House of Lords - European Union

Select Committee on European Union Fourteenth Report

CHAPTER 7: MANAGING THE EU'S STRATEGY TOWARDS RUSSIA

232. Managing the EU's relations with Russia is a difficult and complex enterprise. Building a common EU approach requires the involvement of both the Member States and the European institutions. In Chapter 6 we have discussed some of the reasons for Russia's current attitudes towards the West and in particular the EU. There are divergent views among the Member States about both the substance of EU policy towards Russia, and the most effective way to exert the EU's influence. Similarly, there are often different views among and within the EU institutions. Russian policy-makers find the EU institutions complex, but are adept at dealing bilaterally with individual Member States in order to prevent the EU presenting a united front. Furthermore, they have a distinctive and intimidating negotiating style.

233. Russia's increasing assertiveness and prosperity means that the challenges faced by the EU in managing its relations with Russia have become more pressing and more complex. These challenges include the formulation of coherent policies, maintaining solidarity, elaborating an effective method of influencing Russia, and choosing its negotiating strategy, all of which we look at below.

Common Values: Human Rights and Democracy

234. Two of the areas on which the EU seeks to influence Russia are democracy and human rights. We have already discussed in Chapter 2 the increasing restrictions on democratic freedoms in Russia, and in Chapter 3, some of the implications of this for the negotiation of a new PCA.

235. The EU agreed a Common Strategy on Russia in 1999 (which has now expired), which made reference to common values and the forging of closer relations with Russia, but it was short on specifics of how to achieve these goals. This Committee published a report on "EU Russia relations" in 2003[107] in which it concluded that "most of the changes advocated with respect to Russia itself, though immediately desirable, are unlikely to be fulfilled in anything closer than the medium term … the transformation of Russia will ultimately be completed primarily from within, from below as much as from above, and through a change in outlook as well as of institutions. The EU does, however, have a measure of responsibility."

236. The EU has made some progress since then. In March 2005 the EU launched regular six-monthly human rights consultations with Russia (see paragraph 112). The EU delegation usually meets representatives of Russian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the margin. At these meetings the European delegation regularly expresses its concern about the situation in Russia. In October 2007, they raised issues about the forthcoming parliamentary elections; freedom of the press; Russia's NGOs and civil society following the coming into force of the law regulating the activities of NGOs and the law on combating extremist activities; the rule of law; and the situation in the North Caucasus.

237. Some evidence to the Committee suggested that the EU's message advocating both democratisation and a market economy had not been effective. Sabine Fischer, researcher at the German Institute, for international and security affairs,[108] the SWP, pointed out that "one central goal of the PCA is to promote democracy and [a] market economy in Russia. A critical glance at the progress of the Russian transformation and the EU's technical support shows, however, that in the case of Russia the EU's conditionality policy has been able to contribute little to democratisation and liberalisation".

238. Lars-Gunnar Wigemark of the European Commission thought that one problem lay with the clarity of the message: "when we convey this concept or mantra of common values to the Russians, I do not think it is always clear what we are talking about" (Q 296). "… the very basis for our relationship on strategic partnership dealings with Russia is common values and I think we, within the European Union, know what those common values are, and specifically we are often thinking of the Copenhagen criteria as the basis for membership of the European Union". Lars-Gunnar Wigemark thought that the EU should be more specific in very concrete terms about what was meant by common values, "otherwise it will turn into a discussion of cultural values, which I think we are seeing coming more and more from the Russian side."

239. Many in Europe hold that the EU should speak out in public against the weaknesses and abuses of democratic procedures in Russia today. The arguments for public criticism are that the European Union must be seen to stand up for what it considers right; that the EU's public opinion demands it; and that Russian behaviour will be influenced for the better. A further consideration is that Russians who want the political and economic system in their country to become more democratic and liberal believe that public support from Europe will help their cause and perhaps protect them against the pressure of the state. However, the Russian government and its supporters have been known to use European support for Russian NGOs under pressure as evidence that they are pawns of the West. Therefore supporters of this argument believe that Europeans should keep faith with those who welcome support, but should also listen to them on the most effective ways of assisting.

