving that.[241]

152. We note that the MoD has acknowledged that some Service personnel have had trouble understanding their allowances and has introduced a 'ready-reckoner' to help personnel determine their eligibility and entitlement to allowances. In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to set out its analysis of the difficulties that personnel may have in understanding the allowance package, the causes of those difficulties, and the extent to which the ready-reckoner resolves the difficulties.

Financial Retention Initiatives

153. In an attempt to improve retention levels in those pinchpoint trades which have an impact on operational capability, the MoD introduced Financial Retention Initiatives (FRIs). Tri-Service or large FRI's are agreed by the Secretary of State for Defence, approved by HM Treasury and endorsed by the Armed Forces Pay Review Body. Since 2005, the Services have had delegated authority to spend up to £2 million on lower value single Service schemes, authorised by Service Principal Personnel Officers. The MoD told us that FRIs were considered a highly effective method of stemming outflow by guaranteeing return service from personnel, which allowed time to address the underlying causes of manning short-fall.[242] Five FRIs (both tri-Service and Single Service schemes) have ended, of which, four trades have had some form of FRIs renewed (Aircrew, Submariners, RAF Fire-fighters, RAF Regiment (gunners)). The MoD has time limits and exit strategies for each FRI.[243] The 12 tri-Service FRIs currently in operation (from April 2008) are shown in Table 14. [244]

Table 14: Financial Retention Incentives (FRIs) available from April 2008

Incentive	Value	Take up rate
Aircrew FRI Career Senior Officer Aircrew	£50,000 for 5 years return service	RAF 106% RN 98%
Aircrew FRI Senior Office Pilots	Additional £50,000	RAF 81% RN 59%
Infantry FRI	£4,500 for 2 years return service	48%
Royal Marines' FRI	£10,000 (including commitment bonus for 3 years	55%
Nurses' FRI	£20,000 for 3 years	19%
Special Forces' FRI	£50,000 for 5 years	93%
Submariner Categories A2	£25,000 for 4 years return service	Introduced April 2008
Submariner Categories B2 (extended)	£20,000 for 4 years return service	90% between 2003-07 extended until April 2012
Royal Artillery FRI	£4,500 for 3 years return service	Introduced April 2008
REME Vehicle Mechanics FRI	£7,000 for 3 years return service	Introduced April 2008
RAF Fire fighters FRI	£9,000 (including £3,000 commitment bonus) for service to the 7.5 year point	Introduced April 2008
RAF Regiment FRI	£10,000 (including £3,000 commitment bonus for service to the 7 year point.	Introduced April 2008

Source: Ministry of Defence (Ev 53-4)

154. In its Recruitment and Retention in the Armed Forces report, the NAO cautioned that FRIs can only offer a short term solution and that unless the underlying issues are addressed, when they are removed, problems will return. FRIs may also be being paid to people who have no intention of leaving the Armed Forces.[245] The AFPRB have called on the MoD to "urgently assess the cost effectiveness of FRIs including robust cost benefit analysis which estimates the additional numbers retained rather than looking at absolute numbers who benefit".[246] It also notes that FRIs are now paid to large groups across the Armed Forces which may cause potential pay structure problems.[247] Both the NAO and the AFPRB have concerns that FRIs could be divisive amongst colleagues not working in pinchpoint trades.[248] We asked the MoD about its future plans for FRIs. The MoD told us that "FRIs are designed to be targeted, time-limited, discrete measures to address short-term critical manning shortages".[249]

155. We note that the MoD uses Financial Retention Incentives as a temporary emergency measure to maintain operational capability. Take-up rates have been mixed: FRIs for aircrew, special forces and submariners have had high take-up rates, while FRIs for nurses, the Royal Marines and the Infantry have not been so successful. We note that there are more Financial Retention Incentives operating in 2008 than there were in 2007. This is a reflection of the worsening manning situation in pinchpoint trades.

156. We share the Armed Forces Pay Review Body's concern that Financial Retention Incentives may not prove to be cost effective over the long term. We understand the necessity of these measures, but we have concerns that Financial Retention Incentives may divert investment away from addressing the underlying causes of worsening retention. In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to provide a breakdown of the total cost of each Financial Retention Incentive and the numbers of Armed Forces personnel who have been retained. We also expect the Government to set out its assessment of how Financial Retention Incentives will impact on pay scales over time, particularly for those trades which have been in receipt of successive, large Financial Retention Incentives, such as submariners who can receive up to £25,000 and aircrew who can receive up to £100,000. As pinch point trades often involve small numbers the manning situation in those trades can change rapidly. We expect the MoD to keep FRIs under constant review to ensure that money is not spent unnecessarily

Joint Personnel Administration

157. The Joint Personnel Administration system (JPA) was introduced across each Service during 2006-07, because the "cost, risk and hindrance to business change from continuing with antiquated IT platforms had become unsustainable".[250] In addition to "providing a single authoritative and integrated set of reliable, accurate and up to date personnel information", JPA allows Service personnel to submit expense claims without having to complete paper forms. The MoD say that "work is continuing to ensure that the new culture and working practices are embedded, and that the right training and communications are in place to help all personnel learn how to use JPA effectively according to their requirement and responsibilities, and get the best from it".[251] The MoD told us that it continues "to look at all aspects of the training of personnel in connection with Joint Personnel Administration to ensure that this is fit for purpose. This will focus on the provision of training and processes, primarily...to ascertain whether all users are appropriately trained and sufficiently aware to exploit the full potential of Joint Personnel Administration".[252]

