Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations Contents

Chapter 2: CSDP missions and operations

The development of the Common Security and Defence Policy

8.The CSDP is a subset of the EU’s wider Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Defence and foreign policy co-operation between EU Member States developed in parallel over several decades, as outlined in Box 1.

Box 1: The development of CSDP and CFSP

The idea of creating a common defence policy for European countries dates back to 1948, when the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence (‘The Treaty of Brussels’) was signed by the UK, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg.10 Following the failure of a plan to establish a European Defence Community (EDC),11 the Treaty of Brussels was modified in 1954 and used as the basis on which the Western European Union (WEU), an organisation created to foster co-operation on defence and security between European countries, was established.12 It included a collective self-defence clause (Article V of the Treaty of Brussels establishing the WEU).13

In parallel, a common EU foreign policy was gradually developed. In 1970, (the then) six Member States14 established the European Political Co-operation, which was a purely intergovernmental process that included regular consultation on foreign policy issues and the harmonisation of positions. In 1986, this co-operation was included in the Single European Act.

The CSDP was formally established under the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.15 It also included elements of the development of a European common defence policy: “The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.”16

However, any decisions with defence implications were still taken through the WEU: “The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU) … to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.”17 The operational range of the WEU had been agreed in the so-called Petersberg tasks in 1992. They included humanitarian aid, rescue operations, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, joint disarmament operations, military advice, assistance tasks, and post-conflict stabilisation tasks.18

The wording of the Maastricht Treaty was, as Lord Ricketts, former British Ambassador to France, former UK National Security Advisor, and former Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, observed, a compromise between two groups of EU Member States, led by the UK and France, respectively. The UK was against developing an EU defence capability independent of NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and was in support of keeping the WEU “as the acceptable face of European defence”. France and a number of other Member States, on the other hand, were in favour of building a European defence capability separate from NATO, “reflecting long-held French reservations about the US dominance of NATO”.19

In an attempt to avoid the recreation of structures already existing in NATO, the Berlin Agreement in 1996 established the European Security and Defence Identity to aid the preparation of WEU-led operations within NATO structures. This meant that “parts of the NATO command structure could be ‘lent’ to the WEU to plan and command European operations where the US did not wish to be involved”.20 The Berlin Agreement was upgraded to the Berlin Plus Agreement in 2003, which permitted the entire EU to use NATO structures for military crisis management operations.21

The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997, included a provision that the WEU should over time be fully integrated into the EU, thus paving the way for the joint co-ordination of foreign, security and defence policy.22

In 1998, the UK and France made a joint declaration at Saint-Malo, which Lord Ricketts, then Deputy Political Director at the Foreign Office, described as “reconciling our different philosophies of European security”, which “launched the whole process that led to the institutions, doctrines and operations that have followed from it”.23 The UK “accepted that the EU should develop a real, useable military capability, and the means to plan for, and command, military operations”, and France “agreed that this would be done complementing, not competing with, NATO”.24

Following the Saint-Malo declaration, and in response to their collective failure to intervene in the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, “The EU and its Member States decided that the EU should be able to plan and conduct its own missions and operations.”25 In 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was established as the predecessor of today’s CSDP. At the Cologne European Council in 1999, the EU Member States agreed to the establishment of permanent decision-making bodies which would analyse, plan and conduct military operations. These included the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee, which issues recommendations to the PSC, and an EU Military Staff, including a Situation Centre.26

Based on the ESDP, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in its current form was formally established by the Treaty on European Union (Lisbon Treaty) in 2009. Article 42(1) of the Lisbon Treaty states:

“The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.”27

9.The EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the first European Security and Defence Policy (now CSDP) mission to be deployed, in 2003. Since then, 34 operations and missions on three continents have been launched under the CSDP. 22 were civilian, 11 were military missions and operations, and one—in Darfur—was a mixed mission.28

Structure and decision-making

10.As set out by Article 42(2) of the Treaty on European Union, decisions relating to the CSDP are taken by the Council of the European Union by unanimity:29

“Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State.”30

11.Angus Lapsley, Director, Defence and International Security, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), told us that, because of the structure of CSDP, the UK had “never had to do anything we really did not want to do in the CSDP, because that is just not the way it works”.31

The purpose of CSDP missions and operations

12.Mr Giles Ahern, Head of Euro-Atlantic Security Policy, Defence and International Security Directorate, FCO, said that, due to a lack of understanding of the EU, there was sometimes “criticism or very quick reporting of suggestions of [the CSDP] leading to an EU army, which clearly it is not”.32 Pierre Vimont, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe, and former Executive Secretary-General, European External Action Service (EEAS) agreed that “one should not be overambitious about what the Europeans are trying to do. It is only part of a broader picture in which NATO plays a major role with regard to territorial defence”.33

13.SaferGlobe said that EU missions and operations were in fact “rather low to middle scale and not high-end military missions”.34 Dr Laura Chappell, Lecturer in European Politics, University of Surrey, and Dr André Barrinha, Lecturer in International Security, University of Bath, told us that recent CSDP missions and operations “have focused in part on training and capacity building rather than on the deployment of force”. This “connects with the ideas of resilience and local ownership in facilitating countries to provide for their own security”. 35 Agora Think Tank similarly described them as focused on “land-based civilian capacity building and public security training”, countering piracy and disrupting people smuggling.36

14.Lord Ricketts said that the EU’s current “series of missions” were “much more in niche areas” than initially anticipated when the CSDP was established.37

Differences between EU missions and operations and those of the UN and NATO

15.Our witnesses identified a number of differences between United Nations (UN) and NATO missions and operations, and those of the EU. First, considering the scope of CSDP missions and operations, the Global Europe Centre told us that “the range of [CSDP] activities, relative to those of other actors like NATO or the UN, is limited”.38 Dr Chappell and Dr Barrinha said that it was important to keep in mind that “CSDP is still a relatively recent policy area for the EU”, which, in comparison with NATO, had little experience of military operations. CSDP missions and operations had “limited ambition”, but “do contribute to international security”.39

16.While individual EU missions and operations are of limited scope, we were told that a second difference was the EU’s comprehensive approach, combining tools such as trade and aid policies. Dr Chappell and Dr Barrinha said this was the EU’s “added value in the field of security in comparison to NATO”.40 Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London, told us:

“The great advantage that the EU has over other international organisations is that it does everything. It can do the building of security forces in Somalia and it can do the soft security in Somalia, whilst doing Atalanta off the coast of Somalia. It is the joined-up nature of what the EU can do that provides its value-added when contrasted with other international organisations.”41

17.Dr Filip Ejdus, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, agreed: although “NATO remains a key collective defence organisation in Europe”, CSDP is “a uniquely positioned instrument to tackle a whole range of issues and insecurities such as migration, terrorism, organised crime, state fragility and piracy”. It was “of paramount importance to enabling both the EU and the UK to manage those insecurities at a distance and beyond borders”.42 Mr Lapsley agreed that sometimes the EU was the most appropriate organisation: for example, following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, “it felt right to use the European Union” to establish a rule of law mission, rather than the UN or NATO.43

18.Third, Dr Nicholas Wright, Teaching Fellow in EU Politics, University College London, said that the EU was perceived differently to a military alliance, such as NATO. He said the EU was “for the most part, regarded as non-threatening”, enabling it to “wrap its comfort blanket of money, capacity-building and support around any particular crisis.”44 This advantage is discussed in relation to Operation Atalanta later in this chapter.

