Previously cleared from scrutiny; further information requested; drawn to the attention of the Exiting the EU and the Transport Committee
Proposed Regulation on aviation safety and establishing a EU Aviation Safety Agency
Article 100(2) TFEU; ordinary legislative procedure; QMV
(37381), 14991/15 + ADDs 1–5, COM(15) 613
14.1This chapter considers the implications of EU exit for the UK’s future participation in or co-operation with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)—an EU agency with regulatory and executive responsibilities in the field of civilian aviation safety.
14.2The document nominally concerned is the European Commission’s proposed revision of the EASA Regulation 216/2008 which sets the aviation safety framework at EU level (hereafter “the Regulation”), on which the Government deposited an Explanatory Memorandum in January 2016. The Parliamentary Under Secretary of State of State at the Department for Transport (Baroness Sugg) has provided the Committee with an update on the outcome of trilogue negotiations regarding this proposal. The outcome is in line with UK objectives and she therefore intends to endorse the provisional agreement in the Council of Ministers. A summary of the provisional agreement is provided at the end of this chapter.
14.3Although the Committee cleared this document from scrutiny in our report on 23 November 2016, subsequent Brexit-related developments regarding EASA warrant closer scrutiny. Specific developments include the Government’s widely reported intention to continue to participate in EASA, which the Minister’s letter only partly confirms that; the publication of the European Commission’s Article 50 Taskforce’s slides on future UK participation in the Single Aviation Market, which infer from the Government’s negotiating red lines that the UK will leave EASA; and evidence on the implications of Brexit for the aviation sector given to Select Committees in the Commons and the Lords (see: Stakeholder views), as well as statements by other stakeholders including the chief executive of the UK Civil Aviation Authority.
14.4Article 66 of the Regulation allows third countries to become members of EASA. The participation of third countries as EASA members differs little from that of EU Member States (i.e. EASA rules are accepted and implemented by third country regulators; the CJEU has jurisdiction; contributions to EASA finances and staff are required), with the exception that non-EU members do not have voting rights. UK participation is thus a possibility, although not a right, and would be subject to negotiation of an agreement with the EU.
14.5We thank the Minister for a helpful and clear update.
14.6In addition to ensuring high air safety standards throughout the EU, EASA’s single safety standard also facilitates the free movement of goods within the EU market, enabling UK aerospace manufacturers to frictionlessly move components through their cross-border supply chains and end-products to customers. EASA also currently acts as UK aerospace manufacturers’ route to global aviation markets for UK firms, as many third countries have agreements with the EU which recognise EASA standards, thereby allowing, for example, UK-manufactured parts to be used by US airlines.
14.7UK non-participation in EASA would raise significant challenges for stakeholders. The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) would be required to replicate the current EASA regulatory regime at short notice and considerable expense. Doing so would increase compliance costs for businesses and impede supply chains, and potentially result in disruption while the CAA developed its capacity to discharge its new responsibilities. Strikingly, the Civil Aviation Authority has decided not to plan for a new independent aviation safety system in the UK on this basis that “it would be misleading to suggest that [this is] a viable option”.
14.8While leaving EASA would be highly detrimental for UK stakeholders, UK non-participation would also have a significant negative impact on EASA, to which the UK is, along with France, the largest contributor in terms of both staff and expertise. A UK exit would potentially have the effect of reducing air safety in the UK and the EU—an outcome both parties should seek to avoid.
14.9Regarding the implications of EU exit, we note the Government’s assessment that:
14.10Article 66 of the EASA Regulation (Article 118 of the proposed Regulation) permits the EU to enter into agreements with third countries which allow their participation in the EASA system, but we observe that these agreements require such countries to:
14.11However, we also note the views of industry stakeholders that EASA is a technical agency and operates on the basis of consensus, so voting rights are less important than being able to be present at meetings and to provide detailed input. We also note that the CJEU has never issued a ruling in relation to a decision by EASA.
14.12We note the analysis of the European Commission Article 50 Taskforce that the Government’s negotiating objectives (including regulatory autonomy, no CJEU jurisdiction, no free movement of persons) are incompatible with continued UK participation in EASA. We conclude that the possibility of a UK exit from EASA should not be dismissed.
