House of Lords - European Union

Select Committee on European Union Fourteenth Report

CHAPTER 6: THE COMMON NEIGHBOURHOOD AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

169. In recent years, and especially since the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, the EU has increasingly sought to develop its relations with the countries of the former Soviet Union: Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus in the west; Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Caucasus; and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. Russia sees these countries as being her "Near Abroad" and in her sphere of influence, and has sought to maintain privileged relations with them, both bilaterally and through organisations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). This has created significant tensions between the EU and Russia, which we explore below under the theme of the "common neighbourhood". International security matters, including Iran, Kosovo and the Middle East Peace Process, are also regularly discussed between the EU and Russia, notably as part of the Common Space on External Security. Although the two sides do not always agree, their exchanges have generally been constructive. The second part of this chapter looks at these issues in more detail.

170. Before examining these issues we discuss Russia's view of the world and in particular its attitudes to NATO and the EU.

EU-Russia Relations—The Wider Context

RUSSIA'S WORLD VIEW

171. President Putin followed President Gorbachev in withdrawing from the last outposts of an overextended empire: he closed military bases in Cuba and Vietnam and withdrew peacekeepers from the Balkans. His priorities were Russia's own hinterland, the "Near Abroad"; the relationship with neighbouring powers—Europe, India, China; and perhaps above all, the relationship with the United States. He was determined that Russia's voice should be heard on matters in which it has a close interest, such as Iran; and on matters of less obvious direct importance, such as Kosovo. However, President Putin's ambitions to reassert Russia as a world player did not mean that he was reviving the failed attempt by the Soviet Union to project imperial power across the globe. In a recent interview with the Financial Times,[90] Mr Medvedev, then President-elect, stressed that Russia will continue to pursue a "well-balanced foreign policy, aiming to defend its own interests in a non-confrontational way, so that Russia's positions will contribute towards strengthening world security".

RUSSIA'S ATTITUDES TO NATO AND THE EU

172. Many Russians believe that they were humiliated and exploited by a triumphalist West after the end of the Cold War, and that both Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin failed to defend Russian interests. All that changed, they think, with President Putin, who put their country back on the map. That, together with the generally rising living standards, perhaps more than anything else accounts for his popularity. As the former Ambassador to Russia, Sir Andrew Wood put it: "many Russians feel themselves to have been cheated by the West … Moscow gave up its international power and got nothing in return. That argument feeds on a tradition of xenophobia mingled with self-pity, now compensated for by the idea that 'Russia is back'. President Putin is not the first to say that the weak are always beaten. The corollary is the conviction that Russia needs to show strength and surround herself with dependable, even controllable, allies." (p 191)

173. Inevitably, the EU is often subsumed with the Americans under the heading of "the West" which the Russians feel have let them down and exploited their weakness. Many Russians date their disillusionment with the West from the 1999 air campaign against Serbia (a traditional Russian ally) which they saw as an illegal act of military aggression against a small country by the world's most powerful military alliance. They did not and do not accept the justification put forward by the West that the war was a necessary response to a Serbian campaign of genocide against the Kosovars. They believe moreover that Russia did not receive the rewards it had earned from its rapid support of American actions in Afghanistan—including their acquiescence in American military operations through Central Asia—after the destruction of the Twin Towers in New York (see also paragraph 207). Their disillusionment was strengthened by the Western invasion of Iraq, which they opposed and which was illegal in their view.

174. Above all, however, the Russians feel betrayed by the West over its abandonment of the assurances they were given in early 1990 that NATO would not be enlarged.[91] The announcement by the US in 2007 that agreement had been reached in principle to station a radar system in the Czech Republic and anti-missile missiles in Poland was seen by the Russians as the final straw.[92] As a result, President Putin announced Russia's intention to suspend their observance of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

175. Charles Grant, Director of the Centre for European Reform, told us: "The Russian opposition to missile defence … seems to me to be genuine rather than feigned. It is not just a tactic; I think they are genuinely upset by it. I have heard American diplomats say that in the 1990s we promised the Russians that we would never put any 'something' into the new members of NATO … Some people say [advanced] military systems, some people say military bases, some people say significant American forces, but there was some verbal promise made to the Russians in the 1990s, and the Russians think that America has reneged on it" (Q 161).