158. In our Report Ministry of Defence's Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07 we expressed concern about the reported problems that Service personnel experienced using JPA.[253] The MoD agreed that staff and personnel throughout the Services were "coming to terms with how JPA impacts on their individual roles" and told us that:

in some areas the JPA processes themselves are proving difficult to utilise reliably and accurately, with consequential impacts on payroll accuracy…there remain a number of areas where further improvements are required. JPA is now a stable product that provides an excellent foundation for further optimisation and modernisation of the administrative support arrangements for members of the Armed Forces.[254]

159. As part of the MoD's efficiency targets set in the Comprehensive Spending Review 2004, the MoD agreed to reduce the number of military posts in administrative and support roles by 5,000 by 31 March 2008.[255] The RAF Families Federation told us that the introduction of JPA had removed many clerks from the front-line. Dawn McCafferty expanded on this point: "I have certainly heard evidence of serving personnel not now claiming the allowances that they are entitled to because either they do not know how to do it because the training package was delivered on the system with very limited actual proper training for people to use it, or they are frightened about being audited on it and making genuine mistakes and getting caught out for being dishonest because the system is so complicated".[256] Liz Sheldon told us that SSAFA FH's confidential helpline "experienced a large number of calls…all related to JPA…because, at first, people just did not know where to turn".[257] In its memorandum, the MoD stated that customer satisfaction levels had improved following additional training for enquiry centre staff.[258]

160. Many contributors to our web-forum told us that JPA was difficult to use:

JPA is just the most appalling way of running personal admin. It is difficult to use, is certainly not intuitive and if you have a problem with it the "specialists" have no clue. Bring back people on camp to talk to…Just trying to get a fair return on personal expenditure is a battle...to such an extent that many guys just don't bother. I guess that it is one way to save money by making the system too difficult to use. JPA is just appalling!

The introduction of [JPA] has seen the reduction of RAF clerical staff, coupled with the introduction of a call centre based in Glasgow, who do not understand the military in any shape or form and are unable to answer many of our questions. Furthermore the system has off loaded much of the administrative burden onto the individual or line manager who have no specialist training in this area. We must delve into numerous online documents…to work out what you can or can not do… JPA forms are difficult to complete, confusing and often do not work...

JPA has resulted in confusion and personnel not being paid correctly. Divers spend a significant time on detached duty which requires a claim to be submitted which is a time consuming process and due to the high numbers submitted by each individual results in an audit—yet more time wasted. Individuals no longer bother submitting claims for lunch etc as the system is just too difficult which is somewhat depressing …I had inadequate training on JPA and was thrown in the deep end with JPA responsibilities and minimum manning…JPAC were not at all helpful as they too did not know what they were doing.

161. The Joint Personnel Administration system offers potential efficiency and business benefits. However, we are concerned that Service personnel are not receiving the money that they are entitled to because JPA is difficult to use. The number of military administrative and support posts have been cut as part of an efficiency programme and as a result, Service personnel are not getting the help which they require and should be entitled to. We consider that these difficulties stem from poor planning and ineffective training. In its response to our report, we expect the MoD to set out what action it plans to take to address what is, in our view, a totally unacceptable state of affairs.

162. The Joint Personnel Administration call centre is the frontline for Service personnel who have questions about their pay, allowances and career. As such, it is critical that the advisers staffing it are thoroughly trained and properly equipped to perform their roles. However, the feedback we have received suggests that they are not. We welcome the Government's recent indication that additional training for call centre staff has improved levels of customer satisfaction. In its response to our Report we expect the MoD to provide us with an update on levels of customer satisfaction.

Regular Forces retention challenges: organisational and structural issues

c)  Single Service parity

163. The single Services each have their own individual terms and conditions of service, which have evolved over time and respond to the individual requirements of each Service. In preparation for the introduction of JPA, a new pay scale, 'Pay 2000', was introduced to improve compatibility between different Service terms and conditions.[259] Many pay bands have been aligned, although some major differences remain. The increase in joint operations have highlighted discrepancies and can be a source of irritation to Service personnel. Respondents to our web forum told us that:

Pay 2000 has narrowed the pay gap between trades to the extent that the technical trades feel undervalued and unsurprisingly are leaving…There is disparity between the services in similar jobs in respect of rank, pay and promotion time. Why, for example, is a high pay band RAF Flight Sergeant on the same pay scale as an Army or RN WO2 yet the WO2 gets an OR8 pension and the Flight Sergeant on an OR7 pension? It is my experience that the Flight Sergeant has equal or more responsibility than the WO2. The opportunity to introduce the WO2 rank to the RAF was the ideal opportunity to remove the Chief Tech rank.

A key factor in my decision to leave is the way that engineers and technicians, key to a technology driven force such as the Royal Air Force, have been undervalued since the introduction of the Pay 2000 scheme. The current scheme singularly disadvantages RAF technicians in comparison to the speedy promotion afforded to Army and Navy colleagues by virtue of their artificer and promotion schemes; and fails to financially recognise the length and complexity of training undergone, in addition to the level of responsibility undertaken relating primarily to those carrying out or supervising aircraft engineering tasks.

