Examination of Witnesses (Questions 140-159)
MR JIM
MURPHY MP, MICHAEL
DAVENPORT AND
DAMIAN THWAITES
18 JULY 2007
Q140 Chairman: We can
now turn to some security-related issues. Some of us were in Serbia
and Kosovo last week. One of the burning issues in international
relations is the final status of Kosovo and the Ahtisaari plan.
A few months ago, a UN Security Council resolution on the Ahtisaari
proposals for the supervised independence of Kosovo was envisaged.
As things stand, I believe that we are on to the sixth draft,
to which the Russians have indicated they will not agree. They
will not agree either to the original version of the Ahtisaari
plan or any watered down version. It seems that they are even
balking at an extended timetable for further negotiation. Have
we underestimated the Russian attitude on these matters and, if
so, why?
Mr. Murphy: I do not think that
we have, but that is for others to judge. I met with President
Ahtisaari this morning in London. We had detailed conversations
about the future process. It may be helpful for me to put on record
again the UK Government's belief that this process should and
will end up with independence for Kosovo, internationally supervised
and based on the Ahtisaari proposals. After an enormous amount
of work and real effort we believe that that is a balanced package
for the future of Kosovo. You rightly say that this is a fluid
situation at the United Nations. The intention of the co-sponsors
of the resolution, in the dreadful UN phraseology that you will
be well aware of, is to put the resolution into blue, and to have
further conversations tomorrow in New York. Sitting suspended
for a Division in the House. On resuming—
Q141 Chairman: Minister, you
were mid-way through a sentence, I think.
Mr. Murphy: I hope that the record
will show that I had come to a full stop.
Q142 Chairman: Do you
wish to add anything to your answer?
Mr. Murphy: No, not at the moment.
Q143 Chairman: Clearly,
if there is no new Security Council resolution, UN Security Council
resolution 1244 remains in existence. Under that resolution, Kosovo
is regarded as part of Serbia. Furthermore, the operations of
the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo and KFOR are
currently operating under that resolution. If we are to get the
deployment of a European Union police and civil assistance programme
into Kosovo, presumably we will need a new Security Council resolution
under which that would be possible.
At the same time, if we are to change the status
of Kosovo in international law, we will also need a successor
resolution to resolution 1244. In the absence of Russian agreement
or if there is a Russian veto of any proposal, it is clear to
me, having visited Kosovo last week, that there will be an expectation
of the unilateral declaration of independence at some point, which
people hinted would be a managed unilateral declaration of independence.
Following President Bush's remarks in Tirana and
a number of other countries, my assessment is that the United
States will then recognise that UDI. At that point, we will be
in a difficult position, will we not? On the one hand, resolution
1244 will still be in existence and there will have been no successor
resolution, yet on the other, a country—or at least part
of a country—will be making a UDI and seeking international
recognition. Presumably, it will get that recognition from a number
of countries around the world—the Islamic Conference countries
and some European countries, if not the whole European Union—as
well as the US. What would be our Government's position in those
circumstances?
Mr. Murphy: I am sure that we
could spend the whole of our hearing on that one question. I spoke
to President Ahtisaari this morning, as I mentioned. Our policy
is that in terms of conditions on the ground as we speak today,
the Kosovar Albanians continue to need to see that there is a
process in respect of their continued connection and trust in
the international community's responsibility to fulfil its express
declarations of the past, and for the Kosovo Serbs. President
Ahtisaari's plans contain significant enough protections and devolution.
That can remain the blueprint for our destination. With regard
to recognition, we have not given up the determination to achieve
this UN resolution. We think that this UN resolution has dealt
with the substantial concerns that Russia has about the in-built
automaticity of independence at the end of another round of time-limited
talks. In that respect, we very much agree with the French Government
and President Sarkozy's approach to the time-limited nature of
those talks. We think, therefore, that the removal of automaticity
at the end of those time-limited talks removes the reasonable
concern that Russia may have on that. On that basis, we are determined
to try to get that successful process with the UN. We can
speculate on a series of what-ifs. Your general point that it
is not for the UN initially to recognise is, of course, accurate,
Mr. Chairman. The issue of recognition is a matter for other sovereign
states, as is their approach to any potential declaration by Kosovo.
Our plan and approach is to try to do this through the UN
as far as possible, and that will continue to be our posture.