19.A fourth aspect, compared to the UN, was the size of the EU’s membership. Mr Ahern said that “while it can still be challenging to get the agreement of the 28, that is perhaps easier than getting the agreement of 193”.45

The development of a CSDP mission or operation

20.The development of CSDP missions and operations can be divided into four stages.46 Mr Vimont told us that the first step was a “political assessment, called a political framework for crisis analysis”. This framework was “a sort of strategic assessment of the situation, to explain the need and opportunity for a European operation. Usually, it goes through the Political and Security Committee where ambassadors are in attendance.”47

21.The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is “supported by a phalanx of expert committees”, including the EU Military Committee,48 the Politico-Military Group,49 and legal and financial groups.50 Mr Lapsley referred to the development of the political framework as the “key moment in this planning process”.51 After discussing the political framework, Member States “decide whether it should go ahead”.52

22.The second step is the drafting of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) by the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), a department in the EEAS, comprising both military and civilian experts. Mr Vimont explained to us the significance of the CMC:

“To some extent, it contains the whole strategic vision and environment of what the operation could be as it moves ahead. Further on, it details what will go with the operation; the kind of assistance, co-operation or follow-up that could come after the operation; the deadline for the operation; and the kind of review that should be done on a regular basis. It already encompasses a lot of details that will be very important for the follow-up.”53

23.Following further discussion and approval of the crisis management concept by the PSC, a “very firm political decision has to be taken at the Council of Ministers”.54 This results in a Council Decision on the establishment of a mission/operation.55 In the case of military missions and operations, Mr Vimont said that “the commander of the operation and where the headquarters should be” would “already have been identified” by this point.56 Civilian missions all share the same operational headquarters—the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability—which is part of the EEAS and operates under the control of the PSC.57

24.The third stage in the establishment of a mission or operation is the ‘Concept of Operations’ (CONOPS), which is “decided by services inside the External Action Service”—either the civilian or the military department—in consultation with the operation commander.58 Mr Vimont said that, again, the concept “has to be approved at political level—ambassadors and Ministers”.59

25.The fourth and final stage of the establishment of a mission or operation is the detailed operational planning, which includes “a lot of input from the commander of the operation” and is “a rather long process”.60 Major General Charlie Stickland OBE, Operation Commander, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, told us:

“I am asked to put together an OPLAN,61 based on strategic guidance which the EU Military Staff draft on behalf of the PSC. I then brief that OPLAN back to Brussels, and as long as Member States are content, this gives me my authority to operate from the PSC, within the mandate that they have given me.”62

Similarly, an OPLAN is developed for civilian missions by the Head of Mission.63

26.For both military and civilian missions, this stage also includes the process of ‘force generation’. This, Mr Vimont explained, means asking Member States for their contribution of expertise and equipment.64 The development of a CSDP mission or operation is finalised with a Council Decision on the launch of an operation/mission.65

27.Mr Vimont said that a military CSDP mission or operation could take “between eight and nine months” to be “launched properly with all the necessary forces”. Civilian missions could take up to a year. There were, however, “examples of the process moving much more quickly, for political reasons”, as had been the case for the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, which “was set up in about a month. We had to do it very quickly because of the situation on the ground.”66

28.The PSC—at which all Member States are represented by ambassadors—plays an important role in the process of developing a CSDP mission. Mr Lapsley told us: “At each stage of that process, the relevant decisions and texts are brought back to the Political and Security Committee, and by consensus we agree whether we are happy with what is proposed.” The process also includes “various points at which you have to go back to Ministers and to the Foreign Affairs Council and get them to sign off, politically and legally, on what you are doing”. This meant that the PSC, and with it the Member States, “has more granular control over missions than the UN does”.67

29.The Global Europe Centre described CSDP “decision-making and mission management structures” as “slow-moving and over-elaborated”, thanks to the need for consensus among Member States, and the “range of national sensitivities and sensibilities” that needed to be considered.68

Reviewing CSDP missions and operations

30.CSDP missions and operations undergo regular strategic reviews. The first strategic review usually takes place six months after the launch of a new mission or operation. There is provision for review “at regular stages” in the mission/operation documents that are adopted.69 Such reviews are produced by the CMPD—with input from Heads of Missions or Operation Commanders70—and considered by the PSC, which can lead to a “(re)evaluation of the situation and the revision of the CMC [crisis management concept] by the PSC”.71

How costs are apportioned

31.Civilian CSDP missions are financed through the EU’s budget for CFSP. For 2018, the budget allocated to CFSP—under Heading 4 (‘Global Europe’)—is €328 million.72 The UK’s contribution to the overall CFSP budget is approximately 15%.73

32.Military CSDP missions and operations are financed in part through the Athena financing mechanism, which covers ‘common costs’—such as the running of the headquarters, including travel, IT systems, administration and locally hired staff—and in part by Member States. As set out in Article 41(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the ‘common costs’ for military operations are usually charged to the Member States, in accordance with a gross national income scale. All six current military missions and operations draw on Athena financing, which is estimated to cover 10 to 15% of the costs of an operation.74

33.EU Member States that decide to contribute to an EU military mission or operation cover their own participation costs, on the principle that ‘costs lie where they fall’—for example, Member States bear the costs of seconded personnel. This means that the large majority of the costs of military missions and operations—85–90%—are not ‘common costs’, but rather are borne by participating Member States.75 This makes it difficult to estimate the overall costs of military missions and operations.76

34.The UK’s contribution to the common costs of civilian and military missions and operations is discussed in Chapter 3.

The value of CSDP missions and operations

35.SaferGlobe said CSDP was “an essential tool in ensuring the security of Europe’s neighborhood” and a “cost-effective tool” for individual countries. It further stated that it “has been relatively successful in realizing the ambition in peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security especially in comparison to the modest resources given to CSDP missions and operations”. It told us that there was considerable variation between operations and missions in terms of their success; “relatively successful” was therefore “an apt characterization of EU crisis management, which makes [the] EU stand out in comparison to other international organizations.”77 Dr Wright said they had achieved “quite specific goals around peacebuilding and capacity-building in post-conflict situations”.78 Mr Vimont too said that CSDP had “managed to find its own niche”.79

36.In contrast, Dr Ejdus said that the CSDP had “not delivered that much on the ground; it has punched below its weight thus far”.80 Lord Ricketts assessed CSDP missions and operations as “very long and grinding, and slow to produce results.”81

37.Nonetheless, he told us that the EU had “boldly gone to very many of the world’s conflict areas and set up missions of high political salience in a crisis”. CSDP missions and operations were “doing extremely difficult work in very tough countries and regions, some of which have no concept of the rule of law or indeed any administrative structures”. He thought that “where the EU can engage in such areas, particularly with mixed civilian and military missions, it is valuable”.82