164. We asked the Minister about this discontent. He told us that:

there are obviously a number of differences in pay, particularly amongst the Services and also within the Services...I think the Armed Forces Pay Review Board will need to examine some of these things…Some of them we will probably be able to deal with, but at this stage I would not like to give the Committee an absolute assurance that we are going to solve the whole problem overnight. There are, I accept, differences and there is unhappiness amongst some people about this.[260]

165. Vice Admiral Wilkinson told us that:

our discussions with the pay review body…will certainly feature as my colleagues and I begin to discuss next year's pay round, how we can continue to tidy up and remove these irritants that you have spotted, certainly that emerged from Pay 2000…We are well aware as we fight and live and work far more together than we ever did actually that, if we wish people to concentrate on achieving operational success, then we do not want them to be distracted by whether the sergeant, the petty officer or the flight sergeant sitting next to them is getting more or less pay than they are.[261]

166. The differences in terms and conditions which exist amongst the Services are a cause of discontent. Whilst we acknowledge that it is important for each Service to have the flexibility to respond to its unique circumstances, in an era of increasing joint operations the MoD must give serious consideration to how different terms and conditions in the three Services could be better aligned. We recommend that both the MoD and the Armed Forces Pay Review Body should urgently consider how this could be best achieved.

RETIREMENT AGE

167. The MoD considers that the Armed Forces require an age profile focused on youth and physical fitness. Some 655 Regular and Reservist personnel in the Armed Forces are currently over 55,[262] although there are different regulations relating to retirement age in the Armed Forces. The Royal Navy's policy is to keep under review Officers on Full Term Commissions and Other Ranks on Second Open Engagements to assess the viability of increasing one or both to a retirement age of 55. The Army's compulsory retirement age has been increased to 60, and officers are expected to retire between the ages of 55-60—depending when they complete 34 years of Service, but there is some flexibility to extend service beyond this point. As of January 2008, soldiers may enlist for a term of 12 years, a term of 24 years (for particular roles) or 30 years, and in rare circumstances engagement can be extended up to 65 years of age. The RAF argues that increasing the retirement age would not alleviate manning pinchpoints because short falls are mainly found at the entry level, and that "continuance beyond the retirement age is offered on a case by case basis".[263]

168. We asked the Minister whether he felt that these different regulations were part of a 'joined-up' personnel strategy. He said that "obviously, there is a degree of autonomy that single Services have in terms of their manning and recruitment…There are a number of areas which need to be taken into account in terms of establishing a distinct policy saying, 'yes, you will be allowed to continue until you are 65 or 60'. I do not think it is an exact science".[264]

169. Respondents to our web forum highlighted the fact that, for officers in particular, this lack of flexibility can result in early outflow from the Armed Forces :

At 41, my employment opportunities [as a civilian] in terms of wages, benefits and recognition of my qualifications/experience are far greater than if I remain in service. The prospect of promotion, even with outstanding appraisals, are viewed as unlikely by myself and the majority of my peers (my particular trade of Eng Tech M has a large pool of manpower feeding into, with one other trade, a relatively small pool of Flt Sgts). Anyone but a fool would gamble the small chance of promotion and subsequent offer of extension of service to age 55, against not attaining Flt Sgt rank and being forced to start a new career at age 48.

170. The Armed Forces require an age profile which is focused on youth and physical fitness. However, the MoD must be careful that its retirement policies do not lead to experienced Service personnel leaving before they are due to go. Experienced personnel are a valuable resource and the MoD's policies should reflect this. We are concerned that the differences between the retirement policies in each of the three Services creates a disjointed system and causes inequalities.

171. During our evidence session with the Service Personnel Officers, we also explored how the differing retirement ages between Services can put some, notably the Royal Marines, at a disadvantage when considering inter-Service promotion.[265] We understand that the Services were given exemption from the European Employment directives 2006 on grounds of combat effectiveness. We call upon the MoD to explain how that differences in retirement policies can be justified on grounds of combat effectiveness and how differences in retirement policies fit with the MoD Unified Diversity Strategy mission statement and the Royal Navy Diversity and Equality Policy Statements.

TRANSFERS

172. Transferring to another trade or Service provides a route for personnel who are unhappy in their current job to remain in the Services. The MoD considers each application on the basis of educational, aptitudinal, medical or Service requirements and the manning levels of the 'inward' and 'outward' trades. The different terms and conditions of each Service require personnel to resign from one Service before they join another.

173. In the 12 months to 31 March 2008:

• Naval Service: there were 39 transfers out of the Naval Service and 52 inward transfers. 35 transferred from RN to RM and 11 transferred from RM to RN. 287 internal moves took place, 60 were rejected.
• Army: there were 550 successful transfers, 426 were rejected, 511 were withdrawn. A small number of officers transferred.
• RAF: approximately 50-60 other ranks transfer out per year, with a similar amount of inward transfers. A small number of officers transferred.[266]

174. A number of respondents to our web forum reported that in practice, transfers were difficult to achieve:

Switching between Services and trades is very bureaucratic and is ultimately up to someone who doesn't know you and the numbers have always got to tally, if your source branch is struggling for manpower the chances of a switch will be very slim.

It is theoretically very easy to switch between cap-badges, assuming one meets the criteria—one just completes their transfer paperwork...and then waits...for a very long time indeed, in some cases. Units have a nasty habit of 'losing' paperwork on an almost industrial scale. Transfer between services is a great deal harder, but to be fair, it doesn't happen that often. One has to resign then rejoin, again assuming that you meet the criteria. I—for one—would stay in happily to my 55 year point if the RAF could offer me anything like an interesting and valued job, but there is simply no way to find out if such jobs even exist.

If someone from the military is effective in one trade and through either Service or personal circumstances that trade is no longer viable for that soldier then they should be allowed to switch trades…people who enjoy serving the colours should be encouraged to stay in at all costs. Too many who want to stay in are being disillusioned by petty rules and leave.

Flexibility to switch between trades and branches would appeal to me, and others I suspect. However, it should not be accompanied by a change in pension rights as is currently the case. Those serving on the 'old' pension are currently forced onto the 'new' (less beneficial) agreement, thus rendering any branch change or years accumulated useless.