14.13We ask the Government to respond to the following questions:
14.14We ask for the Minister to respond to these questions by 21 March 2018. We draw this chapter to the attention of the Exiting the EU Committee and the Transport Committee.
Proposed for a Regulation on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council: (37381), + ADDs 1–5, COM(15) 613.
14.15The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is a decentralised EU agency with regulatory and executive responsibilities in the field of civilian aviation safety. EASA’s role is central to most aspects of safety regulation including design and production of aircraft, their operation, flight crew licensing, and oversight in relation to air traffic services. National civil aviation authorities—e.g. the UK’s Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)—implement EASA rules within the Member States.
14.16The Government’s account of the role of EASA, produced as part of its assessment of the implications of EU exit for the aviation sector, is reproduced below:
“EASA was created in 2003 and reached full competency in 2008 through the introduction of Regulation 216/2008 which sets out common safety rules and objectives for civil aviation in Europe. EASA has competence (either full or shared) over:
“EASA prepares draft rules for consideration and adoption by the European Commission. Member States’ National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) then implement the adopted rules with monitoring from the Agency. The UK’s NAA is the CAA. EASA also has a number of executive tasks, for example the initial airworthiness certification of new and modified products (e.g. specific models of aircraft and engines) and the certification of organisations based in third countries. The Department for Transport and UK stakeholders are currently involved in more than 50 rulemaking activities within EASA and the UK is one of the NAAs that contributes the most technical expertise to these working groups.
“The system is underpinned by the set of common safety rules which are designed for uniform application across the EU. Those rules apply both to the air transport industry, individuals, organisations and products and to the NAAs themselves.
“All regulations that derive from the EASA Basic Regulation (EU 216/2008) are currently subject to a vote by the EASA Committee as part of the comitology process. As a member of the EU, the UK is represented at the EASA Committee, which is the EU comitology committee on aviation safety, and has a seat on the EASA Management Board, which is the Agency’s management body. While third countries are able to propose regulations and shape their development at EASA, they do not have a vote at this stage. However, they do have observer status in the EASA Committee. In practice, regulations proposed by EASA as the technical advisory body are rarely voted against by Member States on safety policy grounds, as they prepared on a consensus-based approach.
“Norway and Switzerland participate in the EU’s safety systems through their agreements with the EU. Norway and Switzerland are both associate members of EASA and both make a financial contribution to the running of the organisation.”
14.17It is important to emphasise that, although EASA’s principal objective is to ensure a high level of aviation safety within the Union, a subsidiary objective is the free movement of goods. Where EASA introduces harmonised safety standards in Europe, goods placed on the market within the EU which comply with these standards are recognised throughout the Union, facilitating their free movement. A component that is manufactured in the UK can be used in a German plane, or vice-versa. Any aircraft certified in the UK can go on any national aircraft register in the EU. Similarly, maintenance organisations and training organisations, if accredited, can provide maintenance and issue approvals/issue licenses in any Member State.
14.18In these ways, EASA effectively acts as the route to the European market for the aerospace sector and, to a lesser extent, air carriers. Furthermore, because a number of other regions’ air safety regulators, including the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA), have bilateral agreements with EASA, EASA also currently acts as the UK aviation and aerospace sectors’ route to the global market.
14.19In December 2015 the Commission proposed a revising Regulation which would modernise the role of EASA, currently laid out in the EASA Basic Regulation. Substantive changes included:
14.20When the Committee first considered the proposed Regulation in January 2016 the Government told us that it welcomed the Commission’s proposal to update the aviation safety regulatory system, but also identified areas where it sought further clarification or amendment of the proposal. In a subsequent letter to the Committee, the Government reported in detail on clarifications which had been received or amendments which had been made on all these issues, and said that the Presidency hoped to reach agreement on a General Approach on the proposal, which the Government intended to support, at Transport Council on 1 December 2016. The Committee cleared the proposal from scrutiny in its report of 23 November 2016.
14.21The Royal Aeronautical Society (RAS) has produced a briefing which considers the possible implications of leaving EASA, in the context of Brexit. Explaining the rationale for EASA’s existence, the RAS states that ensuring high levels of safety requires that rules are developed which cover each of the sub-systems within aviation, including airports, Air Traffic Management [ATM], General Aviation and unmanned aircraft systems, construction and maintenance of aircraft, engines, aircraft systems and components, and that rules are also developed to govern the interactions between the sub-systems. Having an independent central body that develops these rules, supported by industry experts, for each of these sub-systems and for the system as a whole, is a necessity.