However, as you have said, Mr. Chairman, we will come to an important
decision if the UN process exhausts itself. I do not think that
it would be helpful for me to speculate on the what-ifs with regard
to the UK's position because that, of course, depends on a different
series of circumstances. It is important for us to be clear to
our friends in Russia and Serbia that we are clear about the end
of this journey and its timetable. I spoke to President Ahtisaari
today, and he agrees with our assessment on that.
Q144 Chairman: My assessment
is that, whether there is a 120-day or a 120-year delay, there
is absolutely no way that you will get an agreement between the
Government of Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians on a compromise,
because one position claims that the region is part of Serbia
and the other wants an independent state. Therefore, if the automaticity
is removed, will you not get into a position where, after another
120 days of talks, you still have no agreement and have made no
further progress? There were issues raised before the Committee
about the status of the UN presence and the KFOR and United Nations
Mission in Kosovo operation during this transitional period. I
think that we will, as a Committee, no doubt be able to ask questions
and take those things further in the future. However, my assessment
from last week is that there is no way, however long you delay,
that you will come to avoid that crunch question, which is that
you have got to make a choice. Do you really expect that the Russians
will end their current obstruction of a UN resolution, or are
we just going through the motions?
Mr. Murphy: From previous conversations
that we have had, I know that you have taken a close interest
in that issue over a prolonged period, Mr. Gapes. We believe strongly
that the text that has been submitted in New York deals with the
stated concerns of the Russians. You are right in saying that
if we get to a point at which, despite that and despite the efforts
of all the co-sponsors, Russia refuses to co-operate, we will
be in very difficult territory. I have to make it clear to the
Committee that in our view Kosovo is destined to be an independent
sovereign state. Of course, there are difficulties with regard
to the internal dynamic. However, in his conversations with Kosovan
Serbs, President Ahtisaari, went out of his way to allow for sensitivities
in relation to the nature of the devolution relationships with
Belgrade, and to provide structural protections. We should continue
to be grateful for the work that he did in giving us such a coherent
package. By any objective measure, it makes great sense.
Q145 Chairman: I do not
doubt that it is a coherent package. The problem is that it is
not being bought by one community. You have recognised the seriousness
of its nature. I shall bring in Mr. Mackinlay in a minute, but
may I conclude by asking whether you interpret the Russian objections
and the obstruction of the Security Council resolution on Kosovo
as part of a wider position? The Russians refer to frozen conflicts,
to precedents, to the Helsinki agreement, to international law—they
deploy all kinds of arguments. Do you think that that is Serbia-specific,
or is it the wider Russian attitude towards solving international
issues?
Mr. Murphy: We all know that every
international issue is multi-dimensional. It is facile to suggest
otherwise. As to the different dimensions at play in Russian attitudes
to Kosovo, we can all speculate and we might come to a common
conclusion or not. Part of what is in play is Russia's perception
of its role and its importance in the world, which I mentioned
earlier. Yes, of course Kosovo has an increasingly westward-looking
gaze where its future is concerned, but Russia has a different
historic perspective, which is partially in play here. Mr.
Chairman, you do not disagree with the Government's analysis that
relatively soon the international community will face a really
important decision.
Q146 Andrew Mackinlay:
I apologise for having been out for a moment.
The position is that if Russia continues to
veto the resolution, resolution 1244 endures. Can we have an assurance
from you that the United Kingdom will not disregard—however
frustrating it is—the Security Council position, if that
is where Russia continues to block? If there is a UDI, so it has
no Security Council cover because no Security Council resolution
has been passed either rescinding or altering resolution 1244
or adopting the Ahtisaari plan of managed independence, will we,
in defiance of that, recognise an independent Kosovo?
Mr. Murphy: As I said—
Q147 Andrew Mackinlay:
You understand the point?
Mr. Murphy: Of course I understand
the point. It is very similar to the point that the Chairman raised
when he emphasised the fact that our view as to the end point
is Kosovan independence.
Q148 Andrew Mackinlay:
I understand that. That is an objective.
Mr. Murphy: That is the end. What
is in dispute is the means to achieve that end. I said earlier
that I do not think that it would be helpful to speculate, based
on our continued intensive efforts in New York, about a series
of scenarios about what-ifs. My understanding of resolution 1244
is that Kosovo remains where it is territorially until the end
of the process. In the meantime, it is administered internationally.
We shall have to look at the detail of the end process in New
York.
Q149 Andrew Mackinlay:
Resolution 1244 also gives the mandate to the police and the soldiers.
It has either to be rescinded or it will endure. It is not rocket
science. It either has to be repealed or altered by resolution
of the Security Council. If it does not, it goes on.
