Chapter 4: Trade and inspections
Tracing movements
100.Trade is a key means by which the UK is exposed to biosecurity risks. Currently, when products enter the EU they are inspected to ensure they comply with standards set out by the WTO and the EU’s own laws (see Chapter 2), which include rules to minimise the risk of importing a pest, disease or pathogen. Once those inspections have taken place, goods can move freely within the EU Single Market. The UK, like all other EU Member States, therefore relies on inspections done by other EU countries, and on the EU-wide systems for monitoring trade, to maintain its biosecurity.
101.Once a product, plant or animal has entered the EU it is generally free to move from one Member State to another without further inspection, as long as it has the necessary paperwork. Dr Kezia Barker, Lecturer in Geography at Birkbeck, University of London, told us that “essentially the EU operates as one domain. There is the veterinary check system and the plant passport scheme with the idea that within those schemes animal and plant products can move relatively freely.”123
Tracing plants
102.The NFU noted that, while plants raised in the EU can move within the EU with a ‘plant passport’, plants moving between the EU and third countries require a phytosanitary certificate (‘phyto’): “Phytos tend to offer a higher level of biosecurity because they are issued by the Plant Protection agency of that country. … There is also a charge for carrying out the inspection, any associated tests and issuing the certificate.”124 Plant passports and phytos are described further in Box 8.
Box 8: Plant passports and phytosanitary certificates
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If a plant or plant product can host pests or diseases (as listed in Part A, Annex V of Directive 2000/29/EC), it may require a plant passport. This is an identification label, usually issued by the nursery raising the plant in question, which identifies the grower and origin of the product, and verifies that the plant is eligible to move freely within the EU. A phytosanitary certificate is used for trade outside the EU, and demonstrates that a product is free from harmful pests and plant diseases. It is issued by a national plant protection organisation (NPPO). |
103.Newey Thinking, a UK horticultural business, highlighted the additional costs, falling on businesses as well as Government, if plants traded between the UK and EU were to require phytosanitary certificates post-Brexit: “Government will need to employ many more Plant Health Inspectors … and each business will require at minimum a full time biosecurity administrator to cope with required paperwork per plant to be exported.”125
104.The NFU was concerned about barriers to trade, and hoped “to see the status quo continue—i.e. plant passports continued to be used rather than the reintroduction of phytos”.126 In contrast, Confor argued that phytosanitary certificates should be required for all imported material, on the grounds that “better regulation of all plant material … would limit the chance of new exotic pests and disease entering the UK”.127
105.While phytosanitary certificates offer a high degree of biosecurity, they also entail a more rigorous administrative and inspection process than the plant passports currently used for the trade of plants between the UK and EU. Both Government and businesses will need to ensure they have sufficient resource to implement the change in regime at the point the UK leaves the EU.
Tracing animals
106.The movement of animals within the EU is tracked by the TRACES system. The potential for future UK involvement in TRACES, and the actions required to prepare for the UK’s withdrawal, were explored in Chapter 3.
Import inspections
107.Several witnesses highlighted the need to increase resources at UK points of entry for additional biosecurity inspections, once the UK has left the EU Single Market. The NFU pointed out that when materials are imported with a phytosanitary certificate, it “has to be inspected prior to export and again either at import or soon after at a designated site”.128 The BVA told us: “Additional capacity at ports will be necessary. Extra inspections and inspection points will be needed.”129 Dr Barker, from Birkbeck, University of London, agreed: “There are resource issues of spaces for lorries at Dover, a need for a potential increase in quarantine and containment facilities and higher admin costs”.130
108.Prospect Union questioned “where such checks on a large number of lorries could be undertaken without causing gridlock at ports”,131 and argued that “the physical capacity at our ports currently does not exist to enable adequate inspection of EU imported material”. According to the City of London Corporation, which is responsible for all port health functions on the Thames, points of entry such as short-sea-crossing ports and smaller airports deal with many EU products, but “often have little or no resource”, while “developing a resource (suitably trained workers, infrastructure and inspection facilities) will be problematic in the short run”.132
109.The resources required at the border post-Brexit are explored in more detail in our report Brexit: the customs challenge.133
Minimising the need for inspections
110.The example of Switzerland suggests, however, that it is possible for a non-EU state to limit the burden of inspections, by means of regulatory cooperation. Dr Rob Amos and Dr Emily Lydgate from the University of Sussex pointed out that “Switzerland has managed to effectively eliminate routine EU border inspections for live animals and animal products, undertaking extensive regulatory cooperation and coordination with the EU in this area”.134 Similarly, the British Egg Industry Council argued that “it is critically important that we achieve mutual recognition of our disease controls to avoid unnecessary disruption in trade between the EU and UK and vice-versa due to animal health issues”.135
111.Giving evidence on our earlier Brexit: food prices and availability inquiry, George Eustice MP, Minister of State for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food at Defra, argued that even in a ‘no deal’ scenario, “It would be open to the UK to unilaterally adopt a risk-based approach to its border inspection and to say that we are confident that the European Union is doing certain things properly.”136 He continued:
“In the early days … with border inspection initially you would say, ‘Membership of the EU plus one? The risks are no different than membership of the EU minus one’, so for an initial period we will adopt a risk-based approach. If months or several years down the line we decide that there are particular challenges with particular animal diseases, or more likely plant diseases, then we could put in place the necessary regulations to impose additional restrictions and have the checks to ensure they could be implemented as well.”