176. According to Sir Anthony Brenton, British Ambassador to Russia, the EU should remember that Russia went through a period which they regard as a "national humiliation". He argued that: "one of their main aims … is to recreate a strong stable, successful Russia. That is what an awful lot of Russia's foreign policy activity has been about. They are particularly concerned to maintain and to reinforce their influence in what they regard as their immediate neighbourhood in the near abroad, in places like Georgia, Ukraine and so on. In regard to their relations with the West, they retain a lot of the suspicions and concerns which are hangovers from the time when the West was in confrontation with Russia during the Cold War. They deeply dislike NATO, they deeply dislike what they see as Western attempts to encircle them and to weaken them in various ways. It is for that reason that they are very hostile in particular to the US plans to site ballistic missiles in Poland and in the Czech Republic" (Q 216).

177. In terms of the relationship between Russia and the EU on the one hand, and between Russia and the United States on the other, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, Political Director, FCO told us that Russia did not see the EU and NATO as one block: on the contrary, it makes a clear distinction between the EU and NATO because of the membership of the United States in one but not the other (Q 23). He pointed out that: "[Russia] would like to use the European Union more as a forum for discussion of security and disarmament issues perhaps than the NATO-Russia Council, which again they find quite a difficult environment. They … feel a bit sort of ganged up on in that context. Also, they are perhaps jealous of the United States' relationship with the European Union, which they feel is a sort of smoother relationship and one where less disagreements surface in the EU-US relationship than do in the EU-Russian relationship" (Q 22).

178. If Russia is less hostile to the EU than to NATO, she has nonetheless found handling relations with the EU difficult. The Russian preference is to deal with the EU as a single body or, at least, with big states on a basis of equality, rather than with small, unimportant (in their eyes) states. The Russians have wrestled with the concept of equality between states within the EU when it comes to the EU's decision—and policy-making. They resent the fact that new Member States such as Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic States can have what they perceive as a disproportionate influence on the EU's decisions and can hamper or dictate the EU's policies towards Russia for what the Russians view as historical reasons.

179. Professor Lieven (King's College, London) summed up the Russian view of the EU. The Russians "would really like … a super-French version of Europe in which Europe is essentially a great power allied with Russia against America. The sensible ones now realise that they are never going to get that. Their nightmare … ultimately is of a Polish Europe, a Europe … where policy towards Russia is made in Warsaw and Riga, and not in Berlin, Paris or even London, and in which the EU does become a kind of battering ram against their influence and interests, especially in the former Soviet Union … they would like there to be one telephone number that they can ring in Europe and they would like when they ring … to get an answer that they like. If they think there is a reasonable chance of that, then they think the more united Europe is the better. If they think that the answer is going to be in Polish and is an answer that they do not like, then … they want Europe to be as divided as possible … they would say they do not have a coherent policy towards the EU because the EU is not a coherent force, so they cannot have" (Q 204). "They were hoping … after the Iraq war that the EU would emerge under French and German leadership as a real counterbalance to America, which has not happened" (Q 175).

180. Patrick Child, Chef de Cabinet of the European Commissioner for External Relations, thought that: "It is certainly true that some of the more acute discussions we have had recently over, for example, the Polish meat issue or, indeed, the Estonian War Memorial, are part of a broader sense of unease in Russian political circles about what the process of EU enlargement means for what they have traditionally considered to be part of their immediate zone of influence … It also explains why it is so difficult for us to engage in the sort of discussions which I would like to see with Russia on some of the frozen conflicts and issues that arise in the context of our common neighbourhood and in the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in some of the countries of Eastern Europe" (Q 353).

181. Patrick Child considered that in the past eight years: "the Russian response to enlargement, and a desire to be more deeply involved and consulted in the enlargement process and decisions, has been a big feature of EU-Russia relations" (Q 353). As Katinka Barysch of the Centre for European Reform put it to us: "Despite the somewhat disdainful rhetoric that is sometimes coming out of Moscow, I think that most Russians are fully aware that the potential for partnership [with the European Union] is greater than with most other countries" (Q 118). However, as Dmitri Simes recently said, it is naive to assume that Europe can "secure Russia's cooperation in areas important to [Europe] while maintaining complete freedom to ignore Russia's priorities."[93]

182. The official Russian view of the international developments of the last two decades is very different from the West's. Russians draw the conclusion that Russia's interests do not necessarily coincide with those of the West. They believe that it is up to them to defend their interests, as they understand them, by the best means at their disposal. Most Russians no longer accept that Western countries represent a valid model to follow, both in terms of Russia's domestic affairs and in terms of its foreign policy.

183. The Russia-United States relationship has always been a key determinant of EU-Russia relations. The attitude of the new US administration will be extremely important and the EU will need strong and direct dialogue with the new administration on Russia.