38.Our witnesses also identified two other positive outcomes of CSDP missions and operations, beyond the EU’s foreign policy priorities. First, Mr Vimont said that the EU’s missions and operations had had the effect of “very slowly building up European military capacity”.83 Second, they had led to collaboration between Member States. The Global Europe Centre said that despite the “modest scale” of CSDP missions, “the number of Member States who have been drawn into operations (both NATO and non-NATO members of the EU) has had the effect of creating a broad-based culture of operational collaboration”.84

39.Witnesses highlighted a number of internal EU issues which limited the effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations. First, Dr Wright said that CSDP had suffered from “a degree of apathy” that prevented action: “What might be a priority for one state may not necessarily be a priority for another.”85

40.Second, a number of witnesses pointed to the difficulties in force generation86 for CSDP missions. Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration, said that the EU “still suffers from unpredictability and shortfalls when it comes to the question of whether the requisite forces, skills and logistical support will be available for CSDP missions”.87 Dr Chappell and Dr Barrinha agreed.88 Dr Duke said missions and operations depended on “the willingness of a Member State to become a ‘framework nation’, or the munificence of those participating in the force generation conference”—contributions were not always forthcoming. However, he said the EU was “well-aware of these shortcomings”, and they were not unique to the EU.89

41.Mr Vimont agreed that there was “great difficulty in getting the attention of Member States on force generation for some of these missions”. He explained that “before we launch an operation, we set the threshold for the number of military people or civilian experts we need. At the end of the force generation process, we often find that we have not reached that threshold”. Mr Vimont said that the EU had usually gone ahead and launched the mission despite the lack of forces, with a smaller size and ambition.90

42.The Global Europe Centre, on the other hand, thought that “CSDP missions and operations have suffered from a culture of ‘presentism’ where there are often a large number of member states making personnel contributions (as indicative of a desire to be committing to CSDP)”. This had sometimes been “sub-optimal for the efficiency, and effectiveness of the missions”.91

43.Third, Dr Ejdus told us the “quality of staff seconded to CSDP missions”, was “a huge problem for CSDP”. He explained that often, “CSDP missions are not really appreciated that well back at home”, and were not conducive to career progression. This led to states not seconding “their best people”, which then “undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the missions on the ground”.92

44.Finally, Dr Duke said there were “questions about the state of preparedness and planning” of Member States for CSDP missions and operations.93

Current CSDP missions and operations

45.Figure 1 shows the 16 current EU missions and operations, as well as the UK’s contribution to them.

Figure 1 Current CSDP missions and operations

Map highlighting countries with current CSDP missions and operations along with UK contributions

Source: Adapted from EEAS, ‘Military and civilian missions and operations—Overview of the current EU mission and operations’: [accessed 30 April 2018] and written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)

46.Our inquiry focused on missions and operations in areas of particular significance to the UK: EULEX Kosovo, Operation Althea, and those in the Horn of Africa (EUTM Somalia, Operation Atalanta, and EUCAP Somalia). They are considered in turn in Boxes 2–4.

EULEX Kosovo

Box 2: EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) Kosovo

EULEX Kosovo was established in 2008, following Kosovo’s declaration of independence.94 EULEX works within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1244.95

The mission consists of two main elements:

1.Monitoring, mentoring and advice (MMA) at senior management level of relevant rule of law institutions to strengthen the chain of criminal justice, with the emphasis on fighting political interference and monitoring of sensitive cases.

2.An executive function, which enables the mission to support the adjudication of constitutional and civil justice, as well as the prosecution and adjudication of selected criminal cases, including cases involving high-level corruption and war crimes. This can only be used in extraordinary circumstances, such as war crimes, terrorism, organised crime and corruption. All other criminal investigations and new criminal trials are conducted by the Kosovo authorities. EULEX Kosovo is the only civilian executive mission which can exert certain functions in substitution to the recipient state.96

EULEX Kosovo is the largest civilian mission, both by budget and staff, ever launched under the CSDP. The overall number of personnel in the mission has been reduced to 419.97 The UK contributes eight secondees to the mission, including the Head of the Strengthening Division.98

The mission’s current mandate runs until 14 June 2018. Its annual budget is €90.9 million.99

47.In evaluating EULEX Kosovo’s achievements, Mr Lapsley assessed that “it is a mission that has had a tough time. Establishing the rule of law and governance in Kosovo is not an easy job.”100 According to Dr Ejdus, the “successes and failures” of EULEX had “to do partially with the context of Kosovo, but also partially with CSDP and how it is run”.101

48.With regard to the political context of the mission, Dr Andi Hoxhaj, Teaching Fellow in EU Law, University of Warwick, said that EULEX Kosovo was “vitally important to building independent institutions” in the country. However, “powerful individuals and political parties dominate independent institutions”, which meant that in these conditions, EULEX “has had only modest success”.102 Similarly, Dr Ejdus said that it was important to “understand the enormous political difficulties under which EULEX has been operating”.103

49.Dr Ejdus noted that EULEX had “managed to achieve certain accomplishments in the field of strengthening and capacity-building”. This was the case in the EU’s “monitoring, mentoring and advising role, for the Kosovan police and also customs”. He said that “especially in the field of community policing, successes are visible”. However, he concluded that “unfortunately, all those achievements and successes have been overshadowed by very little improvement in the rule of law.”104

50.Witnesses also considered the mandate of the mission. Mr Lapsley told us that EULEX’s “initial mandate was just too big; it had everything from customs to prisons to prosecution to police to justice”. This was “probably overambitious”.105 Dr Ejdus concurred, saying that “expectations were, and still are, high”.106 Mr Lapsley said the mission had significantly decreased in size, and would gradually hand over responsibility to the Kosovars. The mission was, however, “still valuable”.107

51.Dr Ejdus told us that another difficulty of EULEX’s mandate was that it ran “on a very short-term basis”—as is the case for most CSDP missions and operations. Every two years mandates are extended, and every year the budget is approved.” Short-term secondments of staff meant that there was “very little continuity”.108

52.Dr Ejdus told us the mission’s “biggest problem” was its executive mandate: “If you have an executive mission that substitutes for what the locals should be doing from the very beginning, you create a culture of dependency.”109 Dr An Jacobs, Senior Lecturer, Defence and International Affairs Department, the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, a former secondee to EULEX Kosovo, said the mission itself had acknowledged that “it was probably a bad idea to have an executive and a strengthening mission in one”, as this made it difficult to build trust with the Kosovar leadership.110 Similarly, Dr Andrea Lorenzo Capussela, former Head of the Economic Unit, International Civilian Office Kosovo, noted that in EULEX there was “weak independence of its judges and prosecutors vis-à-vis the mission’s management, which had political interests that sometimes diverged from the mission’s mandate”.111