240. There have been times in the past, even in the Brezhnev period, when outside pressure has changed Russian policy. One example is the steady campaign in favour of Jewish refuseniks during the 1970s and 1980s, which produced a trickle, and under Gorbachev a flow, of Jewish emigration. The human rights provisions ("Basket III") of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, to which the Brezhnev government agreed, gave great encouragement to those inside Russia who were fighting for a more liberal regime, and contributed significantly towards Gorbachev's campaign of democratisation. President Putin himself has shown from time to time that he does care about his public image. He modified the behaviour of the Russian police in response to Chancellor Merkel's criticism of the handling of demonstrators at the EU-Russia Summit in Samara in May 2007, but these have mostly been tactical moves. Other campaigns, such as those in support of the jailed businessman, Mikhail Khodorkovsky or against the way in which the war in Chechnya has been prosecuted, have had no noticeable effect on the behaviour of the Russian government.

241. One notable example when the EU and the West more generally had to balance public criticism with understanding concerns Chechnya and the North Caucasus. This has been the biggest issue between Russia and the European Union for more than a decade. Chechnya and the other republics of the North Caucasus are an integral part of the Russian Federation and recognised as such by western governments. Western opinion has been appalled by the brutal means adopted by both Mr Yeltsin and Mr Putin in quelling the fighting by Chechen separatists. Very many Chechens and ethnic Russians have died, many have disappeared, and many have been forced into exile. Some Western governments accepted the Russian argument that they were fighting the wider war against terrorism: since the wars in Chechnya began under Yeltsin in 1994, the Russians have been the victims of one major terrorist atrocity after another—each on a scale experienced in Europe only by the Spaniards with the Madrid bomb in 2004. Nor have the Russians been alone in setting human rights aside in the name of anti-terrorism.

242. The devastation in Chechnya is beginning to be repaired under an authoritarian local regime. There have been no general hostilities for two years, and since 2004 no humanitarian crisis as defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). According to François Bellon, the ICRC Representative in Moscow, there has been a sharp decrease in the number of arrests by the security forces, and there is now a more orderly process of trial and conviction or release. However, thousands of civilians and eight hundred members of the security services who disappeared during the conflict have still not been traced. Most of the numerous ethnic Russians who used to live in Chechnya have now left, probably for good. Chechens who fled their homes are slowly returning to their devastated country.[109]

243. The EU responded to this difficult situation with a mixture of criticism (public and private) and humanitarian aid. Russian policy was criticised in many public statements by the Commission, by Ministers, and by the European Parliament. Since the start of the crisis in 1999, the European Union has given €200 million in aid to the North Caucasus, making it the leading donor in the region. In 2006, the Commission contributed €26 million in relief funding for victims of the Chechen conflict.[110]

244. The Russians, and President Putin personally, took very great umbrage at the European criticism which had little effect on Russian behaviour. Professor Hanson (Birmingham University) thought that the tradition in Russia was to see things in terms of interest. "If we have been lecturing them about Chechnya in the past or whatever it might have been, it has always been seen as a ploy to achieve something else and … not taken at face value if it is about democracy and human rights …" (Q 94)

245. Gunnar Wiegand, Head of the Russia Section in the European Commission, insisted that both sides should listen to the other on human rights issues as part of a dialogue: "When we talk about democracy, freedom, human rights and common values, what is important in the new way of interacting with Russia is that we do not discuss these things, … with us being the lecturers. We should not forget that the majority of our Member States—and this I can say as a German—are countries which have come out of authoritarianism themselves, be it from left or right, and many are very young democracies. Many of our countries have undergone similar processes as in Russia and have known similar challenges and there are different ways and means to achieve the same standards in the end. What is important in this process is that we accept also when Russia raises critical points with us. Not everything is perfect in EU Member States, and there is one regular item which always comes up and this is minority rights. I can tell you that we are in close contact with a number of Member States to clarify exactly what is happening in this area. We have to be careful there that it is not a one-way dialogue but a two-way street" (Q 297).