184. The EU should also listen more carefully to what the Russians say. The EU's policy-making will be less effective and it will be unlikely to develop its policies towards Russia successfully if it does not understand their views and bear them in mind. That does not of course mean that the EU should not challenge Russian policies and actions if it thinks it necessary.

The Common Neighbourhood

185. The break-up of the Soviet Union and the expansion of the EU had profound implications for the European Union as well as for Russia. Not only have former members of the Soviet empire joined the EU, but the expanded borders of the European Union and of NATO have brought them ever closer to Russia. Russia's interests now intersect those of the European Union in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Nine of these were either republics in the former Soviet Union or members of the Warsaw Pact, and have now become members of the European Union and of NATO. The Ukraine and Georgia aspire to join both the EU and NATO, and Moldova the EU. The European Union has also asserted a strategic interest—political as well as economic—in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. The United States have done the same: even before 9/11 and the arrival of US troops in the area they were explicitly "fostering the independence of the States and their ties to the West; breaking Russia's monopoly over oil and gas transport routes; and promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers."[94]

186. For the Russians these countries—especially the former members of the Soviet Union—are the "Near Abroad", with which they have been closely involved for centuries With regard to political developments in countries of the former Soviet Union which are now not part of Russia, Sir Mark Lyall Grant told us that Russian and EU interests varied "enormously" (Q 44). The Russians consider that exercising their influence and control over their "Near Abroad" is as natural as the Monroe Doctrine tradition in the foreign policy of the United States, according to which Latin America is the United States' "backyard".

187. This attitude is of course unacceptable to the newly independent countries, and to third parties which consider that, however legitimate Russia's interest may be, it can no longer be exclusive. There are sensitivities on both sides. Russia's neighbours are quick to react to Russian bullying or a failure of solidarity on the part of the European Union and its Member States, and Russia is always on the lookout for outside attempts to interfere in what it regards as its legitimate interests in countries and regions which were formerly part of the Soviet Union.

188. Referring to the EU's policies with regards to the common neighbourhood, Sir Roderic Lyne said: "I think it is extremely important that we also think of NATO in this context. One of the most active questions within the broad East/West dispute over this neighbourhood is whether or not countries like Georgia and the Ukraine are going to enter NATO. I do not think you can divorce that from the question of the EU's relationship with the Russian Federation and the other post-Soviet States. The Russians certainly look at these two things as part and parcel of the same problem from their point of view, which is one of Western encroachment into what they have traditionally regarded as part of their zone of influence, and indeed in the case of Ukraine as part of the Russian heartland. Only the other day Putin was reminding the Russian public that 17 million people whom he classified as Russians lived in Ukraine … This is extremely delicate territory and I can see no way in which we are going to reach an accommodation easily with the Russians over this because, as history shows, when empires break up … it takes a very, very long time for emotions to subside. We have got to frame policies here that respect the rights of those countries, that defend our legitimate interests in them and their rights very robustly, but which at the same time do not lend themselves to misrepresentation in Russia in a way that will make the situation in Europe more dangerous or that will allow new dividing lines to spring up" (Q 139).

EU POLICIES AND ACTIONS

189. The EU conducts its foreign policy relationships with Russia through the mechanisms of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the instrument associated with the Neighbourhood Policy (Box No 13 below).

BOX 13
The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Northern Dimension

In 2003-04 the EU devised a policy designed to encourage countries in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and North Africa to become more stable, democratic and prosperous. The partners would get financial aid and better market access provided they undertook economic and political reforms set out in agreed action plans. It is membership neutral with regards to a country eventually becoming a member of the European Union (see House of Lords report "The Further Enlargement of the EU", 53^rd report of session 2005-06, HL Paper 273).

The European Neighbourhood Policy was originally intended to include the Russians, but they objected that it was inappropriate to include them in a programme directed primarily at small countries, many not even in Europe. The European Union therefore adopted a different approach towards Russia, based on financial cooperation, and priorities jointly identified. The Commission committed €17 million for these purposes for 2007, and is targeting between €30 and €40 million for 2008. The money will go on support for the Common Spaces, plus specific support for programmes aimed at the Northern Dimension and at Kaliningrad (see Chapter 4). The Commission is planning a feasibility study for a network of EU study centres in Russian universities. Russia would also like to agree a framework agreement with the EU covering Russian financial assistance for projects in the educational field in EU Member States (Q 279).

The "Northern Dimension", originally a Finnish initiative, first got under way in 1997. In November 2005 Ministers from the relevant EU countries—those around the Baltic—agreed on an action plan for the further development of the Northern Dimension to include Russia. The new Northern Dimension was adopted at a Summit held on 24 November 2006 in Helsinki, which issued a Political Declaration and a Policy Framework Document.

