Conclusions and recommendations
Web forum
1. The
use of web fora provide us with an opportunity to hear the experiences
of a wide range of current and former Service personnel and their
families. We value this interaction. We welcome the Minister's
support for our ability to communicate freely with the Service
community. However, this is the second time we have had concerns
that the MoD has attempted to undermine a web forum that we have
hosted. We look to the MoD to demonstrate its support for our
interaction with the Service community by actively promoting web
fora we set up for future inquiries. (Paragraph 13)
Pinchpoint trades
2. We
are disappointed to note that between 2004 and 2008, the number
of pinchpoint trades have increased across all Services. In the
Army pinchpoint trades have increased by 15.4%, in the RAF by
63%, and in the Naval Service by 150%, so that there are now 30
pinchpoint trades in the Army, 31 in the RAF and 25 in the Naval
Service. (Paragraph 36)
Assessing Armed Forces responsiveness
3. We
are concerned that, on the basis of the information presented
about PSA Target 3, Armed Forces Responsiveness, the Armed Forces
have limited ability to meet future, as yet unknown, obligations.
The MoD has said that PSA Target 3 provides an assessment of the
level of pressure experienced by the Armed Forces and does not
reflect on their ability to sustain current operations. As the
MoD cannot predict or control the exact nature and timing of future
operational requirements, we believe that its failure to meet
this target points to a potentially serious weakness in the future
capability of the Armed Forces. Furthermore, we question the purpose
of a target which, given recent operational tempo, the MoD has
no chance of meeting. (Paragraph 44)
Engaging with the public
4. We
note that the sometimes negative media coverage about the Armed
Forces is detrimental to the public's understanding of the military
and places unnecessary pressure on Service personnel and their
families. (Paragraph 47)
5. Any increase in
contact between the Armed Forces and civilian society should be
welcomed. We hope that the MoD gives due consideration to the
proposals contained in the report on National Recognition of our
Armed Forces. Budgetary constraints and the level of stretch currently
experienced by the Armed Forces limit the extent to which the
Services can build and maintain links with civilian society. However,
we consider that these activities are central to ensuring the
future success of the Armed Forces. The MoD should afford them
high priority and ensure that they are adequately resourced. It
is also important that decision makers in civilian society, including
Members of Parliament and Local Government representatives, have
an understanding of the military. We recommend that the MoD encourages
more contact between the military and such groups to ensure that
decisions which affect our Armed Forces are evidence based. (Paragraph
50)
Working with schools to raise awareness of the
Armed Forces
6. The
MoD does not appear to have adequately considered the delivery
of its school visits programme, in particular how the geographical
spread of visits and individual Service visits fit into broader
objectives of increasing awareness of the Armed Forces. We recommend
that the MoD considers the relationship between the historic geographic
footprint of the Services and the benefits of school visits. We
are concerned that by concentrating on those areas which already
have an understanding of an individual Service—particularly
for the Royal Navy and the RAF—the full benefits of working
with schools to raise awareness and create links between the Armed
Forces and civilian society will not be achieved. (Paragraph
55)
7. We are encouraged
that in 2006 the MoD investigated how the content of its school
visits programme could be improved and has identified a number
of methods for achieving this. Outreach school visits and recruiting
visits have different purposes and we agree with the MoD that
it must keep them separate. We understand that the MoD is to undertake
a detailed review of its schools programme. In its response to
our Report, we expect the MoD to set out the terms of reference
and timetable for that review. We consider that active, adventure
based outreach programmes will be most successful. (Paragraph
56)
8. The MoD told us
that it would work with Members of Parliament to gain introductions
to schools that have not developed contacts with the Armed Forces.
We see this as a positive development and we look forward to working
with the MoD to put it into practice. (Paragraph 57)
Cadets role in raising awareness of the Armed
Forces
9. We
welcome the positive impact that the Cadet Forces can have on
the lives of young people and we acknowledge the hard work of
all those involved in making the Cadet Forces a success. We note
that the MoD, in partnership with other Government Departments,
is seeking to increase the number of Cadet Forces based in state
schools. This is a welcome development which we feel will bring
benefit to the young people concerned. It will also help to provide
more opportunities for the public to engage with the Armed Forces.
In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to set out its
plans and timetable for increasing the number of Cadet Forces
based in state schools. We will monitor the MoD's progress carefully.