RUSSIAN MEMBERSHIP OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE OSCE

246. Russia's membership of two significant pan-European institutions—the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe—is one area where the EU can engage with the Russians on human rights, since both are based on "European" values and impose certain obligations on their members.

BOX 15
The European Court of Human Rights of the Council of Europe

The European Court of Human Rights of the Council of Europe, located in Strasbourg, hears complaints against any Member State of the Council of Europe.[111] Proceedings can be brought by any person, non-governmental organisation, group of individuals, or another Member State of the Council of Europe. The Court's judgments are binding: they must be implemented by Member States which are found to be in violation of their Convention obligations, under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers.[112] However, while the Committee of Ministers may put political pressure on Member States to comply with a Court ruling, there are no formal sanctions available to ensure that Member States implement the Court's decisions.[113]

247. The EU supports the work of the Council of Europe, which, together with the OSCE, is the pre-eminent pan-European body responsible for upholding human rights in its Member States. In 2006 Russian citizens filed some 12,000 complaints, a fifth of all cases sent to the European Court of Human Rights (see Box 15) that year. Many concerned abuses by the security forces in Chechnya. In 2006 the Court ruled in favour of the Russian applicant in 80 out of 102 cases.[114] In February 2006 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) published a report singling out Russia and Turkey as the two Member States least co-operative with the Court.[115] Both President Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have accused the Court of handing down "political" rulings against Russia. However, defiance of the Court, or withdrawal from the Council of Europe, would have a severely negative effect on Russia's reputation. Both therefore seem unlikely.

248. President Putin was always ready to facilitate the visits to Chechnya of Alvaro Gil Robles, the former Commissioner for Civil Rights of the Council in Europe, and to receive him at length in private. Successive Presidents of the European Council have taken advantage of EU-Russia Summit meetings to make similar private representations. Here too, though, the impact on Russian behaviour has unfortunately seldom been significant. And the Russian reaction has often been to counter with accusations about European failures to observe the norms of democracy and human rights, particularly, so they claim, in the Baltic States.

249. Sir Anthony Brenton, British Ambassador to Russia, pointed out that the Russian Constitution commits the Russians to a democratic way of government and: "They are committed by international obligations to the Council of Europe to a democratic way of government. It is our business, the UK and the EU, to do everything we can to hold them to those commitments …" (Q 210)

250. Jim Murphy MP, Minister for Europe, was clear that the conduct of the Russian parliamentary elections in December 2007 was not consistent with the commitments Russia has voluntarily signed up to under the Council of Europe and the OSCE's Paris Charter (QQ 393, 398). "The electoral registers, the media coverage, the harassment of opponents, are of fundamental significance when it comes to free elections and the observation of them, [these are standards] which Russia herself signed up to and is not adhering to" (Q 398).

251. Gunnar Wiegand of the European Commission felt that progress was being made. The Russian leadership and their civil servants had become much more assertive in establishing and defending their interpretation of common commitments under the Council of Europe and OSCE instruments, as well as under UN instruments. The rulings of the European Court on Human Rights were being increasingly observed and used as case law in the Russian system: "It is not only … that [the European Court on Human Rights is] having an impact on actual rulings in individual cases as a last instance, it is that its rulings are being used by judges in Russia. That is real progress"
(Q 295).

252. However, he cautioned against excessive optimism, noting that Russia was the only country of the Council of Europe that had not yet ratified Protocol 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).[116] The Commission services had ongoing human rights concerns in a number of areas, notably violations in the North Caucasus, and on the question of media freedom where people could express their opinion, but "it appears that self-censorship is something which is widely spread and certainly the ownership of most of the mass media is also a point which is questioned" (Q 295).

253. In terms of what the EU can do about these human rights concerns, Gunnar Wiegand thought that, while each state had to be its own judge under its own procedures and participatory processes, the EU should remain engaged and continue to express its interpretation of the common commitments. The Commission did this at the political level on various occasions, including in biannual human rights consultations. where there were no taboos. "… all issues are discussed in extenso and we appreciate that openness of the Russian side. We only deplore that the participants of these events are the human rights experts of the Foreign Ministry and do not include colleagues from the competent Interior and Justice Ministries" (Q 295). He also expressed the hope that the discussions could sometimes take place in Moscow as well as in Europe and that the outreach session with NGOs, could also be attended by his Russian counterparts. Gunnar Wiegand also referred to the projects organised under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights instrument, EIDHR. These promoted civil society and supported human rights organisations in Russia.