The Northern Dimension brings together the European Union, Iceland, Norway and Russia. It co-operates with the existing Regional Councils (Barents Euro-Atlantic Council, Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Nordic Council of Ministers, and the Arctic Council). The USA and Canada are observers. The Northern Dimension deals with matters set out in the four EU-Russia Common Spaces, adapted to the particular problems of the region, such as reduction of the risk of nuclear and other pollution, maritime safety, protection of the marine environment in the Baltic and Barents Seas, biodiversity, forests, fish stocks and protection of the Arctic ecosystems. The partners meet at foreign minister level every two years. Senior officials meet in the intervening years. Observers and other attend by invitation. A Steering Group meets at least three times a year.

190. The quality and effectiveness of the European Union's dealings with the Russians on foreign policy issues varies with the subject. A number of these issues—in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in Nagorny Karabakh and in Transnistria—are known as "frozen conflicts": where violence is at a low level, but solutions are mostly not in sight. There are also differences between the Russians and the European Union over Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and currently above all Kosovo. We discuss the context as well as some concrete cases below.

191. Gunnar Wiegand, Head of the Russia Unit and Acting Director of Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia at the European Commission said: "We are convinced that we could work very closely with Russia in finding solutions to the problems of the so-called "frozen conflicts", which unfortunately are not always completely frozen. We would like to work more strongly with the Russian Federation on this. We have, perhaps, the most constructive dialogue with Russia on the situation in Transnistria and the least detailed discussion in terms of finding solutions for the situation in Georgia, and Nagorny Karabakh is somewhere in between" (Q 290).

BELARUS AND UKRAINE

192. Ukraine and Belarus form, with Russia, the heartland of the Eastern Slavs. Their peoples have been as often united as they have been divided by history. Although, ever since Yeltsin's early years, there has been regular talk of forming a Union between Belarus and Russia, the project has got nowhere for political, economic and personal reasons. The Commission has repeated its readiness to engage with Belarus, and to negotiate a PCA provided Belarus adheres to the necessary economic and political standards. So far Belarus has made no practical response.

193. Ukraine looms much larger than Belarus in the Russian mind. Even Russians who accept Ukraine's independence intellectually find it hard to adjust to it emotionally. Many still regard the separation as unnatural, and believe that in the fullness of time the two countries will be reunited. Personal, economic and cultural links remain strong. Mr Putin has said that 17 million people whom he classified as Russians live in the Ukraine, about a third of the population: a figure which Sir Rodric Lyne thought was broadly accurate (Q 139). The Putin government also feared that the "Orange" revolution in the Ukraine could be the prelude to a similar upheaval in Russia itself. The Russians would be much disturbed if Ukraine were to join the EU, still more if it were to join NATO. There have been suggestions that Russia could take "retaliatory steps" if Ukraine joined NATO.[95]

194. The Ukrainians themselves are divided about how best to balance their relationship with Russia and their aspirations to become members of NATO and the European Union. President Yushchenko has spoken in favour of Ukraine's full membership of both organisations on many occasions. Polls indicate that around half the public support membership of the European Union, though the number may be declining. About a quarter support membership of NATO. However, opposition has grown: 20% are against EU membership and nearly half against membership of NATO.[96] This doubtless reflects both the uncertainty in the EU about the pace and extent of further enlargement, and the attachment which the ethnic Russians of Eastern and to some extent Central Ukraine feel to traditional links with Russia.

195. The issue of Ukrainian and Georgian membership of NATO was a crucial aspect of discussions among NATO leaders, and between NATO leaders and President Putin, at the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest. Ukraine has been a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council since 1992, and is an active participant in NATO's Partnership for Peace programmes but NATO members held back at the Bucharest summit from inviting Ukraine and Georgia to join a Membership Action Plan, despite keeping the door open for eventual membership. This led some commentators to suggest that Russia had re-established a "sphere of interest" where countries were no longer allowed to pursue their own goals without Moscow accepting them. The Russians are also able to exercise their influence through economic levers. (See Chapter 5 on Energy).

196. Ukraine's first Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union came into force in 1998, and a new Agreement is now under negotiation. This looks forward to an EU-Ukraine Free Trade Area, negotiations on which will start when Ukraine has joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The EU and Ukraine agreed on the terms for Ukrainian accession to the WTO in January 2008, paving the way for membership this year.[97] The EU and the Ukraine have also agreed a Partnership Action Plan under the EU's European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Patrick Child of the European Commission said: "Few days go past without Ukraine saying they would like to be a member of the European Union. The European Union's position on that is clear and well established that the focus of the relationship today is the European Neighbourhood Policy" (Q 355).