Mr. Murphy: What is clear is that
whatever scenario we end up with, in terms of Kosovan independence,
there needs to be international authorities on the ground with
legal cover.
Q150 Andrew Mackinlay: It
was somewhat irritating—although I do not blame you—that
in our brief prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
there was no mention of the Helsinki Final Act. One of the things
that we discover when we talk to every interlocutor of every shade
of opinion is that that is a material factor, and it is part of
the case of the Russian Federation. They say that they have honoured
the Helsinki Final Act, which said that there would be no arbitrary
variation in the boundaries of the nation states of Europe. We
have honoured that since the 1970s. This would be a breach of
that. The United Kingdom recognised that it would be a breach,
but we say that it is a one-off thing. The Russian Federation
say that they disagree. There is Transnistria, for instance There
are Russian enclaves in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Have
they not got a point, rather taking up the Purchase thing? We
expect everyone to accept what our reading is. If you came down
from Mars and looked at this, it would be clear that Russia has
a powerful case. What do you think?
Chairman: We are very short of time.
Q151 Andrew Mackinlay:
What do you think?
Mr. Murphy: The end of that question
could have been "Discuss", rather than what it was.
In terms of precedent, I know that this Committee has looked at
these important issues of the frozen conflicts, not least Transnistria,
Abkhazia and others, and will rightly continue to do so. However,
we do not believe that the process in which we are now engaged
in Kosovo establishes a precedent in the way that you are alluding
to, in the way that the Russians have said publicly. We do not
believe that.
Chairman: We must leave this issue now,
as we have a few other areas to cover in the next 20 minutes.
Q152 Sandra Osborne:
Minister, can I ask you about Russia's attitude to self-defence?
At a NATO meeting on 19 April, member states agreed that US missile
defence plans might be linked with broader NATO plans in order
to protect the whole of NATO territory. However, the Russians
continue to oppose the US plans in their current form. Russia
has suggested a strategic partnership in the area of missile defence,
and to give a greater role to the NATO-Russia partnership. What
involvement has the UK had in resolving the two between Russia
and the US? Do you believe that there is political mileage in
Russia's offer of a strategic partnership in this area?
Mr. Murphy: The Russia-NATO dialogue
is the key way of potentially resolving the issue. However, we
must also look at a number of other issues in respect of missile
defence. First, this is a collection of a couple of agreements
between sovereign states. It is not an issue to which the UK is
party in terms of the bilateral agreement between the US and the
Czech Republic and the US and Poland. How we take this forward
is about looking at the capacity and the intention. The capacity
of what has happened thus far seems to be accepted by those who
know; there may be experts in the Committee but I do not claim
to be an expert in the trajectory of missiles or the sites of
their interceptions and I am not going to masquerade as such.
The overwhelming assessment appears to be that the location,
scale and capacity of what has been deployed thus far could not
objectively be seen to be an attempt to rebalance or to affect
Russian strategic missile capability. It is clearly based on the
number of locations and the capacity of the technology to be aimed
at something smaller in scale and perhaps shorter in trajectory.
An objective assessment leads us to the clear conclusion that
it is rightly aimed at the actions of a third party, a rogue state,
in the middle east. That is the declared position of the United
States. It is an issue that we should continue to discuss through
Russia-NATO dialogue. In terms of the specific offer by the
Russians, let us look and see. Let us have that conversation through
the NATO-Russia Council to see whether there is something in it.
There is a strong case to be made that by the nature of the Russian
offer there is an acceptance of the capacity of the equipment
and the intention of its deployment and that is a positive signal.
Q153 Chairman: Can I
put it to you, based on a conversation I had earlier this week,
that the Russian view may be more to do with the symbolism and
their perception that the interceptor and radar system in Poland
and the Czech Republic is part of a global system the United States
is developing linked to Alaska, California and, potentially, deployment
later in Norway. They see it all as part of an overall surrounding
of Russia. You said "thus far" there are 10 interceptors
planned but their perception is that this is the thin end of the
wedge and it foreshadows a changing strategic balance against
them. How would you respond to that?
Mr. Murphy: I have three very
quick points. First, the conversation has to take place through
the NATO-Russia Council. Secondly, you are right--we agree on
the assessment that the current detailed plan in respect of all
the sites is not intended to address the Russian strategic capacity.
On the situation in Poland, you say there are 10 sites; my understanding
is that the capacity of those 10 locations would be to target
and intercept five missiles. When we look at that in the context
of the Russian stockpile and everything else, that clearly would
not be affected even if the intention was there, which it is not.
