Chapter 3: UK-EU cooperation
43.Not only does much of the UK’s biosecurity legislation derive from the EU, but many of the systems used to maintain biosecurity are shared EU systems. Biosecurity professionals across the EU benefit from formal and informal opportunities to work together. When the UK leaves the EU, it will not have the same access to these systems and networks.
Why cooperation is important
44.Many of the organisations who gave evidence to this inquiry stressed the importance of continued biosecurity cooperation with the EU. Wildlife and Countryside Link told us that “regardless of the nature of the UK’s future relationship with the EU, cooperation on biosecurity matters must continue to the greatest possible extent”,51 a view shared by Fera Science Ltd, Anglian Water Services and the British Veterinary Association.52
45.The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) agreed: “The aim of the UK Government is the broadest and deepest possible partnership with the EU … Collaboration in this area strengthens the biosecurity of both the UK and the EU.”53
46.The key reason cited for continuing biosecurity cooperation was, as the Minister said, “because disease and pests have no respect for borders”54—our geographical proximity to the EU means many biosecurity risks are shared. The Royal Botanic Garden Edinburgh told us that northward migration due to climate change, compounded by substantial movement of animals due to human activity, means the EU “remains a likely source of future pests and pathogens”.55
47.Continued trade with the EU underlines the case for biosecurity cooperation. Dr Rob Amos and Dr Emily Lydgate from the University of Sussex stated: “Given that the UK intends to retain strong trading links, and that commercial trade is one of the identified common pathways through which invasive alien species spread, a shared approach between the UK and EU to biosecurity is essential post-Brexit.”56
48.Fera summarised the position as follows:
“Plant pests and pathogens are no respecters of borders. Recent evidence has strongly suggested that ash dieback did reach the UK naturally (i.e. as windborne spores), as well as via the trade in young trees. Whatever the political settlement, the UK cannot escape its geography and its proximity to continental Europe, with the natural airborne spread of pests and disease posing a very real threat. Even without this, ongoing travel and trade with Europe will provide major pathways for transmission post-Brexit and even with effective (or indeed improved) border controls, biosecurity is not guaranteed. Hence it is vital we retain strong links with our European neighbours and where possible a joined-up, regional approach to preventing the spread of non-indigenous pests and pathogens.”57
49.Given geographical proximity and the volume of trade and travel between the UK and the EU, continued cooperation is critical to the UK’s future biosecurity.
Shared intelligence
50.Many organisations emphasised the biosecurity benefit of the formal and informal information sharing that takes place between EU Member States, and expressed concern that this would be weakened or lost when the UK leaves the EU.
51.The NFU told us: “Surveillance information is integral to informing the plans to prevent, eliminate and eradicate disease—an array of surveillance information is shared formally and informally via the EU, and the UK could miss out on this vital resource.”58 The Scottish Government and the Equine Disease Coalition and British Equine Veterinary Association agreed.59
52.The value of shared intelligence was also recognised in Defra’s evidence: “The Government considers it mutually beneficial for the UK and the EU to continue to work jointly or share information, including surveillance and evidence around biosecurity.”60
Disease notification systems
53.The UK currently benefits from EU-wide alerts on diseases and pests that may pose biosecurity risks, through access to the Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS), the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), the European Alien Species Notification System (EASIN NOTSYS) and the European Union Notification System for Plant Health Interceptions (EUROPHYT). These are outlined in Box 4.