197. Sir Anthony Brenton, British Ambassador to Russia, said: "I am a very firm advocate of the EU moving as fast and as clearly as it can to getting a very close relationship with Ukraine—not because that disadvantages Russia particularly. Indeed, President Putin is on record as having said he would not oppose Ukrainian membership of the EU—but because the surest way of giving Ukraine the economic boost and the self-confidence to get over its own internal difficulties and to stabilise the democratic system, which is still developing there, is precisely to draw it into the EU embrace in exactly the same way as we did with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and so on" (Q 229).

MOLDOVA

198. Moldova is not a Slav country, and it is not contiguous with Russia, but its breakaway province Transnistria, which emerged from a brief civil war in 1992, is dominated by ethnic Russians. For domestic political reasons the Russian Government cannot afford to be seen to abandon its brethren. There are still over a thousand Russian troops in Transnistria: the Russians claim they are there as peacekeepers, the Moldovans claim they are there illegally.

199. The European Union has a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Moldova, and an appropriate Action Plan. In December 2005 it set up a Border Assistance Mission to help Moldova and Ukraine police their common border.[98]

THE SOUTH CAUCASUS (AZERBAIJAN, ARMENIA, GEORGIA)

200. Russia has a very long connection with the South Caucasus, going back to the tenth century in the case of the area now known as Azerbaijan. It currently has good relations with Armenia and reasonable relations with Azerbaijan.

201. With Georgia on the other hand, Russian relations are bad, stemming from the continued presence of Russian troops after the Soviet collapse and Russian meddling in Georgia's rebellious regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russians resented US support for the "Rose Revolution" which brought the American-educated Saakashvili to power, the (very small) American military presence, and the increasingly close relationship between Georgia and NATO, which they see as having no historical justification (see also paragraph 185).

202. Russia—or at least elements of the Russian security services—have exploited these internal conflicts in order to put pressure on the Georgian government. Russia has not yet gone so far as to support the formal secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia: it fears the precedent that would be created for its own turbulent provinces in the North Caucasus. It has also brought the potential for Abkhazian secession into its arguments against to Kosovo's declaration of independence.

203. Relations between the European Union and Georgia are regulated by a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which came into force in July 1999. The EU has allocated €120 million under a five-year Action Plan, and other sums are made available to Georgia under separate programmes. The EU has contributed more than €500 million towards rehabilitation and confidence building in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[99]

204. The common neighbourhood in the Russian "near abroad" is an area in which both the Russians and the EU have close geopolitical interests. It is therefore a particularly sensitive area and should be treated as such by both parties.

205. We believe the EU should consult in depth with the Russians over all aspects of the European Neighbourhood Policy with regard to countries which were formerly part of the territory of the USSR, but should not give them a right of veto over EU policy.

CENTRAL ASIA

206. Mr Putin has patiently and with some success worked to strengthen Russia's political position in Central Asia and has built up his relationships with Central Asian leaders. For a variety of reasons the latter still look towards Russia, though they also exploit their new opportunities of playing the Russians off profitably against the Chinese, the Americans, and the Europeans.

207. Mr Putin, after his immediate expression of support for the United States over the destruction of the Twin Towers on 9/11, backed the establishment of US bases in the area, and arranged for the provision of intelligence and logistical support for the Americans to prosecute the war in Afghanistan (see also paragraph 173). At the time he was criticised at home for selling out, and Russians still feel that the Americans have never given them adequate recognition for their support. European interest in the area has been less of an irritant, though the Russians do not much like it.

208. The European Union's policy towards Central Asia is set out in the Commission's 2002 Strategy Paper for Central Asia. To implement the aid and other objectives of the Strategy, € 944.4 million has been provided over the past 10 years.[100] There are Partnership and Cooperation Agreements in force with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Another has been signed with Turkmenistan, and there is a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Tajikistan. The head office of the Commission's Regional Delegation—which covers the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Tajikistan—is based in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. The Delegation is supported by smaller offices in Bishkek, Kyrgystan and Dushanbe, Tajikistan. There is a Commission Delegation in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, with sub offices in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) and Dushanbe (Tajikistan), and a "Europa House" in Tashkent (Uzbekistan). These activities have not led to difficulties with the Russians.