254. Russian officials we spoke to made clear that they are not prepared to be lectured on how they run their country; and that they are determined that future international agreements to which they are a party contain no didactic elements of the kind, in their view, that figured in earlier agreements negotiated, as they now see it, at a time when Russia was weak. This has implications both for the public positions adopted by Western governments, and for future agreements between Russia and the European Union.

255. Sir Mark Lyall Grant, FCO, described the difficulties of engaging with the Russians on human rights: "it is a challenge and a particular challenge at the moment … It is not that the Russians do not engage, it is that they sometimes question our approach, they question the premise on which we operate and they do not always see us as avoiding double standards" (Q 40).

256. Sir Anthony Brenton thought it was very important for the EU to continue "… to plug away on the democracy/human rights front … they do not yet entirely meet European standards. There are good ways and bad ways of making that point to the Russians but to continue to make our interest and concern clear is a way of bolstering the best elements in Russian society, is a way of encouraging the sorts of developments that we want to see." The Russians saw themselves as part of Europe, and as carriers of European standards: "If there is an area where they see themselves as being badly out of line with contemporary European performance—and human rights is arguably one of them—it is an embarrassment and an encouragement to them for that fact to be drawn to their attention" (Q 243).

257. Progress on democracy and human rights in Russia will be slow. Meanwhile the European Union has no choice but to deal with Russia as it currently is, imperfect though it may be in many ways which the EU considers of fundamental importance. Criticism may well be necessary from time to time if the Russian government falls short of the standards which both sides have accepted, for example in the Council of Europe and the OSCE. However, the European Union should consider carefully before issuing strongly critical public statements about Russian actions of which it disapproves, as it would do with any other country.

Negotiating with Russia

258. A key question we addressed as part of this inquiry is: does the EU have a strong hand in its dealings with Russia? Our witnesses frequently pointed to the importance in the relationship of the mutual dependence of Russia and the EU in the fields of energy, trade and investment, among others. Some observers take the view that the EU's reliance on gas imports from Russia is a source of weakness, but this view was not shared by Sir Roderic Lyne, former British Ambassador to Russia, who commented: "I think the EU has got a very large amount of leverage because it is Russia's largest trading partner … The aspirations of a lot of the Russian people are to move towards a European standard of living … They feel more at home in western Europe and the European Union than they do in other parts of the world, and I do not think we should underplay this"(Q 145).

259. Sir Anthony Brenton echoed this thought in advocating that the EU should: "… continue to expand the fast-expanding … economic links, human links, social links, investment links, trade links … if Russia is to become a normal European country—and I am confident it will—that is going to happen through a sort of osmosis, through a sort of feeling that they are inside, through a sort of feeling that they are a member of the club" (Q 243).

260. Charles Grant, Director of the Centre for European Reform pointed to the importance of EU solidarity in its dealings with Russia: "if we can hold a united position on Russia then we clearly have more influence over it because the Russians respect power" (Q 145).

261. Robert Cooper at the Council Secretariat reminded us that there is a considerable range of attitudes towards Russia among the Member States. Greece and Bulgaria gained their independence from Turkey in the nineteenth century partly as a result of Russian support (Q 312). Others—Poland and the Baltic States—lost their independence to Russia at much the same time. "In the long run", Robert Cooper commented, "everyone would be better off by acting together but, in the short run, that does not always appear so to individual Member States at any particular moment". He explained that the Council Secretariat had a role in trying to find ways of demonstrating to the Member States that "they are better off if they work together" (Q 312).

262. An obvious tactic for the EU's external negotiating partners is to deal bilaterally with the larger members where they can; and where they cannot, to drive wedges between its members so as to undermine any united negotiating front. When the EU is not negotiating under treaty provisions, it becomes very vulnerable. Calls for solidarity, and a determination to pursue a common line, rapidly crumble amid the conflict of national interests. The other side then seek to pick the Member States off one by one, and are often successful. Many examples of the Russians using this tactic come from the energy field, where EU members feel themselves particularly vulnerable and which we discuss in Chapter 5.