In terms of perception, which of course is important, I think
it is significant that NATO members continue to share information
with Russia. But ultimately, Russia does not have a veto over
decisions entered into by other sovereign states that happen to
be members of NATO and that should be very clear.
Q154 Chairman: But Russia
has just announced its suspension of the Conventional Forces in
Europe treaty. In the light of that, is it your assessment that
that is linked to this wider question or is it, to coin a phrase,
sui generis? Is it part of the wider breakdown in relations with
the United States and the perception that countries in central
and eastern Europe have joined the west and that NATO's borders
have been expanded to Russia? Or is it linked as a signal to these
other questions?
Mr. Murphy: There is no shortage
of analysis of this very issue. One way of coming to a conclusion
on this, and certainly the way that I have done it, is to ask
whether there is a specific dynamic within the Conventional Forces
in Europe process that would have led to Russia's suspension.
The conclusion that you have to come to there is that there is
no specific current dynamic that would lead to this Russian decision.
Therefore as there is not a dynamic within the process, the conclusion
must be that it is to do with other events. I do not think that
we should seek to narrow it down to a specific other event. It
is a continuing part of Russia's assessment of itself and its
international posture, and its continued, understandable intention
to be a world player, across the globe, but more importantly for
it, on its borders.
Q155 Chairman: When we
were in Moscow a few weeks ago, I was struck by what I regarded
as the pre-Gorbachev language that was being used by Members of
the Duma and others. Do you suspect, as I do, that these recent
moves are in effect a breakdown of the post-cold war architecture?
I am not saying that the cold war is coming back but that some
of the language being used was reminiscent of the period before
Gorbachev over 20 years ago.
Mr. Murphy: There is a body of
analysis which pretty accurately says that Russia looks back on
its recent past and the period of Yeltsin as a matter of some
shame and collective humiliation. I do not know whether that is
a fair assessment, but the debate will continue. We are undoubtedly
in a period where Russia is more confident. That is understandable
in view of the evolution of its market, the strengthening of its
economic power, the increased wealth and prosperity of its population.
That is a natural evolution. That confidence based on material
and economic wealth is a positive development. It is a core part
of how we would like to see Russia develop. On the wider point
of the CFE suspension, NATO would like to sign a new CFE agreement.
There are a number of important issues, particularly about the
continued siting of Russian forces in specific important locations.
Q156 Chairman: Transnistria,
Armenia—
Mr. Murphy: There is also Abkhazia.
We have supported a working group on Abkhazia to try to see whether
there is a basis of a deal. We think that there is the basis of
a deal on Transnistria through the reconfiguration of Russian
forces that are in place. That would be an important step forward.
I know that the Committee is aware of this. That is the type of
change that we need to see as NATO before we would sign up to
a revised CFE. But, of course, Russian suspension makes that much
more difficult.
Q157 Mr. Moss: Minister,
I want to return to the NATO-Russia partnership council.
I think that you said that the proposals to
site the missiles and the radar equipment, if that is how it can
be described, in Poland and the Czech Republic were bilateral
agreements or discussions between the United States and those
relevant countries. Does that mean that the United States did
not discuss the proposals within NATO, and that the UK was not
aware of the proposals before they were broadcast in the media?
Mr. Murphy: First, I apologise
for appearing distracted, but the Council of the European Union
has made a public declaration about the issues that we spoke about
much earlier in the proceedings, in terms of our relations with
Russia. Perhaps we will return to it at another point. That will,
of course, be available to the Committee.
Q158 Mr. Moss: Would
you like me to repeat the question?
Mr. Murphy: No, I am well aware
of the question. I am doing two things at once.
Q159 Mr. Moss: He is
multi-tasking. He can chew gum and walk at the same time.
Mr. Murphy: On the specific point
about the UK's involvement in those conversations, I know that
you will predict the answer, which is that the UK continues to
discuss all those issues with NATO partners. Yesterday, the Foreign
Secretary and I met the Czech Foreign Minister, and that was one
of the issues that was briefly discussed at that wide-ranging
meeting. It is something that we continue to discuss bilaterally
and multilaterally, and it is right that we should do so. We
made it clear in conversation with our Czech colleagues that we
strongly support the deployment in the Czech Republic and will
continue to do so. The Czech Foreign Minister—incidentally,
unbeknown to me, he is a Green Party nominee—was heartened
by our continued support.
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