14.22The RAS identify the following main implications of UK exit from EASA for UK stakeholders:
14.23Although traffic rights are not primarily dependent on the UK’s relationship with EASA in the first instance, when the UK leaves EASA UK operators, as third country-based entities, will have to apply to obtain licences from EASA. Until these were issued, air traffic to the EU would have no legal basis. While this is a cause for concern, the European Commission’s slides on aviation indicate that contingency arrangements should be put in place to mitigate this risk.
14.24In summary, UK exit from EASA could have the following implications:
14.25Article 66 of the EASA Basic Regulation indicates that agencies of European third countries may participate in (not be Member States of) the work of EASA, where they:
a)are signatories to the Chicago Convention; and
b)enter into agreements with the EU to:
i)adopt and apply EU law in the field covered by the Regulation and its implementing rules;
ii)agree arrangements on financial contributions and staff.
14.26Article 50 (Actions before the Court of Justice) of the EASA Basic Regulation states that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has jurisdiction over decisions taken by EASA. Third countries that participate in EASA must respect this jurisdiction. What this effectively means is that if the Court of Justice ruled that a particular EASA decision was inapplicable, or had to be modified, EASA would adjust its rules in line with the CJEU’s decision, and the third country would have to accept EASA’s rules.
14.27It is important to emphasise that UK participation is thus a possibility under the treaties, although not a right, and would therefore be subject to negotiation.
14.28A number of different models exist for third country participation in, or cooperation with, EASA.
14.29In line with the above provisions, the non-EU EFTA states, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein (which, in practice, is represented by Switzerland) participate in EASA. They adopt and apply EASA rules in the fields covered by the Regulation.
14.30The only major difference between the participation in EASA of, for example, France and Norway is that is that the non-EU members of EASA do not have voting rights on the Management Board or the technical committee which rubber-stamps technical decisions (the Brussels Committee). However, it is rare for votes to be taken in EASA, which is a technical body and tends to operate by consensus.
14.31Third country states of EASA retain their right to conclude international agreements/bilateral agreements with other third countries; however, they may not conclude agreements which would contradict the interests of EASA.
14.32The Western Balkan partners (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia) do not yet participate in EASA but, as part of the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) Agreement are cooperating with EASA to bring their regulatory systems up to its standards. Once fully implemented, the Agreement will effectively integrate the Western Balkan partners in the EU internal aviation market, but the extent of integration is currently limited. The Agreement specifies that—at the end of the second transitional period—the Joint Committee established under the Agreement shall determine the precise status and conditions for the participation in EASA.
Bilateral Air Safety Agreement
14.33The EU has Bilateral Air Safety Agreements (BASAs) with a number of countries with large aeronautical sectors (such as the US, Canada, Brazil), in order to minimise duplication of effort. Both partners retain their separate safety certification systems and, if reciprocal trust is developed, simplified certification processes of products from each side are permitted. A summary of the EU-US BASA states that:
“the main purposes of the agreement are to automatically accept certain approvals issued within the other certification system (an approval issued by one party constitutes a valid approval by the other party) and enable the reciprocal acceptance of findings of compliance during validation processes.”
14.34The agreement of BASAs is a detailed and time-consuming undertaking, as one has to first identify the two systems, then get confidence that the other side is applying its systems properly, and then identify those areas where potentially problematic differences or discrepancies remain, to establish what additional checks would need to be conducted. Given that the UK does not currently have its own air safety regulatory framework, it is highly unlikely that a fully-functioning BASA including a high level of recognition could be agreed in the short term.
14.35A wide range of third countries have less comprehensive arrangements with EASA which aim to reduce the burden of certification procedures, without having a bilateral air safety agreement in place.
14.36The House of Commons Transport Committee, and the House of Lords EU Internal Market and External Affairs Sub-Committees, have received evidence regarding the implications for UK participation of EASA.