263. Like the Americans, the Russians claim that they "would prefer to deal with a strong and united European Union rather than with a weak and divided alliance" (Ambassador Fedotov Q 417). In practice, both Russia and the US deal bilaterally where they can if the result is likely to be more beneficial to them, and the tactic is often successful. It is for the European Union so to order its affairs that foreign governments or businesses see the advantage of dealing with it directly. In the areas where this has already happened, the collective negotiating strength of the European Member States is considerably greater than any of them can muster on their own. That is why the EU is one of the most effective powers in multilateral trade negotiations, with a market numbering almost 500 million people; why the EU can impose its competition rules even on major US corporations; and why Russia found itself having to negotiate with the Commission over visa arrangements and transit through Lithuania for Kaliningrad.

264. EU solidarity is also important to support individual Member States when the Russians decide to bring undue pressure on them to submit to their demands on a particular issue. The EU has demonstrated support in the Russians' dispute with the British over the Litvinenko affair and the British Council; with the Estonians over the Soviet war memorial in Tallinn; and with the Poles over the Russian embargo on the import of meat from Poland. The Russians, needless to say, resent the European Union's show of solidarity in such cases and seek to confine these matters to the bilateral relationships. Their view remains that it is for great powers to settle great affairs, and for small countries to conform. However, the EU is, as the Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellerman-Jensen has put it, designed to make Europe safe for small countries. The President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, addressing President Putin at the EU-Russia Summit in May 2007 in Samara, pointed out that: "It is very important if you want to have close cooperation to understand that the EU is based on principles of solidarity."

265. The EU does have considerable leverage in its dealings with Russia deriving from its position as Russia's largest trading partner with a market of almost 500 million people. Other links, particularly in the economic and investment field, but also through human and social ties, add weight to the EU's hand. The mutual dependence in energy (as supplier and customer), is an additional important factor, as we have noted.

266. The EU will always be more effective when it can agree a united approach in its dealings with Russia. This particularly applies when it is negotiating on a basis laid down in Community law (e.g. the common trade provisions of TEC Article 133). When the EU's leaders stand together, as Chancellor Merkel and President Barroso did at the Summit with Russia in Samara in May 2007, the EU can make maximum impact. Too often, however, Member States act in a way which allows the Russians to drive wedges between them. In future the Member States need to give a much higher priority to standing together than they have done in the past. Once they have drawn up a new strategy for relations with Russia, they should be consistent in applying it.

267. Without allowing any one state or group of states to dominate EU attitudes towards Russia, the European Union and its members have a duty to support vigorously and by all diplomatic means any Member State which Russia chooses to pressurise in an unreasonable and overbearing way.

268. We have noted earlier in this report that the EU is stronger when Member States coordinate EU policy and unite on action. In the case of policy towards Russia this has not often been the case although the 27 Foreign Ministers discussed strategy towards Russia at their informal "Gymnich" meeting on the 28 March 2008, partly in preparation for the EU-Russia summit which will be held in June in Siberia.[117]

269. Different aspects of the European Union's policies towards Russia are handled in different areas of the European Union's complicated machinery. We were struck that they are not brought into a continuing focus, for example by the Ambassadors to the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is responsible for preparing analysis and recommendations for Javier Solana and the Council of Ministers; nor by the Policy Planning Unit under Dr Solana. It appears that no-one is responsible for taking a strategic overview of the relationship as a whole.

270. We consider that the importance of building a stable and strong long-term relationship between the EU and Russia based on mutual trust and understanding is greater than ever. This, combined with a hard-headed and unsentimental approach by the European Union can help to ensure that the relationship is productive rather than the opposite. The Russians should thus be able to see that it is in their own interests to work productively with the EU.