175. We raised this issue with the Minister, who told us that he:

was quite surprised that this point came up…I do not think we clocked it, to be quite honest, as being a major problem...We have no problem with it in principle, we are happy to support it, but it has got to be based on operational needs and also their ability to do the job they are asking to transfer to, and, of course, whether we have a particular issue in their grade in that particular part of the service".[267] "Hand on heart, can I say it is working as well as it can? No, I cannot. I…can go away and do some more work on that to see whether we can actually bottom out and maximise that.[268]

176. We pressed the MoD on whether maximising opportunities for transferring could have a role in increasing retention, particularly in the pinchpoint trades. Vice Admiral Wilkinson said that

there is often, in my experience, a feeling that the grass is greener on the other side and, therefore, a lot of people, both officers and other ranks, do look during their time in the Service at another branch or another trade or career to see if that would be of interest. I am not saying that that is where some of these numbers come from, but certainly, as you know, the recruiting process will do its best to match people's talents, skills and abilities to the right trade or branch. It may well be they get that right and actually some of these transfers are a little more than wishful thinking.[269]

177. Transfers between Services can help encourage personnel to remain in the Armed Forces. However, the number of transfers has to date been low. We consider that this is a mechanism which could be examined further as a possible way of encouraging retention. We welcome the Minister's commitment to look at how the transfer system could be improved and we expect the MoD's response to our Report to set out details of how those improvements will be achieved.

d)  Efficiency and Change programmes

178. A discernible theme which emerged on our web forum was the extent to which morale has been undermined by the high level of operational tempo, stretch and the pace of change in the Armed Forces:

The cumulative effect of too much organisational and administrative change occurring in too short a timescale. Numerous 'leaning' initiatives being forced onto the Services (through manpower capping and budgetary restraints) that do not take into account the cumulative effect upon the people at the 'coal face'.

Outsourcing key military roles to civil servants and commercial companies. Although both bring their own benefits, these are dwarfed by the problems in working culture, quality of output and delivery of service.

No organisational change, governmental review or new initiative can disguise the need for real and large scale investment at station, ship and battalion level. It is important that personnel are able to see tangible investment—procurement projects and consultancy fees are of no interest to the serving soldier, sailor, airman.

The pride I have always felt in wearing the uniform and knowing that I am giving 100% in supporting the people on the frontline is slowly wearing thin. I am employed in an organisation with insufficient funding and lack of manpower, where the military are in the minority and we are viewed as civilians in uniform.

179. The MoD's Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07 says that the "Department has comprehensive efficiency and change programmes that extend right across the organisation and affect every employee".[270] The MoD's Defence Programme is charged with improving efficiency and maximising investment in front-line operational capability. As part of the 2004 Comprehensive Spending Review, the MoD's Efficiency Programme is expected to deliver efficiency gains of at least £2.8bn.[271] The relationship between the different work-streams is set out in Table 15 below.

Table 15: Relationship between change and efficiency programmes

Defence Change programme	Efficiency programme
Defence Change programme	Joint Defence Change Programme and Force Capability Changes	Force Capability Changes
Defence Training Review Transformation	Defence Logistics Transformation	Forces structure change
UK Military Flying Training System	Whole Fleet Management	Manpower reductions
Business Management System	Defence Information Infrastructure	Equipment procurement
Defence Intelligence Modernisation programme	Estates Modernisation	Other
Joint Helicopter Command Rationalisation	People Programme	Lyons
German Basing	Joint Personnel Administration	Finance
Fleet transformation	Defence Health Change Programme	Commodity procurement
Defence recruitment and Individual Training Management	Defence e-Commerce
	Defence Travel Modernisation
	Command HQ Collocations

Source: Ministry of Defence

180. In addition to the current high operational tempo, the Armed Forces face pressures which arise from the various efficiency and change programmes such as the Defence Change Programme and Force Capability Changes. We do not doubt the calibre of personnel in the Armed Forces and their commitment to maintaining the highest standards, but a combination of demands has created an exceptional burden. We accept the necessity of the change and efficiency programmes, but the MoD cannot neglect the resulting impact on Service personnel. We believe that the MoD must do more to manage the pressure on Service personnel.

Volunteer Reserve Forces retention challenges

181. As discussed in Part 2 of our Report above, the actual number in the Reserve Forces falls short of requirements. Volunteer Forces are also subject to high turnover rates.[272] Reservists experience different challenges to those experienced by Regular personnel—families and their civilian employment usually take precedence over their commitment to the Reserve Force. The MoD accepts that it could do more to help Reservists respond to these pressures.[273] On 1 April 2008, the MoD announced a review into the configuration, structure and location of Reservists, as well as considering Reservists training and equipment.[274]

SUPPORTING VOLUNTEER RESERVISTS

182. The NAO's study of the Reserve Forces found that around half of the Volunteer Reservists planning to resign within the year cited personal or family pressure as reasons for leaving.[275] In 2007, 61% of TA personnel who left, cited work or family commitments.[276] We asked SSAFA FH and the Army and RAF Families Federation about the support Volunteer Reservists and their families received. Julie McCarthy noted that the wide geographical spread of many Reservists units made it difficult to provide welfare support in the same ways that it was provided to Regular Forces.[277] Dawn McCafferty emphasised that:

they are a uniquely difficult group to reach and you have to assume that the partners and the families do not actually understand anything about the military lifestyle because they have not chosen to volunteer at the weekends…but they are just carrying on with their normal lives. It is only when their partner is deployed or there is an issue where they need support, suddenly they do not know who to turn to…it is facilitating information to them, a welfare package that they can tap into when they need it, but also respecting the fact that they do not necessarily want it forced down their throats."[278]