Box 4: ADNS, RASFF, EASIN NOTSYS and EUROPHYT
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ADNS The EU’s Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS) registers and documents the development of infectious animal diseases. Member States are responsible for supplying ADNS with information on outbreaks; a notification is issued to all countries that participate in the system within 24 hours when a new outbreak occurs, and a summary that includes details of how outbreaks are developing is sent weekly. As well as Member States, EU candidate (and potential candidate) countries, countries in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and countries with particular agreements with the EU (such as Andorra and the Faroe Islands) participate in ADNS. RASFF The Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) enables the swift exchange of information on health risks to food and feed. Once a member country notifies the Commission of a risk (posed either by a product on the market or by a consignment tested at an EU border), that information is transmitted to all other RASFF members. Members then report back on investigations or other actions they undertake as a result of the alert. All EU Member States and three of the four EFTA countries are members;61 Switzerland is a partial member, receiving notifications on border rejections. RASFF also has an online database that allows members of the public to access summary information on notifications. EASIN NOTSYS The European Alien Species Notification System (EASIN NOTSYS) is the tool used by Member States to notify the Commission and other Members of new detections of species on the list of Union concern, and the related eradication measures taken. EUROPHYT The European Union Notification System for Plant Health Interceptions (EUROPHYT) is the notification and rapid alert system for interceptions (for plant health reasons) of consignments being imported into the EU or traded between Member States. Members (EU Member States and Switzerland) enter data about non-compliant consignments into the database, which then immediately notifies all other members. These are stored in a database that all members can access. The European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation (EPPO) does not have full access to the database but receives regular information on notifications; monthly overviews are available to the general public. |
Source: European Commission, ‘Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS)’: https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/animal-diseases/not-system_en [accessed 13 August 2018]; European Commission, Questions and Answers: Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (August 2017): http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-2461_en.htm [accessed 13 August 2018]; European Commission, ‘EASIN Notification System (NOTSYS)’: https://easin.jrc.ec.europa.eu/notsys [accessed 13 August 2018]; European Commission, ‘European Union Notification System for Plant Health Interceptions: EUROPHYT’: https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/plant_health_biosecurity/europhyt_en [accessed 13 August 2018]
54.Witnesses were keen to remain part of these systems. For example, the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board (AHDB) and the Moredun Research Institute both thought the UK would benefit from remaining in RASFF.62 Dr Simon Doherty, Junior Vice-President of the British Veterinary Association (BVA), told us the BVA hoped “we could look at negotiating a position similar to Norway, Switzerland and Turkey, who have access to that Animal Disease Notification System without being members of the EU”.63 And in relation to EASIN NOTSYS the RSPB said:
“If the UK does not retain access to this system, and a similar system is not put in its place, following a UK withdrawal from the EU; then the UK will be reliant on informal communication between government officials. A process which is likely to be neither rigorous nor timely, and wholly dependent on the personal relationships of individual officials.”64
55.Simon Hall, Director for EU Exit and Trade at the Animal and Plant Health Agency, told us that these systems “are available to countries outside the EU so there is every reason to believe that we would continue to be able to participate”.65 In terms of negotiating that access, however, he told us: “To my knowledge, the negotiations in Brussels have reached nowhere near that level of detail yet.”66 The Minister added a note of caution, noting that these systems were “EU-owned and we will no longer be a member of the EU”. He continued: “We will also make sure that we have developed fallback positions on immediate loss of access.”67
56.Defra told us that these databases had “significant publicly available elements” that they intended to continue to access if the UK were no longer part of the EU’s notification systems.68 Chief Veterinary Officer Dr Christine Middlemiss and Chief Plant Health Officer Professor Nicola Spence warned, however, that this might mean the UK would not receive notifications “as quickly as we currently do as a Member State”.69
57.As an EU Member State, the UK currently receives pest and disease notifications that assist in maintaining the UK’s biosecurity. While EU notifications are often made publicly available, relying on this after we leave the EU would mean the UK receiving notifications more slowly than it currently does as a Member State.
58.We urge the Government therefore to seek continued participation in EU disease notification systems. Detailed provision also needs to be made for how the UK could maintain its biosecurity without full access to these systems. With only months to go before the UK leaves the EU, it is concerning that these provisions are not already in place.
International notification systems
59.A number of non-EU organisations play a part in biosecurity information sharing and disease notification. The Woodland Trust stated: “The UK can remain a member of plant protection organisations post-Brexit, most notably the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization (EPPO). This will ensure that the UK will remain up to date on potential biosecurity threats.”70 The British Veterinary Association (BVA) told us:
“The UK will continue to have access to the OIE [World Organisation for Animal Health] international surveillance system and alerts through the World Animal Health Information System, better known as WAHIS, an internet-based computer system that processes data on animal diseases in real-time and then informs the international community.”71
Fera suggested the UK should engage with the International Plant Sentinel Network, which “provides international connectivity and cooperation, as well as a mechanism for early warning and horizon scanning of future risks”.72
60.The Government also emphasised the UK’s ability to draw on non-EU mechanisms, explaining that information on animal health was already taken from “a variety of sources including the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and the International Society for Infectious Diseases (ProMed)”.73 It described the EPPO as a “strong and effective intergovernmental non-EU organisation … [that] has always played an essential role in risk assessment, intelligence gathering/sharing and setting standards”.74
61.The Scottish Government, on the other hand, warned that “OIE systems are in no way equivalent to those available to EU Member States”.75 Dr Simon Doherty of the BVA suggested the data in the OIE’s/ WAHIS system might not give the full picture: “You can imagine a situation where countries may be less willing to report something if there were going to be restrictions on their trade.”76
62.If the UK is unable to maintain access to the EU’s disease notification systems, it will be able to draw on international sources of information. It is not clear, however, whether these would enable the UK to maintain its current level of biosecurity.