53.In addition to these structural problems, Dr Ejdus told us that the mission’s executive mandate had created an expectation that EULEX would “go after the big fish”. This expectation had not been fulfilled: “Unfortunately, only the secondary figures have been condemned, and the most important or biggest perpetrators of war crimes and organised crime have been immune to prosecution and the judicial system.”112 Dr Capussela concluded that, due to the difficulties surrounding the mission’s executive mandate, “it seems natural that they [EULEX Kosovo] would concentrate on the easier and far less controversial task of providing advice and capacity building to Kosovo’s law enforcement bodies”.113

54.Third, witnesses considered local buy-in. Dr Jacobs pointed out that there was a lack of local ownership of EULEX’s objectives: “The Kosovo authorities felt like some of the objectives put forward were perhaps not really their priorities.”114 Dr Ejdus thought that “the results would have been much better” if EULEX had been developed only with the strengthening dimension, which would have enabled locals to “develop a sense of ownership early on”.115

55.A fourth issue was resourcing. Dr Capussela said that the allocation of EULEX resources was not commensurate “with the rationale of EULEX’s mandate and with Kosovo’s needs”. The mission overall had “too few judges and prosecutors”, who were “irrationally distributed”.116

56.Fifth, we were told that the structure of the EU was itself a complicating factor. Dr Ejdus said one issue was “definitely the lack of coherence” among EU Member States, in particular since five of them did not recognise Kosovo’s independence.117 Furthermore, there were “sometimes tensions between different institutions of the EU working on the ground, such as the Commission and the Council”.118

57.Dr Jacobs noted that some of these issues were not unique to EULEX Kosovo, but reflected the struggles of “any international mission”, including those of the UN and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). She gave us the example of the sharing of ‘European best practice’ by the mission, when “nobody really seems to know what that means”. In the case of policing, there was “no clear definition of what good European policing looks like”. In general, however, she said “European organisational cultures of these institutions are still much closer to each other than perhaps states outside the European environment are”.119

58.Another challenge was shared by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Dr Ejdus explained to us that, according to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, on the basis of which both UNMIK and EULEX operated, “Kosovo is still part of Serbia, and not everyone in Kosovo likes this idea. From the point of view of the Kosovar authorities, EULEX is … in a way, a burden on their claim to sovereignty”. Similarly, “UNMIK was seen as an instrument of 1244 … This severely hampered its effectiveness in Kosovo.”120

59.In conclusion, Dr Ejdus said that, in a difficult operating environment “we should not attribute all the blame to EULEX alone”.121

Comprehensive approach

60.Witnesses told us that a big advantage of EULEX Kosovo was its conjunction with other EU policies on the ground. Dr Ejdus said he believed “the EU was, and still is, uniquely well positioned to deliver on a number of things in Kosovo”. One of the reasons for that was “a synergy in its policies”, which was “in contrast to the UN”.122

61.Dr Jacobs agreed that the EU’s comprehensive approach to Kosovo contributed to the delivery of EULEX. In this context, the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, which started in 2011, was supported by EULEX Kosovo in the areas of rule of law, justice, security and the police.123 Although EULEX “was not really in the lead … it played quite an important role in this process”.124

62.EU enlargement also played a role in supporting EULEX’s goals.125 Dr Ejdus said that “the most important” of the EU’s instruments was “the enlargement policy, the carrot and stick, and the attractiveness of the EU’s institutions and EU membership to the Kosovar authorities”.126 However, while the prospect of EU membership had made Kosovars keen to co-operate closely with EULEX for a number of years, “in recent years, resentment against EULEX among the Kosovar elite, and among the population at large, has grown substantially”.127

63.Finally, the prospect of EU visa liberalisation for Kosovars had also supported the impact of EULEX. Dr Jacobs told us that it was something “the Kosovo institutions and the Kosovo Government really aspired to”, and that “it was a big incentive to push forward with the reform processes that were already going on”, in particular to facilitate the work of the strengthening dimension of EULEX.128

64.Reflecting on the wider EU engagement in the Balkans, Lord Ricketts said: “If the EU had not been putting in that effort in the Balkans over the last 20 years, would things have been exactly the same? No. I think they would have been worse.”129

EUFOR Althea (Operation Althea)

Box 3: EUFOR Althea (Operation Althea)

The military operation EUFOR Althea was launched in December 2004, taking over from NATO’s peacekeeping mission.130 The mission’s mandate has been reconfigured four times.131 Since 2012, its aim has been to:

  • Provide capacity-building and training of the Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) (non-executive mandate);
  • Contribute to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment in BiH (executive mandate); and
  • Contribute to the EU comprehensive approach in Bosnia-Herzegovina.132

The executive mandate is given to Operation Althea by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (currently UNSC 2384/2017)133, and means that the operation forces can intervene without prior permission from the BiH government.134 Operation Althea is the only EU operation currently deployed under the Berlin Plus Agreement, with NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe as the Operation Comm134ander.135

Another objective of the operation is “to contribute to the EU comprehensive approach in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, which means the EU’s “integrated approach between our military, economic, political, developmental and other strategies”.136

Operation Althea operates mainly from Sarajevo and comprises 551 personnel from 19 nations, including 14 EU Member States and five non-EU nations.137 The UK contribution to this operation is discussed below and in Chapter 3.

Operation Althea’s current mandate runs until November 2018 and its annual budget (common costs) is €14.8 million.138

65.As the only operation deployed under the Berlin Plus Agreement, Operation Althea’s design and structure differ from other CSDP missions and operations. General Sir Adrian Bradshaw, former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) and former Operation Commander of Althea, explained that the Berlin Plus arrangements allowed the EU to make use of NATO staff, communications, support for operations, and have NATO carry out operational command. This meant “avoiding the need to duplicate structures within the EU that already exist and that are already resourced by most of the nations that are members of the EU in NATO”.139

66.The Berlin Plus arrangements mean that Operation Althea is commanded by the DSACEUR, the second highest position in NATO’s Allied Command Operations. The position of DSACEUR is assigned permanently to the United Kingdom.140 The Operation Commander is based at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium, and his role is to give “operational direction to the theatre commander, an Austrian major general working in Sarajevo commanding the force”.141

67.General Sir Adrian Bradshaw thought that the Berlin Plus arrangements worked “extremely well” in the context of Operation Althea. The EU would communicate its decisions on political and strategic requirements to NATO, which was then “more than capable of turning that into operational activity on the ground”.142

68.The policy direction for the operation is provided by the PSC. General Sir Adrian Bradshaw said he would report to the PSC on the progress of the operation, “how it was meeting its mandate and its objectives, and I would give military advice on the direction that [the PSC] might give”. Such feedback was very often “instrumental in tempering the direction of travel of policy at the higher level”. This also meant that DSACEUR “has considerable influence on policy”.143

69.In assessing the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, General Sir Adrian Bradshaw told us that “until there are changes at the political level, the dangers from inter-ethnic tension remain very real”. Currently a “satisfactory equilibrium” existed, which was “necessary until there is political change”. Operation Althea was “delivered by a comparatively modest force” and “worth the money at the moment”.144