183. The NAO concluded that the MoD needed to improve the levels and quality of communication between Reservists in theatre, between theatre and home units and with the families of Reservists.[279] Tim Corry, Campaign Director for SaBRE, told us that improvements to communication could be made at Unit level:

I know that there are variations in how much people do…but certainly commanding officers…are able to make sure that families are included in broad communications about what reserves are doing and for them to feel included, particularly in the very difficult periods when reservists are away on deployment and perhaps are mobilised for 11 months with their training and then come back, to make sure that families are kept in the picture as to precisely what is happening to their spouses.[280]

184. The MoD recognises that Reservists should be offered the same level of support as is offered to Regular personnel.[281] However, in 2007 61% of TA personnel felt that they had been poorly informed about their eligibility to use the Army Welfare Service and 53% felt they had been poorly informed about the Welfare Services the Army provided.[282] The NAO found that:

the Army is providing resources for additional welfare officers. There are also instances where units have helped families of deploying Reservists to firm their own informal support networks. However, problems remain for the families of Reserves who serve in specialist units or from the Regular Reserves, who are more widely geographically spread, are more isolated and do not have such ready access to welfare support. More can be done to link them with local Volunteer Reserve or Regular Units.[283]

185. Reservists are vital to our Armed Forces and deserve a high level of support. However, in several areas the level of support needs to be improved substantially. We find it unacceptable that the MoD has not developed a welfare package that responds to the unique circumstances of Volunteer and Regular Reservists. We recommend that this should be addressed as a matter of urgency.

186. We also have concerns about the level of post-deployment support received by Reservists. The NAO asked Reservists about their experiences of the transition from military to civilian life—some described the transition as "difficult" or "abrupt".[284] Tim Corry told us that "when a regular comes back from deployment or mobilisation generally speaking he has his peer group around him and he can decompress, or whatever the expression is, whereas the reservist goes back to his civilian community".[285]

187. Research undertaken in 2006 by Kings College, London, funded by the MoD, found that Territorial Army (TA) members had less post-deployment medical support than Regular Army members. The study concluded that 25% of Reservists who had fought in Iraq experienced mental health disorders, compared with 19% of Regular soldiers.[286] In response to this study, in November 2006, the MoD instituted a Reserves Mental Health Programme, providing a dedicated mental health assessment programme for any member of the Reserve Forces deployed since January 2003, although the MoD Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07 reveals that the numbers assessed have been small.[287] We note that the MoD has instituted a dedicated mental health assessment programme for Reservists, but we are concerned that the number of Reservists who have used it to date has been small. In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to set out the reasons for this.

INTEGRATION

188. The NAO found that "throughout our fieldwork, Reservists have emphasised how important it is that they have valued, meaningful roles to perform, and are employed in those roles when the need arises; otherwise morale and motivation suffer and they are more likely to leave the organisation".[288] Not all reservists are trained, mobilised or integrated properly, and short comings in these areas impacts on Reservists operational effectiveness.[289] 25% of TA personnel felt that the Army's efforts to improve integration had not resulted in any change.[290] The MoD told us:

There will inevitably be cases where individuals moved into larger, formed units, perceive themselves to be initially poorly integrated. This may be exacerbated where individual augmentation occurs for operations although this can affect Regular as well as Reservist augmentees. Integration has significantly improved, but the Department is not complacent and strives for better integration not only on operations, but throughout Reservists' careers. The Front Line Commands, responsible for force generation, now attempt wherever possible to integrate Reservist pre-deployment activity with Regulars at the earliest opportunity… Legislative limitations on the length of mobilised Service sometimes preclude a Reservist from undertaking all his training with the regular unit in which he is to be embedded but commanders are conscious of this practical limitation.[291]

We have heard from Reservists that the process of augmenting and backfilling can lead to a lack of cohesion within formed units and can make it difficult to maintain a high level of performance. We note with concern the NAO's finding that over 40% of those planning to leave the Reserves, cited poor leadership as a factor in their decision.[292] The MoD has set out details of the training courses which it considers will resolve this problem.[293]

189. The Reserves provide the MoD with vital capability on operations abroad and in the UK. We acknowledge the important role they play in the Armed Forces. However, Reserves are often used to augment and backfill other units which can damage morale and motivation and undermine retention. We look to the MoD to examine whether the way it uses Reserves contributes to voluntary outflow.

THE ROLE OF EMPLOYERS

190. Employer supportiveness is an important retention factor for Volunteer Reserves. As we discussed in our Report Medical care for the Armed Forces, the relationship with employers is particularly important in specialist units where Reservists are being used specifically for their civilian skills—such as medical Reservists.[294] SaBRE was created in 2002 as a marketing campaign group to support Reservists and employers of Reservists. The MoD says that 89% of employers surveyed by SaBRE agree that they should be supportive of Reservist employees; although that support reduced by 6% for second mobilisations and fell again by 10% for subsequent mobilisations. SaBRE research found that employer support also fell when employers realised that the length of the average mobilisation period was 11 months.[295]

191. Not all employers are so supportive. Some employers, particularly those with small businesses, do not feel that they can accommodate the obligations of Reservist's and will not recruit workers who have a Reserve commitment.[296] SaBRE also reported that some Reservists facing repeat mobilisations had been told by their employers that they should resign from the Volunteer Reserves for the sake of their long-term career.[297] 22% of TA personnel felt that their commitment to the TA impacted on the security of their civilian jobs. 52% said that their employers would react negatively if they mobilised voluntarily and 24% said that their employers would react negatively if they were compulsory mobilised.[298] This is a matter of concern. We asked SaBRE about whether legislation was necessary to protect the rights of Reservists. Tim Corry told us that:

There are two schools of thought here…People say they have been discriminated against but it is very difficult to prove. On the one hand you could say that we have it in the area of gender, paternity etc, etc, and there could be an argument for legislation in this area. My personal view is that it would be counter-productive. There are some people who, if you produced legislation against discrimination, would find a reason to work round it, whereas if it does not exist certainly based on our relationship with employers we talk to broadly it is dealt with as a case-by-case study.[299]

We are concerned that information about the impact of Reservist's commitments on their civilian employment is anecdotal and unquantified. The MoD must urgently commission research into this issue, and, if necessary, consider legislation to ensure that the rights of Reservists are protected.

