Select Committee on Transport Second Report


6  SAFETY

83. Track work on London Underground is potentially very dangerous. Work is carried out underground, in the middle of the night, by groups of staff working for different employers, to tight deadlines. Contractors have only the five-hour period when trains are not running to move their equipment in, carry out the work and clear it all away again. Work that would be carried out mainly by machines on the surface is carried out by hand underground because of the difficulty of getting plant down the tunnel. In some cases, for example, rubble and debris is carried out of the station by hand, in sacks. We are grateful to Tube Lines for allowing members of the Committee secretariat to observe some of this work in progress. The unions are concerned that the structure of the PPP contracts is having a detrimental effect on safety for Underground passengers and employees engaged in the upgrade work. A number of specific incidents were highlighted to the Committee as examples of poor communication, slow incident resolution and non-compliance with safety regulations.[117] Unite described health and safety procedures on London Underground as "alarmingly fragmented", with poor communication between LU's safety committees and private sector staff.[118] Metronet was in their view the worst offender and they suggested that Tube Lines was able to respond more quickly to safety concerns.[119]

Employee safety

84. Written evidence from ASLEF suggests that the PPP has led to poor communication between the Infracos and their employees, and between London Underground employees and the Infracos.[120] For example, ASLEF reports that London Underground drivers often do not know to whom they should be addressing infrastructure issues, which are the responsibility of the Infracos. ASLEF gives examples of local disputes at Arnos Grove depot, Acton Town depot, and North Greenwich depot, and of disputes on the District line and the East London line.

85. While Terry Morgan, Chief Executive of Tube Lines, accepted the number of organisations involved in carrying out the upgrade work as a risk, he vigorously disputed accusations of lax safety standards or inadequate systems.[121] He told us that employees of Tube Lines are now four times less likely to suffer an injury than they would have been four years ago, before they were transferred from London Underground.

86. Safety is clearly critical in the dangerous environment inhabited by those who work on London's underground railway. It requires a relentless effort to maintain high standards of safety and low rates of injury. Poor communication could lead to life-threatening safety breaches, and the unions highlighted serious concerns with communication structures as a result of employees of several different organisations working alongside one another. In the short term, we hope that Transport for London will take the opportunity to work with the unions to address these concerns when it takes over the Metronet Infracos and brings responsibility for infrastructure and operations together.

87. To maintain the highest standards of safety for employees in the longer-term, the Government must work with Transport for London and the unions to identify existing communication deficiencies and ensure that the future structure of the contracts does not contain inherent safety weaknesses. Where it is necessary for employees of different organisations to work together, the utmost effort must be made to ensure the clarity of procedures for reporting safety concerns.

Passenger safety

88. London Underground is in possession of its safety certificate and safety authorisation from the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR), which, while not guaranteeing safety, indicates that the ORR is satisfied that an effective safety management system is in place. Responsibility for adhering to the terms of the certificate and authorisation rests with London Underground, and the Infracos must cooperate with LU on all safety matters. London Underground will need to obtain an updated certificate and authorisation by March 2012 at the latest. The ORR's own indicators show that overall safety on the railway has not deteriorated since the inception of the PPP Agreements and it describes LU as providing "good levels of passenger and worker safety" though, as with all railways, there is the potential for derailments and other serious incidents.[122]

89. The ORR has investigated four train derailments since the introduction of PPP and concludes that the number and causes of derailments appears to have been unaffected by the PPP. Similarly, the ORR does not believe that PPP has resulted in a change to the number of signals passed at danger. On track maintenance and renewals the ORR says:

    The quality of track has implications for train safety, and was implicated in the 2003 Hammersmith derailment. The PPP Infracos took time to develop their priorities for maintaining and renewing track and this meant that some of the most pressing renewals work was not done as quickly as it should have been. In April 2006 we took enforcement action to require Metronet SSL to maintain the District Line to an appropriate standard.[123]

Finally, the ORR report that, as a result of the PPP, rail defects are now more likely to be detected before they become rail breaks, and that there is no indication that the PPP has had a detrimental effect on rolling stock maintenance.

90. When Metronet entered administration, the ORR carried out additional inspections to ensure that track, signals and rolling stock continued to be safely maintained. However, Gerry Doherty, General Secretary of the Transport Salaried Staffs' Association, expressed grave concern that the PPP structure had, in fact, increased risk on the Underground network:

    Do not wait until you get the same specific instances that you had on the mainline railway through fragmentation and through privatisation before we do something about bringing the railway infrastructure back into where it should be and get proper control over it. What we are saying is that what happened on the Underground is a mirror of what happened on the railway before we had all of those accidents and before we took action by bringing infrastructure and maintenance back in-house.[124]

91. The ORR's evidence supports the view that passenger safety levels on the Tube have been broadly maintained, and in some areas improved, since responsibility for the infrastructure transferred to the Infracos. There is no room for complacency, however—the unions have highlighted the fact that divisions of responsibility, particular during periods when responsibilities are being transferred between organisations, could potentially increase the risk of safety breaches occurring.

92. During the transition of Metronet's ownership from its shareholders to Transport for London and for the duration of Transport for London's stewardship of the Infracos, as well as in the longer-term under whatever vehicle is chosen to deliver the upgrades, passenger safety must be the primary concern of everyone who is involved. A key role for the Government in its discussions with the Mayor and Transport for London will be to ensure that future contracts incentivise the actions that are necessary to guarantee the highest standards of safety on the network.


117   Qq 67-69 Back

118   Ev 78 Back

119   Q 81 Back

120   Ev 63 Back

121   Q 101 & Ev 58 Back

122   Ev 66 Back

123   Ev 66 Back

124   Q 84 Back


 
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