70.He further argued that the security presence, delivered by Operation Althea,

“acts as a deterrent to those who would resort to violence, because they know that we are on the spot and can do something about it, and it boosts the confidence of the population to know that the international community is sufficiently interested in continued security to commit our troops to that country. Everybody knows that although the force is relatively modest on the ground it can call on reinforcements very rapidly.”145

71.General Sir Adrian Bradshaw said that Operation Althea’s “contribution has been extremely important in building the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina certainly into one of the really national institutions in the country, and possibly the only one”. The operation’s contribution to capacity-building and training had “been really important in building that sense of national identity for the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina”.146

72.He told us, however, that the operation’s future was not assured: “Certain nations” had a desire “to see the operation scaled down and to see the removal of the executive mandate.”147

Comprehensive approach

73.As with EULEX Kosovo, the EU’s comprehensive approach is important to the delivery of the operation. General Sir Adrian Bradshaw said that although the executive peace enforcement mandate of the operation could be delivered by NATO alone—drawing on synergies with KFOR, the NATO mission in Kosovo148—this would require “people to be able to integrate military strategy with political, economic, diplomatic, developmental and informational strategies”.149 This was something the EU could do, but which NATO, as a military organisation, could not.

EU missions and operations in the Horn of Africa

74.We also considered the EU’s missions and operation in the Horn of Africa: EUTM Somalia, Operation Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia.

Box 4: EU missions and operation in the Horn of Africa

EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia

EUTM Somalia was launched in April 2010 to contribute to the strengthening of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the institutions of Somalia.150 Initially located in Uganda, the mission headquarters moved to Mogadishu, Somalia, in 2014.

The mission’s current mandate includes mentoring, training, and advisory activities, which aim to build long-term capability within the Somali Ministry of Defence and the Somali National Army General Staff.151

To date EUTM Somalia has trained 5,700 Somali soldiers, four infantry companies, and provided advice to 29 staff of the Somali Ministry of Defence and the Somali National Army General Staff.152

It has eleven contributing Member States (Italy, Spain, The Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Germany, the UK, Hungary, Portugal, France, Romania) and one non-Member State (Serbia). The UK contributes four personnel to the total mission staff of 189.153

The current mandate runs until 31 December 2018 and its annual budget (common costs) is €13.5 million.154

Operation Atalanta

Operation Atalanta was launched in 2008155 and operates under UN Security Council Resolution 1816 to:

  • Protect vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP), African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and other vulnerable shipping;
  • Deter and disrupt piracy and armed robbery at sea;
  • Monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia; and
  • Support other EU missions and international organisations working to strengthen maritime security and capacity in the region.156

Operation Atalanta is widely regarded as a successful CSDP operation, contributing significantly to the reduction in piracy. In January 2011, at the height of Somali-based piracy, 736 hostages and 32 vessels were held captive. As of November 2017, no vessels or crew of International Maritime Organisation-registered vessels were being held hostage by pirates. All World Food Programme vessels delivering aid to Somalia were escorted safely.157

Operation Atalanta has an average of 700 staff over the year, from 19 EU Member States, and three third countries (Serbia, Montenegro and the Republic of Korea).158 The UK contributes the Operational Headquarters at Northwood, as well as the Operation Commander and 56 staff.159

The current mandate runs until 31 December 2018, and its annual budget (common costs) is €4.7 million.160

EUCAP Somalia

EUCAP Somalia was launched under the name EUCAP Nestor in 2012 as a civilian maritime capacity building mission operating in Djibouti, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Kenya.161 It was based in Djibouti until its relocation to Somalia in 2015. In 2015, activities in all states except Somalia were phased out.162

In December 2016, EUCAP Nestor was rebranded as EUCAP Somalia and given a broadened mandate to assist Somalia in strengthening its maritime security capacity. The mission provides strategic-level advice, mentoring and specialised training. It co-operates with the Federal Government of Somalia, as well as the Puntland and Somaliland authorities. EUCAP Somalia has personnel at the Mission Headquarters in Mogadishu and at the Mission Field Offices in Hargeisa (Somaliland) and Garowe (Puntland). It also maintains an administrative office in Nairobi.163

13 EU Member States contribute to the mission. It has 80 staff in total. The UK contributes two staff members to the mission.164

The current mandate runs until 31 December 2018 and its annual budget is €27.4 million.165

EUTM Somalia

75.Brigadier General Gerald Aherne, former Commander of EUTM Somalia (2013 to 2014), said that “the fragile nature of the emerging Somali military architecture”, and “the fact that all brigades were concurrently striving to train while simultaneously being intensely operational against Al Shabaab”, made operating in Somalia particularly difficult. He added that “the continuous challenge was actually getting the troops to the training camp”, because orders to attend training within the Somali military were often “either totally or partially ignored”.166

76.Our witnesses gave differing assessments of the mission’s successes and failures. Dr Jacobs argued that “obviously the mission has contributed to the security of Somalia”.167 Dr Kseniya Oksamytna, Teaching Fellow in European and International Studies, King’s College London, noted that besides its training of trainers, the mission had “supported the reform of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff”, and advised on the Ministry of Defence’s development of the first National Defence Strategy, which were “important contributions”. She thought that “the EU’s approach to security sector reform, which is characterised by the focus on good governance and democratic oversight of the armed forces”, was an advantage to EUTM Somalia, without which long-term stability in Somalia would not be possible.168

77.There were some concerns, however: Major General Stickland acknowledged that it was difficult to track Somali soldiers once they had been trained by EUTM.169 Dr Jacobs agreed, and said that “one of the questions” was “where all these trained soldiers are and the extent to which they are indeed protecting the government institution and Mogadishu from al-Shabaab”. There was “a concern that some of them may have returned to their clans, or even worse, they have joined al-Shabaab, this time as more proficient fighters, because they have just had a year-long training”.170

78.Dr Oksamytna pointed to the difficulties of operating in Somalia, noting that the mission’s delivery was “hampered by inter-clan rivalry, tensions between the central government and regional administrations … and corruption.”171

79.On balance, Brigadier General Aherne thought that “the military objectives of EUTM S[omalia] were better achieved by an EU led mission … than a UN one”. This was due to the different military command models, and the fact that “the EU military commander is the legal owner of the budget”, which “allows quicker but none the less properly accountable use of budget”.172 While security sector reform could also be undertaken under the framework of a UN peacekeeping mission, Dr Oksamytna argued that, “the prospects of a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia are unrealistic, especially considering the controversy surrounding the failed 1990s peace enforcement operation there”.173

Operation Atalanta

80.Major General Stickland told us that Operation Atalanta had been a success,174 contributing to the reduction in the number of successful Somali-based piracy attacks to zero in 2017.175 There were three reasons for this success. First, “counterpiracy is a non-contentious battlefield in that it has a demonstrable effect on trade and on people’s lives, so people can coalesce and co-operate very easily around it”.176

