Select Committee on European Union Twenty-Second Report


CHAPTER 5: Stakeholders, Interest Groups and Other Lobbyists

DEFINITIONS

101.  In addition to the other EU institutions and the Member States, there are many others seeking to influence EU legislation. There are those who may be affected by particular legislation or the lack of it, often called "stakeholders". There are interest groups representing professional groups and trade associations and, more generally, civil society, whose areas of interest range across the whole of EU activity. There are firms of consultants who lobby on behalf of particular interests. For convenience, in this chapter we refer to all these as involved in "lobbying".

102.  Lobbying should be distinguished from consultation. The former involves organisations "pushing" forward their views to (in this case) the Commission, whereas the latter involves the Commission seeking to "pull" views from others. The Commission is the object of much lobbying activity, at all stages from policy formation, through the initiation of a legislative proposal and its development, to the adoption and implementation of legislation. Lobbying may also seek to influence the Commission's use of its right of initiative indirectly, through the European Parliament.[33]

PURPOSE OF LOBBYING

103.  Lobbying may be aimed at persuading the Commission not to make a proposal, as well as positively to promote particular legislation. Lobbying groups know that since the Commission has a monopoly of bringing forward draft legislation, if it chooses not to make a proposal, "it is going nowhere". (Q 19) But Tony Long (Director, European Policy Office, World Wide Fund for Nature), from the perspective of an interest group, told us that currently "the lobbying in Brussels, especially towards the Commission, is the lobbying of propositions, rather than opposition." (Q 143)

LOBBYING IN PRACTICE

104.  Roberto Ferrigno (Vice-President for Public Affairs, Weber Shandwick) and Chris Welsh explained how they approached their work of lobbying. Mr Ferrigno saw policy-making as a circular process, not a linear one. "You need really to spot the right moment at the right place where you get into the process." But generally for legislation, "the closer you are to the starting point … the better for trying to influence the process." You need to be timely, focussed and, if possible, have allies. Mr Welsh added that another means of influencing Commission thinking is through seminars and workshops. His organisation had organised a workshop on standards of heavy goods vehicles from the point of road safety, attended by senior Commission officials (and a number of MEPs). He thought it had promoted understanding of the issues, and the subsequent emergence in proposed legislation of points that had been discussed indicated that the Commission had taken on board ideas which came out of the workshop. (Q 175)

IMPACT OF LOBBYING

105.  Assessing the impact of lobbying is difficult. Professor Rasmussen pointed out that although lobbying has been the subject of political science research, this has generally looked at access to institutions rather than attempting to measure impact directly. (Q 46) But Professor Peers mentioned research covering the 1980s indicating that "the Commission was strongly influenced by a coalition of large industrial groups, to push for the internal market in general and presumably also to influence the details of legislation as they affected each particular area of industry." (Q 16)

106.  Lord Brittan thought "lobbyists have a hard time on the whole" since those being lobbied are aware that the lobbyists have an axe to grind. (Q 68) In his view, much more weight is given to the consultation process and the views and the arguments of stakeholders in that process. Particularly in a technical area, the Commission wishes to hear from people in the business and can then judge the extent to which they are self-interested. (Q 69) Tony Long echoed that thought, arguing that one of the reasons his organisation has the standing it enjoys in Brussels is the quality of the argumentation and soundness of policy propositions that it puts forward. (Q 146)

107.  The representations of public bodies with national standing are likely to be given particular weight. The Government gave the example of lobbying by national telecoms regulators (through the European Regulators Group) on the issue of "roaming" charges for international mobile phone calls, prompting the Commission's proposals for legislation for what became the Regulation on roaming on public mobile telephone networks within the Community.[34] (p 110)

UTILITY OF LOBBYING

108.  Both the European Parliament and the Commission took what David Harley described as "fairly conventional views" on the role of lobbying in the legislative process—that it is useful in providing information to institutions and part of the necessary dialogue in a pluralistic, democratic political context. (Q 424)

109.  Lord Kinnock considered that the contribution to policy development, drafting of law and assessment of effectiveness made by professional bodies of repute and expertise was invaluable. The submissions of such bodies were grounded in real experience. He drew a distinction between "professional bodies with recognised expertise that are prepared to donate advice, information and ideas" and professional lobbying firms which have not done service in the area of activity concerned. He thought that, so long as Commission officials understood whom a lobbyist represents and the purpose of their lobbying, it was fairly easy to tread the strait and narrow. The Commission had, for this reason, been trying to draw up guidelines and rules of the game for lobbying. He noted that "there are reputable, established lobbying firms in Brussels who would be very happy to have that body of rules." (Q 114)

110.  The European Parliament has had a register of lobbyists since 1996. It is de facto mandatory since registration is a requirement for obtaining an identity pass permitting access to the Parliament's premises. Those registered must abide by the Parliament's Code of Conduct, breach of which may lead to withdrawal of the pass.[35] The Parliament appears further advanced in a number of respects than the Commission, which announced the establishment of its register of lobbyists and Code of Conduct only on 23 June 2008.[36] The Parliament's register is mandatory; there appears to be an effective sanction for breach of its Code; and individuals (rather than organisations) must register.

111.  David Harley told us that the European Parliament considered that, properly registered and regulated, lobbyists perform a useful function in the legislative process. He referred to the European Parliament's resolution[37] calling for a common (Parliament and Commission) register and a mandatory system of registration, including full disclosure of financial contributions to lobbyists' funds. (Q 424) Subject to that, the Parliament encourages lobbyists. The Minister for Europe agreed that lobbying was not yet sufficiently transparent. He considered the current proposals from the European Parliament were sensible, though the Government had yet to take a firm view on the proposals. (QQ 474, 480)

EU FUNDING

112.  Some interest groups receive funds from the EU budget. Tony Long told us, for example, that about 35 environmental groups benefited from funding from the EU budget amounting to some 7 million euros in total. His own organisation (the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)) received about 600,000 euros, which represented about 15% of its annual expenditure. (Q 123)

113.  Lord Brittan said that, were he still a Commissioner, he would have been profoundly unhappy with a consultation where the only NGOs consulted were those in receipt of funding from the EU budget. (Q 71)

114.  Catherine Day argued that the system of funding was justified. At the beginning of developing a policy, the Commission seeks to consult widely with relevant interests including civil society generally and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in particular. "We need them to be organised and participate in the consultative process." NGOs which depend on public subscriptions can find it difficult to survive. Funds are, therefore, made available in the EU budget for NGOs in the environment, social and development areas in particular. In answer to the point that such funding might raise problems (for example, that the Commission might only fund NGOs sympathetic to its views) Catherine Day argued that the "fact that it is an uncomfortable arrangement keeps both Commission and the NGOs on their toes", and that the NGOs were "in no sense tame poodles". (Q 358) Roberto Ferrigno from the perspective of a professional consulting agency, also saw this as part of an effort by the Commission and the EP to improve access to policy-making for groups which have not had a voice. (Q 189)


33   The Commission has estimated that there are around 15,000 lobbyists seeking to influence EU officials and Members of the European Parliament: see European Parliament resolution of 8 May 2008 on the development of the framework for the activities of interest representatives (lobbyists) in the European Institutions. FN: 2007/2215/INI. Back

34   Regulation (EC) 717/207; OJ L 171, 29 June 2007, p 32. Back

35   Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament (16th edition), rule 9(4) and Annex IX. Back

36   Press release "Shining a light on EU law-making", 23 June 2008. Back

37   European Parliament resolution of 8 May 2008 on the development of the framework for the activities of interest representatives (lobbyists) in the European Institutions (2007/2215/INI). Back


 
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