209. At its meeting of 21-22 June 2007, the European Council adopted an EU strategy for a new partnership with Central Asia (Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).[101] The strategy identifies the EU's strategic interests in the region, as regards both bilateral and regional cooperation, and suggests avenues for a partnership in areas such as: youth and education; human rights, the rule of law, governance and democratisation; economic development, trade and investment; energy and transport links; environmental sustainability and water; and combating common threats and challenges.

210. The Central Asian countries have become more important for the European Union in recent years, notably as suppliers and potential suppliers of gas and oil, (See Chapter 5) but also due to their strategic position in relation to Afghanistan, China, India and Pakistan. The EU has also expressed concern about human rights violations, notably in Uzbekistan, and the lack of progress towards democracy. This has brought the EU into conflict with Russia, which is keen to keep these countries under its leadership and does not share the EU's concerns about their authoritarian regimes.

211. However, Sir Anthony Brenton, British Ambassador to Russia, emphasised the importance of the EU standing firm in its view on governance in the Central Asian countries: "With regard to Uzbekistan, for example, where there was an appalling massacre a couple of years ago, I think it is important for the prospects of development there that we be very clear on maintaining our democratic values" (Q 229).

212. While Russia may see the EU merely as an unwelcome newcomer and rival in Central Asia, the EU should take account of Russia's interests and concerns in the formulation of its policies towards the Central Asian countries. Beyond this the EU should seek to engage the Russians in a constructive dialogue about the mutual relationship with the Central Asian countries, and persuade Russia that democracy and prosperity in these countries—which are likely to be strengthened by their relationship with the EU—are also in Russia's interest.

International Issues

213. The EU and Russia have shared interests in working together on a number of international issues. The Russian Ambassador in London stressed that both the EU and Russia were in favour of collective efforts to cope with international crises and to reinforce multilateral institutions such as the UN, to counter the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, and to develop effective international institutions to meet global challenges. In addition: Russia is in dialogue with the EU institutions, as well as with individual Member States on "outstanding international issues like the Middle East, Iran and the European agenda" (Q 431).

214. Issues where cooperation with the Russians is extensive and where common ground can be found include counter-terrorism and Iran where Russia has supported the EU-led talks over its nuclear programme and—together with the EU, the US and the UN—is a member of the Middle East Quartet. On a practical level, Russia has proposed providing military assets, especially helicopters, to assist the EU with crisis management. However, the views of the two sides are not always identical in these fields and diverge sharply with regards to Kosovo. We discuss these issues more fully in this section.

215. Ambassador Fedotov's views contrast with scepticism on the part of some Russians about the workings of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Mr Sergei Karaganov, an influential Russian political scientist, has written:

"There are serious grounds for thinking that the European project is in systemic crisis … The EU cannot lay claim to an independent and lead role because its military capacity is undeveloped and because it is unable to formulate a single foreign policy or even a common point of view. The attempts to create a common European foreign and defence policy are, so far, not only ineffective but often counterproductive as well."[

102

IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

216. The negotiations over Iran are perhaps the most striking example of the CFSP machinery at work with the Russians. The European Commission does not have any formal relations with Iran and there is no Delegation of the European Commission in Tehran. The Iranian embassy in Brussels is accredited to the European Community.[103] The European Union is Iran's main trading partner. The EU set up a "comprehensive dialogue" with Iran in 1998, followed by working groups on transport, trade, and human rights. These promising developments were halted after the Iranian elections of 2004, whose conduct was criticised by the European Union.

217. However, in 2003 Britain, France and Germany, supported by the European Union's High Representative, Javier Solana, moved to revitalise stalled negotiations with Iran over its nuclear programme by offering Iran substantial economic incentives to comply with its international commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 and the Safeguards Agreement. Subsequent talks with the Iranians involving, in various configurations, the three European countries, Javier Solana and his staff from the EU Council Secretariat, the Russians, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, supported by the Americans, have still not produced a satisfactory agreement with Iran to stop its programme of potentially weapons-related uranium enrichment.

218. The Russians are the main suppliers of technology and fuel for the Iranians' nuclear power plant at Bushehr which is fully safeguarded against diversion to weapons production. Dr Solana's staff have had a fair amount of contact with Russian officials over the issue and have found them sensible and very knowledgeable. They believe that the Russians are in some ways better able than Western countries to read the Iranians because of their intense relationship on nuclear affairs. Robert Cooper, of Dr Solana's secretariat, also believes that the Russians are appropriately tough with the Iranians in private (Q 302). The Russians have gone along with Western proposals for sanctions with little enthusiasm, but believe that in the end there will have to be a negotiated solution, because the Iranians will not be coerced.