81.Second, the operation had developed “a partnership with industry”.177 This partnership was supported by the Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)—for which see Box 5. This partnership also included “industry getting involved in best management practice”, including “very simple things such as people having private security detachments on board ships, people not going through dangerous routes, people not going slowly to save fuel but going at a faster speed, and having barbed wire on the sides of their ships”.178

Box 5: The Maritime Security Centre–Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)

MSCHOA179 is located at the Operational Headquarters of Operation Atalanta in Northwood. MSCHOA provides 24-hour manned monitoring of vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden, and provides an interactive website to communicate the latest anti-piracy guidance to the maritime industry, on which shipping companies and operators are strongly encouraged to register their vessels’ movements through the region.180

Through its website, the MSCHOA runs the Mercury Chat, through which civil merchant ships can be in direct contact with staff at the Operation Atalanta Operation HQ in Northwood. Major General Stickland told us that, through Mercury, “ships can be given threat warnings and warnings about other things that are going on at sea to try to keep up the situational awareness of ships at sea. Every month, about 14,000 ships and organisations register with MSCHOA.”181

The MSCHOA has also issued a best management practices guide for protection against Somalia-based piracy, which includes information on what action to take should a vessel come under attack. A further initiative is the introduction of group transits, which means that vessels are co-ordinated to transit together through the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, which makes transit safer and allows for military forces to precede the group.182

82.The third reason for the success of Operation Atalanta was “the legal finish”, which was “something that Atalanta has that others [such as the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain and the NATO counterpiracy operation Ocean Shield183] do not”. This meant that “rather than capturing people at sea and then releasing them … we can now see people going through a legal process under the Seychelles government and being transferred into Somali jails”. This served as a “really powerful deterrent”,184 and had led to the arrests of 166 pirates since 2011.185 Mr Ahern agreed that the EU’s ability to use the legal finish was something NATO “certainly cannot” do, showing that there was “value to a CSDP mission”.186

83.Another advantage was that Operation Atalanta was “the only operation that is allowed to operate in Somali internal waters”.187 This enabled Atalanta “to do capacity building and engagements on the land with coastal communities and is something that other missions do not have”.188 Major General Stickland thought that the EU had been able to negotiate access to Somali territorial waters because the EU Delegation in Somalia could “speak with one voice for the 28 nations to the Government”. This combination of “a military and civilian political perspective” was an advantage over the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), which was “very definitely a military alliance as opposed to a political alliance”.189

84.Dr Chappell and Dr Barrinha called Operation Atalanta “one of the most successful EU military operations”, which had had “a demonstrable impact on the prevalence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden”.190

EUCAP Somalia

85.EUCAP Somalia, Dr Ejdus told us, “had a much more ambitious and confusing mandate” than Operation Atalanta. He told us that the mission had originally been overambitious in design and scope, and suffered from low local buy-in.191 Mr Lapsley said it was “the least convincing of the three missions” in the Horn of Africa, and had “struggled at times to find the right role”.192 Following the re-focusing of the mission on Somalia, the opening of new offices in Hargeisa in Somaliland and in Garowe in Puntland in 2015, and the extension of its mandate in 2016, Dr Ejdus said that EUCAP Somalia had “achieved some really nice progress”. The new mandate had achieved greater local buy-in: “Somalis do not see piracy as their own problem; it is the problem of the West”, and so the new mandate had been extended to include “a wider range of maritime security issues, such as illegal fishing or illegal waste-dumping, and a whole set of other issues that are relevant for the locals”.193

86.Dr Ejdus said there was “very low Member State support” for the mission, giving as an example the number of advisers:

“In February last year … the mission had nine advisers in total, out of whom three were maritime advisors, which is the most important role in the mission. With three people you are trying to reform and build counterpiracy capacity in a country with 3,000km of coast. This is an extremely challenging situation, and the Member States should have provided more support.”194

87.Dr Ejdus said that “expectations are extremely high, and Member States expect quick results”, which encouraged “staff on the ground to reach for the so-called low-hanging fruit instead of investing in long-term capacity building”. He said that “it takes probably decades to build coastguards and coastal capacity to fight against piracy,” and “all that significantly hampered the effectiveness and local impact of the mission”. Nevertheless, he commended the staff of EUCAP Somalia for their efforts, who were “really doing their best in extremely difficult conditions in a country that is at war and is a failed state, and where coastguards basically do not have uniforms or buildings. It is an extremely challenging situation.”195

The comprehensive approach in the Horn of Africa

88.Dr Oksamytna said that one of the advantages to EUTM Somalia was that it was “part of the EU’s comprehensive approach” to the Horn of Africa, which included EUCAP Somalia and Operation Atalanta.196 Beyond the EU’s missions and operations in the Horn of Africa, the EU is a significant supporter of AMISOM, to which it “has provided €1.5 billion of financial support”.197 The EU has also contributed 60% of all humanitarian aid to Somalia.198 Mr Lapsley said that the EU’s financial contribution to AMISOM and the UN peacekeeping mission had been “more important than the missions”. It was “not unfair to say that the EU has kept AMISOM afloat financially over the last couple of years. That is the most important thing.”199

89.Brigadier General Aherne, in contrast, said that “a key strategic challenge of EUTM S[omalia] was the non-alignment within the EU of the political, diplomatic and military aims of the Mission, both at Brussels level, within the Horn of Africa Region, and in Somalia”. In his view, this was due to the EEAS being “unwilling or unable to robustly achieve coordination of the much-vaunted EU’s Comprehensive Approach”.200

Conclusions and recommendations

90.CSDP missions and operations are relatively limited in scale, compared to those of the UN or NATO. CSDP missions tend to focus on lower-intensity crisis management, such as capacity building, reform and training.

91.CSDP missions and operations have often been slow to produce results. This has, in part, been a consequence of the challenging and often unstable environments in which they operate—such as Kosovo and Somalia.

92.Nonetheless, since the first deployment in 2003, CSDP missions and operations have made a meaningful contribution to EU foreign policy priorities, including the strengthening of the rule of law, security sector reform, conflict prevention, and the tackling of piracy.

93.Participation in military CSDP missions and operations has also contributed to operational collaboration between the Member States.

94.The key competitive advantage of CSDP missions and operations, when compared to those conducted by NATO or the UN, is the EU’s ability to draw together military, political, diplomatic, economic and legal lines of operation in a comprehensive approach. EULEX Kosovo and Operation Atalanta are striking examples of this. Effective co-ordination both among the EU institutions and among the Member States is, however, sometimes problematic.

95.One CSDP operation has been a particular success: Operation Atalanta has contributed to the dramatic fall in piracy in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden.

96.Although established by unanimity, CSDP missions and operations do not always enjoy strong support from the Member States, which have differing priorities and often look for short-term results to complex challenges. Securing the requisite number of assets and appropriately skilled personnel for missions and operations is a longstanding problem.