TRACES
Box 5: Trade Control and Expert System (TRACES)
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All animals, plants, food, feed, semen and embryo traded within, or imported into, the EU have to be accompanied by documentation. TRACES is an online tool that manages this process. The required documentation is posted on TRACES in advance, pre-notifying countries that the consignment is due to arrive and allowing them to plan their controls in advance. Border control staff then check the consignments and certification. As well as speeding up the process, it allows all consignments to be traced. This makes it easier to respond to any disease outbreaks or other health threats. |
Source: European Commission, ‘TRAde Control and Expert System’: https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/traces_en [accessed 14 August 2018; European Commission, ‘How does TRACES work’: https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/traces/how-does-traces-work_en [accessed 14 August 2018]
63.Trade is an important factor in the movement of biosecurity risks, and witnesses highlighted the importance of TRACES in documenting such movements within the EU. The Dogs Trust told us that it “is invaluable when animals have to be traced as a result of disease outbreak”.77 The City of London Corporation stated: “The UK should seek to maintain access to this system. An equivalent system would be costly, and it is uncertain whether it would provide consistency with the EU due to a lower level of intelligence, with TRACES rejections not communicated to UK authorities.”78
64.There was uncertainty over whether continuing UK access after Brexit would be possible. The Dogs Trust told us that “the European Commission has made clear that access to TRACES is only permissible if a country is a member of the single market”,79 and the NFU agreed: “It can only be used by Member States to track livestock and only covers EU countries.”80 The Ornamental Aquatic Trade Association, however, believed that non-EU states such as Singapore had access to these system, “so there is reason to believe the same could apply to the UK”.81
65.Simon Hall, of the Animal and Plant Health Agency, told us: “Development of that new British-owned and operated import control system to replace some of the functions of the EU TRACES system is going ahead because it will be needed and of benefit regardless of the precise sequence of events.”82 The Minister confirmed that work on a replacement system had started, and that £5.2 million had already been spent.83
66.The ability to trace the movements of animals and plants (and plant and animal products) is an important component of biosecurity.
67.We note that work has already begun to create a UK replacement for the EU’s TRACES system. Given the crucial role the system plays in minimising the biosecurity risks of trade and managing a disease outbreak when it occurs, it is crucial that the replacement system is ready by the time the UK leaves the EU in March 2019.
68.Given that a stand-alone UK system would not benefit from the EU-wide intelligence contained in TRACES, the Government should also explore the potential to link a UK system to TRACES.
The Working Party of Chief Veterinary Officers
69.The Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board highlighted the role of the Working Party of Chief Veterinary Officers:
“The involvement of the UK Chief Veterinary Officer in the [EU] Working Party of Chief Veterinary Officers is very important … If not present at this meeting there will only be access to official reports from the group which will lack the nuances in the discussion and the informal briefings in the margins. The effects of not being involved directly should not be underestimated.”84
The National Pig Association and the Dogs Trust were also keen that the UK continue to be part of the Working Party post-Brexit.85
70.Defra’s Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Christine Middlemiss, told us: “Depending on what deal transpires, we will have different levels of access to the EU CVOs network. For example, Switzerland and Norway attend for certain parts of the EU CVOs’ monthly meeting presently.”86
71.We call on the Government to seek continued involvement in the Working Party of Chief Veterinary Officers (and the Working Party of Chief Plant Health Officers), so that both formal and informal biosecurity information sharing can continue.
