Select Committee on European Union Written Evidence


Memorandum by Mr Alan Littler

1.  OVERVIEW

  Gambling is excluded from the scope of application of the Services Directive[12] following amendments made to the European Commission's 2004 proposal[13] by the European Parliament. The European Parliament justified these amendments by reference to consumer protection issues and the disparities between national approaches to regulating gambling. Although the gambling sector was subject to a transitional derogation in the proposed draft, the European Commission envisaged that it would be subject to the country of origin principle following additional harmonisation of national regulations. At present, gambling does not benefit from the country of origin principle at all. In instances where this principle is embodied in secondary legislation gambling is excluded there from. A prime illustration of this is the E-Commerce Directive which aims to create a single market for "information society services".[14]

  Nevertheless, gambling remains subject to the freedom to provide services as under Articles 43 and 49 EC Treaty and this relationship has generated six preliminary reference rulings from the European Court of Justice ("ECJ").

  In summary, the Schindler case[15] recognised that gambling amounts to a service, consequently falling within the scope of the freedom to provide services (Article 49 EC Treaty). However the ECJ noted that lotteries have a "peculiar nature" based upon; the moral, religious and cultural aspects of lotteries; the accompanying high risk of crime and fraud; the damaging individual and social consequences from lotteries being an incitement to spend; and that lotteries contribute to the financing of benevolent or public interest activities. Only the first three can constitute justifications to restrictive measures, ie restrictions to the freedom to provide services.

  The scope for Member States ("MS") to restrict gambling services, their so-called margin of discretion, was not diminished by the subsequent case of La­a­ra­.[16] The ECJ considered that the assessment of a particular national restriction could only be made by reference to the objective of the restriction in question and not in light of other regulatory regimes upheld in other MS. Following the cases of Zenatti[17] and Anomar,[18] the most important developments arose in Gambelli,[19] Lindman[20] and most recently, Placanica.[21]

  Gambelli saw the ECJ require that restrictive measures have to be applied in a manner consistent and systematic with their aim; for example MS can no longer restrict the cross-border supply of gambling on the basis of avoiding the stimulation of demand, while permitting national monopoly operators to advertise extensively. Furthermore, Gambelli sees the ECJ recognise the importance of home state control and supervision mechanisms, requiring the destination/host Member State to take these into consideration when deciding whether to restrict supply. However, if a MS uses the monopoly supply model then other operators are de facto excluded, regardless of the nature of their home MS control.

  Lindman points towards the possibility of an evidentiary burden upon the Member State seeking to uphold the restrictive measure since the importance of proving a causal relationship between the concern against which the MS sought to guard against and the actual dangers which their residents face, was noted.

  Most recently Placanica saw the ECJ reduce the margin of discretion enjoyed by MS, although it does not require the abolition of monopolies or any degree of liberalisation, deregulation or harmonisation of national markets. Firstly, given that the aim of the Italian legislation was to eradicate crime and fraud in the gambling sector, while not seeking to curb demand, the ECJ stated that a policy of controlled expansion (by the incumbent provider(s)) was permissible, even if the cross-border supply of gambling was restricted. This could allow for advertising, an extensive range of games and the use of new distribution methods. However, a simple numerus clausus would fail to justify a restrictive measure. Secondly, the exclusion of operators quoted on regulated markets outside of Italy from being able to hold a licence was deemed disproportionate, amounting to an infringement of Articles 43 and 49 EC Treaty. This points towards the recognition of home state control and the removal of double regulatory burdens. Nevertheless MS remain free to establish their own objectives and standards.

2.  THE CURRENT STATE OF THE SINGLE MARKET

2.1  Are there significant barriers to firms seeking to offer their goods or services, or to consumers accessing these goods or services, in other Member States of the European Union? If so, what are the most important of those barriers? What measures are needed to overcome those barriers?

  Regarding the supply of gambling services in a cross-border context the vast majority of barriers are encountered by the (potential) suppliers of such services. Far fewer examples of barriers exist which restrict the ability of consumers from accessing gambling services offered by a supplier established in another MS.

  The barriers encountered by suppliers are a consequence of the model of supply chosen by particular national governments, or are a consequence of the implementation of that model. Some MS have chosen to supply gambling services, or perhaps a particular form of gambling, by granting a monopoly position to an undertaking. It would be in contradiction to the very nature of a monopoly if suppliers located in other MS were able to access the home market of a particular monopolist. One such example is the Française des Jeux of France. Monopolies however are not per se contrary to EC law, if a competitive licensing procedure is in place which allows both national and non-national undertakings to bid on an equal footing, then EC law is most likely to be respected. One such example would be the UK National Lottery.

  Tendering procedures are important in MS which award numerous licences to various suppliers. To uphold the Single Market it is of utmost importance that non-national suppliers can compete in such procedures, procedures which do not include requirements which can only be met, or most easily met, by national suppliers. The recent case of Placanica[22] provides an illustration; the Italian legislation in question excluded all companies (whose shares were) quoted on regulated markets from tendering for a licence.

  As a consequence of MS seeking to maintain national consumer bases for their monopolists, consumers can be prevented from accessing the services of suppliers based in other MS. For example, case-law arising in the Netherlands requires Ladbrokes to refuse bets placed by residents of the Netherlands. This can be regarded as a practical consequence of maintaining a monopoly model of supply, but from the consumers' point of view amounts to an infringement of their right to access services under Community law. Furthermore, other MS may require internet service providers to block their residents from accessing gambling services hosted in other MS.

