Examination of Witnesses (Questions 220
- 240)
WEDNESDAY 14 NOVEMBER 2007
MR KIM
RYLEY, PROFESSOR
TOM COULTHARD,
SIR ROBERT
KERSLAKE, COUNCILLOR
JAN WILSON
AND MR
JOHN CHARLTON
Q220 Mr Williams:
The maps that the Environment Agency produced which show how often
a flood may occur in a particular area may or may not be accurate,
but what they do not show is the risk to life of a particular
flooding incident. An area might flood and it might be distressing
and inconvenient, but it might not present a risk to life or serious
risk to property. Does your Strategic Flood Risk Assessment do
that?
Mr Charlton: It does not really,
no.
Professor Coulthard: I believe
the Hull one does come up with a form of risk attached to it based
on the depth and velocity of the water.
Q221 David Lepper:
Colleagues from Sheffield, could I concentrate on one aspect of
planning with you. I think the Environment Agency regards Catchment
Flood Management Plans as very important, both in terms of looking
at land use and planning for land use, to help prevent and mitigate
flooding, but by the time you produced your Strategic Flood Risk
Assessment and published that, the Catchment Flood Management
Plan—I am not sure whether we are talking about one or two
here, one for the Don and one for the Rother—had not been
completed.
Mr Charlton: When we started preparing
the Strategic Flood Risk Assessment it was originally intended
that the Environment Agency would have their Catchment Flood Management
Plan in place but it was delayed and it has since been further
delayed. In fact, they have changed it now from instead of a whole
catchment area to a River Don catchment that will take in Sheffield,
Doncaster and Rotherham. They are doing a Management Plan for
that floodplain for the River Don and that will inform our Strategic
Flood Risk Assessment. It would have been better if the horse
had come before the cart but it did not and we had to do something.
As I said, it is a live document and it will be reviewed when
the Environment Agency's work is completed, which is likely to
be April 2009.
Q222 David Lepper:
I thought that was the date you mentioned earlier.
Mr Charlton: Yes.
Sir Robert Kerslake: It is important
to say that timing for the Environment Agency is entirely an issue
of their priorities and resources. Other parts of the region were
at significantly higher risk of flooding and impact, so it was
quite understandable from my perspective that they came ahead
in this process of producing the plan.
Q223 Chairman:
I think the way you put it in your written evidence was delayed
"due to funding priorities". Perhaps if we had the Environment
Agency here with us they would say if they had had more money
to do the work it might have been completed sooner, but they had
to look at what they regarded as higher risk areas first.
Sir Robert Kerslake: Absolutely.
Q224 David Lepper:
Could I ask how much input Sheffield City Council has had into
the work that has gone on so far on the Catchment Flood Management
Plan?
Mr Charlton: I understand that
a consultant has been appointment by the Environment Agency and
as yet they have not contacted us to ask for information, but
I assume they will do in the fullness of time.
Q225 David Lepper:
So throughout the whole of this process—
Mr Charlton: Sorry, no. They have
only recently appointed a consultant to carry out a Management
Plan of the River Don catchment area which will take in Sheffield,
Doncaster and Rotherham and, as yet, they have not contacted Sheffield
for any information.
Q226 David Lepper:
Is that odd or is the timescale such that you are not particularly
surprised?
Mr Charlton: If they have not
asked us before Christmas I will be surprised, yes. Rather disappointed,
put it that way.
Q227 David Lepper:
Perhaps they will remember to ask you reading the evidence. It
would have been helpful to have the plan in place to aid your
strategic flood risk assessment?
Mr Charlton: Yes.
Q228 David Lepper:
Would you agree with the Environment Agency's view that there
were, not knowing what we know now, higher risk areas that needed
greater attention?
Mr Charlton: You have just heard
what my colleagues from Hull have said, and historically Sheffield
has never been prone to flooding on that scale. It is now likely
to be a one in 150 year event that we experience.