The Military Covenant

192. The Royal British Legion and former and serving military leaders have called for the Military Covenant—the unwritten social and moral commitment between society and the Army—to be formalised and extended across the Services. The campaign centres around a perceived need for an agreed contract between civil society and Service personnel.

193. In their paper Out of Step, Dr Timothy Edmunds and Professor Anthony Forster, maintain that the Military Covenant "has been damaged almost beyond repair. A new civil-military contract is necessary—first, to restore the Military Covenant between the Army and the nation; and second, the Military Covenant must be a tri-Service (rather than Army) pledge between the government (on behalf of its citizens), the military as an employer and individual service personnel".[300] As evidence for the need for a formalised Military Covenant, they point to: the poor quality of some Service accommodation; problems with standard issue kit; breaches in Harmony Guidelines; complaints about pay and allowances; and claim that recent large scale equipment projects have diverted funding from projects supporting Armed Forces personnel.[301]

194. Not all are persuaded by the need for a formalised Military Covenant. Professor Strachan told us that:

The Military Covenant is a very new expression. Many of the issues that are raised under the Military Covenant are issues to do with specific under-provision in areas which we should be providing for even if there were a written and adhered to Military Covenant…I am not entirely persuaded that there is a need for a written document and I am slightly surprised that it has become assumed that there is such a thing as a Military Covenant.[302]

195. Members of the Armed Forces make sacrifices on behalf of civil society and in return they and their families should receive appropriate support. However, we do not see how formalising the Military Covenant would provide that support. In our opinion any formalised Military Covenant would become a political instrument rather than an instrument to protect the interests of men and women in our Armed Forces. As such, it would divert attention from what is important: ensuring Armed Forces personnel receive what they are entitled to.

Representing Armed Forces Personnel

196. Service personnel are prevented from joining unions and do not have an alternative representative body to make collective representations about pay, conditions of service; and to offer support at disciplinary hearings and employment tribunals.[303] The Police Service has such a body which represents the interest of police officers, particularly in terms of welfare provision and the efficiency of the Police Service.

197. In evidence to us, Dr Alexandrou argued that "the lack of a collective representative body currently…impacts negatively on the morale, commitment and ultimately on the retention of high quality military personnel at all levels". [304] The British Armed Forces Federation (BAFF) believes that a possible solution lies in establishing an independent Armed Force's Federation.[305] The proposed terms for a Federation are set out below:

Table 16: Proposed 10 Point Plan for a proposed Armed Forces Federation[306]

1. A professional staff association is to be formed for members of Her Majesty's Forces under the provisional title of the British Armed Forces Federation (BAFF).

2. Comparable bodies have for years served the Armed Forces of allied countries such as the US and Australia, with official cooperation and no negative impact on operational effectiveness or military discipline. The proposed federation is, however, designed to be a specifically British solution... It will reflect and respect the ethos and robust traditions of the three fighting services. It will meet all requirements of British and other law, including international conventions adopted by the UK.

3. The federation's mission shall be to represent, foster and promote the professional, welfare and other legitimate interests of all members of the federation in their capacity as serving or retired personnel of the fighting services of the UK, and in so doing help to maximise operational efficiency and improve the retention of trained personnel.

4. The federation will be a democratic representative institution answerable to its members. Membership of the federation will be open to all personnel irrespective of rank, branch of service or gender. The main membership categories will be Ordinary Membership (Regular), Ordinary Membership (Reserve Forces) and Veteran Membership. In responding to the requirements of its members, the federation will act in the interests of all serving personnel and veterans but will not countenance any pressure on individuals to join.

5. Within resources, the activities of the federation may include:

(a) professional and career development by the provision of education and information;

(b) liaison, monitoring and response to proposals or developments within the services, in Parliament, in the provision of public services or in the commercial sector which have a specific impact on forces personnel;

(c) appropriate advocacy and consultation to protect and improve the conditions of service life including pay, accommodation, medical and welfare services, resettlement and all other areas of personnel support;

(d) appropriate support to personnel facing court martial or other legal proceedings in connection with their service (the federation will not normally comment on any specific case within the systems or military justice and administrative discipline); and (e) the negotiation for members of a range of insurance, financial and other benefits, discounts or affinity deals.

6. The federation will not be beholden to any political party, pressure group, or defence industry interest. While supporting the cross-party consensus on the need for robust, adequately funded but cost-effective forces serving the Nation as determined by the Government of the day, the federation will not be a defence pressure group. The federation will not take a view on matters of defence strategy or operational decisions, although it may raise legitimate subsidiary matters affecting personnel. Parliamentary liaison will be strictly on a cross-party basis.