271. The EU's attitudes and policies towards Russia have an uncoordinated character. In order to better design and coordinate its overall strategy towards Russia, the European Union should rethink its current policy towards Russia as a matter of priority. An updated approach should be drafted as a collaborative project between the Commission and the Council Secretariat and approved by the Council of Ministers. It should be discussed by the European Council at one of its forthcoming meetings.

Russian membership of the EU?

272. We asked a number of witnesses whether Russia could one day become a member of the EU. Most of those who replied judged that the prospect, if it existed at all, was far distant. Membership of the European Union is much more demanding, and over a wide range of domestic activity, than membership of any other international organisation. Apart from insisting that potential members adhere to the liberal democratic and economic principles set out in the "Copenhagen Criteria", they are also expected to adopt the full range of EU laws, regulations, legal precedents and international obligations known as the "acquis communautaire".

273. Although the Russians are, as we were told by Vladimir Mau,[118] discreetly designing new measures to shadow European legislation in an unspoken process of adaptation to the acquis, many of those to whom we spoke said that, for political as well as practical reasons, they could not conceive of Russia submitting to the full range of European disciplines in the foreseeable future. A number of people we spoke to added that Russia was in any case too large a country to be comfortably accommodated within the European Union's decision-making institutions.

274. Several of those we met in Moscow suggested that Russia might achieve a formal relationship with the EU of a different kind: such as participation in the European Economic Area, similar to that enjoyed by Norway. However this arrangement entails applying the acquis and making a financial contribution, without having any direct influence over the EU's decisions. This seems an unattractive option for the Russians. According to Katinka Barysch of the Centre for European Reform, "From the Russian side also, joining the European Union is not a very attractive prospect. Russia … is attached to old-fashioned notions of foreign policy-making" (Q 105).

275. Not joining the EU is also official Russian government policy. Russia's 'Medium-Term Strategy towards the European Union, 2000-2010, published in October 1999, explicitly states that during the period covered by the strategy paper, neither Russian membership of the EU nor formal association are on the agenda.[119] However, the Russian Ambassador in London left the question of the future open. The overall framework of Russia's policies toward the EU, "at this stage at least, could be defined by a quite simple formula: anything but institutions. This means that Russia is prepared to establish as close cooperation with the EU as possible but without being its formal member. We have made our fundamental choice in our foreign policy in favour of forging a strategic partnership with the EU." It remained "one of the priorities of the Russian Government" (Q 413). However, the EU was an evolving institution. "Who knows what will happen with the EU of 50? No-one can predict how it will develop … and how it will allow Russia to take part in its evolution … one cannot exclude anything but, so far, it is hard to see in the future, in 30 or 40 years, how our children and our grandchildren will see it … Then the new generation of political leaders will decide what to do" (Q 437).

276. We asked a number of witnesses whether they concluded that the European Union should clarify its position on Russian membership, either making clear that it was ruled out in principle, or stating that the European Union looked forward to eventual Russian membership when the relevant criteria had been met. Almost all were firmly of the view that it would be premature for the European Union to make a statement one way or the other on eventual Russian membership of the EU.

277. The EU has no interest in offending the Russians, who consider themselves as having a similar status in the international system to the United States. Katinka Barysch said: "I think absolutely no purpose is served because on the one hand if you invited Russia to join the European Union it would be horrified, but if we made it clear to Russia that it would never join, it would be equally horrified. I do not think any purpose is served by drawing borders around the European Union and you probably do not need to answer the question of the potential membership of Russia" (Q 106). For Sir Roderic Lyne, former British Ambassador to Russia, "the urge from some quarters to draw a permanent dividing line around the [European] Union should be resisted. Doors should be kept open rather than closed."[120]

278. The issue of Russia's potential membership of the EU does not currently arise. In the unlikely event that Russia did eventually apply, and if it was judged that Russia qualified, the European Union would need to consider the application on its merits at the time. The EU should continue to insist that Russia meet the standards it has agreed to under the Council of Europe and the OSCE, which are not EU standards but would be relevant in considering Russia's application if it did eventually decide to apply. The prospect of closer relations with the EU, even if not linked to eventual membership, does serve as an incentive for the building of a free trade area with the EU and for political reforms in Russia aimed at meeting European standards on democracy and human rights. Therefore it would be counterproductive for the EU to rule out Russian membership as a matter of principle.