Risk assessment and risk management
72.In the words of the Chair of the Food Standards Agency (FSA), Heather Hancock, risk assessment is “the science that identifies and assesses the nature [of the risk]”, while risk management “takes that scientific assessment, factors in other relevant issues, such as consumer interests, and identifies the potential prevention and control measures that could be used to manage the risk”.87 Both functions are currently undertaken at EU level:
“The process starts with the European Food Safety Authority, EFSA, undertaking and publishing a scientific risk assessment. Officials in the European Commission take that risk assessment and propose draft legislation to implement an appropriate risk management decision. That proposal is then discussed at the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed.”88
Most decisions are agreed by the Standing Committee, with the European Council and Parliament being consulted “only on the most sensitive issues”.89
73.Defra told us the UK “will still have access to the EFSA assessments through their public access website”,90 though Dr Middlemiss said that this would lead to “a delay”.91 The British Veterinary Association (BVA) were also concerned that the UK would lose “early notification on assessments”.92 Chief Plant Health Officer Professor Nicola Spence suggested this delay might be mitigated, at least in relation to plant health, by the UK’s membership of EPPO: “I would expect anything significant would be shared quickly with EPPO.”93
74.In addition to the potential for delay, some witnesses suggested EFSA risk assessments would become less useful to the UK post-Brexit. The BVA noted that “EFSA reports may not include UK data”,94 and Professor Guy Poppy, of the FSA, suggested the UK might not be able to access “the underpinning data that it [EFSA] has used”, making EFSA less useful in informing UK risk management decisions.95
75.Dr Emily Lydgate, lecturer in environmental law at the University of Sussex, told us: “We could elect to have third country status in EFSA and continue to participate … but that would require—the relevant legislation spells this out—that we have adopted and applied relevant legislation in this field. We would need to adopt the EU acquis in this area.”96
76.Most witnesses assumed the UK would not retain membership of EFSA and shared the British Ecological Society’s view that “biosecurity risk assessments will need to be conducted by the UK post-Brexit”.97 Professor Poppy told us that the FSA already had “statutory powers related to risk assessment”,98 and Defra explained that “we already carry out our own risk assessments” for issues specific to the UK.99
77.The British Ecological Society, the National Pig Association and the British Veterinary Association were among the organisations to flag the importance of additional resource to enable the UK to meet the increased need for risk assessments.100 Professor Poppy told us that the FSA was “receiving significant amounts of money in terms of staff increase … to be able to undertake risk assessments within the UK”,101 but added that it was having problems recruiting enough chemical toxicologists. Defra told us: “Analysis is ongoing to assess if there are any resource challenges associated with this.”102
78.In relation to risk management, as we noted in Chapter 2, the UK Government will also need to grant the appropriate legal powers to whichever body or bodies it wishes to undertake this function. Heather Hancock of the FSA told us that her organisation has “proposed that the FSA should have the power to make risk management decisions”,103 supported by a new advisory committee. She said Ministers supported this suggestion: “The only area now for discussion is that we are not yet clear how we would get the power to do that.”104
79.Assessing the risks posed by various biosecurity threats, and then deciding on an appropriate response, are functions currently undertaken predominantly at EU level. Post-Brexit, the UK will no longer be able to rely on the EU’s risk assessment and risk management expertise. We urge the Government to ensure that the relevant UK bodies are adequately resourced, and have the necessary legal powers, to undertake these functions from March 2019.
