Chapter 1: Introduction
1.The EU deploys Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations1 overseas in support of peace-keeping, conflict prevention and the strengthening of international security. It currently has 16 missions and operations—six military and ten civilian—in eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.2
2.In her speech to the Munich Security Conference on 17 February, the Prime Minister stated: “As we leave the EU and forge a new path for ourselves in the world, the UK is just as committed to Europe’s security in the future as we have been in the past. Europe’s security is our security … the United Kingdom is unconditionally committed to maintaining it.”3 The Government’s Foreign policy, defence and development—a future partnership paper stated that “the shared threats we face mean continued close co-operation is vital to both UK and EU interests”, and co-operation “should take as its starting point both our shared interests and the degree of engagement that has evolved through our membership of the EU”.4
3.Consistent with this aim, the Government has stated its interest in continuing to contribute to CSDP missions and operations after Brexit.5 This report considers their importance to the UK’s foreign policy priorities, and how the UK could participate in and influence missions and operations after it leaves the EU. It does not consider wider CSDP activities relating to the development of Member States’ defence capabilities, such as the European Defence Agency6 or Permanent Structured Co-operation (PESCO).7
4.Chapter 2 introduces the concept of CSDP missions and operations, how they compare to other international crisis management missions, how they are developed and funded, and their value. It considers as examples EUFOR Althea (Operation Althea),8 EULEX Kosovo, and the missions and operation in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Somalia, EUTM Somalia and EUNAVFOR Somalia—Operation Atalanta).9 Chapter 3 considers the importance of CSDP missions and operations to UK foreign policy priorities, and the UK’s contribution, with a focus on the missions and operations introduced in Chapter 2.
5.Chapter 4 explores third country participation in CSDP missions and operations, how this is structured, and the level of influence available to third country participants. Chapter 5 considers UK participation in CSDP missions and operations after Brexit, including the desirability of such ongoing engagement, and the Government’s aspirations. It considers how likely these are to be realised, including the UK’s leverage, the possible frameworks for UK participation in CSDP missions and operations, and how these compare to the EU’s initial position on the negotiations. It also considers the UK’s approach to the negotiations and transitional arrangements.
6.This report is based on an inquiry undertaken from January to March 2018 by the EU External Affairs Sub-Committee, whose members are listed in Appendix 1. We are grateful to our witnesses, who are listed in Appendix 2. Members of the External Affairs Sub-Committee also visited the Operational Headquarters of Operation Atalanta at Northwood in February 2018. The Sub-Committee’s call for evidence, which was launched on 12 January 2018, is reprinted in Appendix 3.
7.We make this report for debate.
1 The EU runs both CSDP missions and operations. While civilian missions are always called ‘missions’, military tasks can be called either ‘missions’ or ‘operations’, depending on whether they contain an executive mandate (in which case they are termed an operation). In this report, we use the term ‘EU missions and operations’, but our witnesses did not always make the distinction clear.
2 European External Action Service (EEAS), ‘Military and civilian missions and operations’: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en [accessed 30 April 2018] EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine is sometimes listed with CSDP missions, but is not managed or funded by CSDP structures. For this reason, it is not considered in this report.
3 Theresa May MP, Speech at Munich Security Conference, 17 February 2018: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-munich-security-conference-17-february-2018 [accessed 30 April 2018]
4 HM Government, Foreign policy, defence and development—a future partnership paper (12 September 2017) p 18: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/643924/Foreign_policy__defence_and_development_paper.pdf [accessed 30 April 2018]
5 Ibid.
6 The EDA supports the development of defence capabilities and military co-operation among Member States, stimulates defence research and technology, strengthens the European defence industry, and acts as a military interface to EU policies. European Defence Agency (EDA), ‘Mission’: https://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/Missionandfunctions [accessed 30 April 2018]. See also Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835 of 12 October 2015 defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the European Defence Agency (recast) OJ L 266/55 (13 October 2015).
7 PESCO is “a Treaty-based framework and process to deepen defence cooperation amongst EU Member States who are capable and willing to do so. The aim is to jointly develop defence capabilities and make them available for EU military operations.” EEAS, Permanent Structured Cooperation—PESCO (9 March 2018): https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_factsheet_pesco_permanent_structured_cooperation_en_0.pdf [accessed 30 April 2018]. See also Council of the European Union, Council Decision establishing Permanent Structured (PESCO) and the participating Member States (8 December 2017): http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32000/st14866en17.pdf [accessed 30 April 2018].
8 Hereafter, Operation Althea.
9 Hereafter, Operation Atalanta.