14.37Mr Paul Everitt, Chief Executive Officer, ADS Group, told the Lords EU External Affairs Committee that EASA was the sector’s “route to market … it is through EASA that we gain access to all of our major markets, whether that is the US, China, Japan or elsewhere”. Mr Everitt also said that current membership of EASA cost the UK around £1 million per annum, whereas incorporating these responsibilities into the UK Civil Aviation Authority would cost “tens if not hundreds of millions”. Mr Simon Whalley, Head of External Affairs at the Royal Aeronautical Society, told the House of Lords EU Foreign Affairs Committee that membership of EASA was the RAS’s “number one ask of the UK Government”.
14.38The House of Commons Transport Select Committee held a one-off evidence session on Monday 30 October 2017, as part of an inquiry on Aviation and Brexit which has not yet reported. At this session, Willie Walsh, Chief Executive of the International Airlines Group, recently told the House of Commons Transport Select Committee that:
“We do not want multiple regulatory regimes in place that make it unnecessarily complex. … It is in the interests of the industry globally that we continue to participate and have a common regulatory environment for aircraft design, aircraft certification, aircraft operation and aircraft safety. There is absolutely zero justification to move away from it.”
14.39Mr Walsh also stated that the CAA would not be able to replicate EASA’s current functions:
“I do not believe the UK will be able to replicate a UK structure like it had in the past under the UK CAA. The expertise that existed within the CAA has long since gone, and much of it is used at European level.”
14.40Sophie Dekkers, UK Director, easyJet, told the Transport Committee that:
“The whole industry supports maintaining the same structure and framework going forward. We certainly would not ask for anything different, and would look to have a replication. We do not want different regulations in different countries, because that adds complexity. We want to work to the highest levels. Why would we not want to continue with EASA for that reason?”
14.41The House of Lords EU Internal Market Sub-Committee also recently took oral evidence from stakeholders on the subject of EU exit and aviation. In response to concerns about CJEU jurisdiction and the probable loss of voting rights on EASA, Dr Barry Humphreys CBE, BKH Aviation, said that:
“The fact remains that EASA is a technical body that reaches decisions primarily by consensus. The UK and France are the two principal contributors to EASA.”
“The ECJ has never made a decision on EASA; it has never been involved. I believe the Commission has threatened to use it once or twice, but it has got no further, so in practical terms the answer seems obvious. The UK should continue to be as full a member of EASA as possible, and the fact that it will not have a vote on the management board, and that decisions are theoretically subject to the ECJ, should not, in the view of most people in the industry, be a factor at all. That is what most people want to see.”
14.42Outside Parliament, other stakeholders have also commented on the possible consequences of the UK leaving EASA. The US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) stated that:
“If there is now no EASA regulatory oversight over the United Kingdom’s manufacturers we have no way of relying on EASA’s oversight and certification so therefore we would need to make our own findings, manufacturer by manufacturer. And that is highly disruptive, highly costly for manufacturers to ensure that they can comply with FAA standards for manufacturing.”
14.43Jeegar Kakkad, the chief economist for ADS, the trade body for British aerospace, has suggested that it would take 10 years for the country’s civil aviation authority to create the necessary certification infrastructure. Mr Kakkad said that: “It would be catastrophic for [UK] industry if there was a backlog of parts not being certified”.
14.44On 5 September 2017, Andrew Haines, Chief Executive of the Civil Aviation Authority, gave a speech in which he stated that:
“We at the CAA are very explicit that we want to remain full members of EASA. I have to say in my 8 years in the aviation sector, I don’t think I have ever come across an issue that has such broad consensus in the sector. It’s almost universal. It makes no sense to recreate a national regulator. At best, you replicate the vast majority of European regulation, and you’d have to do it over an extended period of time. At worst, you create unnecessary barriers, and you start to breach my first successful outcome. What does this do to trade, and what does this to choice and value for consumers?”
14.45In the same speech, he stated that the CAA was not undertaking any preparatory work for taking back responsibility from EASA, as it did not consider doing so to be a viable option:
“We are very uncompromising in our view that we should not be planning for a new independent aviation safety system in the UK. Indeed, we have consciously decided not to do that work as it would be misleading to suggest that’s a viable option.”