7. The federation will not be a trade union and, above all, it will not conduct or condone any form of industrial action or insubordination within the Armed Forces. The federation affirms the vital role of the Armed Forces Chain of Command in representing the interests of its personnel. The federation will seek to agree with the Ministry of Defence appropriate mechanisms for the exchange of information with the Chain of Command as well as centrally. A code of conduct will be adopted, and potential disagreements will normally be raised centrally to avoid placing serving personnel in difficulty with their Chain of Command, or vice versa. The federation will act to protect serving members in their federation-related activities within the agreed code of conduct.

8. The federation will not seek to supplant the role of any existing charity or other agency involved in service welfare. ...

9. Work is already under way on matters such as the structure and legal format of the federation, and staffing. A business plan is being prepared.

10. This draft statement of intent outlines the basic principles established so far. Work continues on detailed aspects of the proposals with a view to wider consultation throughout the Armed Forces community, and with the Ministry of Defence".

198. Professor Strachan was confident of the advantages of an Armed Forces Federation and told us that: "it could benefit the Chain of Command if you took some…issues [not connected to operational command, for example housing, family support] out of the Chain of Command and enabled them to be dealt with directly as employment issues…in another form of management structure. Of course there will be issues on the borderline between command and personnel management; I entirely see that, and there will be areas of difficulty. That is not a reason for not doing it".[307] Professor Dandecker was also supportive "it is important that people are involved in decision-making and thinking about the issues that affect the Armed Services. Secondly, the generations of young people who are coming into the military expect it and I think the demand for it is perfectly reasonable".[308]

199. In the 2007, 34% of Royal Naval personnel, 24% of Royal Marine personnel, 36% of Army personnel and 38% of RAF personnel felt that their Service had not treated them fairly.[309] 45% Royal Naval personnel, 64% Royal Marine personnel, 46% Army personnel and 40% of RAF personnel felt that senior Service leaders did not understand or represent their interests.[310]

200. Respondents to our web forum were also largely supportive of the need for an independent Federation to represent the interests of Service personnel:

it would be nice to have representation at government level which did not involve commissioned officers (who tell you that everything is fine)…the majority of senior officers are far removed from…reality and don't know what happens on the ground.

Ordinarily, I would disagree at the very concept of a Federation or union (that's just the soldier in me) as the only Federation I should need is that provided by the Chain of Command. However…I now feel that there should be an independent forum/organisation where ministers etc can be held to account...

There are several 'Federations' and no doubt these self-appointed guardians of the faith will appear on these fora shortly. Frankly, we shouldn't need them, and they mere fact they exist leaves a foul taste in my mouth, but at least they…want the best deal for servicemen and women.

It would be good to have proper accountable representation with the AFPRB. The reason for the welfare issues is massive under-spending by the Government causing hardship across the board for servicemen. Contracting out services like DE and JPA has taken the Chain of Command out of the loop and this has created the problems.

201. The MoD has rejected proposals for an Armed Forces Federation for the following reasons:

Individuals have the right to complain about any matter relating to their service, ultimately to the Defence Council. The Armed Forces Act 2006 introduces improvements to the complaints process, including the establishment of a Service Complaints Commissioner.

There are other mechanisms through which the views of Service personnel can become known. Service personnel may join trade and professional associations, as well as organisations representing their interests, ranging from the Armed Forces Pension Society to the Armed Forces Lesbian and Gay Association.

We remain unconvinced that an Armed Forces Federation is consistent with the ethos and traditions of the British Armed Forces, nor is there evidence of widespread grass roots desire for such a development.

MOD will engage with any organisation which represents individual service personnel interests such as the Forces Pensions Society, the Combined Armed Forces Federation (UK).[311]

202. We asked the Minister to expand on the MoD's position. He said "first of all, we do not see the need for it. There are a number of reasons for that. We feel that in terms of the Chain of Command it is very important that issues are dealt with by that process, particularly around welfare issues. As for the changes in terms of redress…the Service Complaints Commissioner has been put in place.[312] Vice Admiral Wilkinson said that "I agree that …representing the wellbeing and welfare of the people under your command is a vital function for the Chain of Command. I am also strongly of the opinion that there are a number of mechanisms and routes whereby people can make representations or state a complaint all the way up to the Defence Council if necessary."[313]

203. We have listened carefully to the arguments both for and against an Armed Forces Federation. We are open-minded about the benefits of such a Federation, but we are concerned that the MoD is not. We recommend that the MoD considers more constructively the possible benefits which may be gained from an independent Armed Forces Federation, and encourage the MoD to consult with the British Armed Forces Federation.

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176   NAO, HC (2005-06) 1633-I, p 17, para 2.1; HC (2005-06) 1633-II, pp 13-14 Back

177   Ev 109,the Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey (AFCAS)  Back

178   Ev 110-111, the Army Leavers 1 survey Back

179   2007 tri-Service Continuous Attitude Survey, Table 126, p 32 Back

180   Ibid, Table 94, p 24 Back

181   Ibid, Table 51 p 14 Back

182   Q 65 Back

183   Ev 138-140; Ev 79-82 Back

184   Ev 138 Back

185   Q 65 Back

186   Ev 180 Back

187   Ev 104 Back

188   Ev 105 Back

189   Ev 180 Back

190   Ev 106-107 Back

191   Q 22 Back

192   NAO, HC (2005-06) 1633-II, pp 13--14 Back

193   2007 tri-Service Continuous Attitude Survey, Table 212, p 54 Back

194   Q 44 Back

195   Q 46 Back

196   Q 72 Back

197   Q 46 Back

198   Q 47 Back

199   Ev 138; Q 71 Back

200   Q 75 Back

201   Q 74 Back

202   Q 46 [Liz Sheldon] Back

203   Q 46 Back

204   Ev 86 Back

205   MoD Press Notice, 'New Government strategy will improve support to Service personnel and their families,' 8 November' 2007, www.mod.uk Back