219. Sir Mark Lyall Grant, Political Director at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, said: "Russia has always been an extremely co-operative member of the 3+3,[104] and continues to be so, there has never been any question of a different sense of priorities or objectives. Russia does not want to see Iran develop nuclear weapons, nor do we, and that underpins the whole approach to the Russian nuclear issue, so that is a very close relationship" (Q 46). A similar view was expressed by Sir Roderic Lyne: "I think that President Putin has seen this as an area where he has diplomatic leverage because Russia has a relationship with Iran, America does not and the European Union does not have much of one. Russia does not want a nuclear-armed Iran … I think what they are trying to do on Iran is to show that at times they can be helpful, at times they can be less helpful, and that therefore it is very much in the Western interest to deal with them in a way that encourages them to be more helpful. This is classic diplomatic leverage" (Q 162).

THE BALKANS: KOSOVO AND SERBIA

220. As an increasing number of countries in South East Europe become members of the European Union or aspire to join, the Russians have seen their traditional role there diminish drastically. In the case of Serbia, the connection is reinforced by a sentimental attachment to what they see as a traditional brotherhood with the Serbs. This dates back to Russian support for Serbia, which contributed to the outbreak of the First World War and millions of Russians dead, their shared Orthodox faith, and Moscow's ultimately unsuccessful attempts to broker an agreement with Serbia in 1999.

221. In historical reality, the Russians have regularly left the Serbs in the lurch, the last time in 1999 when their intervention was a major factor in getting Milosevic to capitulate. However, the irrational emotions of brotherhood, combined with a degree of calculation, do colour policy-making in Moscow.

BOX 14
The EU and Kosovo

The EU has been heavily involved in Kosovo since the province came under UN administration (UNMIK) at the end of the war in 1999, under UN Security Council Resolution 1244. It is by far the largest single donor: Kosovo had received more than €1.6 billion from the European Union by 2005.[105] The European Union has a representative office there, and some 17,000 soldiers from the EU serve as members of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). Under a compromise plan for a period of supervised independence for Kosovo, devised by the Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari, UNMIK would hand over its responsibilities and many of its powers to an EU mission. NATO forces will remain in Kosovo as the main international security presence. The EU is deploying a new rule-of-law mission to Kosovo, known as EU-LEX Kosovo, consisting of 1,800 policemen, judges and other civilian experts, including customs officers.

222. Negotiations for a final status for Kosovo stalled. The Kosovar majority insisted on full independence; the Serbs insisted that Kosovo should formally remain an autonomous part of Serbia; and the Russians blocked any agreement in the UN on the final status of Kosovo which was not approved by the Serbs. The Serbs were undoubtedly encouraged in their intransigence by the Russian threat of a veto in the UN Security Council against any action Serbia did not accept. The Russians believe that the Kosovars were encouraged in their intransigence by the assurances they were given that the United States and others would support the move towards unilateral independence (Ambassador Fedotov Q 435).

223. On 17 February 2008 Kosovo unilaterally declared itself independent, having held off while the Serbian presidential campaign was being fought out. While the EU unanimously decided to deploy a 1,800-man mission to Kosovo to help stabilise the situation after the declaration of independence, it split on the question of recognition. By the end of April 2008, eighteen Member States of the EU, including the UK, France and Germany, had recognised the new country alongside the United States; Spain, Romania, Greece and Cyprus are among the nine who had not yet done so because of their own concerns about minorities. The EU has signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia.

224. The Russians offer three arguments for their opposition to Kosovan independence. To accept the right of Kosovo to secede would be illegal, since it is still formally part of Serbia. It would be the first time since World War II that frontiers in Europe have been changed without the agreement of both sides. Secession would create a dangerous precedent for Chechnya—and indeed for Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria, whose defections from Georgia and Moldova are opposed by the West. Kosovo's independence could have two further dangerous consequences: it could lead to the expulsion or worse of the few remaining Serbs who still live there; and it could give a fillip to the move for a Greater Albania, which in the worst case could destabilise the Balkans yet again, and possibly suck in both Turkey and Greece.

225. The Russian position is not entirely convincing. There is also, of course, an element of Russian self-interest. Russia has been building up its position in Serbias last remaining toehold in the area. Gazprom has signed an agreement for 51% of the Serbian gas network: the gas will travel through the Russian Southstream pipeline, the competitor to the European Union's supported Nabucco.

226. Russia's steadfast backing for Serbia, including in the UN Security Council, contributed to Serbia's intransigence over the final status of Kosovo. This was one of the factors leading to the failure of the Serbs and Kosovars to reach an agreement through the UN-brokered process in 2007. The EU should recognise that Russia has expressed concerns about separatist movements in Russia and in countries near Russia. The EU should seek to persuade Russia to moderate its position and to encourage the Serbian authorities to show greater flexibility on the status of Kosovo.