14.46The Government has published little official information about its position regarding future UK participation in EASA, however on 1 December 2017 it was reported that, following pressure not just from UK and European airlines, but also the US Federal Aviation Authority, the Government planned to tell the EU that it wished to remain in EASA, and that the Department for Transport had been privately reassuring the aviation industry and aeronautical manufacturers that Britain would stay within EASA. This position is only partly confirmed by the Government’s letter to the Committee, summarised at the end of this chapter, in which the Government acknowledges the benefits of UK participation in EASA and that “it would be beneficial to remain part of the EASA system after the UK has left the EU”, but concludes that “remaining part of the EASA system will be considered as an option [our italics] for the exit negotiations”.
14.47On 17 January 2018 the European Commission Article 50 Taskforce published a set of slides on the subject of aviation, which were used for information purposes at a meeting of the Article 50 Council Working Party on 16 January.
14.48The Commission slides take as their starting point the Government’s statement of its ‘red lines’ (regulatory autonomy, the end of ECJ jurisdiction, and the end of free movement of persons) and the EU27’s ‘guiding principles’ in the negotiations (autonomy of the Union and its legal order, including ECJ jurisdiction, integrity of the Single Market, no “cherry picking”, level playing field and consistent approach towards third country partners).
14.49From these principles, the Commission concludes that the only consistent outcome is that the UK will leave the Single Aviation Market, and that the EU-UK future aviation relationship will be based on ‘classical’ agreements, such as those that exist with a large number of third countries.
14.50The Commission identifies the following consequences of this for the UK:
14.51In terms of a transition period, the Commission states in the slides that the status quo would be retained if the UK applied the acquis and kept participating in the Single Market for a limited period (in line with the negotiating mandate). This is consistent with the negotiating directives on the transition period which were agreed on 29 January 2018.
14.52The EU envisages a Future Aviation Safety relationship which would take the form of a Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement (BASA) between the EU and the UK, which would have separate simplification systems, and simplified certification processes of products from either side (but not mutual recognition).
14.53Importantly, the Article 50 Taskforce paper notes that, in the event of an overall ‘no deal’ scenario, it would be essential to establish EU-wide contingency measures to ensure basic connectivity, which would include a bare-bones EU-UK agreement on traffic rights and safety.
14.54Trilogue discussions have concluded and the Minister now provides the Committee with an update on the provisional agreement reached. The Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Transport (Baroness Sugg) states that this will be submitted to the European Parliament plenary and to a future Council of Minister for approval, following a meeting of COREPER.
14.55The Minister states that, having assessed the final text, she believes that the Regulation will achieve the objective of the original proposal, and is broadly in line with the UK’s policy objectives. It will ensure that the requirements adopted by EASA are proportionate and, wherever possible, performance based rather than prescriptive. The Minister intends to endorse the provisional agreement in the interests of the aviation industry and consumers.
14.56The Minister’s account of the main aspects of the provisional agreement is summarised below.
14.57The Minister states that the extension of the scope of EASA’s remit has been limited to ground handling service providers, aspects of aviation security where there are interdependencies with safety, and drone safety. On this basis, she states that the scope of the Regulation is proportionate and is in line with UK aims.
14.58The Minister says that compromises have been made with the European Parliament regarding the use of Delegated Acts. Delegated Acts are now used to amend Annexes II to IX and for issues where the Commission or EASA is responsible, which the Government accepts is appropriate, whereas Implementing Acts are mainly used where Member States will be responsible for implementation. Delegated Acts have been proposed for the adoption of detailed technical requirements in “a small number of areas where Member States will be responsible for implementation”, but the Minister states that Member States will retain influence on the development and finalisation of the requirements in these areas as EASA are required to undertake full consultation on any proposals for introducing (or amending) requirements in these areas, and the Commission has stated that they would also wish to consult Member States on any delegated acts in these areas before they were adopted.
14.59The emergency oversight mechanism proposed by the Commission, which the Government supported, was removed in the General Approach; however, this has now been reintroduced as an oversight support mechanism to assist states that are struggling to provide an adequate level of oversight.