206   Q 337 Back

207   www.cobseo.org.uk/cobseofrontpage.html Back

208   Q 50 Back

209   Q 387 Back

210   Q 388 Back

211   Ev 141 Back

212   Q 412 Back

213   Q 42 Back

214   HC (2006-07) 535 Back

215   Defence Committee, First Special Report of 2007-08, The work of Defence Estates: Government Response to the Committee's Fifteenth Report of Session 2006-07, HC 109, p 4 Back

216   Ibid.  Back

217   Ministry of Defence Press Release, Chief of the General Staff discusses Armed Forces issues, 5 June 2008 Back

218   HC (2006-07) 535, p 28, para 85 Back

219   HC (2007-08) 109, pp 11-12 Back

220   Q 394 Back

221   2007 tri-Service Continuous Attitude Survey, Table 164, p 42 Back

222   Ev 138 Back

223   HC Deb, 19 Mar 2008, 66WS Back

224   HC Deb, 19 Mar 2008, 66WS; Ev 180 Back

225   Ev 84 Back

226   HoC Deb, 10 May 2007, Col 18WS Back

227   Armed Forces' Pay Review Body, Thirty-Seventh Report, 2008, Cm 7315, pp 53-65 Back

228   Ev 86 Back

229   Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07, HC 697, p 105, para 184 Back

230   Ev 85 Back

231   Ev 85 Back

232   RAND Europe, Motivations and Attitudes of New Recruits Regarding Remuneration Issues, 2007, p vii Back

233   Ev 82 Back

234   2007 tri-Service Continuous Attitude Survey, Table 133, p 34 Back

235   Ministry of Defence Press Release, Chief of the General Staff discusses Armed Forces issues, 5 June 2008 Back

236   Armed Forces' Pay Review Body, Thirty-Seventh Report, 2008, Cm 7315, p 67 Back

237   www.mod.uk Back

238   RAND Europe, Motivations and Attitudes of New Recruits Regarding Remuneration Issues, 2007, p 47 Back

239   Q 398 Back

240   Q 400 Back

241   Q 401 Back

242   Ev 103 Back

243   Ev 104 Back

244   Ev 130-134 Back

245   NAO HC (2005-06) 1633-I, p 26, para 2.30 Back

246   Ev 86 Back

247   Ibid Back

248   NAO HC (2005-06) 1633-I, p 26; Ev 86 Back

249   Ev 178 Back

250   Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07, HC 697, p 108 Back

251   Ibid  Back

252   Ev 188 Back

253   HC (2007-08) 61, para 104  Back

254   HC (2007-08) 468, pp 30-31 Back

255   Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07, HC 697, p 85, para 144 Back

256   Q 74 Back

257   Q 77 Back

258   Ev 188 Back

259   Ministry of Defence, Performance Report 2000-01, Cm 5290, p 29 Back

260   Q 363 Back

261   Q 364 Back

262   Ev 177 Back

263   Ev 178 Back

264   Q 380 Back

265   Qq 381-382 Back

266   Ev 175-178 Back

267   Q 374 Back

268   Q 375 Back

269   Q 378 Back

270   Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07, HC 697, p 84, para 141 Back

271   Ibid, p 84-5 Back

272   NAO, HC (2005-06) 964, p 2, para 20 Back

273   Ibid, p 37, para 4.13 Back

274   HC Deb, 19 Mar 2008, Col 64WS Back

275   NAO, HC (2005-06) 964, p 35, Figure 14 Back

276   2007 Continuous Attitude Survey (Territorial Army), Q 71, p 30 Back

277   Q 58 Back

278   Ibid Back

279   NAO, HC (2005-06) 964, p 37, para 4.16 Back

280   Q 104 Back

281   NAO, HC (2005-06) 964, p 38, para 4.18 Back

282   2007 Continuous Attitude Survey (Territorial Army), Qq 52 a-b, p 24 Back

283   NAO, HC (2005-06) 964, p 38, para 4.17 Back

284   Ibid, p 41, para 4.30 Back

285   Q 93 Back

286   More medical aid for reservists, 16 May 2006 bbc.co.uk Back

287   Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07, HC 697, p 132, para 243 Back

288   NAO, HC (2005-06) 964, p 36, para 4.11 Back

289   Ibid, p 14, para 2.8 Back

290   2007 Continuous Attitude Survey (Territorial Army), Q 29 a-b, p 13 Back

291   Ev 108 Back

292   NAO, HC (2005-06) 964-I, Appendix Three, p 50 Back

293   Ev 171-172 Back

294   HC (2007-08) 327, para 115 Back

295   Ev 107 Back

296   Ibid Back

297   NAO, HC (2005-06) 964, p 39, para 4.22 Back

298   2007 Continuous Attitude Survey (Territorial Army), Back

299   Q 91 Back

300   Demos, Out of Step: The case for change in the British Armed Forces, November 2007, 19-20 Back

301   Demos, Out of Step: The case for change in the British Armed Forces, November 2007 Back

302   Q 18 Back

303   HC Deb, 13 May 2008, Col 1215; Ev 90 Back

304   Ev 90 Back

305   As set out by BAFF on the Army Rumour Service website in January 2006, www.baff.org.uk. Back

306   Ev 90-91 Back

307   Qq 30-31 Back

308   Q 31 Back

309   2007 tri-Service Continuous Attitude Survey, Table 34, p 10 Back

310   Ibid, Table 109, p 28 Back

311   Ev 179-180 Back

312   Q 402 Back

313   Q 403 Back

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Prepared 30 July 2008