10 The Treaty of Brussels established the Western Union. EEAS, ‘Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy’: [accessed 30 April 2018]

11 The European Defence Community was proposed in 1950 by René Pleven, French Premier and former Defence Minister. The so-called Pleven Plan proposed the creation of a European army, with the eventual involvement of West German units, to be placed under a single military and political European authority. Although the proposal was accepted by most Western countries, concerns about German rearmament and the supranational control of forces remained, particularly in France. The proposal was rejected by the French National Assembly in August 1954. CVCE, ‘The failure of the European Defence Community (EDC)’: [accessed 30 April 2018] and Daniel Fiott, ‘European Defence, 60 years after the Treaty of Rome’, European Defence Matters (2017): [accessed 30 April 2018]

12 The founding members of the WEU were the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and Germany. The WEU replaced the Western Union.

13 EUR-Lex, ‘Collective Defence’: [accessed 30 April 2018]

14 The six Member States were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

15 The Maastricht Treaty established the European Union, based on three pillars. The first pillar included the European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community. The second pillar was the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the third pillar covered provisions on police and judicial co-operation.

16 CVCE, EU Treaty—Article J.4 (Maastricht, 7 February 1992) (27 September 2012): [accessed 30 April 2018]

17 Ibid.

19 Peter Ricketts, ‘The EU and Defence—The Legacy of Saint-Malo’, RUSI Journal, vol .2, 163 (28 July 2017): [accessed 30 April 2018]

20 Ibid., p 32

21 The only CSDP operation to be deployed under the Berlin Plus Agreement is Operation Althea, which is discussed later in this chapter.

22 From 2000 onwards, the WEU institutions and tasks were successively integrated into the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and the WEU ceased to exist on 30 June 2011. In 2011, the WEU had ten members: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. EU accession candidates became observers before their joining the EU, and Iceland, Norway and Turkey were invited to become associated members of the WEU.

24 Peter Ricketts, ‘The EU and Defence—The Legacy of Saint-Malo’, RUSI Journal, vol .2, 163 (28 July 2017): [accessed 30 April 2018]

25 EEAS, EU Missions and Operations (5 March 2018): [accessed 30 April 2018]

26 EEAS, ‘Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy’, (8 July 2016): [accessed 30 April 2018]

28 EEAS, EU Missions and Operations (5 March 2018): [accessed 30 April 2018]

29 There are some exceptions, for instance when the Council adopts decisions implementing an EU decision or for some decisions relating to the European Defence Agency (EDA) and Permanent Structured Co-operation (PESCO), where decisions are taken by qualified majority voting. These cases do not apply to CSDP missions and operations.

32 Q 1; see also Box 1.

34 Written evidence from SaferGlobe (BSD0007). See also written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005).

35 Written evidence from Dr Laura Chappell and Dr André Barrinha (BSD0004)

36 Written evidence from Agora Think Tank (BSD0006)

38 Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)

39 Written evidence from Dr Laura Chappell and Dr André Barrinha (BSD0004)

40 Ibid.

43 Q 3 (Angus Lapsley)

44 Q 22 (Dr Nicholas Wright)

46 According to the Ministry of Defence: “The EU planning methodology is very similar to that of NATO, and the outputs include a concept of operations (CONOPS) and operation plans (OPLANs), and ultimately generate, direction, deployment, sustainment and recovery of a joint force. The EU process is, however, initially more ‘linear’ than NATO’s, which can conduct operations planning in parallel at various levels. This is principally due to the decision not to establish a permanent EU command structure that would duplicate NATO. Hence subordinate levels of command have to be established for a particular operation before planning in parallel can commence. Efforts to streamline the process, for example, by designating an operation commander and operation headquarters early, are used as much as possible.” Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 01—UK Joint Operations Doctrine (November 2014) p 95: [accessed 30 April 2018]

47 Q 89. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) meets at ambassadorial level as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its main functions are keeping track of the international situation, and helping to define policies within the CFSP, including the CSDP. It prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic direction. It meets twice a week, and more often if necessary. EEAS, ‘CSDP structure, instrument, and agencies’ (8 July 2016): [accessed 30 April 2018] and Council of the European Union, ‘Political and Security Committee (PSC)’: [accessed 30 April 2018]

48 The EU Military Committee (EUMC) comprises the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States. They are regularly represented by their permanent Military Representatives. The EUMC provides the PSC with “advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU”. EEAS, ‘European Union Military Committee (EUMC)’: [accessed 30 April 2018]

49 The Politico-Military Group “carries out preparatory work in the field of CSDP for the Political and Security Committee”. This includes “the political aspects of EU military and civil-military issues, including concepts, capabilities and operations and missions.” Council of the European Union, ‘Politico-Military Group’: [accessed 30 April 2018]

50 Q 5 (Angus Lapsley)

52 Q 89 (Pierre Vimont)

54 Q 89 (Pierre Vimont)

55 European Security and Defence College, Handbook on CSDP—The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, Third edition (18 May 2017), p 80: [accessed 30 April 2018]

57 EEAS, ‘CSDP structure, instruments and agencies’ (8 July 2016): [accessed 30 April 2018] and European Security and Defence College, Handbook on CSDP—The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, Third edition (18 May 2017): [accessed 30 April 2018]

58 Q 89 (Pierre Vimont)

60 89 (Pierre Vimont)

61 Operation Plan.

63 Frame, Case study: Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (31 May 2016), p 91: [accessed 30 April 2018]

65 European Security and Defence College, Handbook on CSDP—The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, Third edition (18 May 2017) p 81: [accessed 30 April 2018]

66 Q 89 (Pierre Vimont)

67 Q 5 (Angus Lapsley)

68 Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)

69 Q 89 (Pierre Vimont)

70 Frame, Case study: Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (31 May 2016), p 100: [accessed 30 April 2018]; Q 52 (Major General Charlie Stickland)

71 European Security and Defence College, Handbook on CSDP—The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, Third edition (18 May 2017), p 82: [accessed 30 April 2018]

72 Definitive adoption (EU, Euratom) 2018/251 of the European Union’s general budget for the financial year 2018—Title 19 Foreign Policy Instruments, 19 03 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), OJ L 57/1309 (28 February 2018)

73 Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)

74 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001) and European Parliamentary Research Service, Financing of CSDP missions and operations (February 2016) p 2: [accessed 30 April 2018]

75 Council of the European Union, ‘Athena—financing security and defence military operations’: [accessed 30 April 2018]

76 European Parliamentary Research Service, Financing of CSDP missions and operations (February 2016) p 2: [accessed 30 April 2018]

77 Written evidence from SaferGlobe (BSD0007)

82 Q 73 (Lord Ricketts)

84 Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)

85 Q 17 (Dr Nicholas Wright)

86 Force generation is a negotiation over the resources pledged by Member States to CSDP missions and operations.

87 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)

88 Written evidence from Dr Laura Chappell and Dr André Barrinha (BSD0004)

89 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)

91 Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)

92 Q 63 (Dr Filip Ejdus)

93 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)

94 EULEX Kosovo’s current mandate was established by Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/947 of 14 June 2016 amending Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), OJ L 157/26 (15 June 2016)

95 UN Security Council, Resolution 1244 (1999) (10 June 1999): [accessed 30 April 2018]

96 EEAS, ‘What is EULEX?’:,16 [accessed 30 April 2018]

97 Personnel numbers include both international and local staff.

98 Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)

99 Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)

102 Written evidence from Dr Andi Hoxhaj (BSD0002)

104 Q 59 (Dr Filip Ejdus)

108 Q 60 (Dr Filip Ejdus)

110 Ibid.

111 Written evidence from Dr Andrea Lorenzo Capussela (BSD0008)

113 Written evidence from Dr Andrea Lorenzo Capussela (BSD0008)

116 Written evidence from Dr Andrea Lorenzo Capussela (BSD0008)

117 The five EU Member States that do not recognise Kosovo’s independence are Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain.