14.60To reach a draft agreement with the European Parliament, the Minister reports that the Presidency has provisionally agreed to the inclusion of a threshold for the registration of drones. Drones with a potential energy on impact of 80 joules (roughly equivalent to a maximum mass of 900g) or more will require to be registered. The Minister states that this is much higher than the 250g threshold for registration of drone users that is currently being considered in the UK, but that Member States remain free to impose additional requirements on non-safety grounds and it is likely that a 250g threshold for legislation could still be established in the UK. She adds that the registration threshold set in the Regulation may be amended by delegated acts.
14.61The Minister states that:
195 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council
196 Regulation (EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency.
197 Explanatory Memorandum from the Minister, DFT, to the Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee ().
198 Letter from the Minister, DFT, to the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee ().
199 Nineteenth Report HC 71–xvii (2016–17) (23 November 2016).
200 Sky News, Govt to stay in EU air safety body in blurring of Brexit red line ().
201 Taskforce 50, Internal EU27 preparatory discussions on the framework for the future relationship: “Aviation” ().
202 Article 66 of Regulation (EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency—replicated by Article 118 of the proposed Regulation.
203 It is important to note that these benefits are also reliant on a range of other EU measures, such as the customs union and intra-EU VAT arrangements.
204 Civil Aviation Authority, Speech by Andrew Haines ().
205 In addition, during the transition period proposed by the European Commission’s supplementary negotiating directives EASA rules would continue to apply to the UK but the UK would have no voting rights on the agency.
206 This position reflects the requirements of Article 66 of the current Regulation.
207 Taskforce 50, Internal EU27 preparatory discussions on the framework for the future relationship: “Aviation” ().
208 Civil Aviation Authority, Speech by Andrew Haines ().
209 EASA, The Agency .
210 HM Government, Aviation Sector Report, published by the Exiting the European Union Select Committee ().
211 HM Government, Aviation Sector Report, published by the Exiting the European Union Select Committee ().
212 Air carriers do not gain full access to the Single Aviation Market solely by virtue of membership of EASA and compliance with its standards. The Single Aviation Market, and the traffic rights that it confers on ‘community carriers’, are governed by Regulation (EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community.
213 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and Council on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation and establishing a EU Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the EP and Council .
214 (Consolidated) Regulation on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC.
215 The comitology procedure enables EU subordinate legislation to be adopted by means of Implementing Acts to be scrutinised by a Committee of the representatives of the Member States, but has no European Parliament involvement.
216 Eighteenth Report HC 342–xvii (2015–16), (13 January 2016).
217 Letter from the Minister, DFT, to the Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee ().
218 Nineteenth Report HC 71–xvii (2016–17) (23 November 2016).
219 Royal Aeronautical Society, “Civil Aviation Regulation: What future after Brexit?” ().
220 Taskforce 50, Internal EU27 preparatory discussions on the framework for the future relationship: “Aviation” ().
221 (Consolidated) Regulation on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC.
222 EASA, Decision of the Management Board adopting the rules of procedure of the Management Board of the European Aviation Safety Agency ().
223 Multilateral between the European Community and its Member States, the Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Iceland, the Republic of Montenegro, the Kingdom of Norway, Romania, the Republic of Serbia and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo* on the Establishment of a European Common Aviation Area (ECAA).
224 EASA, Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on cooperation in the regulation of civil Aviation Safety ().
225 House of Lords EU Committee, Brexit: Trade in Goods, p. 54 ().
226 House of Lords EU Committee, Brexit: Trade in Goods, p. 55 ().
227 Transport Committee, Oral Evidence on Aviation and Brexit ().
228 Transport Committee, Oral Evidence on Aviation and Brexit ().
229 EU Internal Market Sub-Committee, Brexit: Trade in Non-financial Services—follow up ().
230 Reuters, Top U.S. official calls for clarity on post-Brexit aviation safety ().
231 Civil Aviation Authority, Speech by Andrew Haines ().
232 Sky News, Govt to stay in EU air safety body in blurring of Brexit red line ().
Financial Times, UK wants to remain in EU aviation safety agency ().
233 Letter from the Minister, DFT, to the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee ().
234 Taskforce 50, Internal EU27 preparatory discussions on the framework for the future relationship: “Aviation” ().
236 Taskforce 50, Internal EU27 preparatory discussions on the framework for the future relationship: “Aviation” ().
237 Letter from the Minister, DFT, to the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee ().
23 February 2018