Sir Robert Kerslake: This is pretty
wide really. This was the highest rate for 125 years. You cannot
predict that will happen but, having happened, you have to reassess
the risk.
Q229 Chairman:
Is there any danger that we have got too many bits of exercise
going on to get a coherent picture? When I started to read we
had got these strategic flood risk assessments, and then I looked
at what your assessment in Sheffield was supposed to cover and
one of the key first paragraphs I read is, "To collate all
known sources of flooding, including river surface water, local
drainage, sewers, ground water, that may affect existing and/or
future developments in the district", and then I discover
that you are working very closely with the Environment Agency,
Yorkshire Water and a lot of other bodies, and then we have got
the Environment Agency who are doing their catchment flood management
plans. It seems to me that you have got one lot doing one thing,
one lot doing another; whereas in actual fact what you want to
plan, which then breaks down from a big thing, is how it impacts
on a city like Sheffield. The main driver which seemed to be pushing
your strategic flood risk assessment were planning issues—this
bit which I still do not understand—the operation of something
called the "sequential test" followed by the "exceptional
test" under PPS25, and so the idea of coherence in planning
seemed to be muddled.
Sir Robert Kerslake: I think the
point that John made is right, which is that in an ideal world
you would do the catchment management plan which would then inform
the risk assessment, but, because of priorities and resources,
it was pretty evident to us that we were not going to see our
catchment management plan done for Sheffield any time soon, or
the wider area, and we needed guidance in order to inform our
planning decisions and other actions, hence the reason why we
did the strategic risk assessment that was talked about. I think
there is a coherent model here, but the model probably relies,
in fact does rely, on the sequence of the things happening in
that order.
Q230 Chairman:
In other words, there should not be any cart before the horse
situations, if you are going to get the benefit of one model informing
the other?
Sir Robert Kerslake: I think that
is right, but in the end you cannot hang around, you have to have
something that guides your planning decisions.
Councillor Wilson: Could I just
add that it would be great to do things in the order that you
have suggested, but the particular corridor here is where we are
doing a lot of master planning for our economic growth, making
plans for the next ten, 20, 30 years, and it is necessary to have
master plans of what our aspirations are, hence the work that
has gone on in advance. There is significant work in Sheffield
to do with growth. It would be great to have all the ducks in
an absolute row, but Sheffield has not been a high flood risk
area, so the planning work that was done, particularly within
the regional spatial strategy that has been drawn up through Yorkshire
and the Humber, gave us comfort in order to continue with our
development, because the world does not stand still, does it,
and that is our industrial corridor where we want our growth to
take place.
Chairman: It raises some of the
big issues as to how all the assumptions that are being made about
where risk occurs react to climate change/extreme weather events.
This Committee did an inquiry into the Foresight Report, which
was done by the Government's Chief Scientist, which counselled
taking into account, according to which scenario you chose, the
fact that there would be extreme weather events. I do not want
to get into territory which is beyond my technical understanding,
but I think what has happened has focused people to say perhaps
we should be re-looking at what the impact is going to be of severe
weather events and then decisions are going to have to be taken
as to what degree of the protection your systems can afford to
provide according to what scenario you chose, and I think that
is quite a difficult choice. Anyway, before we get too far into
the realms of conjecture, we will move on to Roger.
Q231 Mr Williams:
The Environment Agency has done a survey of critical infrastructure
installations and found that a fair proportion of those are at
risk from flooding. As I understand it, in Sheffield you had problems
with power failure, whereas in Hull most of your services remained
working during the flood. What critical installations have you
identified in your city? Have you done that work?
Sir Robert Kerslake: Absolutely.
We know where the risk sites are and, indeed, you are quite right,
35,000 people were without power because of the impact of the
flooding. It struck me, going round the particular power station
at which this happened where the step-down transformers are, that
there were some fairly simple things that you could do to increase
resilience. For example, two of the transformers are on the same
side, so it stands to reason that, if it floods, they are both
going to be out of action. You could locate one or create another
one somewhere else in the system away from the flood risk area.