(Paragraph 60)
10. We also welcome
the fact that the MoD recognises that it needs to make changes
to the constitutions of individual Cadet Forces to enable them
to work together more easily. We believe that these changes will
benefit future growth in the Cadet Forces. However, we do not
consider that these changes will be possible unless the Cadet
Forces are funded appropriately and that that funding is equitable
across the four Cadet Forces. (Paragraph 61)
Reservists role in raising awareness of the Armed
Forces
11. We
support the MoD's proposals to do more to encourage links between
military and civilian society through the Reserve Forces. We look
forward to the publication of the MoD's review of the Reserve
Force and its findings about the Reserves role in developing the
relationship between the Armed Forces and civilian society. (Paragraph
62)
Recruiting environment
12. We
note that the MoD is recruiting in a challenging economic environment.
It is not consistently meeting its recruitment targets and therefore
sufficient numbers are not entering the Armed Forces. We acknowledge
that the MoD is trying to respond to a changing recruiting environment,
although we do not think that it is responding quickly enough.
We believe that current recruiting shortfalls will be even greater
in the future, unless the MoD increases its success rate in recruiting
women and ethnic minorities. We are also concerned that the MoD
has not demonstrated that it is responding to changes in society,
such as an ageing population and a growing demand for more flexible
careers. If it is to remain an attractive employer, it needs to
do so. (Paragraph 65)
13. We were told that
a number of recent EU migrants to the United Kingdom had expressed
an interest in enlisting in the British Armed Forces. In its response
to our Report, we expect the MoD to provide us with an assessment
of the impact that opening recruitment to EU migrants could have
on the manning situation in the Armed Forces. (Paragraph 66)
Recruiting diversity
14. We
call on the MoD to acknowledge that the figures it cites for the
increase in ethnic minority representation—1% in 1999 and
6% in January 2008—are based on different data sets and
are not directly comparable. (Paragraph 68)
15. We are concerned
that there is evidence which suggests that there is a widespread
culture of complacency at many levels across the Armed Services
about the value of ensuring that the make-up of the Armed Forces
reflect the United Kingdom's ethnic diversity. An internal communications
strategy is required to ensure that all personnel in the MoD understand
the importance of diversity to the long term credibility and legitimacy
of the Armed Services. (Paragraph 76)
16. We recognise that
improving ethnic minority recruiting is a major challenge and
it will take some time to see the success of some of the MoD's
current recruiting strategies. However, we are concerned that
the MoD is not collecting the data that is required, and without
this data it cannot develop well informed, evidence based policies.
The MoD told us that it was improving data collection wherever
it could. We do not consider that this is an appropriate response
to such an important issue. In its response to our Report, we
expect the MoD to set out exactly how it has improved data collection
and what assessment the Equality and Human Rights Commission has
made of those improvements. (Paragraph 77)
17. We note the Equality
and Human Rights Commission's conclusion that recruiting strategies
based on the individual characteristics of each Service may improve
the MoD's success in recruiting ethnic minorities to the Armed
Forces. We recommend that the MoD work with the EHRC to identify
such strategies. (Paragraph 78)
Recruiting campaigns and resources
18. We
commend the MoD on its recruitment campaigns and marketing strategies
and we welcome the Armed Forces use of online resources to engage
their target audiences. We also welcome the Armed Forces targeting
individual pinchpoint trades as part of their marketing campaigns,
but note that on the basis of available evidence, success has
been limited. We recommend that the MoD develops a more systematic
approach to recruiting to pinchpoint trades. (Paragraph 84)
One Army Recruiting
19. One
Army Recruiting', integrating Regular and Territorial Army recruiting,
has been in operation for more than 12 months, and has been in
development for several years. We are surprised that the Army
was unable to share with us its initial lessons learnt about this
major change in its recruiting methodology. We expect the MoD
to provide us with such an analysis in its response to our Report.
(Paragraph 86)
20. Some evidence
we received suggests that One Army Recruiting has had a detrimental
affect on Territorial Army recruiting. In its response to this
Report, we expect the MoD to provide us with its assessment of
the affects that One Army Recruiting has had on Territorial Army
recruiting. (Paragraph 89)
Recruiting and schools
21. We
have concerns that the MoD may be missing opportunities though
a lack of co-ordination of its recruitment activities in schools.