The Importance of a Long-term Perspective

279. Sir Roderic Lyne summed up the way in which the EU needed to view Russia in a long-term perspective. The EU "should be patient; and honest in its analysis, eschewing wishful thinking. It should recognise that it cannot determine the course of events within Russia". The EU should understand Russia better, and weigh the consequences of its actions: "This does not mean appeasing; or suppressing criticism; or abandoning our principles. Russians do not respect weakness. But it does mean understanding Russia's viewpoint and sensitivities; avoiding needless provocation; and above all not taking steps which play into the hands of the most backward and hard-line forces in Russia". Sir Roderic concluded that "talk of a 'new cold war' is absurd. Russia does not represent a threat to the EU; and no sensible Russian sees a threat from Europe … it is not in our interests, any more than it is in Russia's, for Europe to push Russia away. 'Strategic Partnership has had to be put into cold storage for the time being, but it should not be dumped in the incinerator. It is a sensible long-term objective, and its time will come again."[121]

280. Sir Roderic expanded on this analysis when he appeared before the Committee, saying: "… we are now in a negative cycle in a long process of transition … which will very probably last for at least another five years and quite possibly 10 or 15, … so I believe that the European Union needs to calibrate its approach to the circumstances which currently exist in Russia … we should firmly reject ideas of neo-containment which are popular in some quarters, particularly on the other side of the Atlantic. We should firmly reject any approaches which are designed to isolate Russia. I think we need in the European Union to develop a shared analysis of what is going on there and a much better understanding of this within the EU" (Q 135).

281. The sensible approach for the EU is to situate its relationship with Russia in a long-term perspective. The European Union is not facing a new Cold War but EU-Russia relations are perhaps in a negative phase in a long process of transition which could last for some time. Despite the difficulties, Russia cannot avoid dealing with the European Union on trade, on competition, on customs and frontier controls, and on a variety of other issues involving the European Union's common standards and regulatory procedures. Even when either side loses sight of it, they are bound by an inescapable common interest.

282. In an increasingly interconnected world, both Russia and the EU have an interest in co-operating on long-term global issues, such as the environment and climate change, as well as on key foreign policy issues, such as Iran, which have a direct impact on their interests.

107 The European Union Committee report, "EU Russia relations", 2003 (3rd report of session 2002-03 HL Paper 29), Extracts taken from paragraphs 93 and 94. Back

108 Sabine Fischer "The EU and Russia: Conflicts and Potentials of a Difficult Partnership", Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin), Research Paper 1, January 2007, p.16. Back

109 Meeting, Mr François Bellon, Moscow, Moscow, 11 December 2007, see Appendix 4. Back

110 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/field/russia/index_en.htm. Back

111 All the Member States of the EU and Russia are members of the Council of Europe. Back

112 All the EU Member States are represented on the Committee of Ministers. Back

113 Under article 8 of the Council of Europe Statute, it is open to Member States to suspend a Member State's rights of representation or eject it from the Council of Europe in the event of a serious breach of the rule of law or the obligation to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected. In most cases, failure to implement a Court judgment would not meet this threshold. Back

114 Johnson's List, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-17-22.cfm; Kommersant 22 March 2007, at http://www.kommersant.com/p752062/r_530/Court_Human_Rights_Ministry_Justice/. Back

115 Radio Free Europe,
http://rfe.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/10/9AD2E375-39EE-4DEC-94EF-71AE55136493.html. Back

116 Protocol 14 would simplify the ECHR regime in an attempt to tackle the problems facing the European Court of Human Rights, not least its growing backlog. It can only enter into force once ratified by all Council of Europe Member States. Russia is the only one not to have done so yet. Entry into force is necessary to allow the EU to accede to the ECHR, as foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty. Back

117 "EU foreign chiefs to debate future ties with Russia", EU Observer, www.euobserver.com, 28 March 2008. Back

118 Meeting, Mr Vladimir Mau, Moscow, 12 December, see Appendix 4. Back