Similarly, the thing that went when the flooding happened was
all the electrical equipment, which was on the ground floor. If
you put it up higher, you probably would face much less damage
being done. What became absolutely evident to us is that we need
these utilities—electricity and gas—more actively
engaged in the analysis of prevention and then response to emergencies.
They have not been round the table, basically, and I would go
so far as to say they are not entirely equipped to be round the
table, their capacity works in a different way, and that is a
major issue that has to be addressed in any future planning.
Q232 Mr Williams:
It brings me on to the other point, which is that within the Civil
Contingency Act there is a requirement of utilities to actually
plan for major problems, and I think the Environment Agency said
that many of the utilities did not have in existence business
continuity plans. What responsibilities do local authorities have
under the Civil Contingency Act?
Sir Robert Kerslake: We have clear
responsibilities in terms our own business continuity, and we
do that and those plans worked. I think the biggest risk came
in other areas, in my view—it came in the power and related
activities—and your description of the fact that there were
not always plans there I think is right. I think that is one of
the things that have to be addressed.
Mr Ryley: I would just like to
confirm that. I think that is absolutely right. I think it is
an urgent area to look at. I think in Hull, although our flood
defences were certainly an asset on this occasion, we came close
to losing key pieces of infrastructure, closer than we were happy
with even then, and we were not convinced that there was the same
extent of business continuity planning and even the same attitude
towards the protection of those assets, which were perhaps influenced
more by commercial consideration, if you like, than actually their
usefulness in maintaining public order.
Sir Robert Kerslake: It is worth
saying that you have a complexity of arrangements, here. You have
the National Grid and the series of companies and they may not
necessarily know themselves where all their problems are, and
that was one of the key issues, John, that we had to tackle, was
it not?
Mr Charlton: Yes. There was a
gantry bridge that spanned the River Don and it acted like a beaver
dam, there were trees and debris blocked there, and gas, water
and electricity was suspended underneath. It took us quite a while
to get someone of sufficient seniority and technical expertise
to tell us whether those were live or dead. Eventually we found
out they were not and removed the bridge. The danger was that
it would sweep downstream where there was another bridge that
was taking live cables, and that would have cut half of Sheffield
off from electricity; but fortunately the beaver dam did not break
and it did not destroy the bridge further down, but it could have
done and it could have been because of indecision by the utilities
on site that particular day who could not tell us immediately
whether they were live or dead.
Professor Coulthard: I think there
is an issue in devolving responsibility to the respective utilities
to manage their own flood risk in that respect. You split the
problem up. Only if, say, for example, an electricity company
suddenly realises one of its sub-stations is in real danger will
it get in touch possibly with Silver or Gold Command and say,
"We have got a real problem here and we need it." By
then, I suspect, it might well be too late. Certainly one of the
issues we found and that Yorkshire Water mentioned to us with
the pumping situation, obviously were not allowed is the wrong
word, but they found they were not a part of Silver Command until
fairly late on the process, and they are critical. Hence, the
emergency services did not actually know that there were three
pumping stations in Hull that were critical to Hull remaining
dry, or drier, and, when I pointed them out on a map, they were
quite surprised to find they were there, and their failure, if
that had happened, would have had such severe consequences. There
is this issue of the utilities. By being split up they do not
have the same sort of centralised strategy for dealing with this.
Q233 Chairman:
Dams and reservoirs. You had the Ulley Dam, which I think dominated
people's concerns when the television coverage of what was happening
in Sheffield was on, but it has raised the rather more serious
and wider spread issue, as your own evidence in paragraph 4.5.6
talks about. You said in your evidence in the issues raised that
there should be clarity and responsibility for dam and reservoir
over-topping plans, and you asked the very pertinent question:
who has the statutory duty to warn and inform? I was at a seminar
last week organised by a company called Logico and a gentleman
there was saying that many of these dams go back 120 years. It
is not clear who is responsible for them, and he said that there
were not systems in place for monitoring them, either from the
point of view of their ability to hold back water or physically
what might be happening to them. I felt under threat at that point.