227. The Russians may regard the lack of unity between EU Member States on the question of recognition of Kosovo as some justification for their position, despite the decision to proceed with the EU mission to Kosovo. The sooner this disunity is ended or is reduced, therefore, the better.

COOPERATION ON OTHER ISSUES

228. Russia and the EU are both members of the Quartet on the Middle East Peace Process (see our report "The EU and the Middle East Peace Process", 26th report of session 2006-07). Sir Mark Lyall Grant, Political Director, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) said: "I have not sensed that in its own bilateral activities in the Middle East Russia has caused any particular difficulties. Russian objectives in the Middle East are not very dissimilar from ours and I think this is a good area for cooperation" (Q 46). According to Sir Roderic Lyne, formerly British Ambassador to Russia, another area where cooperation has been good is over North Korea and Afghanistan (Q 162).

229. One challenge which the European Commission has been addressing in the field of external security is that of nuclear safety. Gunnar Wiegand of the European Commission told us that in this area since the early 1990s all the funds available to the Community have been spent on the former Soviet Union, with the lion's share going to Russia and Ukraine, linked to Chernobyl. He commented that the Commission had gradually moved away from upgrading nuclear power stations to higher safety standards, including technical assistance and the provision of hardware, to its current focus on regulatory, supervisory and training assistance (Q 292): "We have a new instrument for this purpose, which is called the Instrument for Nuclear Safety. This provides us with a substantial sum over seven years of €572 million where we will also be able to go to different countries in the future." Gunnar Wiegand added that: "Russia is quite a good partner in working with us on nuclear safety improvement. We are also working with other instruments and there is now the new Stability Instrument which provides for funding also on non-proliferation …"

230. A practical example of cooperation is the provision by Russia of heavy lift helicopters for the European peacekeeping mission in Chad. Ambassador Fedotov, told us this was under discussion (QQ 431, 433). The British Government have subsequently confirmed[106] that Russia has been in contact with the EU Council Secretariat regarding this proposal, and HMG has welcomed in principle a continued and increased Russian support for EU, NATO and UN and other international operations, including through the contribution of helicopters, ground forces and other capabilities.

231. The Russians can be co-operative where there is an identifiable common objective: to some extent this is true in Iran where the negotiations are perhaps the most striking example of the CFSP machinery at work with the Russians. There has also been good cooperation with the Russians over anti-terrorism, and this needs to continue in the future. In general, however, the Russians have not been much impressed by the CFSP. Over Kosovo the best that can be hoped for is an agreement to disagree which does not spill over into other areas.

90 "Interview transcript: Dmitri Medvedev", Financial Times, 24 March 2008. Back

91 The Russians were given oral assurances by the Americans and the Germans as well as the British. Nothing was put in writing-something now regretted by Mr Primakov, later Yeltsin's foreign minister, whom we met during our Moscow visit. The record of Prime Minister John Major's exchange with the Soviet Defence Minister on 5 March 1990 has since been published by the Russian Foreign Ministry. Back

92 Presidents Bush and Putin recently discussed missile defence at the NATO summit in Bucharest and at their subsequent meeting at Sochi, April 2008, but without making a breakthrough. Back

93 Simes D, Losing Russia, Foreign Affairs, (New York, November/December 2007, pp. 37-52. Back

94 Congressman Bereutter, speaking on 12 February 1998.
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa48119.000/hfa48119_0.HTM. Back

95 For example a Russian official speaking on 22 January 2008,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/23/content_7475090.htm Back

96 "In accordance with the Democratic Initiative Foundation (DIF) … in 2005 the public opinion was still quite supportive of Ukraine's membership in the EU. Forty-four percent of the respondents were for the EU accession, 28% were against and 28% would abstain from partaking in the referendum. The results of the opinion poll of the National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS) are less optimistic: 'the support for Ukraine's membership in the EU decreased from 55% in 2001, to 47% in 2005, and 43% in 2006'." Shumylo O, The debate on the EU Membership Prospects of Ukraine, International Center for Policy Studies, Kyiv, http://www.europeum.org/doc/pdf/859.pdf. Back

97 http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/ukraine-wins-eu-backing-2008-wto-accession/article-169657 Back

98 http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=986&lang=EN. Back

99 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/georgia/index_en.htm. Back

100 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ceeca/rsp2. Back

101 The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership (doc. 10113/07). Back