118 Q 61 (Dr Filip Ejdus)

119 Q 60 (Dr An Jacobs)

120 61 (Dr Filip Ejdus)

123 The aim of the EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo is “to promote co-operation”, support their “progress on the path to Europe” and improve the lives of the population. The high-level dialogue is also supported by the work of experts in the tri-partite implementation working groups. EEAS, ‘Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina’ (15 June 2016): [accessed 30 April 2018]

124 Q 59 (Dr An Jacobs)

125 Ibid.

127 Q 61 (Dr Filip Ejdus)

128 Q 59 (Dr An Jacobs)

130 EUFOR Althea’s initial mandate was established by Council Decision 2004/803/CFSP of 25 November 2004 on the launching of the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, OJ L 353/21 (27 November 2004)

131 EEAS, EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA) (January 2015): [accessed 30 April 2018]

132 Q 30 (General Sir Adrian Bradshaw) and EEAS, EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA) (January 2015): [accessed 30 April 2018]

133 EEAS, European Union Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations—annual report 2017 (2017) p 27: [accessed 30 April 2018]

134 Q 27 (General Sir Adrian Bradshaw)

135 Q 26 and EEAS, ‘Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy’ (8 July 2016): [accessed 30 April 2018]

136 Q 30 (General Sir Adrian Bradshaw)

137 EEAS, European Union Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations—annual report 2017 (2017) p 27: [accessed 30 April 2018] and written evidence from Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)

138 UN, ‘Adopting Resolution 2384 (2017), Security Council Renews Authorization of Multinational Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (7 November 2017): [accessed 30 April 2018] and written evidence from Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)

140 NATO, ‘Leadership Staff’: [accessed 30 April 2018]

141 Q 27 (General Sir Adrian Bradshaw)

142 Q 31. He did, however, point to ongoing problems between the EU and NATO, as a result of the dispute between Turkey and Cyprus. He said this situation meant that the Berlin Plus mechanism “is not allowed to be applied to future situations.”

145 Q 29 (General Sir Adrian Bradshaw)

147 Q 27 (General Sir Adrian Bradshaw)

148 Under the authority of the United Nations (UN Security Council Resolution 1244), NATO has been leading a peace support operation in Kosovo since 12 June 1999 in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the area. NATO, ‘Mission’: [accessed 30 April 2018]

150 EUTM Somalia’s current mandate was established by Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP of 15 February 2010 on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces, OJ L 44/16 (19 February 2010). See also Political and Security Committee Decision EUTM Somalia/2/2011 of 6 December 2011 on the establishment of the Committee of Contributors for the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia) (2011/814/CFSP), OJ L 324/34 (7 December 2011)

151 EUTM Somalia, ‘EUTM Somalia in Figures’: [accessed 30 April 2018]

152 Ibid.

153 Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)

154 Ibid.

155 Operation Atalanta’s current mandate was established by Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2082 of 28 November 2016 amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, OJ L 321/53 (29 November 2016).

156 EEAS, European Union Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations—annual report 2017 (2017) p 25: [accessed 30 April 2018]

157 Ibid.

158 EEAS, European Union Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations—annual report 2017 (2017): [accessed 30 April 2018]. In April 2018 it had 375 personnel. This is due to the seasonal nature of the piracy threat. The operation scales up when piracy is expected to be higher (in good sea conditions). Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)

159 EEAS, ‘Mission’: [accessed 30 April 2018]

160 Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)

161 Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP of 16 July 2012 on the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR), OJ L 187/40 (17 July 2012)

162 EEAS, EU capacity building mission in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia) (August 2017): [accessed 30 April 2018]

163 Ibid.

164 Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013). The authorised strength of the mission is 165. EEAS, EU capacity building mission in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia) (August 2017): [accessed 30 April 2018]

165 Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)

166 Written evidence from Brigadier General Gerald Aherne (BSD0011)

168 Written evidence from Dr Kseniya Oksamytna (BSD0009)

171 Written evidence from Dr Kseniya Oksamytna (BSD0009)

172 Written evidence from Brigadier General Gerald Aherne (BSD0011)

173 Written evidence from Dr Kseniya Oksamytna (BSD0009)

175 EEAS, European Union Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations—annual report 2017 (2017), p 25: [accessed 30 April 2018] Please also refer to Box 4 earlier in this chapter.

177 Q 42 (Major General Charlie Stickland)

178 Q 42 (Major General Charlie Stickland)

179 Established and operated under the auspices of Operation Atalanta (see Box 4).

180 Q 41 (Major General Charlie Stickland)

182 The Maritime Security Centre—Horn of Africa, ‘About MSCHOA and OP ATALANTA’: [accessed 30 April 2018]

183 The CMF is a multinational naval partnership and consists of 32 member nations. It mainly focuses on defeating terrorism, preventing piracy, encouraging regional co-operation, and promoting a safe maritime environment. It includes three Combined Task Forces: CTF 150 (Maritime Security Operations and Counter-Terrorism), CTF 151 (Counter Piracy), and CTF 152 (Maritime Security Operations in the Arabian Gulf). NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, which patrolled the seas off the Horn of Africa as part of a wider international effort, ran from 2009 to 2016.

184 Q 42 (Major General Charlie Stickland)

185 Ibid.

187 Q 46 (Major General Charlie Stickland). A country’s internal waters refers to a belt of coastal waters extending 12 nautical miles from the baseline of a coastal state, as established by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UN, ‘Part II—Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone’: [accessed 30 April 2018]

188 Q 46 (Major General Charlie Stickland)

190 Written evidence from Dr Laura Chappell and Dr André Barrinha (BSD0004)

194 Ibid.

195 Q 67 (Dr Filip Ejdus)

196 Written evidence from Dr Kseniya Oksamytna (BSD0009)

197 Written evidence from Dr Kseniya Oksamytna (BSD0009). The EU has so far provided more than €1.3 billion to AMISOM, which was expected to reach €1.5 billion by the end of 2017. European Commission, ‘EU reinforces cooperation with the African Union and announces new peace building support of €120 million’: [accessed 30 April 2018] The EU has yet to disclose what funding it will provide to AMISOM after 2018. European Union Institute for Security Studies, ‘The impact of new funding uncertainties on AMISOM’ (7 March 2018): [accessed 30 April 2018]

198 Written evidence from Dr Kseniya Oksamytna (BSD0009)

200 Written evidence from Brigadier General Gerald Aherne (BSD0011)

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