What would you like to say from the Sheffield standpoint?
Mr Charlton: Within the Sheffield
boundary there are 20 reservoirs, dams, and 19 of those are owned
and managed by Yorkshire Water. I understand you are talking to
them later. I think it might be better if you let them speak on
that. The one dam that we are responsible for is a very small
dam. It is checked every six months. It was checked in April of
this year before the flood, it was checked at seven on the morning
after the flood and there was not any safety issue to deal with.
We do those checks. I understand other authorities who have got
dams should be doing those checks under the Reservoirs Act, and
I assume Yorkshire Water is doing the same, but in terms of—
Q234 Chairman:
Let me pick you up on a bit of language there. "I assume
that Yorkshire Water is doing the same." One of the points
you raised, which is why I read it out from your evidence, seemed
to be that you were worried actually whose responsibility it was
to advise if there were problems with dams, and you have now told
us that within your area, within the city's boundaries, you have
got, if you like, a major risk in terms of these dams if something
went wrong. Have you ever had as a city councillor a conversation
with Yorkshire Water about what they do about dams?
Mr Charlton: I have not personally.
I understand members of staff within Sheffield City Council—the
land drainage engineer has regular contact with Yorkshire Water.
I think the uncertainty is about who raises the alarm in terms
of warnings. I think that is the issue. That is unclear. I am
not sure there is a system in place for actually doing that. There
is a system in place for severe flood warnings, flood warnings
and flood watches issued by the Environment Agency for river flooding,
but I do not think one exists for reservoirs, to the best of my
knowledge.
Sir Robert Kerslake: I think our
particular concern that led to that comment was the Ulley Dam.
If you think about the situation here, the Ulley Dam is essentially
recreational, the reservoir is a recreational reservoir, it serves
no purpose other than for recreation now, and yet at one point
we were under an impression that, had this dam broken, it would
have taken out the M1 and taken out the power station and Sheffield
would have been without power for a week. If you think about the
consequences of that, you can see that there must be some system
of assurance here about these dams.
Q235 Chairman:
Who off the record is responsible for this dam?
Sir Robert Kerslake: In that instance
it is Rotherham.
Q236 Chairman:
Rotherham. So the City Council of Rotherham is responsible. It
is their dam.
Councillor Wilson: Yes.
Q237 Chairman:
You do not talk your next-door neighbour about their dam?
Sir Robert Kerslake: We absolutely
do talk to them plenty of times, but I think the issue we are
trying to describe here is the risk assessment of the consequences
of the failure. I do not think anybody had thought that if this
damn collapsed it might have the kind of impact that it would
have had, and it is that risk assessment.
Q238 Chairman:
Going back to your own strategic flood risk assessment, when you
were doing that exercise was the question of dams incorporated
in the work you were doing there?
Mr Charlton: Yes.
Chairman: It was. Okay; Roger.
Q239 Mr Williams:
Do you know from any particular reservoir owner whether they actually
insure against consequential loss if there was a failure or an
over-topping?
Sir Robert Kerslake: It is a good
question. I do not know is the short answer.
Q240 Mr Williams:
Is there any requirement under the Reservoir Act for that?
Mr Charlton: I simply do not know.
Sir Robert Kerslake: I do not
know.
Chairman: Thank you very much indeed.
You have certainly added some useful colour to the very helpful
written evidence which you have kindly put to us. We always comment
that if on the train on the way home you suddenly think, "Wow,
there was something I forgot to tell them", the door is still
open for us to be told, but thank you very much for coming to
talk to us today. Obviously we will reflect very carefully on
what you have had to say when we come to produce our report.
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