We recommend that the MoD's review of its school programme considers
how recruiting visits could be better co-ordinated. We commend
the Armed Forces on its work experience and enterprise programmes
for young people interested in a career in the Armed Forces. We
consider that first hand experience of Service life is a positive
recruitment tool. (Paragraph 92)
Gap years
22. We
consider that the MoD's recent decisions to close Army and Royal
Marine Gap year schemes is shortsighted. We note that the Australian
Defence Force has responded to its recruiting shortfalls by launching
a scheme for 700 school leavers, which it plans to expand in the
future. We recommend that the MoD reconsiders its policy on Gap
year schemes. (Paragraph 93)
Educational incentives
23. Professor
Strachan told us that the MoD could do more to use educational
incentives to draw people to the Armed Forces, we agree. The Armed
Forces have a long tradition of using educational incentives to
attract officers and medical staff, and we believe that this should
be expanded to other ranks. We consider that the MoD could be
more imaginative in developing recruitment opportunities based
around education and should specifically recognise the need to
adapt recruiting strategies to the recent growth in higher education.
(Paragraph 97)
Training
24. We
believe that initial training should ensure that as many recruits
as possible succeed. High wastage rates during initial training
suggest that there is a serious weakness in initial training programmes
or that the recruitment process does not adequately predict those
unsuitable for life in the Armed Forces. We note that there is
a balance to be struck in ensuring that the pool of potential
recruits is not unnecessarily limited and that resources are not
wasted. (Paragraph 101)
25. We are concerned
at the high wastage rates in Phase 1 and 2 training and in particular,
by the increases in wastage rates since 2005. The Royal Marines'
wastage rates have been consistently close to 50% for the last
5 years, (Paragraph 104)
26. although we note
that the standard required by the Royal Marines is very high.
In its response to this Report we expect the MoD tell us how many
Royal Marine recruits who do not complete training enlist in other
parts of the Armed Services. Both the Army and the RAF's wastage
rates are creeping upwards. In its response to our Report, we
expect the MoD to set out the causes of such high wastage rates,
the factors which have contributed to the pattern of increase
in the last five years, and the reasons why our wastage rates
appear to be so much higher than our major allies. (Paragraph
104)
The impact of Service life on family and personal
life
27. The
evidence we have received reinforces our conclusion that failure
to meet Harmony Guidelines and the resulting pressure has serious
consequences for retention in the Armed Forces. Given the demands
placed on our Service personnel from the current level of operations,
the Armed Forces are unlikely to achieve their Harmony Guideline
targets in the near future. This continues to put Service personnel
and their families under considerable strain. (Paragraph 111)
28. We strongly support
Service personnel and their families in their calls to have greater
stability. If the MoD is to succeed in its efforts to retain Service
personnel, it must urgently seek ways to lessen the impact of
stretch on Service personnel and their families. We have seen
some evidence that the Services have recognised the importance
of stability in the personal and family life of Service personnel,
but this needs to be given greater priority. In particular, the
MoD should examine how more advance notice of postings and deployments
could be given to Service personnel, so they and their families
have more time to prepare. In its response to our Report we expect
the Government to set out what measures it plans to introduce
to create greater stability for Armed Forces personnel and the
timetable for doing so, and in particular, how the development
of Super Garrisons contributes to those plans. (Paragraph 115)
Welfare provision
29. The
importance of first class welfare support for our Service personnel
and their families cannot be overstated. They deserve nothing
less. We commend organisations such as SSAFA FH and the Army,
Naval and RAF Families Federations for the excellent work they
do in this area. We acknowledge the recent improvements the MoD
has made to the operational welfare package. However, it needs
to do more. We are concerned that a reduction of Armed Forces
Welfare Officers has had a detrimental affect on the quality of
welfare support provided to Service personnel and their families.
(Paragraph 122)
30. We welcome the
publication on 17 July 2008 of the Service Personnel Strategy.
We plan to monitor its implementation and we will be seeking regular
updates from the MoD on the progress being made and how the proposals
in the strategy address the current shortcomings in the provision
of welfare support. (Paragraph 123)
Co-ordinating welfare support
31. We
acknowledge the important work undertaken by the voluntary sector
to support current and former Service personnel and their families.
However, we are concerned that more could be done to make their
assistance more coherent. We welcome the MoD's recent innovation
of welfare conferences, but look to the MoD, in its response to
this Report, to make a clear statement about its future plans
to ensure there is a framework which provides a better focus for
co-ordinating welfare support. We are particularly concerned that
the boundaries between the welfare support provided by charities
and that provided by the MoD has become blurred. (Paragraph 126)
Focus of welfare provision
32. We
accept that the Command structure has an absolute duty to provide
welfare support, but, at a time of high operational tempo, we
are concerned that welfare support is not always being delivered
in the way that personnel and their families require. The MoD
recognises that welfare support can be improved. In its response
to our Report, we call on the MoD to set out the specific improvements
it plans to introduce, and how those changes will place the individual
at the centre of welfare provision. (Paragraph 129)
Standards of Service Housing
33. We
have already highlighted in our earlier report the important role
that accommodation plays in the ability of the Services to retain
personnel. The MoD plans to spend some £5 billion on accommodation
over the next ten years. Given the importance of accommodation
to family welfare and retention, we expect the MoD to ensure that
the work to improve accommodation is pushed forward as quickly
as possible and, where possible, further resources are earmarked
for upgrading accommodation. We note that Super Garrisons provide
the MoD with an opportunity to deliver high quality Service accommodation.