112.In our report Brexit: the customs challenge, we concluded: “The Government’s position that, in the case of ‘no deal’, customs checks of goods arriving from the EU could be unilaterally suspended, may be in breach of WTO rules.”137
113.The UK will have to carry out more inspections of products at its borders post-Brexit to ensure it is not exposed to higher biosecurity risks.
114.Doubt has been cast on whether there is sufficient infrastructure to carry out biosecurity inspections on goods arriving from the EU. We call on the Government urgently to clarify its plans for ensuring the necessary facilities will be available to maintain the passage of goods across the UK’s borders.
115.The need for these inspections could, however, be reduced if the Government were to place minimal checks on imports from the EU. We note, however, that the UK Government would at the very least be obliged to comply with WTO rules. In our Brexit: food prices and availability report we urged the Government to publish exactly what customs and border requirements it would put in place on EU food imports in that situation. We repeat that recommendation.
116.A decision to place minimal checks on imports from the EU would need to be accompanied by a mechanism for monitoring the risks of such an approach as UK and EU rules diverge over time.
New risks
117.Underlying many of the issues we have explored is the need to balance biosecurity risks against economic opportunities. For instance, Dr Emily Lydgate, Lecturer in Environmental Law at the University of Sussex, said that the challenge facing the Government was one of “striking the balance between on the one hand preventing the introduction of a species or organisms which could be economically and ecologically catastrophic, while on the other hand trying to facilitate trade and reduce bureaucracy in border areas”.138
118.The NFU sought a biosecurity framework that would “facilitate trade and also … do all possible to prevent the introduction of quarantine pests”.139 Lord Gardiner agreed: “We are a trading nation and therefore need to continue in that balance—trading with EU countries and non-EU countries, mindful of protocols of biosecurity and having science-based and risk management principles at the very heart of it.”140
119.Maintaining such a balance in the long term will be a challenge. Dr Barker commented that “every new trading pathway brings with it new risks which would need to be assessed”.141 The Royal Botanic Garden Edinburgh concurred, citing “potentially increased risk if changes in trade agreements result in increased imports from countries further afield, with more/different pests to the existing situation”, and adding that “the risks come from the imports themselves and packaging/shipping.”142
120.Dr Paul Walton, of RSPB Scotland, stated: “We need to be responsive to those pathways and be prepared to put in safeguards around them as appropriate.”143 According to the British Ecological Society:
“Should the UK increase trade and transport links with non-EU countries post-Brexit, it will be important to have shared data and surveillance systems with those countries. This will enable evidence-informed risk assessments and rapid response plans to be developed.”144
The Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board suggested that the risk “could be offset to some extent by the ability to have a different list of priority pests than the current EU one”.145 This will be considered further in Chapter 7.
121.Although Brexit provides an opportunity for the UK to pursue trade deals with countries outside the EU, it is vital that these deals do not compromise the UK’s biosecurity. Any new trade deals must include measures to protect the UK from their biosecurity risks.
Audits outside the UK
122.Managing the risks inherent in trade will require active oversight of standards in trading partners. These could potentially include EU Member States, as the National Pig Association pointed out:
“Depending on the resultant trade agreement with the EU, it may be necessary for the UK to resource its own audits of EU Member States to ensure they are complying with the necessary rules regarding animal health, food safety and biosecurity, especially if requirements substantially diverge from what is already required by EU law. Similarly, the UK will also need to conduct compliance audits in third countries exporting to the UK. This activity is likely to require substantial and dedicated resource.”146
123.Dr Christine Middlemiss, Defra’s Chief Veterinary Officer, noted that in terms of animal trade there were “a number of information sources out there”, such as the World Organisation for Animal Health’s (OIE) independent inspection regime. She noted that at present “the EU undertakes a lot of that inspection” and publishes its results.147 The Equine Disease Coalition and British Equine Veterinary Association therefore argued that “there could be resource challenges associated with [conducting third country audits] and the risk of unnecessary duplication of effort and cost”.148 Lesley Griffiths AM, Cabinet Secretary for Energy, Planning and Rural Affairs in the Welsh Government, emphasised that “there will also need to be a body to replicate the audit and advisory support, post EU exit … Audit by a credible independent body is essential to assess our animal and plant health standards to support our global trade interests.”149
124.The numbers of staff required to support such an audit function is likely to be relatively small. Dr Middlemiss said that “at a guess, it would be tens”.150 Similarly, Chief Plant Health Officer Prof Spence told us: “The SANTE F unit in the European Commission that does this with plant health controls has about 10 people in a unit that covers the whole world.”151
125.As an EU Member State, the UK currently relies on EU inspections and audits to ensure biosecurity standards in non-EU countries are being met, reducing the biosecurity risks posed by trade. We anticipate that the Government will need to resource its own audits post-Brexit, but the extent of this obligation will depend on the details of the final trade agreement between the UK and the EU, and on the terms of trade agreements struck with third countries.
132 Written evidence from City of London Corporation (BFS0005) [Brexit: food prices and availability inquiry]
133 European Union Committee. Brexit: the customs challenge (20th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 187)
137 European Union Committee. Brexit: the customs challenge (20th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 187)
141 Q 10; also written evidence from Anglian Water Services (PAB0006), Prospect Union (PAB0008), the Equine Disease Coalition and British Equine Veterinary Association (PAB0015), RSPB (PAB0024) and Wildlife and Countryside Link (PAB025)
148 Written evidence from Equine Disease Coalition and British Equine Veterinary Association (PAB0015)
151 Ibid.