Research collaboration
80.The Microbiology Society told us:
“UK-EU collaboration on microbiological research is important for preparing for and responding to threats for animal, plant and foodborne pathogens … Microbiologists in the UK benefit from and contribute expertise to: EU research funding programmes and networks … and EU advisory and regulatory bodies.”105
81.The Society for Applied Microbiology agreed that “UK-based scientists and experts play a significant role in informing and influencing the work of EU agencies”, adding that “UK-based experts made up 13% of the population of EFSA’s Scientific Panels in the period 2009–2018”.106 The Society suggested “these collaborations … function as a conduit of soft power”.107
82.Dr Simon Doherty, of the British Veterinary Association, who was a veterinary research officer at the Agri-Food and Biosciences Institute in Belfast (AFBI) when the Schmallenberg virus appeared in 2012, highlighted the importance of cooperation between research institutes in biosecurity:
“It was a completely new virus of a type which had not been seen in northern Europe before … We were in a situation at AFBI where, because of research collaborations that we had been involved in through European funding mechanisms, we were able to pick up the phone and drop an email to the Friedrich-Loeffler Institut, and, literally within days, we were able to get the primers and probes to set up a diagnostic test in Belfast to be prepared for—or at least screen samples for—the possibility that that virus had reached UK shores.”108
83.The Equine Disease Coalition and British Equine Veterinary Association were confident that this cooperation would continue post-Brexit: “Contact between reference laboratories and global links with other laboratories and institutions carrying out disease surveillance will continue.”109
84.Other organisations, however, had concerns. The Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board, for example, stated:
“It also remains to be seen whether UK involvement in more informal groupings of laboratories and research workers will be affected by leaving the EU. Research organisations outside the EU can and do participate in European projects but often need to find their own source funding … There is also a risk that by not participating in the efficient network of laboratory expertise available within Europe that the capability in British laboratories and universities will degrade over time.”110
85.The Microbiology Society told us:
“The Government should swiftly clarify and ensure future collaboration with these infrastructures and, where necessary, strengthen national capacity. It is of national biosecurity importance to act to maintain and promote access and reciprocity of internationally available microbial strains, DNA collections and other data, so the UK research community can continue to effectively study these global threats.”111
86.The importance of EU research funding was highlighted by an analysis by Fera of 14 EU and European Food Safety Authority plant and bee health projects. It found that “for every £1 Defra invested in top-up funding, it leveraged access to £51 of total funding”.112
87.The UK Government has proposed “a science and innovation accord” with the EU, which would provide for continuing UK participation in some EU research funding programmes, and establish “channels for regular dialogue between regulators, researchers and experts”.113 It is not yet known whether the EU will accept this proposal or, if it does, the extent of the funding programmes that would be included.
88.Collaborative work with researchers from across the EU strengthens the UK’s biosecurity knowledge and expertise and can be an effective channel for informal information sharing.
89.We note that the Government’s proposal for the future UK-EU relationship includes continued cooperation on research and participation in EU research funding programmes, and we welcome this inclusion. Given that such an agreement cannot be guaranteed, however, we call on the Government to evaluate the impact on the UK’s biosecurity of any loss of joint EU research funding and to ensure alternative sources of funding are available to mitigate any risks identified.
EU Reference Laboratories
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The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) has a network of designated Reference Laboratories. Each is responsible for a named disease, on which it then acts as a source of expertise, recommending diagnostic methods and vaccines, providing testing facilities, undertaking research, collecting data and providing training to OIE member countries. OIE Reference Laboratories in the UK include the Pirbright Institute, the Animal and Plant Health Agency and the Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science. The EU also has a network of National Reference Laboratories, coordinated by EU Reference Laboratories, which fulfil a similar purpose to OIE Reference Laboratories and are often the same institutions. These aim to ensure expertise is shared and standards are harmonised. |
Source: World Organisation for Animal Health, ‘Reference Laboratories’: http://www.oie.int/scientific-expertise/reference-laboratories/terms-of-reference/ [accessed 14 August 2018]; World Organisation for Animal Health, ‘Reference Experts and Laboratories’: http://www.oie.int/scientific-expertise/reference-laboratories/list-of-laboratories/ [accessed 14 August 2018]; European Commission, ‘EU Reference Laboratories’: https://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/official_controls/legislation/ref-labs_en [accessed 14 August 2018]
90.EU Reference Laboratories (EURLs), as described in Box 6, are funded by the EU, and provide scientific and technical expertise to support the European Commission’s risk assessment and risk management activities. Dr Christine Middlemiss, the Chief Veterinary Officer, told us that the UK had “seven EU Reference Laboratories designated by the EU as being the standard-setting Reference Laboratories”,114 all of which will move to the EU by the time the UK leaves. Dr Middlemiss acknowledged that some personnel might be lost from these laboratories, but stated that the intention was to increase the number of UK institutions that are designated as reference laboratories by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), to “make up for that gap”.115