(Paragraph 133)
34. We were very disappointed
that the Government response to our Report on The work of Defence
Estates failed to acknowledge the serious shortcomings in the
administration and maintenance of Service accommodation. It is
now one year since we published our Report, and we are still receiving
evidence that the standard of maintenance repairs and level of
customer service falls well below the expectations of Service
personnel and their families. We note that the Under-Secretary
of State for Defence finds this unacceptable. So do we. We recommend
that the MoD seeks advice from Local Government Housing Associations
about how Defence Estates can move towards a customer-centred
approach and we plan to monitor the MoD's progress in doing so.
(Paragraph 138)
Support for Service personnel to own their own
homes
35. While
we recognise the great value in welfare terms of the close-knit
community that Service provided accommodation ensures, we support
the MoD's recent initiatives to help members of the Armed Forces
achieve home ownership. We consider that moves towards more stable
basing of Armed Forces personnel will provide the MoD with more
opportunities to develop new home ownership initiatives. It is
vital that the MoD begin work on developing new initiatives now,
that it works in partnership with the social housing sector, and
that the resources to ensure their success are committed early.
(Paragraph 141)
Pay and allowances
36. We
found General Dannatt's comparison of the Armed Forces personnel
pay with traffic wardens and police constables unhelpful. Pay
is only one component of Service personnel's remuneration package
which makes such comparisons far from straight forward. It is
vital that remuneration remains competitive and does not deter
people from considering a career in the Armed Forces or from remaining
in the Services. Our Armed Forces are among the best in the world
and their pay should reflect this. We note that the overall basic
pay package does not appear to be a major cause of Armed Forces
personnel leaving the Services. (Paragraph 149)
Financial Retention Incentives
37. We
note that the MoD has acknowledged that some Service personnel
have had trouble understanding their allowances and has introduced
a 'ready-reckoner' to help personnel determine their eligibility
and entitlement to allowances. In its response to our Report,
we expect the MoD to set out its analysis of the difficulties
that personnel may have in understanding the allowance package,
the causes of those difficulties, and the extent to which the
ready-reckoner resolves the difficulties. (Paragraph 152)
38. We note that the
MoD uses Financial Retention Incentives as a temporary emergency
measure to maintain operational capability. Take-up rates have
been mixed: FRIs for aircrew, special forces and submariners have
had high take-up rates, while FRIs for nurses, the Royal Marines
and the Infantry have not been so successful. We note that there
are more Financial Retention Incentives operating in 2008 than
there were in 2007. This is a reflection of the worsening manning
situation in pinchpoint trades. (Paragraph 155)
39. We share the Armed
Forces Pay Review Body's concern that Financial Retention Incentives
may not prove to be cost effective over the long term. We understand
the necessity of these measures, but we have concerns that Financial
Retention Incentives may divert investment away from addressing
the underlying causes of worsening retention. In its response
to our Report, we expect the MoD to provide a breakdown of the
total cost of each Financial Retention Incentive and the numbers
of Armed Forces personnel who have been retained. We also expect
the Government to set out its assessment of how Financial Retention
Incentives will impact on pay scales over time, particularly for
those trades which have been in receipt of successive, large Financial
Retention Incentives, such as submariners who can receive up to
£25,000 and aircrew who can receive up to £100,000.
As pinch point trades often involve small numbers the manning
situation in those trades can change rapidly. We expect the MoD
to keep FRIs under constant review to ensure that money is not
spent unnecessarily (Paragraph 156)
Joint Personnel Administration
40. The
Joint Personnel Administration system offers potential efficiency
and business benefits. However, we are concerned that Service
personnel are not receiving the money that they are entitled to
because JPA is difficult to use. The number of military administrative
and support posts have been cut as part of an efficiency programme
and as a result, Service personnel are not getting the help which
they require and should be entitled to. We consider that these
difficulties stem from poor planning and ineffective training.