  Although these barriers exist, there are only two ways at present through which they can be overcome. Firstly they can be challenged on an ad hoc basis through cases before national courts and via infringement proceedings undertaken by the European Commission. Proceedings at the national level have given rise to preliminary references before the ECJ. The subsequent rulings of the ECJ however are not intended to develop a European gambling policy but merely to apply existing Community law to the particular national circumstances of the cases in question. Consequently the existing requirements of the law are in an embryonic stage and, apart from upholding the freedoms enshrined in the EC Treaty, lack any policy direction. Furthermore, the infringement proceedings can only apply the existing case-law. By virtue of the fact that this is relatively limited, such proceedings have their limitations if perceived as a mechanism for developing a European gambling policy.

  A potential second means for overcoming such barriers would be for secondary legislation to be enacted. This would require the 1994 Edinburgh Council Decision[23] to be overcome, but would be of value since it would provide a policy direction and establish a framework for assessing the legality of restrictions. Furthermore, it would furnish an opportunity for determining whether monopolies are to be permitted to remain within this sector, and under what conditions. The legislative process would provide an opportunity for matters to be discussed and decisions taken which do not fall within the remit of the ECJ during preliminary reference proceedings.

2.2  Do you consider further legislative measures by the Commission to be necessary for the completion of the single market? If so, what measures would you consider appropriate?

  In light of the answer above, legislative measures are necessary to not only complete the single market, but more fundamentally perhaps, be used to decide where the boundaries of the single market lie in relation to this sector. Relying upon the ECJ and European Commission infringement procedures to settle this issue is subject to the limitations inherent in these mechanisms, as alluded to above.

  During a conference on this matter, former Advocate-General Alber of the ECJ noted that MS should accept that the EC Treaty has far reaching effects; and that as a consequence, national gambling markets should be open to competition.[24] MS have different views on this, as various approaches to regulating gambling indicate.

  Consequently, the legislation of various MS clashes with the ideals behind the single market on a theoretical level, and with each other on a practical level as operators mount challenges, using Community law as a tool, to prise open protected markets.

  MS also have numerous concerns regarding consumer protection and the eradication of crime and fraud from gambling, as indicated by the justifications put forward in the ECJ's case-law. Community secondary legislation would provide an opportunity for these to be addressed. For example, responsible gambling mechanisms could have a pan-EU application so that a resident of one MS cannot circumvent national mechanism by playing on a site located in another MS. Furthermore, secondary legislation would provide an opportunity for different forms of gambling to be distinguished and accorded different treatment where deemed appropriate. The means by which gambling is delivered, whether via the internee and other means of distance communication or in an off-line environment frequently entails a considerable difference to the manner in which it is regulated. Again, secondary legislation would provide an opportunity for necessary distinctions and nuances to be made.

  In my view, the legislative process would provide a coherent framework for these issues to be debated at an institutional level. The outcome of this process is likely to be far more coherent than the results of various ad hoc preliminary references and infringement proceedings, and would hopefully contain an effective supervision and enforcement mechanism.

2.3  What is your view of the Country of Origin Principle, whereby a company registered to provide services in one Member State is automatically qualified to provide those services in any other Member State on the basis of home country regulation? Does this Principle constitute the best basis for single market measures?

  The use of the Country of Origin Principle would provide an effective mechanism for encouraging the cross-border supply of gambling services. However, numerous issues regarding the quality of supply, the eradication of crime and fraud, as well as consumer protection/responsible player mechanisms would have to be determined at a European level. Inherently, the status of monopolies would have to be decided upon also. Consequently, it is unimaginable that this principle could apply to this sector, without detailed legislation, probably of a harmonising nature, being in place. If Community secondary legislation were to be enacted then the means by which providers established in different MS are recognised in other MS would have to be decided upon, and the merits of the Country of Origin Principle would have to be balanced against other potential forms, such as mutual recognition which has been used in other fields, eg professional qualifications.

2.4  Should there be a greater role for technology and research in facilitating the single market?

  Research on gambling in the context of the EU is extremely limited. Before decisions are made at the level of the European institutions a thorough understanding needs to be gained of the effects of gambling in a cross-border environment, particularly with reference to whether the dangers associated with gambling are likely to be greater in such an environment. This will either support MS restrictions or point towards greater cross-border activity, but could also be used to develop cross-border mechanisms to respond to such concerns while upholding the Single Market.

29 June 2007




12   Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market. Back

13   European Commission, Proposal for a Directive on services in the internal market, 13 January 2004, COM(2004) 2 final. Back

14   Art. 1(5)(d) of the Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market. Back

15   Case C-275/92, Her Majesty's Customs and Excise v. Gerhart Schindler and Jörg Schindler, [1994] ECR I-1039. Back

16   Case C-124/97, Markku Juhani La­a­ra­, Cotswold Microsystems Ltd and Oy Transatlantic Software Ltd v Kihlakunnansyytta­ya­ (Jyva­skyla­) and Suomen valtio (Finnish State), [1999] ECR I-6067. Back

17   Case C-67/98, Questore di Verona v Diego Zenatti, [1999] ECR I-7289. Back

18   Case C-6/01, Associaçã Nacional de Operadores de Máquinas Recreativas (Anomar) and Others v. Estado português, [2003] ECR I-8621. Back

19   Case C-243/01, Criminal Proceedings against Piergiorio Gambelli and Others, [2003] ECR 1-13031. Back

20   Case C-42/02, Diana Elisabeth Lindman v Skattera­ttelsena­mnde, [2003] ECR 1-13519. Back

21   Joined Cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04. Available online at www.curia.eu. Back

22   Ibid. Back

23   European Council, DOC/92/8, European Council in Edinburgh-11 and 12 December 1992 Conclusions of the Presidency, 13 December 1992. Back

24   As stated by Professor Siegbert Alber during his presentation "Key Principles to be Remembered", during the conference The Future of Gambling in the Internal Market: The Demise of State Monopolies?, Academy of European Law, Trier, Germany, 8-9 February 2007. Back


 
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