91.Dr Simon Doherty of the British Veterinary Association was confident that that recognised global expertise would mean cooperation with EURLs would continue:
“[EURLs] are still going to rely on the global reference laboratories that we maintain here, and the expertise we have … We have tremendous expertise in foot and mouth disease, African swine fever and highly pathogenic influenza, without even having those diseases in the country. That is not going to go away.”116
92.This was borne out by evidence from one of the UK’s EURLs, the Pirbright Institute:
“Pirbright is the EU Reference Laboratory for FMD [foot and mouth disease] and bluetongue, but it has already been announced that Pirbright will lose this status on Brexit … Pirbright will, of course, continue to be the UK National Capability with its diagnostic reference laboratory services, and its status as OIE/FAO World Reference Laboratory for FMD, bluetongue and other viruses does not currently appear to be in jeopardy. Pirbright will continue to maintain and develop its reference laboratory capability by collaborating with the new EU Reference Laboratories for FMD and bluetongue, as well as the global bodies OIE and FAO.”117
93.Dr Doherty was concerned, however, that losing EURL status could result in a loss of funding for those institutions:
“To maintain the national reference laboratory framework and the OIE reference laboratory framework at APHA, Weybridge, Pirbright and so on, we will need to ensure those are properly resourced. We should bear in mind the gap in that funding with EU status being taken away.”118
The Society for Applied Microbiology noted that “activities related to the FAO and OIE are not necessarily supported by additional funding, so in practice EU funding goes toward enabling this internationally relevant work”.119
94.With regard to ongoing UK collaboration with EURLs, the Society for Applied Microbiology told us:
“The EURL networks are open to non-EU countries, whose representatives may attend meetings and participate in group proficiency tests. Strong consideration should be given to this option for future UK-EU reference laboratory collaboration … The Society for Applied Microbiology recommends that HM Government make a strong commitment to maintain collaboration with the EURL network, and to provide additional support to UK NRLs to compensate for any loss in funding, or equivalent resource, as a result of losing EURL status.”120
95.When the UK leaves the EU, UK laboratories will lose EU Reference Laboratory status. They will also lose the funding associated with that status, so it is paramount that the Government ensures UK laboratories are adequately funded to enable them to provide the necessary level of expertise to maintain the UK’s biosecurity, and to support their continued work with other EU and international Reference Laboratories.
96.As Reference Laboratories all have their own disease specialisms, the Government needs to ensure that the international Reference Laboratory network it will be relying on covers the full range of diseases in which the UK has an interest.
Funding
97.We also heard concerns from the RSPB about access to funding for biosecurity activities. Dr Paul Walton of RSPB Scotland told us that “the EU LIFE funding stream is one of the very few biodiversity funding streams we can access” to fund work to tackle invasive non-native species.121 The EU LIFE programme is described in Box 7.
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The LIFE programme provides co-funding for environmental, nature conservation and climate action projects that contribute to EU policy objectives. Its budget for 2014–20 is €3.4 billion, and the European Commission has proposed this be increased by almost 60% in the 2021–27 budget. The programme allows for the possible participation of countries and activities outside the EU, where that is necessary to achieve the EU’s goals. |
Source: European Commission, ‘Welcome to LIFE’: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/ [accessed 14 August 2018]
98.In their written evidence, the RSPB stated:
“The UK receives c. £31 million per year from LIFE. Among other actions for improving the environment, LIFE funds large-scale ambitious invasive non-native species eradication projects. For example, LIFE provided £460,225 of co-financing towards invasive non-native rat eradication and biosecurity as part of the Isle of Scilly Seabirds Recovery Project … It is essential that EU funds for invasive non-native species biosecurity and management are replaced domestically following a UK withdrawal from the EU.”122
99.We note the concerns over the loss of EU funding for environmental, nature conservation and climate action projects, many of which have significant biosecurity components. The Government will need to consider what additional resource is needed to continue the biosecurity activity currently funded by the EU.
52 Written evidence from Fera Science Ltd (PAB0009), Anglian Water Services Ltd (PAB0006) and the British Veterinary Association (PAB0013)
59 Written evidence from the Scottish Government (PAB0039) and the Equine Disease Coalition and British Equine Veterinary Association (PAB0015)
61 Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway
62 Written evidence from the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board (PAB0017) and Moredun Research Institute (PAB0036)
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
97 Written evidence from the British Ecological Society (PAB0023). See also written evidence from the Scottish Government (PAB0039), British Veterinary Association (PAB0013) and Fera Science Ltd (PAB009)
100 Written evidence from the British Ecological Society (PAB0023), the National Pig Association (PAB0032) and the British Veterinary Association (PAB0013)
107 Ibid.
109 Written evidence from the Equine Disease Coalition and British Equine Veterinary Association (PAB0015)
113 HM Government, The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, Cm 9593, July 2018, p 78: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/725288/The_future_relationship_between_the_United_Kingdom_and_the_European_Union.pdf [accessed 6 August 2018]