In its response to our report, we expect the MoD to set out what
action it plans to take to address what is, in our view, a totally
unacceptable state of affairs. (Paragraph 161)
41. The Joint Personnel
Administration call centre is the frontline for Service personnel
who have questions about their pay, allowances and career. As
such, it is critical that the advisers staffing it are thoroughly
trained and properly equipped to perform their roles. However,
the feedback we have received suggests that they are not. We welcome
the Government's recent indication that additional training for
call centre staff has improved levels of customer satisfaction.
In its response to our Report we expect the MoD to provide us
with an update on levels of customer satisfaction. (Paragraph
162)
Single Service parity
42. The
differences in terms and conditions between each Services are
a cause of discontent. Whilst we acknowledge that it is important
for each Service to have the flexibility to respond to its unique
circumstances, in an era of increasing joint operations, the MoD
must give serious consideration to how different terms and conditions
in the three Services could be better aligned. We recommend that
both the MoD and the Armed Forces Pay Review Body should urgently
consider how this could be best achieved. (Paragraph 166)
Retirement age
43. The
Armed Forces require an age profile which is focused on youth
and physical fitness. However, the MoD must be careful that its
retirement policies do not lead to experienced Service personnel
leaving before they are due to go. Experienced personnel are a
valuable resource and the MoD's policies should reflect this.
We are concerned that the differences between the retirement policies
in each of the three Services creates a disjointed system and
causes inequalities. (Paragraph 170)
44. We call upon the
MoD to explain how that differences in retirement policies can
be justified on grounds of combat effectiveness and how differences
in retirement policies fits with the MoD Unified Diversity Strategy
mission statement and the Royal Navy Diversity and Equality Policy
Statements. (Paragraph 171)
Transfers
45. Transfers
between Services can help encourage personnel to remain in the
Armed Forces. However, the number of transfers has to date been
low. We consider that this is a mechanism which could be examined
further as a possible way of encouraging retention. We welcome
the Minister's commitment to look at how the transfer system could
be improved and we expect the MoD's response to our Report to
set out details of how those improvements will be achieved. (Paragraph
177)
Efficiency and Change programmes
46. In
addition to the current high operational tempo, the Armed Forces
face pressures which arise from the various efficiency and change
programmes such as the Defence Change Programme and Force Capability
Changes. We do not doubt the calibre of personnel in the Armed
Forces and their commitment to maintaining the highest standards,
but, a combination of demands has created an exceptional burden.
We accept the necessity of the change and efficiency programmes,
but the MoD cannot neglect the resulting impact on Service personnel.
We believe that the MoD must do more to manage the pressure on
Service personnel. (Paragraph 180)
Support for Volunteer Reservists
47. Reservists
are vital to our Armed Forces and deserve a high level of support.
However, in several areas the level of support needs to be improved
substantially. We find it unacceptable that the MoD has not developed
a welfare package that responds to the unique circumstances of
Volunteer and Regular Reservists. We recommend that this should
be addressed as a matter of urgency. (Paragraph 185)
48. We note that the
MoD has instituted a dedicated mental health assessment programme
for Reservists, but we are concerned that the number of Reservists
who have used it to date has been small. In its response to our
Report, we expect the MoD to set out the reasons for this. (Paragraph
187)
49. The Reserves provide
the MoD with vital capability on operations abroad and in the
UK. We acknowledge the important role they play in the Armed Forces.
However, Reserves are often used to augment and backfill other
units which can damage morale and motivation and undermine retention.
We look to the MoD to examine whether the way it uses Reserves
contributes to voluntary outflow. (Paragraph 189)
50. We are concerned
that information about the impact of Reservist's commitments on
their civilian employment is anecdotal and unquantified. The MoD
must urgently commission research into this issue, and, if necessary,
consider legislation to ensure that the rights of Reservists are
protected. (Paragraph 191)
The military covenant
51. Members
of the Armed Forces make sacrifices on behalf of civil society
and in return they and their families should receive appropriate
support. However, we do not see how formalising the Military Covenant
would provide that support. In our opinion any formalised Military
Covenant would become a political instrument rather than an instrument
to protect the interests of men and women in our Armed Forces.
As such, it would divert attention from what is important: ensuring
Armed Forces personnel receive what they are entitled to. (Paragraph
195)
An independent Armed Forces Federation
52. We
have listened carefully to the arguments both for and against
an Armed Forces Federation. We are open minded about the benefits
of such a Federation, but we are concerned that the MoD is not.
We recommend that the MoD considers more constructively the possible
benefits which may be gained from an independent Armed Forces
Federation, and encourage the MoD to consult with the British
Armed Forces Federation. (Paragraph 203)
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